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ABSTRACT 
 
COLLECTIVE DUTIES (FARḌ KIFĀYA) IN ISLAMIC LAW: THE MORAL COMMUNITY, STATE 
AUTHORITY AND ETHICAL SPECULATION IN THE PREMODERN PERIOD 
 
Adnan A. Zulfiqar 
Joseph E. Lowry 
This dissertation studies a unique subset of legal obligations in Islamic law known 
as “collective duties” (farḍ kifāya) and focuses on juristic writing in the premodern period 
between the 9th and 14th centuries C.E. Together with the more widely recognized 
“individual obligations” (farḍ ʿayn), these duties encompass the complete range of 
mandated behavior in Islamic law. Individual obligations follow a simple pattern: one 
person is assigned responsibility for performing a particular act and is solely held 
responsible if they fail to do so. Collective duties are premised on a different concept 
involving shared responsibility for required acts. They are based on a formula consisting 
of two clauses, which loosely draws from a Qurʾānic prooftext. The first clause states that 
as long as some people perform the duty, then the obligation is suspended for everyone 
else. While everyone initially carries the burden, they are not all required to perform. 
However, the second clause adds an important warning: if no one performs the duty, 
then everyone is held accountable.  
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This study explores the juristic discourse on collective duties in order to better 
understand how they function, what purpose they serve and why they might have been 
created. As premodern jurists explored the implications of collective duties as a whole, 
they developed the theoretical outlines of a kifāya-doctrine, one that asked questions of 
whether collective duties were preferred to individual obligations, who in the collective 
was required to perform and when an obligation was suspended. Beyond the general 
doctrine, the dissertation also examines legal rules developed for three specific 
collective duties: jihād, funerary rites and duties to rescue. The discourse on these duties 
demonstrates how jurists not only provided practical guidance for performance of the 
obligation, but also thought more broadly about the theoretical implications for law. In 
the process, they began to determine who belongs in the moral community, defined a 
robust role for the state in law’s implementation and speculated on what should 
constitute ethical behavior. As a result, they made clear that the normative universe of 
obligation is essential to understanding the Islamic legal tradition. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“A world centered upon obligation is not, really cannot be,  
an empty or vain world.”1 
 
Background 
Every intellectual exploration has an origin story, a genesis for why this 
particular path is being travelled. This is no different for academic endeavors including 
the present study. The explanation need not venture into butterfly effects from moments 
in the distant past, but can simply answer the question: why this inquiry? Hence, tailored 
for this project we might ask, where exactly the idea of writing on farḍ kifāya, or collective 
duties, came from? Aside from the confluence of personal research interests—
community, warfare, morality, legal theory—in one study, my pursuit of a fuller 
understanding of obligation, specifically collective ones, arose out of two key 
observations. 
The first observation came from within the field of Islamic studies, where an 
increasing number of scholars have pushed to expand the traditional boundaries of 
inquiry in the field and reopen the question of what precisely should be included in the 
study of Islam. More importantly, as they advocate for subsuming a wider range of topics 
                                               
1 Robert Cover, “Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order,” Journal of Law and Religion, vol. 5, 
no. 1 (1987): 70. 
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under the definition of “Islam,” a parallel goal seems to be the desire to diminish law and 
theology as prime movers in this space. Putting aside any assessment of the substantive 
value of this expansion, every field of study can benefit from challenges to commonly 
held assumptions and ossified understandings. At the same time, it is hard to ignore that 
both the present and past signify an inescapable truth: law is an overriding 
preoccupation of the believer. Put another way, the core question for every religious 
adherent is often a simple one: “what is required of me?” These requirements range 
between restraint and positive acts; they are found in detailed rules, but also expressed 
in more open-ended principles and maxims. From the answers to this core question a 
moral community takes shape. Changing geographies and times bring variation to the 
answers and, in the process, refine the boundaries of the community. Yet, the north star 
of the moral community remains the same: duties that its members owe and that they 
are owed.  
Juxtaposed to this trend in the field of Islamic studies, my second observation 
came as a result of the “lived Islam” around me, in the United States and across the globe. 
Here, I observed a discourse permeated with the language of law and manifesting the 
believers’ preoccupation described above. Countless books on what was required of the 
believer occupied the marketplace, only to be dwarfed by the volume of websites devoted 
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to providing advice and answering inquiries on the topic. What proved most fascinating 
was the ever-expanding nature of these requirements, a trend that betrayed a common, 
arguably universal, operating assumption regarding piety: the more requirements to 
fulfill, the greater one’s faith. However, I observed that the creation of more 
requirements often required less rigor in the application of legal terminology, in 
particular the term “obligation” (farḍ). This casual approach to obligation meant that 
common conversations tended to use the term obligation lightly with no measure of its 
significance or the consequences of its application. Wherever there was need to 
emphasize the importance of an act it was framed in the language of obligation: by 
classifying an act as required, the underlying behavior instantly gained significance. 
Of course, this enterprise of expanding the category of obligations is fraught with 
theoretical difficulties. It is also an interesting illustration of how legal language 
functions in both technical and lay spaces, often with confusing results. Just as the word 
“rights” has become ubiquitous in American parlance, the words “farḍ” and “wājib,” as 
well as their English equivalents “obligation” and “required,” and their derivatives, are 
pervasive in modern Muslim parlance. A few examples help illustrate the consequences 
of this expansion and unrestrained usage.  
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In early 2017, a Jewish cemetery was desecrated in Northeast Philadelphia and 
there was an overwhelming response of sympathy and solidarity from the Muslim 
community. One particular tweet stood out to me during this period. A Muslim in the 
United States Marine Corps wrote on Twitter: "I’m a #MuslimMarine in Chicagoland area. 
If your synagogue or Jewish cemetery needs someone to stand guard, count me in. Islam 
requires it (emphasis added)."2 The sentiment was echoed by several others. While the 
statement at that particular political moment was powerful and moving, I immediately 
thought of his use of the word "requires." What did he mean by “requires?” Was he 
speaking in a more generic sense of some amorphous Islamic principle of justice that 
encouraged him to stand guard, without holding him accountable if he failed to do so? 
Or did he mean this was an actual obligation Muslims were mandated to fulfill and they 
would be responsible if they failed to do so? While the generic sense of encouraging this 
behavior was plausible given how easily broad principles can be applied to different 
circumstances, I struggled to find justification for the claim that this was an actual 
obligation. It seemed evident the term had been used colloquially, but meant to convey 
the force associated with a technical religious obligation.  
                                               
2 Wais Bashir, “Muslims offer to guard Jewish sites in US,” BBC News (March 2, 2017), available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39142831 (last visited October 14, 2018). 
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On another occasion many years prior, I engaged a friend in a conversation about 
my research on farḍ kifāya. He noted that he himself was actually engaged in fulfilling a 
kifāya-duty. Intrigued, I asked him which particular kifāya-duty he was fulfilling? He 
explained that he was a prison chaplain in an all-female correctional facility and that this 
role was a farḍ kifāya. The idea captivated me at the time, and since then, for a few 
reasons. First, there was no legal authority that I could recall in the years of studying the 
topic which suggested chaplaincy in prisons, whether male or female, was a type of 
kifāya-duty. Certainly not in the premodern Islamic law literature where that type of 
chaplaincy was entirely absent. Second, it seemed as though my friend, like many others, 
emphasized the “communal” aspect of the common translation of kifāya-duty as a 
“communal duty” and applied it to his work. The logic was simple: since he considered 
his job “beneficial to the community” and it involved a clear religious dimension, it must 
then be a farḍ kifāya. Given that premodern jurists also routinely discussed communal 
benefit as a rationale for kifāya-duties, my friend’s logic was not entirely unreasonable. 
As will later be shown, jurists employed the same reasoning to attach the label of kifāya 
to an expanded list of acts in the post-formative period.  
However, there was a third reason that proved to be most instructive. My friend 
seemed unconcerned with the potential implications of creating a new kifāya-duty in his 
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job. The fundamental idea behind a kifāya-duty is that some can perform on behalf of 
others, but if no one performs then all are sinful. If one accepted my friend’s suggestion 
that he was engaged in a kifāya-duty, then at any point where an all-female correctional 
facility did not have a Muslim chaplain, the community as a whole would be liable. This 
came to fruition a short time later when he pursued another opportunity and left his 
position at the prison vacant. In theory, as long as that position remained vacant, my 
friend, along with the rest of the community, remained liable for failing to fulfill an 
obligation. In expanding the category of kifāya-duties he had also increased the 
likelihood of the community being more sinful. Interestingly enough, this consequence 
was also one that premodern jurists seldom paid attention to. 
 
Defining “Duty” 
Bearing the above in mind, the idea of duty (or obligation) receives a fair amount 
of treatment in Islamic thought, including in the fields of philosophy, theology and law, 
but an exhaustive discussion of all its various aspects is beyond the scope of the current 
project. For my purposes, the specific focus here will be on the treatment of duty in the 
Islamic legal discourse and advancing a better sense of how duties are broadly 
constructed. The most widely used term for duty in the legal literature is wājib, although 
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other terms are also used, such as farḍ.3 For the most part, jurists treat these terms 
interchangeably with the exception of those jurists affiliated with the Ḥanafī school.  
The Ḥanafīs distinguish farḍ from wājib in three ways. First, they say that farḍ 
must come from “unimpeachable sources.”4 In other words, all farḍ injunctions must be 
proven on the basis of an epistemologically “certain source that has no form of doubt in 
it, that is, dalīl thābit lā shubhata fīh.”5 Second, farḍ requires “mental affirmation.”6 And 
finally, a “commitment” to farḍ is a pre-requisite for membership in the Muslim 
community.7 None of these apply to wājib. Hence, intentionally failing to perform a farḍ-
duty is considered a purposeful omission, making it more blameworthy and deserving of 
severe consequence, such as being branded a disbeliever (kāfir). On the other hand, 
intentionally failing to perform a wājib-duty is simply a neglectful act and not one that 
rises to the level of disbelief.8  
                                               
3 In addition to farḍ and wājib, there are words like kataba, amr, ʿalā or different constructions that indicate 
performance is required, such as “imperative expression,” an “infinitive acting as a verb,” or a “verbal 
noun.” Ahmad Hasan, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: The Command of the Sharīʿah and Juridical Norm 
(Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1993), 44-47.  
4 A. Kevin Reinhart, “Like the Difference Between Heaven and Earth: Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī Discussions of 
Farḍ and Wājib in Theology and Uṣūl,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 
2002), 216. 
5 Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law: From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice (South Bend: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 97. 
6 Reinhart, “Farḍ and Wājib,” 216. 
7 Reinhart, “Farḍ and Wājib,” 216. 
8 Reinhart, “Farḍ and Wājib,” 209. For his part, Zarkashī, a Shāfiʿī, notes that when it comes to farḍ kifāya 
and wājib there is no real difference from the perspective of obligation except that kifāya allows the 
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Non-Ḥanafī scholars critically weigh in on this distinction, generally considering 
the Ḥanafī argument to be semantic and inconsequential. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) 
provides a blunter assessment of the Ḥanafī position referring to it as essentially 
incomprehensible.9 He insists that only two types of acts are possible: noncompulsory 
(taṭawwuʿ) and compulsory (farḍ) ones. Noncompulsory acts are not sinful to forgo (lam 
yakun ʿāṣiyan li-Allāh), but their nonperformance is disliked while compulsory acts are 
sinful to omit.10 There is no third option: either you are liable for failing to perform an 
obligation or you are not (immā shayʾ yaʿṣī Allāh taʿālā tārikuhu wa-immā shayʾ lā yaʿṣī Allāh 
taʿālā tārikuhu wa-lā wāsiṭah baynahumā).11 As proof, Ibn Ḥazm cites a Prophetic ḥadīth 
where he responds to an interlocutor who asks “what is Islam,” to which the Prophet 
responds that the five prayers are compulsory and everything beyond that is 
noncompulsory.12 Had there been a third option, Ibn Ḥazm argues, it would have been 
                                               
obligation to be removed by the actions of a few while wājib does not since it is a burden that every 
person must carry. Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, vol.1, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAbd 
Allāh al-ʿĀnī (Kuwait: Wizārat al-awqāf wa-l-shuʿūn al-islamiyya, 1992), 243. 
9 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, vol. 2, ed. Aḥmad M. Shākir (Cairo: Idārat al-Ṭabāʿat al-Munīriyyah, 1928), 227. He 
does not mention the Ḥanafīs by name, but simply says that “some people say” (qāla qawm) that there is a 
third category known as wājib. His full response to this position is that “this is a mistake because it is a 
claim without any proof and a statement that is incomprehensible and even the person making the claim 
is not able to explain its meaning.” (hadhā khaṭāʾ li-annahu daʿwā bi-lā burhān wa-qawl lā yufham wa-lā yaqdir 
qāʾiluhu ʿalā an yubayyin murādahu fīhi). Ibid. 
10 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 2, 226. 
11 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 2, 227. 
12 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 2, 228.  
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stated in this ḥadīth. Hence, he considers the terms wājib, farḍ, ḥatm, lāzim and maktūb to 
be interchangeable, carrying the same meaning: obligatory.13 Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 
475/1083) echoes this view stating that maktūb, wājib and farḍ all carry the same 
meaning.14 He says the terms are synonymous because each mandates punishment for 
non-performance. Shīrāzī notes that the Ḥanafīs consider farḍ to be based on definitive 
evidence (bi-dalīl maqṭūʿ bihi) while their definition of wājib is based on evidence 
formulated through interpretation (bi-dalīl mujtahadin fīhi).15 Like others, he also 
considers this distinction purely semantic with no substantive impact.  
Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) addresses the distinction between farḍ and 
wājib stating that, setting aside their technical meanings, semantically wājib means 
“falling” or “fixed” while farḍ means “estimation” (taqdīr), “revelation” (inzāl) or 
“permissibility” (ḥilla).16 Āmidī recognizes the semantic differences between the two 
terms, but from a technical, legal perspective sees no distinction between them. He notes 
that both terms signal what the Lawgiver considers blameworthy behavior.17 Āmidī is 
                                               
13 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 2, 227. 
14 Shīrāzī, al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Muhyī al-Dīn Yūsuf Alī Badawī (Damascus: Dār al-Kalām al-Ṭayyib, 
1994), 63. 
15 Shīrāzī, Lumaʿ, 64. 
16 ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-Aḥkām, vol. 1, ed. ʿAbd al-Razzāq ʿAfīfī (Riyadh: Dār al-
Ṣamīʾī li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʾ, 2003), 135. 
17 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 136. 
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also aware of the Ḥanafī position and summarizes it by stating that for them farḍ is 
backed by “definitive” (maqṭūʿan) evidence while wājib is based on “speculative” 
(maẓnūnan) evidence. He also contends that this distinction is just semantic and does not 
impact whether something is obligated. In fact, he argues that the Qurʾān itself uses farḍ 
and wājib interchangeably.18  
Despite being the most commonly used term for obligation, wājib is employed in 
such a variety of ways that its definitions are “often intermingled, sometimes confused, 
and overlapping and only identifiable once the source, and the inherent spirit of 
legislation is referenced.”19 If we consider Āmidī’s discussion on obligation again we find 
that it is illustrative of the general framework within which jurists consider obligations. 
From an etymological perspective, Āmidī notes that the word for “obligation” (wajaba) is 
meant to convey the idea of “falling down” (suqūṭ). For example, he mentions that the 
“the sun setting” is described as wajabat al-shams. Similarly, if a wall collapses it is 
described as wajaba al-ḥāʾiṭ. Āmidī also connects the meaning of obligation to the words 
“firmness” (thubūt) and “resoluteness” (istiqrār), citing a Prophetic ḥadīth as evidence: 
                                               
18 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 136-137. 
19 Izzi Dien, Islamic Law, 97. 
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“If a sick person dies, then no females should weep for him” (idhā wajaba al-marīḍ fa-la 
tabkīn bākiyatan).20  
With regard to technical or legal (sharīʿa) usage of the term, Āmidī states that 
duties are those acts, which, if omitted, trigger a penalty.21 This is the most widely 
accepted definition of duty or obligation. In Āmidī’s opinion, the “rendering obligatory” 
(wujūb),22 in terms of the Sharīʿa, is how God’s (al-shāriʿ or “Lawgiver”) persuasive 
“speech” (khiṭāb) designates the nonperformance of particular acts as blameworthy in 
certain situations (fī hālatin mā).23 As Bernard Weiss explains, Āmidī considers any 
“addressed speech that constitutes a Sharīʿa categorization” as either calling for 
something or not calling for anything. If it calls for something, then it is either calling 
for performance or nonperformance of an act. If it calls for performance, then it does so 
either in a “peremptory manner” or “nonperemptory manner.” If it does so in a 
                                               
20 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 133. 
21 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 134. 
22 In this specific instance, I’ve adopted Bernard Weiss’ definition of wujūb here based on his reasoning for 
how Āmidī uses the term. Bernard Weiss, The Search for God’s Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of 
Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), 94 & 96. In other places I maintain a 
simpler translation of “obligation” or “duty” as these translations lack the awkwardness of placing 
“rendering obligatory” in a sentence. 
23 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 134. 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
peremptory manner then “the categorization constitutes a rendering obligatory;” if it is 
nonperemptory then “it constitutes a recommending.”24 
 
Obligation in Theology 
 Before delving further into the legal dimensions of obligation, a brief comment 
on how theologians discussed duty might be helpful. The central question for 
theologians concerning duty is why God should be obeyed. Aron Zysow notes that 
historically theologians had two primary answers to this question: “prudence” and 
“morality.”25 The Ashʿarī school advocated for “prudence,” believing that no “moral 
order exists independent of revelation” thus the act of obeying God is prudential. God’s 
command activates duties and these duties are rooted in the “threat of punishment.”26 
Thus, the Ashʿarī position, which became normative for a certain current of Shāfiʿīs and 
some other jurists, was one where “an obligatory act is nothing more or less than an act 
that God makes obligatory by his decree whether there be a reason behind it or not.”27  
                                               
24 Weiss, God’s law, 95. 
25 Aron Zysow, “Two Theories of the Obligation to Obey God’s Commands,” in The Law Applied: 
Contextualizing Islamic Shari‘a, eds. Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard Weiss (New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2008): 397. 
26 Zysow, “Two Theories,” 397. 
27 Weiss, God’s Law, 88. 
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On the other hand, the Muʿtazilīs were proponents of “morality” as the reason to 
obey God. For them, there is a moral order that exists separate from revelation and 
obligations are necessarily grounded in reasons outside of revelation.28 As a result, they 
saw two different approaches to the question of obeying God. The first is what Zysow 
terms the “Baghdadi” theory of “gratitude to the benefactor.” This approach, whose 
main proponents included Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931), the Twelver Shiʿī, Zaydīs, 
some Shāfiʿī and Central Asian Ḥanafīs, believed that human obedience to God’s law did 
not merit a divine reward since fulfillment of the duty was actually a way to demonstrate 
gratitude to God.29 Other scholars like Ibn Mattawayh (d. 469/1076) rejected this idea, 
noting that there were certain duties, like jihād and fasting, which were too burdensome 
to be sustained over time simply out of a motivation to show gratitude for God’s benefits 
to humanity.30  
The second theory, which falls under the “morality” answer is what Zysow terms 
the Basran luṭf theory. This theory said that obedience to law is strengthened by the 
motivation to do what is right and any subsequent reward is merited because of the 
                                               
28 Zysow, “Two Theories,” 398; see also, Weiss, God’s Law, 87. 
29 Zysow, “Two Theories,” 398. 
30 Zysow, “Two Theories,” 401. The theory of gratitude was revived in Yemen by the Zaydis. It gives a 
more universalist notion of revealed law in that it makes revealed law necessarily contemporaneous with 
morality and binding on all humans. Zysow, “Two Theories,” 410. 
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“hardship” in complying with the command despite other impulses.31 Basran Muʿtazilīs 
argued that since God is obligated to act for the “maximal benefit” of His creatures, they 
owe Him no gratitude because the obligation to be grateful only arises when the 
benefactor acts without being under an obligation.32 According to Zysow, the general 
trend was for Muʿtazilīs, Twelvers and Zaydīs to move from the gratitude theory to luṭf.33  
 
A Framework for Legal Duties 
Returning to the legal perspective on duty, the term farḍ is discussed in a variety 
of ways with slight differences in how certain associated terminology is used. One useful 
way of structuring the discussion on legal duties is found in the writings of the modern 
Syrian jurist Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī (1932-2015). He creates four categories to help explain 
obligations. Each category is distinct and provides four different paradigms within which 
Islamic legal duties can be understood: (1) obligations based on when the act must be 
                                               
31 Zysow, “Two Theories,” 399. As Mairaj Syed explains, the “source of the hardship…is the value forgone, 
as representated by the motivations ignored in the choice that is made.” Mairaj Syed, Coercion and 
Responsibility in Islam: A Study in Ethics and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 52. 
32 Zysow, “Two Theories,” 401. 
33 Zysow, “Two Theories,” 402. There were also different theories with regard to duties that exist as a 
result of revealed law, for instance prayer. Some argued that there was no independent reason for these 
duties outside of revelation. Others said that there were reasons for these acts outside of revelation 
because they conferred benefits on human beings. Māturīdī said that God’s bounty touches every organ 
and every organ must express gratitude. Since reason cannot determine the measure of gratitude due for 
each organ, prophecy is necessary. Ibid., 405. 
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performed, (2) who is obligated to perform it, (3) the extent of performance required and 
(4) whether an option to perform exists or not.  
The first category, concerning when performance must take place, is divided into 
two parts: open-ended (al-wājib al-muṭlaq) and time-bound (al-wājib al-muqayyad). An 
open-ended duty does not specify any particular time period within which performance 
must take place; it can be performed immediately or delayed till later.34 On the other 
hand, the time-bound duty requires performance to occur, barring a legitimate excuse, 
within a particular time period otherwise it is no longer valid.35 The most common 
example of this is the designated times within which five obligatory prayers must be 
performed.36 Some scholars, particularly in the Ḥanafī school, divide the time-bound 
duties into three subdivisions. One subdivision is muwassaʿ (broad) and includes those 
acts where more than enough time has been allocated for the duty to be performed. 
Although the obligation is restricted to a particular time period, that time period itself is 
broad and more than adequate for performance to take place.37 For instance, an example 
would be one of the daily prayers: the prayer might take five minutes to perform, but the 
                                               
34 Wahba al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl al-fiqh al-Islāmī (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1986), 50. 
35 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 50. 
36 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 50. 
37 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 49. 
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time period within which performance must occur is significantly greater than that.38 
Another subdivision is muḍayyaq (narrow), where the time granted for performance is 
sufficient for one act to be performed and no similar act. For instance, the Ramadan fasts 
must be performed within a specific month and no other types of fasts can be performed 
during this month.39 The final subdivision is dhū shibhayn (possessing both qualities), 
which refers to acts that include elements of both muwassaʿ and muḍayyaq: some aspects 
of the duty can be performed within a broad time frame, but other aspects are more 
restricted.40 Hajj would fall under this subdivision: it must be performed once in a 
person’s lifetime (muwassaʿ), but can only be performed on certain days in any given year 
(muḍayyaq).41  
The second category of duty is based on guidelines for the extent and amount of 
performance required. There are two types within this category. The first is al-wājib al-
muḥaddad (fixed obligatory act) where both the extent and amount of performance are 
defined and satisfying the duty means meeting those exact requirements. Examples 
would be the number of prayers performed in a day and how many prostrations they 
                                               
38 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 49. 
39 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 49. 
40 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 49. 
41 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 49. 
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involve or the amount of zakat that must be paid by each particular individual. This type 
of duty automatically incurs “liability” for nonperformance.42 The second type is al-wājib 
ghayr muḥaddad (variable obligatory act) where neither the extent nor the amount of 
performance has been defined and liability only attaches based on judicial decree or 
initiation of performance. In other words, these are broad duties requiring acts that can 
be performed in a number of ways; examples are spending in the way of God (such as, to 
build a mosque), cooperating in good works, feeding the hungry, etc. These duties do not 
have fixed requirements because they are contingent on needs and circumstances.43 
The third category is based on who must perform and is most pertinent to our 
discussion here. This category is divided into “duties every individual is required to 
perform” (al-wājib al-ʿaynī) and those “only required of some community members” (al-
                                               
42 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 59. The use of the term “liability” requires additional explanation. It is an imperfect 
expression in the context of Islamic legal duties and even in Western law can carry multiple meanings 
depending on which field of law is being discussed. In general, in modern legal settings, “liability” for 
failing to perform a duty implies there will be some penalty forthcoming from the legal system that has 
jurisdiction over you, whether in the form of non-penal sanction (civil liability) or incarceration 
(criminal liability). Unperformed religious obligations, on the other hand, are generally viewed as only 
incurring “moral blame.” The challenge for Islamic legal duties is that they exist between these two 
categories. There is moral blame for failing to perform obligations. At the same time, you will be held 
accountable for nonperformance, meaning it might lead to punishment if, on balance, your praiseworthy 
acts are not greater than the blameworthy ones. But this punishment tends to be deferred till the 
afterlife. Unfortunately, no adequate term exists to describe this position that includes both liability and 
blame. On balance, using the word “liability” signals the importance of recognizing there is an undefined 
penalty associated with nonperformance of Islamic legal duties, which is why I have chosen to use it 
throughout this text. 
43 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 59. 
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wājib al-kifāʾī).44 Individual duties, required of every person with legal capacity, cannot be 
satisfied through third-party performance. On the other hand, with collective duties 
there is no concern over who performs, only that performance should result in the duty 
being fulfilled. If performance is completed, then the duty is suspended for everyone 
else.45 In Zuḥaylī’s framework, focusing on the person bearing legal responsibility for the 
duty is just one way of approaching the category of collective duties, but for many 
medieval scholars this was the only frame of reference for understanding duties.  
For instance, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) frames his understanding of farḍ 
on three types of performers, though an individual can be more than one type. Each type 
encompasses a different aspect of farḍ and collectively they represent every aspect of 
what is obligatory.46 The first performers are individuals who have reached the age of 
maturity. The obligations they owe revolve around belief: belief in God, the Prophet, 
prior revealed texts, as well as devotional acts (ʿibādāt) required of every person, such as 
prayer and fasting.47 The second category are duties strictly for the scholarly class, not 
                                               
44 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 60. 
45 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 62. This is the standard formulation found in medieval scholarship as well. Ibn Ḥazm, 
Muḥallā, vol. 2, 143. 
46 Abū Bakr b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, Al-Inṣāf fīmā yajibu iʿtiqāduh wa-lā yajūz al-jahl bihi fī ʿilm al-kalām, ed. 
Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2000), 21. For a more detailed 
look at Bāqillānī’s hermeneutics, see generally, David Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Legal Hermeneutics: 
How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2011). 
47 Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 20-21. 
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the general public. For instance, these duties include issuing legal opinions regarding 
religious rules (aḥkām al-dīn), exercising independent legal reasoning (ijtihād), examining 
the methods of arriving at legal rules (ṭuruq al-aḥkām), knowing what is licit (ḥalāl) and 
illicit (ḥarām). The duties in this category are considered farḍ kifāya and are not 
designated for any one particular person to perform. As long as some people, specifically 
scholars, perform the duty then the rest of the community (ummah) is no longer liable.48 
Bāqillānī considers these duties to include memorizing the Qurʾān, relating parts of the 
Prophetic sunnah, performing funeral rites or undertaking jihād.49 Interestingly enough, 
he is one of the few jurists who assigns legal responsibility for these duties to the 
“community of scholars” as opposed to the whole community. The final category of 
obligations is one Bāqillānī considers the ruler’s responsibility separate from the rest of 
the community. Within this category he includes carrying out the ḥudūd, appointing 
deputies and justices, and adjudicating.50  
                                               
48 Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 21. Interestingly, Bāqillānī’s use of the term ummah is quite unique since it is rarely used 
by other jurists for this formulation. Jurists generally state that the duty will be suspended for “the rest” 
and assume the reader understands who exactly the rest are. It should be noted though, that in using the 
term ummah, Bāqillānī likely just means a community in a particular area as opposed to the entire 
Muslim community. 
49 Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 21. 
50 Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 21. The category of duties specific to the ruler is also raised by Nawawī in relation to the 
collective duty to “command what is right and forbid what is wrong.” He says that this duty is assigned 
to specific people through the state’s authority (ḥukm al-wilāya) and they are known as the muḥtasib. 
Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī, Rawḍa al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 7, eds. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad 
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Returning to Zuḥaylī, his final category of duties relies on determining the 
purpose of the act (taʿyīn al-maṭlūb bihi) and is divided into two sub-categories. One sub-
category is a designated obligatory act (al-wājib al-muʿayyan), where the Lawgiver has 
assigned someone to fulfill the duty, and thus nonperformance is not an option.51 This 
sub-category includes acts like prayer and fasting, and anyone that possesses legal 
capacity is required to perform. The second category is an obligatory act that contains 
the option to perform (al-wājib al-mukhayyar).52 The Lawgiver provides several options 
for how the duty can be fulfilled. The classic example of this is expiation (kaffārah) for 
breaking an oath. The requirement to expiate can be fulfilled through choosing one of 
three options: feeding ten indigent persons, clothing ten indigent persons or freeing a 
slave.53 
 
The Idea of Farḍ Kifāya 
 With the above in mind, despite a central place for obligation in the Islamic legal 
discourse, there is surprisingly little written on farḍ kifāya in Western academia and, to 
                                               
Muʿawwaḍ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 418-419. Jihād is the most common collective duty to 
fall under the state’s administration. I discuss this in more detail in the chapter on jihād. 
51 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 65. 
52 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 65. 
53 Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 65. 
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my knowledge, no comprehensive treatment of the subject to date. In addition, no entry 
for farḍ kifāya exists in any edition of the Encyclopedia of Islam, though it is mentioned in 
a brief entry on “farḍ.”54 A slightly longer entry on farḍ kifāya by Kevin Reinhart appears 
in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, but it also provides a cursory overview.55 Of 
course, the topic does arise in scholarship on specific topics of substantive law that are 
considered kifāya duties, such as jihād, foundlings, funeral rites, etc. However, for the 
most part, these tend to be passing references with no detailed exploration of the idea. 
 The term farḍ kifāya literally translates to a “sufficiency obligation,” meaning it is 
an obligation that requires a sufficient number of performers in order to be fulfilled. 
However, the term is generally translated as either “collective” or “communal” duty (or 
obligation). My own preference is for the term kifāya-duty, but I have used this 
interchangeably with collective duty throughout the text. The idea behind farḍ kifāya is 
a unique one that finds no easy parallel in any other legal tradition. Simply stated, the 
concept is that although everyone carries the obligation, not everyone needs to fulfill it. 
In other words, an individual can receive credit for fulfilling an obligation even when he 
performs no act. Jurists express this in an oft-repeated formulaic phrase consisting of 
                                               
54 Th. W. Juynboll, “Farḍ,” EI2. 
55 A. Kevin Reinhart, “Farḍ al-Kifāyah,” Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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two clauses. The first clause states that: “if some perform [the duty] then it is suspended 
for the rest” (idhā qāma bihi al-baʿḍ saqaṭa ʿan al-bāqiyīn).56 The second clause is a 
correlating statement that is less formulaic, but expresses the basic idea expressed in it 
is that “if no one performs, then everyone is sinful.”57 Hence, if a sufficient number of 
people fulfill these duties then everyone else is exempt, but if no one fulfills them then 
everyone is liable.  
  In the following chapters, my objective is to construct a framework for the 
inquiry that jurists make into the subject of kifāya-duties and to examine three of the 
most prominent ones. The first chapter begins by trying to outline the nature of the 
general kifāya doctrine, essentially the overarching theory that can be gleaned from 
juristic discussions on the topic. This chapter relies more heavily on the texts of legal 
theory as opposed to substantive law. Having constructed an overall framework, Chapter 
Two explores the most prominent kifāya-duty: jihād. The chapter explores how jihād 
                                               
56 Shams al-Dīn al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1993), 263. There are different 
variations of this formula. For instance, Qudūrī crafts it as “if a group from the people performs [the 
duty] then it drops from the rest” (idhā qāma bihi farīq min al-nās saqaṭa ʿan al-bāqiyīn). Abū al-Ḥusayn al-
Qudūrī, Mukhtaṣar al-Qudūrī fī al-fiqh al-Ḥanafī, ed. Kāmil Muḥammad Muḥammad ʿUwayḍah (Beirut: Dār 
al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1997), 231. Shīrāzī states it as “if someone possessing the requisite capability 
performs [the duty] then it drops from the rest” (idhā qāma bihi man yaqaʿu bihi al-kifāyah saqaṭa ʿan al-
bāqiyīn). Shīrāzī, Lumaʿ, 63. 
57 For example, Qudūrī phrases it as “if no one performs [the duty] then everyone is sinful for omitting 
[performance]” (in lam yaqum bihi aḥadun athima jamīʿ al-nās bi-tarkihi). Qudūrī, Mukhtaṣar, 231.  
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functions as a kifāya-duty, how factors like immediacy and proximity impact the nature 
of the duty and the crucial role played by the state in administering the duty. Chapter 
Three shifts focus to duties owed to the dead and contributes to the discussion on 
navigating between functional and pietistic objectives within the duties. Chapter Four, 
the last substantive chapter, argues for the creation of a subcategory of duties within the 
larger kifāya category: duties to rescue. It begins by exploring the quintessential duty to 
rescue, saving someone from drowning, and advocates including the duty to care for 
foundlings as an extension of this rescue-duty. In the process, the chapter explores the 
shaping of the moral community and how its contours are defined by the ethical 
speculation of the jurists. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE KIFĀYA DOCTRINE 
Introduction 
As noted in the introduction, jurists speak of “kifāya” in the context of farḍ (and 
wājib), but also sunna, though with markedly less frequency. For our purposes here, farḍ 
is of primary concern because the significance of the category arises from the fact that 
we are dealing with acts which must be performed. Jurists created a category of acts that 
Muslims should carry out, then elevated their status by making performance of the acts 
obligatory. Not only did they expand the scope of the law, but made it into a shared 
enterprise for the community. The process raises several questions, which often emerge 
in the subsequent discussion: what compelled jurists to create these additional burdens, 
why the focus on community and what was the urgency? Among the answers is that the 
kifāya project was a space for jurists to engage in moral speculation, where the law was 
the language of morality for them. Through this speculation, kifāya becomes a way for 
them to shape the moral and ethical contours of the community.  
The idea of a “moral” or “ethical” community has been discussed by a number of 
contemporary thinkers. A helpful framework for appreciating the idea of moral 
community might be the one proposed by the American legal philosopher Ronald 
Dworkin (1931-2013). His work contains an overarching theme opposing positivist claims 
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that law and morality are distinct, something that resonates with premodern Islamic 
jurisprudence. In discussing this distinction, Dworkin provides insights on the role of 
community as a “distinct moral agent” necessary for the defense of a key political virtue: 
integrity.58 Integrity is the idea that obedience to the law is not simply about “fidelity to 
rules,” but also to the “theories of fairness and justice” underlying those rules.59 Integrity 
requires members of the community to “accept demands” on them and allows them to 
“make demands on others” as part of a “common scheme of justice” or “standards” that 
they are committed to as a consequence of their communal relationships.60 Dworkin 
terms these demands “associative” or “communal” obligations.61  
                                               
58 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 188. He notes that this 
“integrity” is needed because we do not live in a “utopian state” where “coherence would be 
guaranteed” since “officials would always do what was perfectly just and fair.” Ibid. 176. 
59 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 176 and 185. In other words, the idea of integrity rests on the notion that the 
“community must respect principles necessary to justify one part of the law in other parts as well.” Ibid., 
210. 
60 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 189. The demands do not need to be equal to each other, some may be obligated 
more than others, but there should be “roughly the same concern” between members of the community. 
Ibid., 199. This resonates with the unequal distribution of obligations within the kifāya framework since 
expertise, legal capacity, proximity and a number of other factors influence where the obligation lies. 
61 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 195-96. He distinguishes these communal/associative obligations from personal 
obligations, somewhat similar to the ʿayn/kifāya distinction, except that Dworkin’s personal obligations 
have no connection to duties owed to God, but rather obligations incurred “through discrete promises 
and other deliberate acts.” Ibid., 196.  
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With that in mind, Dworkin outlines the “conditions” he considers necessary for 
a community to have these obligations, what he calls a “true community.”62 There are 
four conditions that he outlines. First, members of the community must regard “group 
obligations as special,” meaning they are held “distinctly within the group” as opposed 
to general duties owed to people outside of it.63 Second, they have to accept that the 
“responsibilities are personal” running “directly from each member to each other 
member, not just to the group as a whole in some collective sense.”64 Third, members 
have to see the “responsibilities as flowing from a more general responsibility each has 
of concern for the well-being of others in the group.”65 Finally, even if the community is 
hierarchical, its members must show “equal concern” for everyone within the 
community: “no one’s life is more important than anyone else’s.”66 Dworkin considers 
this to be a “community of principle,” one in which members “accept their fates are 
linked” because they accept that “they are governed by common principles, not just by 
                                               
62 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 201. He distinguishes between a “bare community” and a “true community.” The 
bare community “meets the genetic or geographic or other historical conditions” for a fraternal 
community; the true community usually has some “bare” quality as well, but requires additional 
elements (described in the text) to be considered “true.” Ibid. 
63 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 199.  
64 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 199.  
65 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 200.  
66 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 200.  
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rules hammered out” for them.67 They also accept that “others have rights” and they 
themselves “have duties” even if they are never “identified or declared.”68 This 
community of principle is “faithful” to the promise that the law will be “chosen, changed, 
developed and interpreted in an overall principled way” such that they can then claim 
the “authority of a genuine associative community and can therefore claim moral 
legitimacy.”69 
Premodern Islamic jurists would find that elements of Dworkin’s framework 
resonate with their own thinking about community and its obligations, but there would 
also be much that they disagreed with. The basic premise that law and morality are not 
distinct is evident in premodern writings: Islamic jurists would also balk at the positivist 
claim that the two ideas should be distinct. One major criticism of Dworkin’s framework 
that premodern jurists would have is the absence of a role for independent actors outside 
the state apparatus. Social practice, not jurists, articulate communal obligations in 
Dworkin’s community of principle as opposed to the outsized role that jurists play in 
defining these obligations in Islamic law. In his works, Dworkin disfavors what he terms 
a “rulebook” model of community that has a “general commitment to obey rules” that 
                                               
67 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 211.  
68 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 211.  
69 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 214.  
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are established in a way that is “special” to the community.70 In many respects, this is 
precisely what the premodern jurists’ community was like, though with important 
elements of a community of principle present as well. Similar to the rulebook 
community, the premodern community had its own special way of formulating rules that 
must be obeyed by community members. However, like a community of principle, the 
structure was highly decentralized and informal, residing outside the state apparatus, 
and relying on shared values to gain moral legitimacy.  
Returning to Dworkin’s conditions for a true community with moral legitimacy, 
there are points of convergence and divergence with the views of premodern jurists. The 
first condition, that communal obligations must be special to the community, generally 
tracks the position of jurists. The requirement to perform kifāya-duties does not extend 
to non-Muslims; in the context of “easy rescues,” however, they are still owed a duty. For 
easy rescues, no inquiry is made into the religion of a drowning individual prior to saving 
them. In this instance, jurists extend the moral community to include all of humanity. 
The second condition, that the obligations are “personal,” running from member to 
member as opposed to the group as a collective, seems to strike at the core of how kifāya-
duties function. Unlike Dworkin’s communal obligations, kifāya-duties are premised on 
                                               
70 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 210.  
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the idea that some of the group can fulfill an obligation on behalf of everyone else. Hence, 
the duty does run from individuals to the group as a collective. The third condition also 
raises some complications because it connects the obligation to a concern for the well-
being of other community members.71 While the well-being of the community is arguably 
one reason for the obligations, it is not always the only reason nor a reason that is present 
in every kifāya-duty. The purpose of kifāya-duties extends beyond its benefits to any one 
member within the community. Finally, the fourth condition, equal concern for every 
member, generally holds true in the kifāya context. There are some adjustments in the 
performance of a duty to account for important communal values like modesty or 
heroism, but kifāya-duties operate on the assumption that each life within the group is 
equal to another. 
Despite the kifāya context diverging in some significant ways from Dworkin’s 
framework, the ideas he raises on community and obligation are useful for situating 
premodern jurists as they navigate the boundaries of moral community and speculate 
on the law. The subsequent discussion examines the theory that jurists develop around 
the kifāya category, including ideas around community and morality. Their theoretical 
                                               
71 This makes sense for Dworkin’s model where communal obligations are not fully articulated or defined. 
As will be discussed, kifāya-duties may sometimes extend to undefined areas on the basis of some shared 
principle, but in general these duties are fully articulated. 
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discussions reveal what is at stake for them, where their primary concerns lie and what 
values they consider essential. 
 
Development of the Doctrine 
One of the earliest mentions of the “kifāya doctrine” in the legal literature occurs 
in Shāfiʿī’s seminal works, al-Risāla and al-Umm. However, the manner in which he 
discusses kifāya suggests that the concept was not his original contribution and was 
already in circulation.72 Aside from providing the standard definition for kifāya, Shāfiʿī 
does not elaborate on the broader concept and no subsequent writer attributes the 
concept to Shāfiʿī either. In general, there is an absence of discussion on kifāya’s 
background in the legal literature. While brevity is not an uncommon feature in writing 
of this period, one might have anticipated a few more details on kifāya and its origins, 
                                               
72 Michael Bonner suggests that Shāfiʿī may have been the first to “set out the theory of farḍ kifāya, but as 
I note, it is difficult to classify Shāfiʿī’s discussion on kifāya as that of a “theory” or “doctrine” given the 
absence of an extended discussion on the topic in his works. Michael Bonner, “Jaʿāʾil and Holy War in 
Early Islam,” Der Islam 68 (1991), 46. The general idea behind kifāya, the collective fulfillment of a duty, is 
mentioned in other early texts as well. For instance, ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s (d. 211/826) ḥadīth collection, al-
Muṣannaf, begins its chapter on jihād with two ḥadīth where an interlocutor is asking whether “everyone 
is required to participate in battle” (a-wājibun al-ghazw ʿalā al-nās kullihim). In the first ḥadīth, Ibn Jurayj 
poses the question to ʿAṭāʾ and in the second someone poses the question to Ibn Jurayj. The term kifāya is 
not mentioned in either ḥadīth, but the premise behind this category of questions is present in the 
question posed.  ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 5, ed. Muḥammad Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān (Beirut: 
al-Maktab al-Islamī, 1972), 172. 
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equivalent to what is found when other “new” concepts are introduced. Similarly, the 
Qurʾān itself does not discuss the kifāya concept in any significant detail. It simply 
presents a basic formula for kifāya when discussing the jihād duty: not everyone is 
required to participate in jihād, but everyone is eligible for a reward, however those who 
fulfill the duty are entitled to more. For his part, Shāfiʿī feels comfortable simply 
explaining the concept of kifāya with reference to these verses without needing to 
elaborate or theorize much about it. 
A fuller articulation of a “kifāya doctrine” actually emerges well after the 9th 
century. By the kifāya doctrine, what I mean is both the substantive law and legal theory 
connected to the performance of particular obligatory acts or duties whose 
responsibility is shared by the community. Discussions relating to collective duties occur 
in the legal literature in two principal places: manuals of applied law (furūʿ) and treatises 
on legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). Generally, the kifāya doctrine appears in manuals of applied 
law as part of a jurist’s exploration of matters concerning a specific collective duty. This 
is the primary location where jurists discuss kifāya-duties. In the centuries following 
Shāfiʿī, jurists crafted legal guidance for a variety of hypothetical scenarios that might 
arise in the performance of these duties. In the process, they also significantly expanded 
the number of acts classified as kifāya. While most jurists only discuss how the kifāya 
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doctrine operates as part of specific legal obligations, there are a few that theorize about 
the broader implications of these collective duties and outline an overarching doctrine. 
Unlike manuals of applied law, in which one can anticipate finding discussions on kifāya 
as part of the sections on jihād or funeral rites, there is little consistency in how kifāya is 
discussed in treatises on legal theory. When the kifāya doctrine is mentioned, it appears 
as part of broader topics like the nature of commands (amr), the typology of knowledge 
(ʿilm) and the meaning of obligation (wājib). That said, arguably, the richest discussion of 
kifāya as a doctrine takes place in texts devoted to examining legal theory. 
As with other Islamic legal concepts, the robustness of the kifāya doctrine in later 
centuries tracks the introduction of greater complexity in post-formative legal 
scholarship that endeavored to explain prior legal ideas and take legal doctrine in new 
directions.73 The earliest discussions of kifāya were limited to the specific context of 
certain duties (performing funeral rites, pursuing religious knowledge and partaking in 
jihād) and contained a basic formulation of what kifāya meant in those contexts. The 
discussion was rudimentary enough that it is difficult to posit that a “doctrine” existed 
at this stage. After the formative period, many new acts were introduced into the 
                                               
73 Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 75-
78. 
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category of collective duties even ones that bore no apparent relation to the prior ones. 
With the creation of more obligatory acts, jurists began to flesh out the doctrine. They 
employed a positivist approach, working backwards from the obligatory act to articulate 
rationales for why certain acts should be considered collective duties. However, this 
rationalization had two primary shortcomings. First, developing rationale in a piecemeal 
fashion for each duty meant an overarching rationale for the category of collective duties 
was missing; in other words, there is no unifying explanation for why these acts are 
grouped together. Second, as a result of the above, there are no consistent guidelines by 
which other similar acts might also be considered collective duties. Hence, although 
jurists might cite certain principles that justify why a particular act should be considered 
a collective duty, it did not mean that any other act which might fall within the scope of 
that principle could then also be classified as a collective duty. Hence, there is no obvious 
mechanism for distinguishing between what is included and what is excluded from the 
kifāya category.  
Of course, one might speculate that based on the inclusion of certain behavior in 
the category of collective duties—such as, being socially responsible, redistributing 
wealth, physically defending one’s community and performing certain collective 
rituals—the tie that binds these obligations together was building a better moral 
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community. In part, this may have been the result of an expanding civilization seeking 
to incorporate new populations into the existing social structure. As Ahmed El Shamsy 
notes, several changes accompanied the rapid spread of Islam:  
“the influx and rising prominence of new converts from diverse backgrounds, the 
emergence of new alliances and localized Muslim subcultures across the empire, 
and the consequent dissolution of the tribal ties and ethnic homogeneity that had 
sustained the initial wave of expansion.”74  
 
El Shamsy argues that these changes “prompted a search for new foundations of 
religious authority, a way of accessing the authentic message of divine revelation that 
was more secure than the avenue of communal practice.”75 He suggests that canonization 
of the law was introduced to address the “arbitrariness” of a legal system based on 
communal practice. At the same time, the discourse on collective duties might actually 
be seen as paying homage to this prior, less formal legal system centered around 
communal practice and an acknowledgement of the role that community must continue 
to play within the system despite the “radical individualism” Shāfiʿī’s theory 
introduced.76 In some respects, communal practice itself was not simply law in action, 
but law as an expression of the community’s values: the shared morality that bound them 
                                               
74 El Shamsy, Canonization, 5. 
75 El Shamsy, Canonization, 5. 
76 El Shamsy, Canonization, 6. 
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together. The kifāya doctrine might then be thought of as the location where jurists 
continue their speculation about the moral community. 
Bearing the above in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
evolution of collective duties in the premodern period from a few specific obligatory acts 
into a distinct category of duties shaping the boundaries of the moral community. The 
primary focus is on how scholars thought about collective duties in the late formative to 
early post-formative period, between the 9th and 14th centuries, and what they considered 
its most important characteristics. This will include a discussion of how duties are 
broadly understood in Islamic law, the relationship between farḍ ʿayn (individual or ʿayn-
obligation) and farḍ kifāya (collective or kifāya-duty), the hierarchy between duties, who 
is obligated to perform and when the duty is suspended. Questions of what broad purpose 
these collective duties serve in Islamic law will also be considered, specifically, why did 
jurists feel the need to develop such a concept? This section raises additional questions 
relating to authority and responsibility: who determines what qualifies as a collective 
duty, who can command others to violence, who is responsible for fulfilling this duty, 
what type of knowledge is required, what role does geographic proximity play, etc.? 
Finally, the chapter outlines the principles jurists have proposed as justification for 
classifying a particular obligatory act as collective or individual. For instance, at points 
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the reasoning underlying a particular kifāya act relates to matters of religion; at other 
points, it pertains to a general concern for human welfare or an implicit concept of 
promoting societal betterment (maṣlaḥah), such as the justification behind caring for 
foundlings or marrying widows.77  
While it would be convenient to separate the discussion on kifāya into camps that 
track the different legal or theological schools (madhhab), no consistent patterns emerge 
to suggest that jurists thoughts on kifāya diverged solely based on affiliation. At the same 
time, differences do exist and the relative importance given to these collective duties 
also varies, though this is often on what seems to be the scholar’s personal preference as 
opposed to their particular school. This presents certain challenges in understanding the 
kifāya doctrine since it does not neatly fit into the standard divisions in Islamic law. That 
said, there is broad consensus with regard to how different jurists understand collective 
duties. As a result, the most intriguing information on the kifāya doctrine comes from 
jurists either providing greater detail on the basic doctrine that is agreed upon or 
advocating unconventional approaches.  
                                               
77 To some degree, the farḍ kifāya discussions cover similar themes found in the discourse on maqāṣid 
(objectives of the law) and may be a less formal pre-cursor to that discourse. For a broad overview of 
maqāṣid, see generally, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah: The Objectives of Islamic Law,” 
Islamic Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (Summer 1999).  
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Explaining Kifāya 
Having provided a broad framework for how duties are discussed in Islamic law, 
we can turn to an investigation of the concept of kifāya specifically. Ghazālī’s definition 
of kifāya, endorsed by Zarkashī as the most “accurate” description of the concept, is as 
follows: “everything of religious importance that is sought to be obtained, but which 
does not place legal responsibility in one specific individual” (kul muhimm dīnī yurād 
huṣūluhu wa-lā yuqṣad bihi ʿayn man yatawallāhu).78 He notes that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 
505/1111) recognizes two aspects of the kifāya duty: the duty itself and the excuses that 
suspend the duty (al-maʿādhīr al-musqiṭah).79 Nawawī (d. 676/1277) defines farḍ kifāya 
somewhat differently, approaching it from the perspective of non-performance: if a 
person of legal capacity, in a particular locality, does not perform then everyone in that 
locality will be sinful.80 
Abū Bakr al-Sarakhsī (d. 490/1096) provides a lengthy definition of farḍ kifāya as 
part of his discussion on the status of voluntary acts. He notes that voluntary acts, as well 
                                               
78 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol.1, 242. 
79 Abū Hamīd al-Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 7, ed. Aḥmad Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 1997), 5. 
80 Nawawi commentary in Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, al-Tanbīh fī al-fiqh ʿalā madhhab al-imām al-Shāfiʿī (Egypt: 
Sharikat maktaba wa-maṭbaʾa Musṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabi wa-awlādihi, 1951), 19-20. 
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as acts the Prophet encouraged people to perform, are not strictly speaking farḍ.81 One 
does not incur any sin by refusing to perform. However, the performance of the acts is 
obligatory for the collective such that if “people in a particular time period collude on 
forgoing supererogatory acts they will be forgoing what is obligated and thus be 
collectively liable” (idhā ijtamaʿa ahl zaman ʿalā tark nafl kānū tārikīn li-farīḍa mushtarikīn fī 
al-maʾtham li-anna bi-tark al-nafl yandaris shayʾ min al-sharīʿa).82 This of course raises the 
question as to how acts can be individually voluntary, but collectively obligatory? 
Sarakhsī reasons that collectively deciding to forgo voluntary acts, like supererogatory 
prayers, is problematic because the complete nonperformance of a voluntary act would 
effectively remove a part of the Sharīʿa (by which he means “religion”). On the other 
hand, an individual omission of a voluntary act does not rise to the level of 
“extinguishing” a part of the Sharīʿa and so there is no liability associated with it.83  
Sarakhsī further explains this by considering two purposes (maqsūd) behind 
voluntary acts. First, he says voluntary acts “disrupt Satan’s ambition” (qaṭʿ ṭamaʿ al-
shaytān) to interfere with the behavior of believers because the performance of optional 
acts indicates that obligatory acts, which take precedence, have already been performed. 
                                               
81 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 263. 
82 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 263. 
83 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 263. 
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In other words, the assumption is that supererogatory acts are only performed 
subsequent to completing mandatory duties. Second, these voluntary acts compensate 
for whatever deficiency there might be in a person’s performance of individually 
obligated acts.84 Sarakhsī considers both purposes crucially important and the threat of 
their disappearance due to the neglect of voluntary acts requires a solution. As a result, 
he frames the duty to perform these voluntary acts in kifāya terms: “performance is 
obligatory on people as a whole” (fa-adāʾuhu ʿ alā al-nās farīḍatun). Immediate performance 
is generally not required, since these are open-ended obligations (muwassaʿ), except 
when widespread nonperformance threatens to extinguish the voluntary act.85 
Sarakhsī’s primary concern is with preventing any alteration of the Sharīʿa through acts 
of omission. He demonstrates the importance of this concern by contrasting two 
different types of omission: failure to perform a voluntary prayer and failing to be in a 
state of ritual purity prior to performing a voluntary prayer. In the first instance, 
refusing to perform voluntary prayers does not trigger individual liability. However, a 
                                               
84 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 263. Sarakhsī bases this on a Prophetic ḥadīth that states: “if there is 
anything lacking in the obligatory acts of the slave then God will say to his angels, place the 
supererogatory acts of my slave as compensation for the deficiencies in their obligatory acts.” Sarakhsī, 
Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 263. The closest equivalent of this ḥadīth I could find is in “Sunan al-Nasāʿī.” See, Abū ʿAbd 
al-Raḥmān al-Nasāʿī, Kitāb al-sunan al-kubrā, vol. 1, ed. Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Munʿim Shalbī (Beirut: Resalah 
Publishers, 2001), 205-206. 
85 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 263. 
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person is liable if they perform a voluntary prayer while in a state of ritual impurity. The 
reason is that while performance of a voluntary prayer is optional, every element of a 
valid prayer, regardless of whether it is an optional prayer or not, is obligatory. Thus, 
while forgoing the performance of a voluntary prayer does not impact any legal rule 
(ḥukm al-sharʿ), neglecting an obligatory component of that prayer does.86 
Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392) divides kifāya-duties into two types. The first 
is comprised of acts that, when performed, satisfy the purpose of the duty completely 
and subsequent performance does not yield any additional benefit. In other words, an 
“exhaustible duty:” the performance of these acts by some people removes the duty from 
others.87 The second is acts where the benefit of the duty is renewed each time the act is 
repeated, or an “inexhaustible duty.”88 Examples of this type of kifāya-duty are the 
pursuit of knowledge, memorizing the Qurʾān and performing the funeral prayer. The 
“purpose of these acts is intercession” (maqṣūduhā shafāʿah) because they allow good 
deeds to intercede on behalf of the believer in his final accounting, which is why the duty 
                                               
86 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 263. 
87 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. He specifically describes this exhaustible duty as one “in which 
you obtain the entire objective through [one performance] and no additional [performance] is accepted” 
(mā yaḥṣul tamām al-maqṣūd minhu wa-lā yaqbal al-ziyāda). Ibid. 
88 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. He describes the inexhaustible duty as one where “the benefit 
renews with a performers repetition of the act” (yatajaddad maṣlaḥa bi-takrār al-fāʿilīn lahu). Ibid. 
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is addressed to everyone (kull aḥad mukhāṭab bihi).89 The status of these acts as duties does 
not change regardless of whether someone fulfills them or not, but the burden of 
performing them diminishes after the first performance.90 In other words, if these 
collective duties are performed, there is no longer a burden on anyone else to perform 
them; however, if someone does subsequently perform the act, they will be rewarded as 
though they had fulfilled a duty. In essence, they are inexhaustible duties. Zarkashī also 
notes that it is not permissible to forgo an inexhaustible collective duty unless someone 
else undertakes it and lifts the burden.91 For the exhaustible collective duty, any 
performance subsequent to completion of the obligation will not be considered 
performance of an obligatory act because after one completed performance of the duty, 
it ceases to exist.  
Zarkashī advances an expansive definition of kifāya that includes various acts 
absent from the lists of other scholars. He takes Ghazālī to task for failing to include a 
broader set of collective duties in his book al-Wasīṭ, claiming he leaves out acts relating 
to craftsmanship (al-ḥarf), industry (al-ṣanāʿāt) and livelihood (qiwām al-maʿāsh).92 He 
                                               
89 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīt, vol. 1, 253. 
90 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīt, vol. 1, 253. 
91 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīt, vol. 1, 253. 
92 In my own review of Ghazālī’s al-Waṣit, I found references to a more expanded notion of kifāya 
obligations as part of his discussion of the three categories of kifāya. One of those categories, included 
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contends that the omissions are consistent with the opinion of Ghazālī’s teacher Imām 
al-Ḥarmayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085).93 Zarkashī vociferously argues that the opposite is 
true; he considers all these acts to be collective duties and penalizes their 
nonperformance.94 It is not entirely clear what caused Zarkashī to hold this opinion since 
Ghazālī does offer an expansive definition of collective duties in an earlier work, Iḥyāʾ 
ʿulūm al-dīn, including tillage, cupping, tailoring and various other crafts, and so may not 
have been in disagreement with Zarkashī’s view after all.95  
 
Categorizing Kifāya Duties 
Despite the lack of explicit support from Islam’s primary textual sources, in the 
formative and early post-formative periods jurists expanded the category of farḍ kifāya 
to contain at least fifteen different duties. These duties included a wide range of behavior 
with varying degrees of importance. Hence, an act as potentially serious as engaging in 
                                               
activities like “plowing” and “cultivation.” Ghazālī, al-Waṣīṭ, vol. 7, 6. Hence, it is not quite clear what 
Zarkashī was basing his claim on. 
93 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 242. 
94 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 242. 
95 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, vol. 1, ed. Badawī Ṭabāna (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-
Arabiyya, 1957), 43. With regard to the dating of Iḥyāʾ in relation to al-Wasīṭ, neither of the two books by 
Ghazālī that carry the title al-Wasīṭ are mentioned prior to Iḥyāʾ. George F. Hourani, “A Revised 
Chronology of Ghazālī’s Writings,” Journal of American Oriental Society 104, no. 2 (1984): 292. See also, Frank 
Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13-20.   
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armed struggle is categorized together with something as routine as “returning a 
greeting.” In addition to jihād, funeral rites, “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” 
and acquiring knowledge, a range of other activities fell within the category of collective 
duties. These activities included religious rituals like the adhān (call to prayer) and 
congregational prayer, as well as economic redistribution, such as spending on the 
destitute beyond the obligatory alms-tax and distributing wealth in excess of one’s 
needs. Some scholars mention duties relating to social responsibility such as caring for 
foundlings, marrying widows, marriage in general, and feeding as well as clothing the 
poor. In a similar vein, certain etiquettes, presumably beneficial for social cohesion, were 
also considered obligatory for the community.  
 
  Ghazālī seems to be one of the first jurists to put forward categories of collective 
duties. He divides kifāya acts into three categories: acts relating to religion, to life, and to 
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both religion and life.96 The first category relates to “religion alone” (maḥḍ al-dīn). Ghazālī 
cites examples he believes should not be “absent” from an Islamic polity. This includes 
“instituting proselytization using polemics” (iqāmat al-daʿwa al-hijājiyya bi-l-ʿilm) and 
“conquering with the sword” (al-qahriyya bi-l-sayf). It also includes activities that connect 
to the core tenants of the faith and its distinctive rites (furūʿ al-dīn wa-shiʿārihi).97 For 
instance, “giving life to the Kaʿaba” through the annual Hajj, promoting “right” behavior 
and returning the salām greeting. Ghazālī’s inclusion of returning the salām greeting is 
based on its mention in both the Qurʾān and Sunna. This also makes sense since duties in 
this category generally contain some group benefit (maṣlaha kulliyya) and “returning the 
salām greeting” demonstrates both social solidarity and group demarcation. Ghazālī 
offers a reason for including the duty to return a greeting in this category: the group 
benefit it provides is in promoting positive relations between Muslims. He considers it 
imperative that the dominions under Muslim control not be devoid of these activities, 
which he considers the essence of religion.98 
                                               
96 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6-7; Nawawī has a similar division as well, but does not include a compounded 
category. He says that collective duties pertain to religion and worldly affairs (farūḍ al-kifāya amūr kuliyya 
tataliq bihā maṣālih dīniyya aw dunyawiyya). Nawawī, Rawḍa al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 7, 418. 
97 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
98 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
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  Ghazālī’s second category includes duties relating to welfare (al-maʿāsh).99 The first 
example is of the duty to remove harm caused by indigency by helping to satisfy people’s 
basic needs.100 Specifically, he says that this kifāya-duty can only be performed 
subsequent to completing the ʿayn-obligation to pay the alms tax or zakat. The kifāya-
duty is simply an additional means by which to help alleviate the difficulties of those in 
need; if their needs persist then the duty to help persists as well.101 Within the category, 
Ghazālī also mentions other activities that people cannot survive without and must not 
be neglected such as commercial transactions, marriage, plowing, cultivation and 
cupping.102 Ghazālī’s last category is a compound of the first two categories: duties 
relating to religion and life. This category of duties contains elements pertaining to 
religion alone while also accounting for livelihood and public welfare, for instance, the 
duty to testify (taḥammul al-shahādāt) or to assist judges in fulfilling people’s rights (iʿānat 
al-qaḍā ʿalā tawfiyat al-ḥuqūq). Not only do these duties benefit public welfare and ensure 
subsistence (“relating to life”), they are also considered religious rites (“relating to 
religion”).103 
                                               
99 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
100 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
101 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
102 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
103 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 7. 
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Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) categorizes kifāya-duties as part of a broader 
division of acts. He divides actions into two categories: actions with benefits that 
replicate with repetition and those whose benefits are not replicated.104 While Qarāfī does 
not delineate between different kinds of benefit, his discussion puts forward at least four 
kinds. The first kind of benefit is the one that an individual acquires for performing a 
good deed because God will reward them for their act. This benefit attaches to all duties 
regardless of what additional benefits might be associated with the act. Aside from the 
benefit to individuals, there is also a benefit to third parties, generally communities, that 
gain from the performance of certain obligations. This is a benefit common to the kifāya-
duties under discussion here. In all these duties some third party, whether one individual 
(i.e. someone saved from drowning) or an entire community (i.e. a town requiring help 
in its defense), benefits. Finally, there are a small number of duties that might be 
construed as beneficial to God. However, this framing is theologically problematic: God 
does not require a benefit nor could human acts bring benefit to God. Thus, we might 
                                               
104 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʿ al-furūq, ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Sirāj and ʿAlī Jumuʿa 
Muḥammad (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2001), 234. 
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think of “benefit to God” as symbolically beneficial to God or possibly as “beneficial to 
religion,” which broadens its scope significantly.105  
The first category is one that Qarāfī says the Lawgiver (i.e. God) has legislated on 
every individual (sharaʿahu ṣāḥib al-sharʿ ʿ alā al-aʿyān) and allowed the benefits to multiply 
each time the act is repeated. Hence, Qarāfī, unlike others, does not create a division 
between finite and infinite benefits within the category of collective duties, but suggests 
that infinite benefits can only be attained through the performance of individual duties 
while collective duties can only result in finite benefits. An example of an act in this 
category is praying the midday prayer (salāt al-ẓuhr): each time you pray it you receive 
the benefits associated with the prayer. The amount of benefit is only limited by an 
individual’s ability to replicate the act within the designated time frame for the prayer. 
The benefits derived from these acts all serve to enhance one’s relationship with God by 
demonstrating submission (al-khuḍūʿ), reverence (taʿẓīm) and subservience (al-tadhallul) 
to God; allowing intimate conversation with God (munājāt) and comprehension of God’s 
speech (al-tafahhum li-khiṭāb); presenting oneself (muthūl) before God; and following the 
                                               
105 For instance, a famous ḥadīth qudsī, reported in various collections, records the Prophet reporting 
God’s statement that “fasting is for me and I will reward it” (al-ṣawm lī wa-anā ajzī bihi). Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, 
Al-Musnad, vol. 7, ed. Aḥmad M. Shākir (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 1995), 41-42. 
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moral example God sends (al-taʾaddub bi-ādābihi).106 For the second category, acts whose 
benefit cannot be replicated, Qarāfī cites one illustrative example of a collective duty: 
saving someone from drowning, also a well-known example of a moral duty (to rescue) 
in Western philosophical literature. He notes that there is no additional advantage or 
benefit secured from diving back into the water to save someone that has already been 
rescued. Qarāfī notes that God designates these acts as collective duties in order to curtail 
unnecessary performance that will not render any further benefit (jaʿalahu ṣāhib al-sharʿ 
ʿalā al-kifāya nāfiyyan li-l-ʿabath fī al-afʿāl).107 Other acts also fall into this category, for 
instance, providing clothes for the needy and feeding the hungry.108  
Like Qarāfī, Zarkashī also divides collective duties into two parts relating to the 
benefit acquired. He raises this distinction as part of a broader question regarding the 
difference between how legal theorists (al-uṣūliyyīn) understand duties versus jurists 
(fuqahāʾ). Legal theorists and jurists are not mutually exclusive categories, but Zarkashī 
is separating them to illustrate the difference between two different functions legal 
scholars were engaged in. When elaborating theory, legal scholars were involved in 
developing an overarching understanding of legal ideas and concepts without being 
                                               
106 Qarāfī, Furūq, 234. 
107 Qarāfī, Furūq, 234. 
108 Qarāfī, Furūq, 234. 
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constrained by the facts of any particular case. They utilized hypotheticals as well as 
actual cases and the legal-theoretical literature devotes significant space to developing 
linguistic approaches to reconciling potential conflict between the sources informing the 
law. On the other hand, the jurists, many of whom functioned outside the state’s legal 
apparatus, were also consulted on actual legal cases by the lay public and judiciary, thus 
operated with great deference to practical considerations. Bearing the above in mind, 
these respective approaches are behind the conflict between theorists and jurists that 
Zarkashī is using to make his point about kifāya-duties with finite benefits. He notes that 
legal theorists eliminate kifāya-duties after their first performance while jurists allow the 
possibility that the second performance of these kifāya-duties might still fulfill the duty.  
The jurists’ position raises the question of how it is possible for the second 
performance of an act to be considered a duty when that duty has technically been 
suspended after it was first performed?109 Nawawī’s answer, as reported by Zarkashī, is 
that the phrase “the duty is suspended” (farḍ al-kifāya yasquṭ) actually means “the offense 
(of omission) is suspended” (yasqut al-ḥaraj). In other words, after the first performance, 
it is not an offense for a second group to forgo performance of the duty (la ḥaraj ʿalayhim 
fī tark hādhā al-fiʿl). However, if the second group does decide to perform, it still receives 
                                               
109 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. 
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credit for performing a “duty” as if the performance had been simultaneous with the 
first performance.110 Abū Saʿd al-Mutawallī (d. 478/1085),111 rejects this explanation by 
Nawawī and argues that the very definition of duty (farḍ) is an act whose omission results 
in liability. Hence, if, after an initial group performs a collective duty, there is no longer 
any offense or liability for forgoing performance then any subsequent performance of 
the same act cannot be considered fulfillment of a “duty.” 112  
Zarkashī introduces a two-part division to kifāya-duties as an attempt to solve this 
difference between theorists and jurists. The first type of kifāya-duty is where a single 
performance achieves the purpose of the duty and repeated performance yields nothing 
additional. This is the type of kifāya-duty that is suspended once it is performed by a 
sufficient number of people. The second type is where repeat performance of the act 
results in renewed benefits; the benefits are infinite.113 Examples of this second type of 
kifāya-duty include “pursuing knowledge” (ishtighāl bi-l-ʿilm), “memorizing the Qurʾān” 
(hifẓ al-Qurʾān) and “praying the funeral prayer” (ṣalāt al-janāza).114 In each of these 
                                               
110 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. 
111 His full name was Abū Saʿd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Maʿmūn al-Mutawallī. Born at Nīsābūr and died in 
Baghdad, Mutawallī was a Shafiʿī jurist and identified with Ashʿarī theology. See, D. Gimaret, “Al-
Mutawallī,” EI2.  
112 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. 
113 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. 
114 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. 
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examples, as well as others, Zarkashī says everyone is being addressed (kull aḥad 
mukhāṭab bihi) and they remain duties regardless of how many times they have 
previously been performed. Forgoing their performance is only possible if someone else 
undertakes the duty and if that happens then the liability of failing to perform is 
removed.115 Zarkashī’s solution is simply to suggest that Nawawī and Mutawallī are 
actually speaking about two different types of kifāya-duties and if we account for this 
distinction then both of their ideas can co-exist. An act can be considered a duty even 
after it is performed the first time because additional benefits can be acquired from 
subsequent performances; meaning its objective can continue to be achieved. However, 
Zarkashī’s solution still fails to address Mutawallī’s contention that additional 
performances of an act that is a collective duty cannot be considered fulfillment of a 
“duty” because liability no longer exists for failing to perform, which is integral to the 
definition of duty in the first place.116 
Alongside framing how kifāya-duties should be categorized, some jurists also 
discuss the reasoning behind an act’s classification as kifāya. However, when jurists 
discuss their reasoning they generally do so without consideration for the category of 
                                               
115 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. 
116 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 253. 
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kifāya-duties as a whole. In most instances, they simply comment on what justification 
lies behind a specific duty’s inclusion into the kifāya category. For instance, when 
discussing the duty to pursue knowledge, some jurists note the importance of acts that 
are “useful to religion” or that allow one to “respond to heresies.”117 In the same vein, 
they suggest that pursuing knowledge, specifically religious knowledge, gives “life to the 
Sharīʿa.”118 When discussing jihād, the justification changes to “fortifying” or 
“strengthening” the faith, or enhancing its prestige.119 Likewise, for certain duties 
relating to social responsibility, like caring for foundlings, jurists argue that the duty 
stems from an obligation to save lives, specifically children, and to cooperate in 
“performing good works.”120 Unfortunately, the reasoning classifying an act as a 
collective duty lacks any systematization, such that the same reasoning cannot be 
                                               
117 Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Sunni Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500-1800,” Islamic Law & Society, 
vol. 11, no. 2 (2004): 227. 
118 Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-Kasb, ed. Suhayl Zakkār (Damascus: ʿAbd al-Hādī Ḥarsūnī, 
1980), 72; Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 262-63. 
119 Shams al-Dīn al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī, vol. 2, ed. Abū al-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1993), 289. According to Baber Johansen, the original edition was published at Hyderabād at the 
Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Maʿārif al-Nu‘māniyya, in two volumes. Baber Johansen, “Dissent and Uncertainty in the 
Process of Legal Norm Construction in Muslim Sunnī Law,” in Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought: 
Studies in Honor of Professor Hossein Modarressi, eds. Michael Cook, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), fn. 23, pg. 143. This version by Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya seems to be a reprint of the original. Osman 
Taştan notes that there are at least two other editions of the text. Osman Taştan, “al-Sarakhsī (d. 
483/1090),” in Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists, eds. Oussama Arabi, David S. Powers 
and Susan A. Spectorsky (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 250fn83. 
120 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 8, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ilmiyya, 1999), 
34; Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 303. 
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applied to other acts in order to include or exclude them as kifāya-duties as well. Hence, 
not every act that saves a life or is “useful to religion” is classified as a collective duty. 
Yet, despite the absence of formal principles from which to derive collective duties, 
jurists did seem to share a sense of the law’s “higher objectives,” which they appealed to 
in their discussions and attendant justifications of these duties. For many jurists, 
collective duties were a vehicle through which to achieve a vague objective of bettering 
society (maṣlaḥah). Of course, this could only be done through the support of the 
“sources” of law, which meant that jurists sought to creatively interpret the texts more 
expansively than a prima facie examination might indicate. Khaled Abou El-Fadl 
describes this process, noting that: 
Legal systems are authority bound, and quite often a legal system will have a set 
of texts that it considers authoritative and binding. Jurists functioning within a 
particular legal culture normally do not feel at liberty to ignore authoritative 
texts considered central to that culture. If jurists aim to achieve particular 
normative objectives, they do so by engaging in a linguistic practice according to 
which they creatively interpret or construct the meaning of authoritative 
texts.”121 
 
ʿAyn versus Kifāya 
                                               
121 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Soul Searching and the Spirit of Shariʿa: A Review of Bernard Weiss’s The Spirit 
of Islamic Law,” Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 1 (2002): 555. 
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  Another avenue to better understand the kifāya doctrine is by examining the 
relationship between farḍ ʿayn (individual obligation) and farḍ kifāya (collective duty).122 
The basic difference between these two categories of obligatory acts revolves around who 
bears the burden of performance. For farḍ ʿayn, the burden is on each individual; 
everyone is required to perform. For farḍ kifāya, the obligation is on the entire 
community; however, as long as some people within that particular community perform, 
the duty is fulfilled for everyone else. This is the standard formulation already discussed 
which has widespread agreement.123 However, in addition to this basic difference 
between individual obligations and collective duties, scholars also construct a hierarchy 
between the two sets of obligations/duties as well as within each of them.  
   
Basic Difference 
  Ghazālī captures the difference between ʿayn and kifāya in a slightly different way 
from the standard formulation. He notes that a kifāya-duty is one where the objective of 
performance is to achieve some legal (sharʿī) purpose whereas the individual obligation 
                                               
122 These two terms appear in different formulations within the legal literature, for instance, farḍ ʿalā al-
kifāya, wājib ʿalā al-kifāya, farḍ al-kifāya, wājib kifāʾī and their ʿayn equivalents. 
123 For instance, see Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, ed. Aḥmad M. Shākir (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d.), 362 & 
366; Shaybānī, Kitāb al-Kasb, 71; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 2, 143; Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 243-244. 
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is simply a means of testing an individual.124 In other words, if we frame it within our 
earlier typology of benefits, the collective duty has a purpose that provides a benefit to 
third parties external to the performer whereas the individual obligation’s purpose 
focuses exclusively on benefit to the performer. Āmidī notes that from the perspective 
of rendering something obligatory, there is no difference between the individualized 
obligation (wājib al-ʿayn) and collective obligation (al-wājib ʿalā al-kifāya): they encompass 
everything obligatory.125 He notes that this is contrary to the opinion of people who say 
that a difference exists because an individual obligation cannot be satisfied through the 
actions of others, but a collective duty can. Āmidī argues, similar to his critique of the 
Ḥanafīs farḍ and wājib distinction, that this is a semantic difference about the manner in 
which an obligation is removed, but does not concern the true nature of either the 
individual obligation or collective duty. 126 He illustrates this point by noting how both 
the person who commits apostasy and the one who commits murder face a mandatory 
sentence of death. However, the mandatory sentence is waived through the apostate’s 
repentance, whereas a murderer’s repentance does not automatically remove 
punishment. The murderer’s repentance requires an additional step: acceptance by the 
                                               
124 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
125 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 137. 
126 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, 137. 
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victim’s kin. Returning to his critique of the farḍ and wājib distinction, Āmidī states that 
semantically we would refer to both scenarios described as death sentences even if there 
is an easier mechanism for relief in one case versus the other.127  
  Qarāfī begins his discussion by creating a distinction between duties and non-
compulsory good acts (mandūbāt). He moves various acts commonly classified as duties 
into the category of good actions. Qarāfī notes that the classification of duties as either 
kifāya or ʿayn is similar to how classifications occur for non-compulsory good actions 
(mandūbāt). For instance, the call to prayer (adhān), signaling the commencement of 
prayer (iqāma), returning and giving salām (taslīm), praising God after sneezing (tashmīt), 
and rituals relating to the dead are classified as collective good actions (kifāyat mandūbāt). 
Similarly, there are individual good acts (aʿyān mandūbāt) like praying witr, fasting on 
favored days, praying on either Eid, circumambulation outside the state of pilgrimage 
and non-compulsory charity.128  
In al-Baḥr al-Muḥīt, Zarkashī also introduces his discussion of kifāya by 
distinguishing between kifāya and ʿayn. He says it is generally believed that collective 
duties are considered duties that are performed without consideration for who the 
                                               
127 Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, vol. 1, 137. 
128 Qarafi, Furūq, 234; Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 1, ed. M. Būkhubza (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1994), 83. 
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performer is whereas individual obligations are primarily concerned with the individual 
performer. Although he recognizes this as largely true, he notes that it is not entirely 
correct all the time. Zarkashī points out that the kifāya context also considers the 
performer because who performs will determine how punishment and reward for 
performance or nonperformance is assigned. However, in the kifāya context, while it is 
useful to know who performs, the intention is not to assign performance to a particular 
person. The primary concern is just that performance take place.129 Having provided his 
explanation of the difference, Zarkashī critiques the Mu’tazilite opinion that the kifāya 
and ʿayn difference is based on genus (jins). He contends that the difference actually does 
not rise to this level and is simply a distinction of species (nawʿ) within the same genus.130 
He notes that both species of obligatory acts must be carried out. Just as the individual 
obligation is incumbent on everyone with legal capacity, the collective duty penalizes 
everyone with legal capacity when no one performs, but satisfies the duty for everyone 
if an adequate number do perform.131 Both duties have the same cumulative objective: to 
acquire all benefits associated with performance. 
 
                                               
129 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol.1, 242. 
130 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol.1, 242. 
131 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol.1, 242. 
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Hierarchy between Obligations 
Although many scholars allude to a hierarchy between different types of 
obligatory acts, and between collective duties themselves, there is no agreed upon 
framework for how to consider these duties in relation to each other. The general 
consensus is that individual obligations take precedence over collective duties, although 
there are some prominent dissenting views. However, there is surprisingly little 
substantive discussion on how to prioritize certain collective duties over other ones 
despite the evident need for such a discussion given the wide spectrum of duties that are 
labeled as kifāya. For instance, there is relative absence of instruction on whether the 
jihād duty should take precedence over the duty to attend a funeral. While scholars 
generally fail to articulate a preference between two collective duties, an implied 
hierarchy likely did exist based on the relative significance of different duties, such as a 
preference for fighting an attacking enemy versus attending someone’s last rites. 
Scholars who comment on the hierarchy of obligatory acts often construct a very 
simplistic framework with regard to the “types” of acts that should receive precedence 
in performance. For instance, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463/1071) says that collective duties 
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are preferred over both voluntary (taṭawwuʿ) and supererogatory (al-nāfila) acts.132 
Sarakhsī articulates the common view that individual obligations are more important 
than collective duties and supports this view with the Prophetic ḥadīth that “nothing is 
better than jihād except for the obligations.”133 He considers jihād, as mentioned in the 
ḥadīth, to be a collective duty while “obligations” refers to individual obligations. 
Similarly, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al- (d. 582/1191) raises the issue of the hierarchy of obligations in 
his discussion on adjudication. He mentions a situation where a judge is faced with the 
choice of attending a funeral or presiding over a case where he has to “render judgment.” 
Both are collective duties, but the judge should excuse himself from participating in the 
funeral and give preference to the adjudication. The deceased possesses a right to have 
other Muslims attend his funeral, but it is secondary in this scenario. Of course, 
technically speaking, this does not demonstrate a preference between two collective 
duties at the time of performance. Rather, in this case “rendering judgment” is a 
collective duty that has been specifically assigned to that judge (essentially becoming a 
quasi-individual duty) and takes precedence over the non-assigned collective duty of 
                                               
132 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Kitāb al-Istidhkār, vol. 7, ed. ʿAbd al-Muʿṭī Amīn Qalʿajī (Damascus: Dār Qutayba li-al-
Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1993), 215. 
133 Shams al-Dīn al-Sarakhsī, Sharḥ al-siyar al-kabīr, ed. by Ṣalāh al-Dīn al-Munjid (Cairo: Maʿhad al-
Makhṭuṭāt, n.a.) 24. 
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attending a funeral prayer, which anyone can fulfill.134 Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) notes 
that collective duties like pursuing knowledge and jihād take precedence over (quddimat 
ʿalā) the collective duty to get married, as long as you do not fear creating hardship in 
the process (lam yakhsha al-ʿanat).135 
Qarāfī raises the hierarchy of different obligations as part of his discussion in al-
Furūq, specifically the difference “between the principle of duties and rights that take 
precedence over Hajj and those that do not take precedence” (bayna qāʿidat al-wājibāt wa-
al-ḥuqūq allatī tuqaddam ʿalā al-ḥajj wa-bayna qāʿidat mā lā yuqaddam ʿalayhi).136 He begins 
by noting a couple general, common sense principles. First, the acts which have a 
restricted, narrow time frame (muḍayyaq) should take precedence over those that are 
more open-ended (muwassaʿ). The reasoning he gives is simple: since God has placed 
narrow time restrictions on these acts they must be more important to Him (al-taḍyīq 
                                               
134 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, ed. ʿAbbās Aḥmad al-Bāz (Beirut: Dār Kutub al-ʿArabī, 
1974), 10. 
135 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā al-kubrā, vol. 5, eds. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā and Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir 
ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1987), 450. Of course, this is may be a logical consequence of Ibn 
Taymiyya not considering marriage to be a kifāya, unlike other scholars. See for example, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-
Samarqandī, Tahfat al-Fuqaha, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlmiyya, 1984), 117; Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228; 
Shīrāzī, Tanbīh, 109. Ibn Taymiyya also mentions that Abū Yaʾlā al-Ṣaghīr and Ibn Munī said marriage was 
a collective duty not a sunna. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa al-Kubrā, vol. 5, 450. He does acknowledge 
Marwazī’s opinion that there is consensus on the collective duty to marry a widow (tazwīj ayāmā farḍ 
kifāya ijmāʿan). Ibn Taymiyya, Fatawa al-Kubrā, vol. 5, 452. 
136 Qarāfī, Furūq, 650. 
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yushʿir bi-kathrat ihtimām ṣāḥib al-sharʿ bi-mā jaʿalahu muḍayyaqan).137 Second, those acts 
that require immediate (fawrī) performance take precedence over those that can be 
delayed (tarākhī). Third, he says preference should be given to those acts that you fear 
might lapse (fawāt) due to nonperformance versus those that you do not have the same 
fears about. For instance, the preservation of another person’s wealth takes precedence 
over prayer when you fear that the wealth will be lost (yuqaddam ṣawn māl al-ghayr ʿalā 
al-ṣalāh idhā khushiya fawātuh).138 Qarāfī notes that this connects to the idea that rights 
owed to humans (ḥaqq al-ʿabd) can at times get precedence over rights owed to God (ḥaqq 
Allāh), though he points out that jurists differ on this point.139 
Within this discussion, Qarāfī also notes that farḍ ʿayn should be performed prior 
to farḍ kifāya because the “act that is commanded of every person of legal capacity must 
be preferred in its completion over what is commanded of only some” (ṭalab al-fiʿl min 
jamīʿ al-mukallafīn yaqtaḍī arjaḥiyyat mā ṭuliba min al-baʿḍ fa-qat).140 Furthermore, like other 
jurists, he also argues on the basis of the relative benefits that are gained from 
performance of the kifāya versus ʿayn duties. Qarāfī notes that kifāya-duties rely on 
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benefit not being replicated by repeated performance, whereas ʿayn-obligations are the 
opposite: additional performances replicates benefit. In his view, any act whose repeated 
performance yields additional benefits in every case (fī jamīʿ ṣuwarihi) is superior to acts 
where additional benefits only occur in limited cases.141  
Ghazālī provides some of the most extensive remarks on the relationship between 
ʿayn and kifāya as part of broader comments he makes regarding the culture of “debate” 
(munāẓarah) that developed during his time. He laments the close ties between scholars 
and the state, a relationship he says contributes to the development of different legal 
schools, various legal opinions and even sects. As a result of this state of affairs, Ghazālī 
says scholars, and subsequently laypeople, become obsessed with debating intricate 
questions of religion to the detriment of more important tasks. While he appreciates the 
need for these types of discussions, he is uncomfortable with how much they had come 
to dominate the concerns of jurists. Hence, he outlines eight conditions to serve as a 
guideline for engaging in such disputations. Among these, Ghazālī states, is the idea that 
the pursuit of truth, as a collective duty, must be appropriately prioritized. Specifically, 
he says that a person should not be “occupied with collective duties when they have yet 
to complete their individual obligations” (man ʿalayhi farḍ ʿayn fa-shtaghil bi-farḍ kifāya), 
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even if the purpose behind the kifāya-duty is “search for true understanding of religion” 
(ṭalab al-ḥaqq min al-dīn).142 Simply put, Ghazālī does not consider the pursuit of truth 
(ḥaqq) to take precedence over what is legally and individually obligatory. He takes a 
harsh view towards individuals who use rare circumstances as justification to set aside 
individual obligations in order to pursue other tasks. For instance, Ghazālī is 
unconvinced by the person who justifies forgoing obligatory prayers in order to weave 
cloth, arguing that cloth is necessary to cover up nakedness during prayer. He considers 
this an insufficient basis for formulating a rule that allows you to abandon an individual 
obligation and compares it to how jurists preoccupy themselves with minor legal debates 
in pursuit of truth while neglecting obligations on which there is consensus.143 For him 
the governing rule is clear: individual obligations must take precedence over collective 
duties.  
That said, within the category of collective duties, Ghazālī is one of the few jurists 
who explicitly discusses a hierarchy and considers it illegitimate to perform less 
important kifāya-duties over more important ones. In other words, while some may 
consider “pursuit of the truth” a collective duty, there are other more significant kifāya 
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duties that must receive precedence. Ghazālī illustrates this point by discussing the 
hypothetical of an individual who has the power to provide water to a group that is dying 
of thirst, but instead decides to learn the procedure for cupping. Both are collective 
duties and the individual justifies his preference by saying that if the cupping procedure 
disappears from a particular locality, the population of that area would suffer irreparable 
harm. Furthermore, he argues that even in cases where there are a sufficient number of 
cuppers, cupping remains a collective duty that must be learned. Ghazālī dismisses this 
line of reasoning because it fails to prioritize kifāya-duties appropriately based on the 
level of performance that has already occurred: coming to the aid of people moribund 
due to thirst is an unperformed collective duty, whereas the cupping duty is already 
being performed.144 Hence, Ghazālī suggests that a hierarchy exists between collective 
duties such that unperformed duties must receive preference over ones already fulfilled, 
even if repetition of previously performed duties will let you attain additional benefit 
(i.e. inexhaustible duty).  
At another point, while warning of vanities people develop in relation to having 
performed supererogatory acts, Ghazālī constructs a hierarchy of acts (obligatory and 
supererogatory), as expressed in the diagram below: 
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  As shown above, Ghazālī begins by placing all obligatory acts (farāʾiḍ) above 
supererogatory acts (nawāfil).145 Next, he gives individual obligations precedence over 
collective duties.146 Up to this point, the proposed hierarchy is in line with most other 
jurists. However, unlike other jurists, Ghazālī continues to set up further hierarchies 
between the obligatory acts. He divides collective duties between those already 
performed and those yet to be performed (taqdīm farḍ kifāya la qāʾim bihi ʿalā ma qāma bihi 
ghayruhu). For individual obligations, which must be performed regardless of prior 
performance, Ghazālī constructs a hierarchy on the basis of the relative importance of 
the obligation, considering some individual obligations to be more crucial than others.147 
  While the general consensus seems to be that individual obligations take 
precedence over collective duties, there are scholars who argue the opposite. The most 
                                               
145 Supererogatory acts are optional acts that one is encouraged, but not required, to perform. 
146 Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ, vol. 3, 391.  
147 Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ, vol. 3, 391-392. In addition, Ghazālī makes one other note, saying that obligations can be 
separated into those that require you to act (positive obligation) and those that require the omission of 
some action (negative obligation). Between these two, he preferences fulfilling positive obligations 
before negative ones. Ibid., 392. 
Preferred
Individual Obligations
Individual Obligations
Collective Duties Not Yet Performed
Collective Duties Already Performed
Supererogatory Acts
 
 
 
 
 
66 
oft-cited opinion in this regard is from Imām al-Ḥarmayn al-Juwaynī who states that farḍ 
kifāya are more “among the acts pleasing to God, thus kifāya-duties are more elevated in 
status than the ʿayn-obligations” (qiyām bi-mā huwa furūḍ al-kifāyāt…aʿlā min funūn al-
qurubāt min farāʾiḍ al-ʿayān).148 The reasoning he offers is that for individual obligations, 
recompense for performing or failing to perform is affixed to one person. However, 
omission of a collective duty places liability on everyone regardless of rank or station 
(law farīḍa tuʿṭal farḍ min furūḍ al-kifāyāt la-ʿamma al-māʾtham ʿ alā al-kāffa ʿ alā ikhtilāf al-rutab 
wa-l-darajāt). Furthermore, he posits that it is not possible to adequately assign a value 
to the performance of deeds on behalf of the entire community, but that it certainly 
exceeds the value of performing them solely for one’s self.149  
In his discussion of obligatory acts, Zarkashī also raises the question of whether 
a collective duty should actually take precedence over an individual obligation. He begins 
by noting Bāqillānī’s position that in general it is permissible to consider some obligatory 
acts “more obligatory” (awjab) than others just as one considers some “sunnaic” acts 
more authoritative than others, once again contrary to the Muʿtazalī position.150 He also 
                                               
148 Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, Ghiyāth al-Umam fī iltiyāth al-ẓulam, eds. Muṣṭafa Ḥilmī and Fuʾād ʿAbd al-
Munʿim Aḥmad (Alexandria: Dār al-Daʿwa, 1979), 260-261. 
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al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 1, 14.  
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notes Ibn al-Qushayrī’s opinion that the action whose absence results in greater 
admonition should be considered of greater importance, hence, belief in God should 
precede performing ablution.151 For the kifāya context, Zarkashī says the argument is that 
performing a kifāya act not only removes the obligation from the performer, but also 
from other people while performing an individual obligation only removes the obligation 
from an individual performer and no one else (al-qiyām bi-farḍ al-kifāya awlā min al-qiyām 
bi-farḍ al-ʿayn li-annahu yasquṭ fīha al-farḍ ʿan nafsihi wa-ʿan ghayrihi wa-fī farḍ al-ʿayn yasquṭ 
al-farḍ ʿan nafsihi fa-qaṭ).152 Hence, the collective duty has a greater impact and is arguably 
more beneficial. Zarkashī mentions that this preference of kifāya over ʿayn has been 
attributed to various scholars, including Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyinī (d. 418/1027) in his Sharḥ 
kitāb al-tartīb, Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī (d. 438/1047) in his al-Muḥīṭ bi-madhab al-Shāfi‘ī 
and, his son, Imām al-Ḥaramayn in al-Ghiyāthī (as it is popularly known).153  
However, Zarkashī argues that a correct reading of the above-mentioned 
scholars’ opinions reveals that they did not in fact prefer kifāya over ʿayn.154 Rather, 
Zarkashī believes their opinion pertained to the relationship between broader genera 
                                               
151 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 184. 
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153 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 251; see also, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Mardāwī, al-Taḥbīr sharḥ al-taḥrīr fī uṣūl al-
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(jins) of acts as opposed to specific individual obligations. In other words, these scholars 
favored certain types of acts over others (fa-inna kalāmahum innamā huwa fī al-qiyām bi-
hādhā al-jins afḍal min dhālika).155 He adds that when Juwaynī says that carrying out a 
collective duty demonstrates “distinction” (mazāyā) this does not necessarily mean 
“preference” (afḍaliyya). More importantly, he mentions a comment by Shāfiʿī, whose 
school all the aforementioned scholars belonged to, which argues that ʿayn is preferred 
over kifāya. Shāfiʿī says that it is detestable (makrūh) to interrupt circumambulation 
during the Hajj by performing the funeral prayer or any optional act of devotion (rawātib) 
because it would mean suspending an individual obligation for a collective duty.156 For 
Zarkashī, this is another reason why we cannot read these scholars as having preferred 
collective duties over individual obligations since it is inconceivable to him that Shāfiʿī 
jurists would diverge from the opinion of their school’s eponym on such a crucial matter. 
Zarkashī also reports that Kamāl al-Dīn b. al-Zamlakānī’s (d. 727/1327) 
explanation for preferring kifāya over ʿayn relates to situations where a collective duty is 
assigned to a specific person and in that case becomes an individual obligation for him. 
Hence, when comparing an “assigned” collective duty to an individual obligation, 
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156 Zarkashī, al-Bahr al-muhīṭ, vol. 1, 252. 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
Zamlakānī notes that some scholars permit the collective duty to receive preference. 
However, if the collective duty is not assigned, then the individual obligation remains 
preferable.157  
 
Who is Obligated? 
In analyzing an obligatory act, one of the central questions of juristic inquiry is 
who should be obligated to fulfill a collective duty. Despite “community” being so central 
to the kifāya doctrine the term is never explicitly defined by scholars. On its face, this 
would make it difficult to determine what exactly the boundaries are, geographic or 
otherwise, that define the collective that is duty-bound to carry out the kifāya acts. Does 
this collective include the population of a particular town, a city, a larger geographic 
area or the entire Muslim community that existed at the time? Although the legal 
literature does not have any readily available answers, scholars are not particularly 
discomfited by this and seem to operate on an implicit understanding of what the 
collective comprises. In fact, it is through their discussion of kifāya-duties that they 
define the boundaries of this moral community.  
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For instance, one part of this discussion relates to whether individual members 
of a community are responsible for performing the collective duty. Jurists initially 
determine whether someone is eligible to perform any obligatory act by asking whether 
they satisfy the requisite legal standard to be held accountable (taklīf). For an individual 
to be legally accountable (mukallaf) he must, among other things, be free, sane, healthy 
and mature.158 An individual who fails to meet any element of this standard is excused 
from performance. Zarkashī holds that those exempt from performing obligations due 
to a lack of legal capacity (i.e. minors, mentally unfit, etc.) are also excused from kifāya-
duties. However, in specific circumstances, certain duties can be performed by minors 
under adult supervision, for example leading a funeral prayer.159 As discussed in greater 
detail in the chapter on jihād, this exemption is particularly relevant when jurists 
consider whether slaves are expected to perform kifāya-duties. In these cases, the general 
rule, as noted by Ibn Mufliḥ, is that kifāya duties are only obligatory for free males, not 
slaves, regardless of whether the slave is commanded to perform by his master or even 
by a Muslim ruler.160 Of course, there are certain exceptions to this rule, which are 
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discussed below. Legal capacity is a prerequisite and, as Āmidī notes, collective duties are 
considered complete based on a sufficient number of legally capable people stepping 
forward to fulfill them.161 
Having satisfied the general guidelines for legal responsibility, jurists turn their 
attention to the level of accountability that is required of an individual in relation to a 
specific collective duty. Context plays an important role here and various scenarios are 
examined to determine the extent to which it might affect the obligatory act. Bernard 
Weiss summarizes the legal reasoning involved as follows: “with every obligatory act it 
is possible to ask whether its obligatory character is affected in any way by extenuating 
circumstances, either by being eliminated entirely or by being attenuated in some 
way.”162 Many jurists begin by investigating how the command is constructed 
linguistically to determine where legal responsibility should be placed for a particular 
duty. For instance, Shīrāzī discusses farḍ kifāya while commenting broadly on the idea of 
God’s speech (khiṭāb). He explains that if the speech is made using non-specific language 
(lafẓ al-ʿumūm) then everyone who can reasonably be considered an addressee of the 
speech is in fact being addressed and must carry out the performance demanded. The 
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only exception is for situations involving collective duties.163 In the kifāya context, even 
with language of general import, performance of the duty is not required for everyone. 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) notes that if a command addresses a group then it 
either speaks to them as a collective or individually. If the command is to the group 
collectively, then the performance of a group’s members is mutually contingent (fiʿlu 
baʿḍihim sharṭan fī fiʿl al-baʿḍ). An example of this would be the congregational Friday 
prayers (salāt al-jumʿa): an individual cannot perform Friday prayers alone. In order for 
an individual performance of Friday prayers to be valid there must be communal 
performance of the prayer. On the other hand, Rāzī notes that if every individual in the 
group is addressed, then the command is a collective duty (furūḍ al-kifāyāt).164 This is 
because the duty’s objective can be attained through a sufficient number of people 
performing and without needing the entire group to perform. For example, Rāzī notes 
that jihād’s objectives are to “protect Muslims” and “humiliate the enemy,” both of which 
can be accomplished through the efforts of some people satisfying the duty for everyone 
else.165 
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Zarkashī also discusses this distinction when considering where legal 
responsibility for the kifāya command lies: is the command addressed to everyone (kull) 
or some (baʿḍ)? He notes that the majority of scholars believe the kifāya command is 
required of everyone collectively (ʿibārat al-aktharīn annahu wajaba ʿalā al-jamīʿ), but there 
are others who believe it is designated to each person individually (wajaba ʿalā ʿayn kull 
wāhid).166 Regarding the opinion that the act is collectively obligatory, Zarkashī puts 
forward two opinions. The first requires performance from every person of legal capacity 
(wājib ʿalā jamīʿ al-mukallafīn min ḥaythu innahu jamīʿ). The second obligates every 
individual, regardless of legal capacity (wājib ʿalā kull wāḥid). In this case, as long as some 
perform the obligation, the burden drops from others; if none perform, then they are all 
sinful.167 Additionally, Zarkashī highlights a key difference between these two opinions 
on the issue of how “responsibility” should be assigned when an obligatory act is not 
performed. In the first case, where the duty is that of individuals with legal capacity, 
blame is assessed on the basis of the person while in the second case, where everyone is 
obligated, only performance is considered (ʿalā al-awwal taʾthīm kull wāḥid yakūn wāqiʿan 
bi-l-dhāt wa-ʿalā al-thānī bi-l-ʿarḍ).168 Some scholars critique assigning blame on the basis 
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of performance because it creates an invalid abrogation of the command. They argue 
that if the duty is assigned to every individual, but without consequences for 
nonperformance, then any person’s successful completion of an obligation essentially 
abrogates the original command by removing the burden from others.169 These scholars 
argue that abrogation is only valid with a new command and none was issued here so no 
abrogation can take place and the burden cannot be lifted. In contrast, the other 
approach obligates everyone in the group simply because they are part of the group (wa-
huwa wujūbuhu ʿalā al-jamīʿ min ḥaythu huwa jamīʿ). Of course, Zarkashī takes issue with 
obligating everyone in a group since presumably some of them will not yet have legal 
capacity.170 
In addition to a general discussion of who is obligated to perform, jurists also 
discuss scenarios that would cause an obligatory act to be assigned to specific people. In 
other words, in some cases where, as a result of certain circumstances, a kifāya-duty will 
be transformed into an ʿ ayn-obligation. There are three primary scenarios contemplated: 
insufficient number of performers, initiation of performance and re-establishing lapsed 
performance. Ibn Mufliḥ describes the most common scenario where this transition from 
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kifāya to ʿayn occurs: if the minimum number of people required to complete a collective 
duty are the only people available to perform then the collective duty becomes 
individually obligated upon them.171 The best example of this is when certain individuals 
possess unique skills necessary to complete a collective duty. For instance, Shīrazī 
mentions that if there is only one person available to adjudicate a matter or carry out 
general judicial duties then the obligatory acts become specific to that person such that 
they can be compelled to perform.172 Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223) shares the same view, 
arguing that serving as a judge becomes an individual obligation if only one person is 
able to fulfill the role. He argues that, in this case, the person should be compelled to 
perform because the alternative is for a collective duty to remain incomplete for the 
foreseeable future.173 He also holds a similar view with regard to “bearing witness,” 
stating that if only two people are available who can provide written testimony then this 
collective duty becomes an individual obligation for them.174 Shīrazī and Jaṣṣāṣ provide 
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Qayyām (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Risālah, 1999), 525.  
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the same reasoning for the collective duty of “giving written testimony” becoming 
individually obligated: if only one person in a locality is capable of performing the duty 
then it becomes assigned to them specifically.175 
However, aside from situations where so few potential performers exist that only 
one person is able to perform, jurists also contemplate other scenarios where this 
transition from kifāya to ʿayn occurs. For instance, jurists consider a person individually 
responsible for a duty if they commence performance of it. Initiating performance 
transforms an obligatory act from a collective duty to an individual obligation for the 
“initiator” while preserving it as a collective duty for everyone else. This is apparently 
an opinion shared by some of the Prophet’s Companions, particularly in relation to the 
jihād duty.176 Qarāfī raises this issue in the context of a statement he narrates from the 
author of the book al-Ṭirāz: Sanad b. ʿAnān b. Ibrāhīm al-Azdī.177 Azdī reportedly said that 
the actions of a non-obligated person who accompanies fighters (mujāhidīn) onto the 
battlefield will receive the recompense of an obligatory (farḍ) act, as opposed to the lesser 
reward of a supererogatory act, even though they are technically not obligated (wājib) to 
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perform.178 Ghazālī relates that Qaffāl al-Shāshī, and others, reject enhancing every 
obligatory act from collective duty to individual obligation simply based on initiation of 
performance. Shāshī notes that factors arising in one type of obligatory act may not be 
replicated in others. As a result, circumstances might make initiating performance in the 
jihād context sufficient to transform the duty from kifāya to ʿayn, but would fail to do the 
same in the context of funeral prayers.179 
Another case where jurists transfer the requirement to perform from the 
collective to the individual is where an obligatory act has ceased to be performed. Ghazālī 
states that for certain collective duties, like “pursuing knowledge,” if the obligatory act 
is no longer performed in a particular locality then three scenarios, involving different 
levels of culpability, are instructive with regard to performance. The first is when an 
individual knows that the collective duty is no longer being performed and himself has 
the capacity to perform.180 This individual is held liable for failing to perform. The second 
scenario is where an individual does not know performance of the obligation has been 
suspended, but their proximity to where performance was taking place triggered a duty 
to investigate, which they failed to undertake. In other words, they did not know but 
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should have known.181 The individual here is also liable for failing to perform. The final 
scenario is where there is no knowledge that performance of the duty has been 
suspended nor are they in close enough proximity to reasonably be expected to 
investigate. In this situation, the individual is not liable.182 
  A final situation discussed by jurists is how to consider the performance of a 
collective duty after it has already been performed by another group. Ghazālī suggests 
that it all depends on context. As an example, in the jihād context, “who” is obligated 
depends on how the conflict arose and the potential obligor’s proximity to it. Thus, if 
there is a sudden attack, catching a town unprepared for the onslaught, then every 
person in that town is burdened with the duty to defend it including those who are sick, 
slaves and women.183 It becomes an individual obligation for all of them. As for 
individuals who reside outside the town under attack, their level of responsibility varies 
depending on their distance from the town. In addition, it also matters whether their 
services are necessary for the town to contribute the sufficient number of volunteers for 
the duty to be adequately completed. If the town’s own forces are insufficient for 
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countering the enemy then the next town over is required to help meet the sufficiency 
requirements for defense.184  
  
When is the Legal Duty Suspended? 
  In addition to when performance must take place and who should carry it out, 
scholars also discuss when an obligatory act is suspended and what factor(s) cause this. 
They posit two explanations for what causes an obligatory act to be suspended: either it 
has been performed or the underlying reason (ʿilla) for the duty no longer exists. This 
distinction is captured well by Qarāfī’s exchange with a hypothetical interlocutor. His 
interlocutor challenges the notion that a nonperforming individual can have their duty 
removed by proxy, in other words, by someone else’s performance. In particular, the 
interlocutor makes a distinction between physical and non-physical duties, stating that 
collective duties fulfilled through physical acts (al-fiʿl al-badanī) must follow the general 
rule that no individual can fulfill physical acts for another.185 Thus, it is invalid to classify 
any duty involving physical acts as kifāya because these duties cannot be satisfied by 
proxy. In response, Qarāfī takes issue with how his interlocutor is understanding the 
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performance of these obligatory acts. In his opinion, these duties are not fulfilled as a 
result of the actions of a proxy, but rather the obligatory act is suspended due to the 
absence of an “underlying purpose for the obligation” (ḥikmat al-wujūb). Qarāfī illustrates 
this point with the collective duty to rescue a drowning person. The duty to save 
someone who is drowning no longer exists after that person is rescued because the 
rationale for the obligation (i.e. saving a life) is no longer present once the person has 
been saved. The underlying reason for saving the drowning person is to preserve their 
life and since that has been accomplished no further performance is required.186  
  Zarkashī supports the view that for a duty to be complete, other than having it 
abrogated by an additional command, the underlying reason for the duty (ʿillat al-wujūb) 
must no longer exist. He illustrates his thinking by pointing to the funeral prayer 
context.187 Zarkashī claims that “God obligates funeral prayer in order to pay respects to 
the dead” (innamā awjaba ṣalāt al-janāza iḥtirāman li-l-mayt), just as God obligates the 
rituals around burial as a way to, among other things, appropriately cover the body.188 
Thus, the underlying reason for performing funeral prayers is respecting the dead and 
the reason for burial is to cover the body. As a result, if some people carry out these 
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obligatory acts, then no one else is required to do so because these underlying reasons 
will have been accomplished. Similarly, the duty to bury someone no longer exists if the 
dead body has been burned or eaten by a wild animal. In both cases, the reasoning behind 
the “duty to shroud a corpse” ceases to exist when the body is no longer present. In turn, 
if no reason for the duty remains, then the duty itself ends.189 Addressing the issue of 
whether an obligatory act is suspended due to someone’s performance versus the 
absence of an underlying reason, Zarkashī notes that when performance, as opposed to 
other extenuating circumstances, causes the underlying reason to disappear then it is 
reasonable to frame the duty as having been removed due to performance.190 He notes 
that a duty can sometimes be removed by performance and other times because 
circumstances make performance impossible.191 
  Another consideration raised in the kifāya literature is the level of certainty 
necessary to determine whether an obligatory act has been performed sufficiently 
enough that its burden is lifted. Many scholars note that simply the belief that a duty has 
been performed, not its actual performance, is adequate to remove the burden of the 
duty. In other words, the probable (ẓann) performance of an obligatory act is sufficient 
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to remove its burden and it is unnecessary to be absolutely certain that the duty was 
completed. For instance, Nawawī holds that as long as one receives word of someone else 
performing the collective duty then the burden is removed and there is no requirement 
to investigate further. In addition, if a group performs an obligatory act unaware that it 
has already been performed, their actions still count as though they fulfilled a collective 
duty.192 Qarāfī also considers a kifāya command satisfied simply if one “believes” that 
performance took place, regardless of whether this belief is confirmed to be true. Hence, 
if Group X thinks it is probable that Group Y performed an obligatory act, then the duty 
is suspended for Group X. Likewise, in the same scenario, if Group Y believes Group X has 
performed the duty, then the duty is suspended for Group Y.193 Thus, theoretically, both 
Group X and Y can fail to perform an obligatory act without incurring any liability simply 
by operating under the sincere assumption that the other has performed and thus the 
duty has been suspended.194 Qarāfī also believes there is no penalty for a particular group 
if they assume another group performed the duty since they are satisfying a shared 
responsibility.195 Rāzī phrases the same idea slightly differently. He believes that the 
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burden of a kifāya-duty is suspended due to a “preponderant belief” (al-ẓann al-ghālib) 
that the duty has been completed. The result is the same: if one group believes that 
another has completed the duty, its burden is removed. Similarly, within a group, if every 
member thinks someone else has performed the obligatory act, then it is satisfied 
regardless of whether it has actually been performed. However, Rāzī makes clear that the 
opposite also holds true: if a group (or group member) believes that no one else has 
fulfilled an obligatory act then they remain obligated, even if the duty has actually 
already been completed.196 Rāzī’s core point, shared by other scholars, is that since it is 
often not possible to know with certainty whether an act has been performed it is more 
reasonable to expect people to act on the basis of the probable information they 
possess.197 
   
Liability 
  Having discussed the particulars of when an obligation is triggered, who bears 
legal responsibility and when that responsibility ends, we turn to a consideration of 
liability, both individual and collective, for failing to perform. First, as mentioned above, 
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liability attaches if certain circumstances transform a collective duty into an individual 
obligation for a specific person(s) and they subsequently fail to perform. In essence, this 
is liability for failing to perform a quasi-individual obligation. Second, if an entire 
community either collectively decides to forgo a duty or none of its members step 
forward to perform then all members are held liable. 
  To this point, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805) says that if people 
collectively decide to forgo the fulfillment of a duty then they are all liable.198 Nawawī 
echoes the same sentiment, but extends it beyond purposefully omitting performance to 
a lower level of culpability which penalizes collective failure to perform regardless of 
whether it was purposeful or not. He states that a failure to perform the kifāya duty 
results in everyone being liable until someone satisfies the obligation and removes 
liability.199 Āmidī goes so far as to suggest that there is a scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ) that 
everyone should be penalized if they collectively agree not to perform a duty.200 Qarāfī 
requires an additional step before penalizing the collective: if they conspire to forgo the 
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duty and then fail to meet their shared responsibility.201 In other words, Qarāfī seems to 
require that the conspiracy be put into practice before it is considered liable behavior.  
  Zarkashī comments extensively on this issue and supports the idea that in a 
situation where a group collectively decides to forgo a duty everyone has transgressed 
(athimū). In fact, he considers a group that suspends (taʿṭīl) a kifāya to be just as 
blameworthy as an individual that forgoes an ʿayn obligation.202 Furthermore, Zarkashī 
argues that those who collectively agree to neglect the collective duty should have 
compliance forced on them even if that means taking up arms against them (law ittafaqū 
ʿalā tark al-farḍ kifāyatan qūtilū).203 He mentions that Juwaynī presents an apt analogy to 
this situation in his Kitāb al-talkhīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh (“Brief Source in Legal Theory”). Juwaynī 
discusses a person who owes a thousand dirhams and, along with his guarantor, decides 
to default on repayment. Both debtor and guarantor would be considered in violation of 
their duty to repay the debt.204 Hence, the relevant lesson/analogy for the kifāya context 
is that although an individual might be responsible for performing the collective duty, 
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everyone else in the community is a guarantor of that performance. Thus, when no one 
performs they are all liable.  
  Qarāfī raises an interesting critique of holding someone liable for initiating 
performance of an obligatory act they had no duty to perform. His hypothetical 
interlocutor notes it odd that a person’s actions can be considered obligatory once 
initiated but their subsequent nonperformance will not result in any penalty. For 
instance, if someone is not obligated to take up arms, but does so and then gets separated 
from the war party, they are not penalized at that point for returning home even though 
presumably the warring party has now come to rely on their performance. For the 
interlocutor, this disrupts the entire definition of “duty”: an act whose omission is 
punishable.205 If someone initiates performance of an act and their actions are classified 
as the performance of a duty then any subsequent nonperformance should carry liability. 
Qarāfī recognizes this difficulty and responds by arguing that the duty is conditioned on 
the performance of the group as a whole, not individuals within the group. In other 
words, the question of penalty only arises if everyone forgoes performance not on the 
basis of one person performing (or not).206 Hence, the rule is that the duty depends on a 
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condition and is nullified by the absence of that condition (anna al-wujūb al-mashrūṭ bi-
sharṭin yantafī ʿinda intifāʾ dhālika al-sharṭ).207 Thus, if the person is separated from the 
group then the condition that obligated the person in the first place (i.e. leaving with the 
war party) is no longer present and the duty no longer operative. For Qarāfī, it is not odd 
that an obligatory act would be contingent on how connected or separated it is from a 
situation.208 He cites the hypothetical of Zayd and his wife. If Zayd is married and living 
with his wife such that intimacy is possible then he is duty-bound to support her. 
However, if he has formally separated from her such that intimacy is not possible, then 
he doesn’t have the same duties unless he returns to her and ends the separation.209 For 
Qarāfī the same logic of proximity applies to the jihād context: if an unobligated person 
joins people leaving for jihād then he is obligated to fight, but if he separates from them 
then the duty no longer exists.210 
  One final issue that is raised by Qarāfī in his exchange with a hypothetical 
interlocutor is this: if an obligation has been decreed for every group, how can it be 
suspended for nonperformers as a consequence of other people performing (kayf saqaṭa 
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ʿan man lam yafʿal bi-fiʿl ghayrihi)? In particular, in the context of kifāya-duties that are 
physical acts (al-fiʿl al-badaniyy), how do we contend with the rule for physical acts that 
says the act of one person cannot be of use to another? How can the law equate the one 
who acts with the one who does not act (kayf sawwā al-sharʿ bayna man faʿala wa-man lam 
yafʿal )?211 Qarāfī seems to be alluding to the issue that arises in Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:95 where 
both those who stay and those who go off to fight are “promised a good reward” (wa-
kullan waʿada Allāh al-ḥusnā). Qarāfī addresses this issue by first noting that the duty is not 
suspended as the result of the substitution of someone’s performance (niyābat al-ghayr) 
for another’s nonperformance. Rather, it is because the underlying reason (ḥikma) is no 
longer present. Furthermore, the scenario in which performance and nonperformance 
are “equal” is not equality in the sense of reward (thawāb), but rather they are simply 
equal in the sense that the obligation has been suspended for both of them. The 
performer is entitled to a reward while the nonperformer is not.212  
  As mentioned earlier, one final area that does not seem to receive any treatment 
in the literature is the sanction, if any, that should be given when there is a failure to 
perform. Discussion of sanction is largely absent from the discussion, either on collective 
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duties generally or in the sections discussing specific collective duties. To some degree 
this is indicative of the general disposition in Islamic legal literature that disfavors 
punishment, but it also demonstrates the fact that, like many individual obligations, 
state enforcement is not expected or of primary importance. For most collective duties 
this does not present much of an issue since performance and nonperformance are 
related to divine reward and punishment in the afterlife. Hence, nonperformance 
generally does not entail civil or criminal sanction. One might presume that, similar to 
the individual obligation to pay zakat, some basic notion of enforcement and 
accountability would be present. However, despite historical accounts of enforcing the 
payment of zakat (i.e. the ridda wars), legal discussions on zakat rarely mention 
enforcement. Moreover, even collective duties that fall under the state’s authority, such 
as jihād, make no mention of punitive measures for failure to comply. At most, the jurists 
will use the term “sinful” (ithm) to describe liability for failing to carry out a duty, 
indicating that a penalty will be imposed in the “afterlife.” 
 
Concluding Thoughts  
As the above discussion shows, the kifāya doctrine developed significantly after 
its initial articulation in the 9th century. The main discourse on kifāya is found in the 
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discussions on substantive law where jurists craft legal rules for acts classified as 
collective duties. As a result, kifāya discussions center on how it functions with regard to 
a specific obligatory act and broad, theoretical discussions on the idea of a kifāya-duty, 
let alone a kifāya doctrine, are far less common. However, it is in these less common 
theoretical discussions where the contours of the doctrine seem to be found, especially 
with jurists writing in the 12th century CE and later. The questions central to these 
theoretical discussions are understanding the relationship between kifāya and ʿayn, 
particularly from the standpoint of prioritizing one over the other; as well as, 
determining who is obligated to perform and when that duty is suspended. While there 
is uniformity in the core ideas behind the kifāya duty, there are also points of 
disagreement. 
Another interesting element of the discussions relating to collective obligations 
is the manner in which jurists create a category of duties that they are uniquely qualified 
for. This is most evident with the collective duty to acquire knowledge. Shāfiʿī notes that 
the general public is “incapable” of attaining certain types of knowledge and that such 
knowledge is even beyond the grasp of some specialists. Hence, he suggests that it is the 
province of an elite group within society that is capable of acquiring this specialized 
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knowledge and they are required to do so.213 Despite restricting the duty to a subset of 
the larger collective, he applies the same basic rule: if some members of the elite group 
obtain this knowledge then other members of the elite are relieved from the duty, 
bearing in mind that those who actually undertake the pursuit receive a greater 
reward.214 Elsewhere, Shāfiʿī creates this elite category again by dividing Prophetic 
reports into two sets: one for general consumption and another for those capable of 
interpreting them.215  
One might assume that one of the reasons jurists want to a craft a special category 
for themselves and the duties they perform is because they were exempt from answering 
the governing authority’s call for individuals to satisfy the collective duty of jihād. 
Furthermore, making these laws subject to the scholarship duty made them both pious 
and elite. There seems to be a similar division of the community with regard to the verse 
Q 3/al-ʿImrān:104 which carries an instruction to command what is right and forbid 
wrong actions. Michael Cook notes that the common view on this verse restricted the 
duty to a specific qualified elite and that many commentators felt a requisite amount of 
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knowledge was needed to fulfill the duty.216 For instance, Abū ʾl-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 
373/983), a Ḥanafī, says that the ḥadīth that commands you to prevent a wrong with your 
hand, tongue or heart is first for rulers and scholars and then for the rest of society.217 
This relationship between legal responsibility, authority and collective duties is a 
consistent theme, as will be shown in the next chapter on jihād.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DUTY TO FIGHT 
Introduction  
 Chapter One explored the medieval doctrine and theory that developed around 
kifāya-duties as a way of explaining the variety of acts that jurists include in this category. 
Arguably the most important act that was categorized as a kifāya-duty was jihād, 
specifically with the meaning of engaging in warfare. As one scholar has noted, the rapid 
expansion of Islam is at least partly credited to the fact that the Muslim “conviction to 
‘strive’ for God to make their belief manifest by carrying out jihad was so strong: it seems 
to have been as intrinsic to belief as any other religious duty.”218 This duty to fight or 
jihād-duty was especially prominent because jurists believed it had explicit textual 
support from the Qurʾān. In this sense then, the jihād duty is unique because it becomes 
the basis upon which the entire category of kifāya-duties is constructed. There are 
various verses in the Qurʾān that deal with jihād, but jurists consider two of them as 
commenting directly on the collective nature of the obligatory act; these verses become 
the core proof-texts for farḍ kifāya as a whole.219 The first verse is Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:95: 
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Those believers who stay at home (al-qāʿidūn), apart from those with an 
incapacity, are not equal (lā yastawī) to those who commit themselves and their 
possessions to striving in God’s way (al-mujāhidūn fī sabīl Allāh). God has raised 
such people to a rank above those who stay at home– although He has promised 
all believers a good reward (wa-kullan waʿada Allāh al-ḥusnā), those who strive are 
favoured with a tremendous reward above those who stay at home.  
 
The verse discusses two sets of people in the context of military engagement: 
those who fight and those who stay behind. Both parties are viewed favorably simply 
because they are believers and so will receive some reward. However, the text makes 
clear that those who join the fight are entitled to greater recompense for this act. 
Similarly, the second verse, Q 9/al-Tawba:122, states: 
Yet it is not right for all the believers to go out [to battle] together (li-yanfirū 
kāffatan): out of each community, a group should go out to gain understanding of 
the religion (li-yatafaqqahū fī al-dīn), so that they can teach their people when they 
return (li-yundhirū qawmahum idhā rajaʿū ilayhim) and so that they can guard 
themselves against evil.  
 
                                               
until there is no more chaos and religion is for God}; Q 9/al-Tawba:14 says {fight them and God will punish 
them by your hands and cover them with shame}; Q 9/al-Tawba:29 {fight those who do not believe in God 
and the Last Day}; Q 47/Muḥammad:35 {be not weary and faint-hearted, crying for peace, when you should 
be uppermost because God is with you}; Q 9/al-Tawba:5 {fight the disbelievers wherever you find them}; Q 
9/al-Tawba:36 {fight the disbelievers all together as they fight you all together}; Q 9/al-Tawba:41 {go forth 
lightly or heavily and strive with your wealth and yourselves in the way of God}; Q 9/al-Tawba:39 {unless 
you go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty and put others in your place}; Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:71 {go 
forth in parties or go forth all together} and Q 61/al-Ṣaff:10-11{O you who believe! Shall I lead you to a 
bargain that will save you from a grievous penalty? That you believe in God and His messenger and that 
you strive your utmost in the cause of God, with your property and your persons}. 
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Here, a third group emerges that is a subcategory of those who stay behind: 
people who stay behind with a purpose.220 The purpose is two-fold: to acquire greater 
understanding of Islam and then to transmit that understanding to others, specifically 
those who return from battle. In other words, not only is there no requirement for 
everyone to join the fight, but it is discouraged. Additionally, the verse signals in two 
ways that those who stay behind with this purpose have a different station than those 
who stay behind with no purpose. First, it suggests that these people pursuing knowledge 
will become the “teachers” of those who have gone off to fight, a comparatively elevated 
status. Second, unlike the earlier verse Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:95, there is no mention here of those 
fighting receiving a greater reward in comparison to those staying behind with a 
purpose. 
Building on this scriptural background, as noted, the earliest juristic articulation 
of the category of kifāya-duties seems to be by Shāfiʿī and develops out of particular 
reference to matters relating to performing jihād, for instance, juʿl (substituting someone 
in your place to perform jihād) and takhalluf (failing to participate in the jihād duty).221 In 
general, jurists’ discussions of jihād create a distinction between kifāya-duties and ʿayn-
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obligations based on “who” is required to fulfill the obligatory act. An ʿayn-obligation 
(farḍ ʿayn) assigns the duty to one person and only that person’s performance can satisfy 
the obligation; no one else is eligible to fight on his/her behalf. On the other hand, if jihād 
is classified as a kifāya-duty then a larger set of people is eligible to fight on behalf of 
everyone else. For some acts, only one person is required to satisfy the duty, while in 
other cases, like the jihād duty, performance is generally mandated for more than one 
person. As long as those selected to fight perform the duty’s requirements, it is satisfied 
for everyone else. However, if any of them fail to perform, and the minimum number of 
performers is not met, then liability for the failure to fight falls on everyone. Hence, 
performers and nonperformers receive both the accolades and blame for fulfillment and 
omission of these duties. 
Some have linked the development of a “classical theory” around farḍ kifāya 
directly with Shāfiʿī attempting to address the “problem of finding enough men to fight 
on the frontiers while preserving a role in all of this for constituted authority, the 
sulṭān.”222 Only the ruler, or his designees, had the ability to preemptively declare jihād 
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when no attack was impending.223 Qarāfī notes four reasons that jihād is made an 
obligation: the removal of disbelief  (izālat munkar al-kufr), enabling a ruler (imām) to 
designate forces to a task, the requirement to defend one’s land when under attack and 
in order to rescue prisoners of war (istinqādh al-asrā).224 During the Prophet’s lifetime, and 
for at least a century afterwards, there was no professional, standing army. As a result, 
governing authorities needed to rely on voluntary forces to pursue defensive or offensive 
military campaigns. Jihād as a kifāya-duty contained not only a religious incentive for 
people to come forward to fight, but allowed the burden of the duty to be shared. 
Furthermore, since in its most basic form the duty was triggered by a state’s request for 
fighters, jihād as a kifāya-duty also promoted the state’s oversight over military affairs. 
In theory, this oversight allowed the state to regulate the overall size of the fighting force 
to be deployed in any given situation, the number of soldiers each locality needed to 
contribute to fulfill their obligation and which particular localities it wished to draw 
troops from.  
                                               
“ummah,” as “military service became increasingly understood as pertaining to one’s status as a Muslim.” 
Bonner, “Jaʿāʾil and Holy War in Early Islam,” 46. 
223 Unlike in the medieval Christian context where Urban II eventually “took the prerogative for declaring 
holy war away from emperors and kings,” leaving it for individuals and the Church, it is only in recent 
decades that there has been a widespread disintegration of the state’s role in waging jihād. Michael Bonner, 
Aristocratic Violence and Holy War: Studies in the Jihad and the Arab-Byzantine Frontier (New Haven: American 
Oriental Society, 1996), 3. 
224 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 387-89. 
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This highlights another unique aspect of the jihād-duty: the state’s active role in 
its implementation. Even though the jihād-duty is the initiator of the kifāya category, in 
virtually all other kifāya-duties the state is absent.225 While kifāya-duties contain both a 
spiritual and practical dimension, the discourse generally centers on what an individual’s 
responsibilities (or rights) are in relation to a particular duty. For jihād, individual 
responsibility is discussed, but jurists also endeavor to center the state in the practical 
performance of the duty. This is especially because the jihād-duty is used to protect and 
expand the state’s territory; jihād functioned as the central mechanism through which 
the Muslim polity exerted its authority and maintained its legitimacy. Moreover, this 
feature of the jihād-duty, in which the state figures prominently, forced jurists to 
navigate the tensions that arise when the state is able to exercise authority over 
individual religious obligations. Put differently, jurists struggle with the idea of 
endowing the jihād-duty with spiritual significance if it is always going to be in the ambit 
of the state’s authority. There must be circumstances in which the individual is able to 
                                               
225 Specifically, the state determines the number of individuals necessary to satisfy the duty since it 
triggered the kifāya-duty in the first place. However, two important points need to be kept in mind here. 
First, while jihād is the main kifāya-duty where jurists articulate a prominent role for the state, it is not 
the only duty where the state is present. For instance, as we will discuss later, the state also has a role in 
certain circumstances relative to the caretaking of foundlings. In addition, the adjudication of cases is 
also considered a kifāya-duty and the state has a role in selecting judges for this. Second, it is important 
to note that the state triggers the jihād-duty when it is kifāya, but in those “defensive” circumstances 
where it is an ʿayn-obligation there is an automatic trigger from the actions of the hostile party.  
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override the state’s control over the jihād-duty and its monopoly on violence. The precise 
occasions when this occurs underlie jurists’ construction of the overall framework for 
the duty to fight. 
 
Definitions 
The Scriptural Meaning of Jihād  
  The lexicographer Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1311) explains that the basic meaning of 
the Arabic term jihād is to struggle against something or exert effort towards an 
objective.226 Many scholars also acknowledge a “non-violent” element to the definition 
of jihād, specifically the struggle against one’s own desires or “lower soul” (nafs).227 
                                               
226 Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al- ʿarab, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1990), 135 (j-h-d). 
227 The dichotomy between a violent and non-violent jihād is characterized in the literature as between a 
“greater jihad” (al-jihād al-akbar) and “lesser jihad” (al-jihād al-aṣghar). Modern jurists have tried to connect 
this greater jihād with a “personal moral struggle,” even suggesting it divides into a “jihād against the self” 
and a “jihād against the devil.” Ahmed al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2011), 76. However, this idea of greater jihad was “often rejected by many in 
Islam’s mainstream ‘orthodoxy’ from the late medieval period onwards” and seems to have been popular 
primarily in Sufī circles. Gavin Picken, “The Greater Jihad in Classical Islam,” in Twenty-First Century Jihad: 
Law, Society and Military Action, eds. Elisabeth Kendall and Ewan Stein, 126-138. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 
126. Some recent scholarship has tried to argue, with mixed results, that jihād originally did not have as 
prominent a militaristic sense as it does now and that due to sociopolitical circumstances the term’s 
meaning, as found in the Qurʾān, ḥadīth and exegetical literature, was actually narrowed as compared to 
its original meaning. See generally, Asma Afsarruddin, Striving in the Path of God: Jihād and Martyrdom in Islamic 
Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Reuven Firestone posits a slightly different argument, 
suggesting that the “early ban on fighting” was not necessarily a “protective tactic” to avoid the smaller 
and weaker Muslim community from being destroyed, as the tradition has explained, but is “just as likely” 
a “nonmilitant view” calling for “verbal argument without physical aggression” that was “lost to history.” 
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However, generally speaking, and for our purposes here, in the legal literature jihād has 
meant an “armed struggle against unbelievers” and connects back to historical battles 
fought by Islam’s prophet, Muḥammad.228 Hence, very early on the qitāl (“fighting”) 
component of jihād figured prominently as a specific manifestation of the larger concept 
of “struggle.” The Qurʾānic text seems to support this implication that fighting was an 
essential component of jihād’s definition with “numerous” verses on warring, “spread 
out over more than a dozen chapters.”229 For many scholars, the first verse that allowed 
Muslims to engage in fighting was Q 22/al-Ḥajj: 39.230 Broadly speaking, the jihād verses 
outline the conditions in which fighting becomes necessary, as well as the limits of 
“justified military combat,” all of which become the basis for juristic reflection over 
centuries of Islamic legal thinking.231  
                                               
Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 54. Bearing 
all this in mind, for our purposes here, the only jihād under consideration is that of engaging in armed 
struggle.   
228 Rudolph Peters, Jihād in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 
1. As Suleiman Mourad and James E. Lindsay note, “in a specifically religious context, and as understood 
and articulated by almost every Muslim religious scholar past and present, including Ibn Manẓūr, jihād has 
one meaning: to exert one’s effort in fighting the enemies of God by acts or by words.” Suleiman A. Mourad 
and James E. Lindsay, The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period (Leiden: 
Brill, 2013), 16.  
229 Firestone, Jihad, 47. 
230 Firestone, Jihad, 54. 
231 Afsaruddin, Striving, 34.  
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  One challenge that arises is the instructions on jihād propose different approaches 
to fighting, moving between levels of aggression, and even offering seemingly conflicting 
guidance. Rueven Firestone suggests that juristic writing on jihād was consumed by the 
“seeming contradiction” in the jihād verses and jurists subsequently came to espouse an 
“evolutionary theory” of war as an explanation.232 In this theory, “incremental escalation 
in militancy” corresponds with “incremental growth and development of the religious 
community,” such that “divine authority for total war” is withheld from Muslims until 
they acquire the capacity and organization to undertake it.233 Hence, Muslim scholars 
concluded that “scriptural verses regarding war were revealed in direct relation to the 
historic needs of Muḥammad during his prophetic mission.”234 The theory might also be 
framed as a pragmatic one, advocating for a less aggressive posture when the 
community’s capabilities (and size) made it a less effective fighting force against any 
opponent. The need to reconcile seemingly contradictory verses on jihād was partly due 
to the “atomistic approach” traditional exegetes took to scriptural interpretation: they 
often focused on a verse in isolation and used information external to the Qurʾān as the 
primary means of interpretation. In addition, the “principle of abrogation” (naskh) 
                                               
232 Firestone, Jihad, 50.  
233 Firestone, Jihad, 50. 
234 Firestone, Jihad, 50. 
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became an easy method for dealing with two isolated verses that conflict and eventually 
led to a heavy reliance on naskh as an interpretive tool.235 
  Firestone notes that the “traditional schema” for the Qurʾān’s commentary on war 
is divided into four stages: nonconfrontation (e.g. Q 16/al-Naḥl: 125), defensive fighting 
(e.g. Q 22/al-Ḥajj: 39-40), initiating attacks but with limits (e.g. Q 2/al-Baqara: 194) and 
unconditional command to fight all unbelievers (e.g. Q 9/al-Tawba: 5).236 Despite 
appreciating the logic of the traditional framework, Firestone rejects it.237 He suggests 
that the overarching context that produced this schema was likely one where more 
militant factions within the Muslim community, promoting an aggressive posture, won 
out over nonmilitant factions in understanding these verses.238 Firestone offers a 
different organization of the verses, one he contends is “independent of traditional 
Muslim assumptions” as far as possible.239 This organization also divides the Qurʾān’s 
                                               
235 Mustansir Mir, “Jihad in Islam,” in Jihad and Its Times: Dedicated to Andrew Stefan Ehrenkreutz, eds. Hadia 
Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1991), 115. 
236 Firestone, Jihad, 51-60.  
237 Firestone, Jihad, 50. Firestone himself is less convinced of this theory considering it the product of an 
existing policy of empire. Ibid. His basis for rejecting the theory is the fact that it is premised on 
“occasions of revelation” (asbāb al-nuzūl), but he argues this does not align with the disagreement among 
jurists as to what occasion marked which revelation. Some jurists mention asbāb literature to provide 
context for a verse and in doing so disrupt the chronology that would be necessary for the verse to fit 
within an evolutionary theory of war. Eventually, Firestone contends, even statements in the Qurʾān that 
do not appear to refer to war are articulated as “divine pronouncements” on jihād by the post-Qurʾānic 
tradition. Ibid., 47. 
238 Firestone, Jihad, 68.  
239 Firestone, Jihad, 69.  
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verses into four parts: nonmilitant verses, verses restricting fighting, those expressing 
“conflict between God’s command and the reaction of Muḥammad’s followers,” and 
those “strongly advocating war for God’s religion.”240 
  In addition to the Qurʾān, the historical precedents set by Muḥammad also inform 
later legal thinking on jihād. The tradition records Muḥammad as having participated in 
at least twenty-seven military campaigns of his own and deputizing at least fifty-nine 
                                               
240 Firestone, Jihad, 69. Although an analysis of Firestone’s organization of these verses, as well as his 
critique of the traditional account, is beyond the scope of this project, a few brief comments seem 
necessary. In general, Firestone’s examination offers many useful insights into the framework that came 
to dominate the traditional understanding of these jihād verses. The excessive reliance on asbāb al-nuzūl 
literature clearly presents complications for scholars that want to advocate for an evolutionary theory, 
but are challenged by the dating of these occasions of revelation. It would be worthwhile to explore a 
larger sample of exegetes, even those in later centuries, to get a full sense of the extent of militancy 
projected back onto the Qurʾān. In particular, exegetes less reliant on asbāb al-nuzūl literature in their 
methodology would be particularly helpful, such as Zamakshārī or Rāzī. It would also be worthwhile to 
see whether jurists, such as Ibn Ḥazm, who rejected ideas like naskh, which was central to the classic 
doctrine, still espoused the evolutionary theory and on what basis. Some scholars, like Asma Afsarrudin, 
have begun this work already. With regard to Firestone’s own account, its primary challenge seems to be 
too atomistic in its approach to the Qurʾān. While Firestone avoids obtaining context through asbāb 
literature, he does not seem to take full account of the context the Qurʾān provides for its own verses. 
Unfortunately, he operates under the common assumption that the Qurʾān “provides virtually no 
historical contexts for its own messages” and thus ignores a crucial source of information on these 
verses: the Qurʾān itself. Firestone, Jihād, 70. However, recent scholarship on the Qurʾān presents a 
different picture, suggesting greater coherence and internal commentary within the text. See, for example, 
Angelika Neurwirth, Studien zur Komposition der mekkanischen Suren (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007) and 
“Structural, linguistic and literary features,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen 
MacAuliffe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Neal Robinson, Discovering the Qur’an 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004); Islam Dayeh, “Al-Ḥawāmīm: Intertextuality and 
Coherence in Meccan Surahs,” in The Qurʾān in Context: Historical and Literary Investigations into the Qurʾānic 
Milieu, eds. Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai and Michael Marx (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Mustansir Mir, 
“Continuity, Context and Coherence in the Qurʾān: A Brief History of the Idea of Nazm in the Tafsir 
Literature,” Al-Bayan, vol. 11, no. 2 (2013). 
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others, such that his biographers felt it necessary to have a term referring to this period 
in his life: maghāzī (raids).241 Of course, all of this fits in with the larger historical milieu 
of the time, one that reflected the close relationship between religion and warfare, so 
that by the end of the fourth century, even the “militant interpretations of the Christian 
message and mission” had become normative both for Roman policy and Christian 
communities.242 Hence, Islamic juristic discussions engage Qurʾānic imperatives and 
Muḥammad’s historical precedent in the above context in order to craft a doctrine on 
military engagement. Among other things, the doctrine included broad concerns over “a 
priori reasons for engaging in justified armed conflict” and issues of “humane conduct” 
                                               
241 Mourad and Lindsay, Sunni Jihad Ideology, 18. The term maqghāzī and its translation as “raids” can be 
somewhat misleading. As one scholar notes, the word “invokes the discrete locations of key battles and 
raids conducted by the Prophet and his followers, yet it also invokes a more metaphorical 
meaning...Maghāzi are also sites of sacred memory; the sum of all events worthy of recounting.” Sean W. 
Anthony, “Introduction,” in Maʿmar ibn Rāshid, The Expeditions: An early Biography of Muḥammad, trans. Sean 
W. Anthony (New York: New York University Press, 2014), xix-xx. It should also be noted that despite 
biographers having a special term for this period of the Prophet’s life, in general the sīra literature says 
very little about “military methods and technology.” John W. Jandora, “Archers of Islam: A Search for ‘Lost’ 
History,” The Medieval History Journal, vol. 13, no. 1 (2010): 98. 
242 Thomas Sizgorich, Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam 
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 5. As some scholars have noted, Constantine’s 
evocation of the “symbol of Christ in his military drive to seize Rome” was one of the acts that fixated a 
Christian holy war conception in late antiquity, that eventually “morphed into the high medieval crusade.” 
Philip Buc, Holy War, Martyrdom and Terror: Christianity, Violence and the West (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 25. The one major difference in the crusader period was that, unlike late antique 
holy war, they involved “ordinary believers, massively, both as combatants and as economic and spiritual 
supporters,” very similar to roles played in jihād. Ibid. 
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during armed conflict.243 Part of this discussion, and the central concern of this chapter, 
is what these discussions have to say about the legal duty of jihād, what it exactly 
entailed, who was obliged to participate, what limitations existed and which authorities 
regulated the duty.  
 
Defining Jihād through Purpose 
  Participation in jihād appears in the earliest discussions on kifāya-duties and is 
arguably the most substantive obligatory act that falls in this category. Various scholars 
have attempted to precisely define jihād and its objectives for legal purposes resulting in 
a definition that has grown increasingly robust over time. For example, when Shāfiʿī 
considers jihād he does so narrowly, defining its basic purpose as twofold: to prevent the 
enemy from entering Muslim territory and, subsequent to that, to send Muslims on 
military campaigns to convert disbelievers or impose a poll tax (jizya).244 Māwardī also 
provides a two-part definition, but includes the inner/outer dichotomy: “striving to 
subdue the enemy” and “strenuously striving to improve oneself.”245 Sarakhsī considers 
                                               
243 Afsaruddin, Striving, 34-35. These ideas roughly correspond to the notions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  
244 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 40. Cites Shāfiʿī’s Kitab al-Umm 4:90.9f. 
245 Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 114; Ibn Taymiyya also speaks of a jihād that is fought “against the 
desires of one’s own soul.” Interestingly enough, he classifies this as an individual obligation (farḍ ʿayn) 
whereas he considers jihād as armed struggle to be a collective duty (farḍ kifāya). Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-
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jihād, in the context of armed struggle, to be a far more robust duty than Shāfiʿī 
articulates, discussing it as an example of an act meant to “elevate God’s word and bring 
greatness to His religion.”246 Qarāfī goes further and describes jihād as a “significant act 
of worship” (min al-ʿibādāt al-ʿaẓīma). He says that because of the esteemed manner in 
which jihād is discussed within the ḥadīth, Mālik and his associates chose to include it 
alongside other acts of worship in their works (yurajjiḥ ikhtiyār Mālik wa-aṣḥābihi fī jaʿlihi 
fī al-muṣannafāt maʿ al-ʿibādāt).247 On the other hand, he claims that Shāfiʿī included jihād 
with other crimes (jināyāt) because he considered it a “punishment for disbelief” (ʿuqūbat 
ʿalā al-kufr).248  
 
State, Military and Jihād   
The “State” 
                                               
Fatāwā, vol. 10, ed. ʿĀmir al-Jazzār and Anwar al-Bāz (al-Manṣūra: Dār al-Wafāʾ li’l-Tibāʿ wa-l-Nashr wa-l-
Tawzīʿ, 2005), 357. In his classification, the jihād against one’s own desires is seemingly a more important 
obligation than participating in armed struggle. 
246 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 30, 262-63. 
247 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 383. 
248 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 383. It is not clear which of Shāfiʿī’s work Qarāfī is referring to because I was 
unable to find any reference in al-Umm which referred to jihād as punishment for a crime. At most it 
might be possible to draw that inference from the discussion relating to those people from whom the 
poll tax (jizya) cannot be taken and who must instead be fought until they convert or are killed. Shāfiʿī, 
al-Umm, vol. 5, 399-403. Furthermore, organizationally jihād does not appear alongside other crimes in al-
Umm, though it also does not occur earlier in the text with the other traditional acts of worship as it does 
in Mālik’s Muwaṭṭaʾ. Other scholars, such as Ibn Qudāma, do include it alongside the discussion of other 
crimes. Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, v. 5, 453. 
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   Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile to briefly examine my use of the term 
“state,” which appears periodically in the present study, but does not necessarily track 
modern definitions of the state.249 The term is a source of contention in many scholarly 
disciplines, including the field of Islamic studies.250 Despite the term’s inadequacies and 
continued debate, my use of “state” for the premodern Islamic context is not unique.251 
Of course, there is still need for caution, especially given the challenges inherent in 
describing a legal culture that operated in both a different language and time period as 
compared to the present. As Wael Hallaq succinctly notes:  
Our language fails us in our endeavor to produce a representation of that history 
which not only spoke different languages (none of them English, not even in 
British India), but also articulated itself conceptually, socially, institutionally and 
culturally in manners and ways vastly different from those material and non-
material cultures that produced modernity and its Western linguistic 
traditions.252 
 
                                               
249 For modern definitions, see, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2012), 96-103; 
John Hoffman, Beyond the State: An Introductory Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 19; Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 101–48; and, Max Weber, Economy and Society, 
trans. Ephraim Fischoff, et. al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 56. 
250 In theory, another term could be substituted such as “polity,” but stylistically “state” is more 
widespread and less burdensome on the reader. 
251 See, for example, Michael Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics: The Islamic Case in Comparative Perspective 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 1–3; Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 38–39; Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (2d ed. 2002); and, Roy 
Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
252 Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 1. 
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Scholars of Islamic history have offered different guidance on how to apply the 
term “state” to the premodern context and what pitfalls exist. For instance, Patricia 
Crone observes that in modern parlance the word “state” refers either to a “set of 
governmental institutions which constitute the supreme political authority within a 
given territory” or “a society endowed with such institutions, that is a politically 
organized society or polity.”253 However, she notes that “medieval Muslims had no word 
for states in either sense” and saw themselves “governed by persons rather than 
institutions.”254 It was not until the nineteenth century that an Arabic name, dawla, was 
given to a state “in both senses of the word.”255 That said, Crone acknowledges that 
despite the lack of a concept of the state, pre-Modern Muslims did have “governmental 
institutions” which conformed “roughly” to the concept.256 Fred Donner tries to 
complicate Crone’s definition arguing that since states are not “natural phenomena, but 
rather social ones,” such that each entity we define as a state will be different, the 
definition of the state can be modified based on “our needs and interests.”257 As a result, 
                                               
253 Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 3. 
254 Crone, God’s Rule, 4. 
255 Crone, God’s Rule, 4. 
256 Crone, God’s Rule, 4. 
257 Fred Donner, “The Formation of the Islamic State,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 106.2 (1986), 
283. 
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Donner proposes a definition of the state that is comprised of three main elements: “the 
ordering of power in a society,” “institutional structure” and “a concept of legal 
authority.”258 Based on this definition, he contests Crone’s claim that there was no notion 
of a state in this early period. Donner’s examination of “documentary” evidence, 
alongside literary sources, led him to place the formation of an “Islamic” state to a much 
earlier period than Crone.259 In his view, a state existed from the time of the reign of ʿAbd 
al-Malik (A.D. 685-705) and “probably existed back into the time of Muʿāwiya b. Abī 
Sufyān (A.D. 661-680),” in other words as early as 50 years after the hijra.260 Others, like 
Hugh Kennedy, have suggested that a more appropriate term for this type of polity in 
early Islam would be “empire” since it describes a “political system in which a dominant 
elite rules over a collection of countries in which different areas have their own ethnic 
and cultural identities” and where a “dominant ideology” is present.261  
Furthermore, it is also necessary to situate “state” in relation to law. For Hallaq, 
to study Sharīʿa means to speak of “law” and by extension the “state.” However, he argues 
that the modern conception of “state” is one that has embedded within it coercive power 
                                               
258 Donner, “Islamic State,” 283. 
259 Donner, “Islamic State,” 285. 
260 Donner, “Islamic State,” 293. 
261 Hugh Kennedy, “The Decline and Fall of the First Muslim Empire,” Der Islam 81 (2004), 3fn1. 
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and this frames our thinking about the state. As he notes, “modern scholarship proceeds 
with extraordinary innocence, unaware of the culpable dependency of its project on the 
ideology of the state.”262 Both terms, law and state, are problematic for Hallaq as they 
suggest an operating framework he considers far removed from the premodern Islamic 
context. For instance, Hallaq highlights one of the primary critiques of Islamic law by 
orientalists: the “clear and undoubtable liability” of failing to distinguish law from 
morality.263 His fundamental aversion to speaking of Islamic law in the context of the 
state arises from his view that the modern nation-state is such a drastic departure from 
premodern Islamic governance that it is impossible to connect Islamic law to the state. 
Specifically, he raises seven areas of incompatibility between Islamic law and the state, 
often consisting of similarity in function but difference in approach. For instance, he 
notes that they both are “machines of governance,” “legally productive mechanisms” 
and both claim “ultimate legal sovereignty.” In addition, he also notes differences, such 
                                               
262 Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 5. 
263 Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 2. It is unfortunate, and somewhat peculiar, that Hallaq relies exclusively on orientalist 
scholarship by non-lawyers for his assessment of modern law in the West. As a result, he does not 
consider the extensive scholarship by Western legal thinkers on the relationship between law and 
morality. It is far from a settled issue as Hallaq seems to imply. See, for example, Joseph Raz, “Authority, 
Law and Morality,” The Monist, vol. 68, no. 3 (July 1985); Michael Moore, “The Various Relations between 
Law and Morality in Contemporary Legal Philosophy,” Ratio Juris, vol. 25, no. 4 (2012); Lon L. Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); Paul H. Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and the Utility of Desert (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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as how hierarchy functions in each; the fact that the state promotes social engineering 
in a way Islamic law does not; that Islamic law is bottom up, while the state is top down; 
and, that Islamic law does not pursue homogenization of the social order.264 That said, 
even Hallaq routinely uses the term “state” to describe different polities in Islamic 
history.265 
For my purposes, the connection between Islamic law and the modern nation 
state has little bearing on my generic use of the term “state.” In my view the definition 
of state in the premodern Islamic context is a functional one: if an entity performs 
certain activities then the rights and responsibilities associated with political power can, 
in theory, be acquired. These activities include adjudicating disputes, punishing crime, 
regulating the marketplace, collecting taxes, administering religious services, engaging 
in warfare and negotiating external agreements.266 This conception is more expansive 
                                               
264 Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 361-365. Although Hallaq raises some important points in this comparison, it is hard to 
ignore that he essentializes Islamic law, and Muslim governance, across time periods and contexts, in 
order to create a neater juxtaposition with the modern state. This seems to obscure his recognition of the 
areas where the modern state and premodern Islamic polity shared core similarities, specifically 
regarding areas of law with a required role for state authority. For a more extensive exploration of the 
incompatibility, see generally, Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics and Modernity’s Moral 
Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
265 See, for example, his description of Medina as a “small state” or Yemen as a “vassal state.” Hallaq, 
Sharīʿa, 27. 
266 This is not far from what Donner proposes are the political institutions upon which the state’s legal 
authority rests: a governing group, army/police, judiciary, tax administration, and institutions to 
implement other state policies. Donner, “Islamic State,” 283. Donner also notes that the requisite 
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than the rigid, modern idea of a state: a centralized, administrative state with a hand in 
the affairs of even the remotest parts of its territory. As I discuss in the next section, 
although this modern conception cannot be applied to the premodern context, that does 
not mean that political authority was non-existent.267 Even more importantly, from the 
standpoint of intellectual history, the jurist’s conception of the state did not always 
mirror reality. In fact, their notion of the state was in some respects more robust. Hence, 
Hallaq’s conception of premodern Muslim governance is certainly “passive” when 
compared to modern governance, but does not account for a relatively active role jurists 
imagine for the state in the administration of certain areas of law, such as jihād.268 In this 
                                               
“ideological features of the state” must be in place and be linked to its institutional features. Donner, 
“Islamic State,” 289.  
267 Some scholars have suggested as much by the use of terms like “non-state actors” to describe 
individuals who were fighting on the frontiers. Robert Haug, “Frontiers and the State in Early Islamic 
History: Jihād between Caliphs and Volunteers,” History Compass 9/8 (2011): 634. While there was 
certainly independence from central control on the frontiers, the use of “non-state actors” is 
problematic for a few reasons. First, it suggests the absence of any common vision for military campaigns 
and instead the pursuit of independent objectives. This does not seem to be the case and instead the 
campaigns seem to be consistent with traditional caliphal pursuits in this realm. Second, the idea of non-
state actors in the jihād context also rests on the assumption that at some point in the early Abbasid era, 
religious scholars usurped the authority of the state in matters of religion, including jihād. However, this 
seems to now be recognized as an oversimplification. As Muhammad Qasim Zaman has shown “the 
caliph’s participation in religious life was not in competition with, or over and above that of, the 
emergent Sunni ‘ulamā’, but in conjunction with them.” Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “The Caliphs, the 
Ulama, and the Law: Defining the Role and the Function of the Caliph in the Early Abbasid Period,” Islamic 
Law and Society, vol. 4, no. 1 (1997): 4. 
268 This idealized role is particularly important since Hallaq seems to juxtapose the historical record of 
the Islamic state, as opposed to the jurist’s idealized notion, to argue for what Islamic law requires from 
the state. The jurist’s notion would arguably be a better measure for determining what the Sharīʿa 
requires.  
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context, Max Weber’s well-known definition of the modern state, offered in his 1919 
lecture entitled “Politics as a Vocation,” is particularly useful: “the state is the form of 
human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical 
violence within a particular territory.”269 He goes on to note that any other entity can 
only “assert the right to use physical violence” when the state “permits them to do so” 
and the state is the “sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.”270 This concept parallels 
the foundational premise of the premodern jurists’ discussion on jihād and a key 
prerequisite for violence: the presence of a “competent authority.” They even outline 
the conditions necessary for agents deputized with this authority by the ruler.271 
  
Military and the Islamic State until 15th century 
                                               
269 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2004), 
33. It should be noted that scholars like Wael Hallaq argue the opposite, suggesting that Islamic law “did 
not arrogate to itself monopoly over violence” and there was no attempt to subordinate society and the 
individual to the control of a higher political order. Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 365. However, as Donner notes, while 
states sometimes recognized that “under certain conditions and within certain limits the use of force 
between contending groups is permissible,” the state’s force is always “superior” to any other group. 
Donner, “Islamic State,” 283-284. 
270 Weber, Vocation, 33. 
271 For instance, Shāfiʿī outlines several qualities that the imām must consider when selecting a deputy to 
oversee the jihād, including being “firm of faith” (thiqa fī dīnihi), “brave in body” (shujāʿan fī badanihi), 
neither “hasty” (ghayr ʿajūl) nor “imprudent” (naziq), possessing “good sense” (ḥusn al-anāh), etc. Shāfiʿī, 
al-Umm, vol. 5, 390. 
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Turning from use of the term “state,” it is helpful to gain a broad sense of how 
Muslim fighting forces changed between the 7th and 14th centuries CE, including the 
evolution of their command and control. Examining juristic thought on jihād as a legal 
duty requires situating jurists within their historical context, which serves two primary 
purposes. First, it allows us to account for how jurists’ lived experience may have shaped 
their vision of state authority over the duty to fight. This “lived experience” is useful 
when it aligns with the legal framework that a particular jurist has constructed, as well 
as when the jurist departs from the prevailing practice of his time and advocates for 
another ideal. Second, while aware of the role that lived experience can have in juristic 
thought, they are also just as interested in constructing an ideal to aspire to. The reality 
of the Prophet’s lifetime is supremely important as the exemplar of all things Islamic. 
Hence, appreciating the nature of fighting forces and the authority over them during the 
Prophet’s lifetime may also explain the framework some jurists use as their starting point 
in the discussion on jihād.  
Broadly speaking, we know that premodern Islamic armies inherited from at least 
three military traditions: the Graeco-Roman/Early Byzantine, the Sassanian and the 
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Central/Southern Arabian.272 The initial Islamic fighting forces were largely made up of 
adult men from “Bedouin origins,” generally tracing their heritage to the tribes of 
Yemen.273 As a result, they had experience in various military activities, partly supported 
by the rich hunting heritage they came from. Hence, in comparison to “farmers and 
citizens of settled areas of the Near East,” these individuals were better versed in riding, 
archery, spearing and swordsmanship, such that they might be considered a “military 
population.”274 However, this meant that the division that eventually occurred, and 
became widespread, between civilians and the military did not exist in the context in 
which Islam first emerged. Instead, “all adult males were fighters” and it was only after 
later Islamic conquests, and the settlements that followed, that armies began to emerge 
as “discrete” groups.275 In addition, prior to Islam there does not seem to be any “system 
of renumeration” for fighting forces nor any “structure of command with coercive 
                                               
272 David Nicolle, Crusader Warfare Vol. II: Muslims, Mongols and the Struggle against the Crusades 1050-1300 AD 
(London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), xi. That being said, we are at a “relatively early stage” of 
scholarship on “military affairs of the medieval Islamic world” in comparison to its medieval 
counterparts. Ibid., ix. 
273 Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 1; see also, Nicolle, Warfare, 1-2. 
274 Kennedy, Armies, 1. 
275 Kennedy, Armies, 1. As Fred Donner has noted, it is often difficult to “disentangle” the military and 
civilian aspects of the early Islamic state because the first Islamic state had “all aspects of the 
community’s life” directed by the Prophet himself. Fred Donner, “The Growth of Military Institutions in 
the Early Caliphate and their Relation to Civilian Authority,” Al-Qantara, vol. 14 (1993): 311. 
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powers” outside each Bedouin tent.276 Each tent provided its own warriors with 
subsistence and weaponry, as opposed to some organizing power that did this; hence, 
other than the tribe, there was no “structure of command” or “regular payment” of 
troops at this time.277  
The extent to which this changed with Islam is still a matter of scholarly inquiry 
and one must be mindful of the possibility that later Muslim historians and jurists might 
project structure and organization back onto the earliest Muslim fighting units.278 In 
general, the state or caliphate that emerged was, as Chase Robinson has noted,  
a political and military unit, but one that was assembled by believer soldiers 
inspired to fight for God and His Prophet, and mustered and coordinated by men 
who had pledged their allegiance to a ‘commander of the faithful’ the caliph, 
God’s representative on earth.279  
 
Features of the pre-Islamic fighting forces persisted into the early military 
campaigns of the Prophet, which were often “small raids against specific objectives.”280 
Hugh Kennedy notes that the caliphs immediately succeeding the Prophet were the ones 
                                               
276 Kennedy, Armies, 1. 
277 Kennedy, Armies, 2.  
278 In other words, we have to be “wary of anachronistic detail drawn from military institutions of later 
times” that are then projected back. Donner, “Military Institutions,” 313. 
279 Robinson, “Conclusion,” 686. 
280 Donner, “Military Institutions,” 315. Military administration was also simple: troops fought for 
“religion, the prospect of booty and because their friends and fellow tribesmen” were also fighting. 
Kennedy, Armies, 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
who “organized and dispatched the armies which brought down” the Roman and Persian 
empires, even though none of them “led their armies in person.”281 Even as early as the 
Battle of al-Qādisiyya in 636 CE, there are accounts of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās, the Muslim 
commander, having “some sort of command structure” in which the amīr appointed 
“leaders” of various tribal units and divided the soldiers into “units of ten.”282 This ten 
man squad or ʿ irfāfa, was “at least initially, the Muslims’ base military unit.”283 By the time 
of this battle, there was also greater functional specialization in the Muslim military, 
with formations containing “distinct echelons” and units becoming “specialized in 
weaponry.”284 In the Battle of Ṣiffīn (657 CE), Muslim scholars report that ʿAlī tried to 
raise an army, assembling the leaders in the society and asking them to “write down” the 
                                               
281 Hugh Kennedy, Caliphate: The History of an Idea (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 8. 
282 Kennedy, Armies, 10. Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās was a muhajir from the Quraysh and seems to have been 
appointed by the caliph ʿUmar because he was an early companion of the Prophet and would help 
resolve a brewing conflict between al-Muthannā and Jarīr “over who was to command” Muslim troops in 
Iraq. Donner, Islamic Conquests, 203. The battle at al-Qādisiyya took place against Sassanian forces, which 
were defeated and then pursued to the Euphrates and it is considered a decisive battle in which Muslims 
had “broken the back of Persian resistance in central Iraq.” Ibid., 205. Subsequently, Saʿd’s forces pursued 
the Persians into the “cultivated alluvium (sawād) of central Iraq. Ibid., 209. Though there are some 
conflicting sources about how Saʿd organized his army, he appears to have “gone into battle in a well-
organized manner.” Ibid., 210. The battle is also important because it is considered to have the “fullest 
Arabic historiographic treatment of any ‘early’ engagement.” Jandora, “Archers,” 107. 
283 Jandora, “Archers,” 105. The ʿirfāfa might also be a useful unit for understanding what the state 
required in terms of fighting men from a town that wished to fulfill its kifāya-duty to fight. While the 
current study is focused on the theoretical doctrine of kifāya-duties, a future project hopes to examine 
references to implementation of the jihād-duty in the premodern period to produce a better picture of 
how the kifāya-duty functioned in practice.   
284 Jandora, “Archers,” 111. 
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fighting men they had, leading to almost 65,000 names being presented.285 That said, 
beyond just a more robust command structure, organized and established armies only 
came “decades” after the early military successes.286 
However, it was the later, larger campaigns that added new features to make the 
Muslim polity’s operations look more akin to “the army of a state” as opposed to “private 
forces” led by “individual tribal chiefs in pursuit of private interests.”287 By the reign of 
ʿAbd al-Malik (685-705), in the early 8th century CE, the military began to professionalize, 
allowing an army to emerge such that the state “maintained a standing force for defense” 
as opposed to requiring society to mobilize any time there was war.288 These forces were 
“carefully organized” and not “haphazard or ad hoc” groups of fighters.289  Arabic papyri 
indicate that an “allowance to the troops” (ʿaṭāʾ al-jund) was also created during this 
period and “specific tax-districts were responsible for supporting certain contingents of 
troops.”290 Hence, we can say, with some confidence, that by this stage “Muslim troops 
                                               
285 Kennedy, Armies, 9. 
286 Kennedy, Armies, 7. Part of this organization came earlier in the form of garrison cities (amṣār, sing. 
miṣr) in Kūfa, Basra, Fusṭāṭ and Jābiya. Ibid.  
287 Donner, “Military Institutions,” 315. 
288 Donner, “Islamic State,” 286. See also, Haug, “Frontiers,” 636. These professional armies were “imitated 
by provincial dynasties, and soon became the norm in the Islamic world” culminating in the armies of 
the Sāmānids, Fāṭimids, Ghaznavids and Seljuqs. C.E. Bosworth, “Military Organization Under the Būyids 
of Persia and Iraq,” Oriens, vol. 18/19 (1965/1966): 145. 
289 Donner, “Islamic State,” 286. 
290 Donner, “Islamic State,” 285. 
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were definitely an army,” as opposed to a “tribal migration.”291 This is confirmed even 
further once we enter the period of Muslim conquest, where the “very scale and success 
of the [Islamic] conquests themselves stand as evidence in favor of the traditional view 
that the Muslim armies coalesced rapidly.”292  
The role of Caliph, and what political authority he exercised, did not remain static 
over the centuries; it was subject to countless variations as the empire expanded. 
However, jihād remained an important measure of the Caliph’s authority from the start. 
During the initial period of transition between Umayyad and Abbasid rule, territorial 
expansion slowed, with military campaigns in Asia Minor coming to a halt, and the 
frontiers “opening up to local warlords,” occasionally joined by volunteers in 
“improvised ribāṭs (frontier forts).”293 The caliph al-Mahdī began the process of 
reasserting caliphal authority in this space by organizing campaigns on the frontier and 
                                               
291 Kennedy, Armies, 4.  
292 Donner, “Military Institutions,” 313. Centrally directed, large-scale expansionary warfare ceased being 
the primary activity of the caliphate by end of Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik’s (724-743) reign. Haug, 
“Frontiers,” 635. However, even prior to Hishām, commanders had a fair amount of autonomy to pursue 
campaigns, such as the expansion into Andalusia by the governor Musa b. Nuṣayr and his mawla Ṭariq b. 
Ziyad in 711. Of course, even as their power grew, these commanders remained deferential to the caliph, 
and paused their activities to respond to a summons back to Syria by the caliph al-Walīd. Paul M. Cobb, 
“The Empire in Syria 705-763,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, Vol 1: The Formation of the Islamic 
World, Sixth to Eleventh Centuries, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 
232. 
293 Tayeb al-Hibri, “The Empire in Iraq 763-861,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, Vol 1: The Formation 
of the Islamic World, Sixth to Eleventh Centuries, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011): 278. 
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leading one campaign in person in 780.294 Part of the strategy of this religious propaganda 
was to “set in place” the image of a warrior caliph who was “resuming the unfinished 
mission of the early Islamic conquests.”295 Al-Mahdī’s son, Hārūn al-Rashīd (786-809), 
seems to have taken this even further and is thought to have “more assiduously” 
undertaken “summer expeditions against the Byzantines” in comparison with his 
“predecessors or successors,” considering them an opportunity to “show himself as the 
military leader of the Muslims.”296 Hence, during what many consider the “golden age” 
of the Abbasids (750-809) “all aspects of Islamic military culture, organization, tactics, 
strategy and technology reached a remarkable level of sophistication.”297  
However, by 870, after the “second period of power” for the Abbasids, the “extent 
of caliphal authority was much reduced.”298 The expansion of the Islamic state, in both 
“size and complexity,” meant that caliphs started to delegate more of their “effective 
power to governors, tax agents, commanders, judges and the like,” but all of them only 
wielded “legitimate power…in so far as they served God’s caliph on earth.”299 Figures like 
                                               
294 Al-Hibri, “The Empire in Iraq,” 279. 
295 Al-Hibri, “The Empire in Iraq,” 279. 
296 Kennedy, Caliphate, 79. This was also the period when Ibn Mubārak (d. 797) is thought to have 
established the “religious theory and legal basis of jihād.” Ibid., 79. 
297 Nicolle, Warfare, 2. 
298 Kennedy, “First Muslim Empire,” 4. 
299 Robinson, “Conclusion,” 686. 
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Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn emerged, governor of Egypt from 868-884 CE and considered one of the 
first who became “to a large degree, independent of the central caliphate.”300 In 936, the 
Caliph al-Rāḍī instituted the post of amīr al-ʿumarāʾ, a “supreme military commander” 
and transferred many of the powers to govern that had commonly been associated with 
the Caliph. The arrangement he created lasted through the Buyid and Seljuq eras to the 
end of the 12th century.301 During the reign of the Abbasid caliph al-Nāṣir li-Dīnillāh 
(1180—1225 CE), there was an attempt to reassert “meticulous control over 
governance.”302 He sought to “rejuvenate the institution of the caliphate” in an attempt 
to solidify his political position by intentionally enhancing the spiritual claim of the 
Caliph on Muslims everywhere.303 However, by the start of the 11th century CE, Islamic 
territory was already fragmented and largely “under indigenous local rulers,” with 
various dynasties of Andalusians, Berbers, Arabs and Kurds exercising control over 
different parts.304 They maintained a symbolic deference to the Abbasid caliphate, but 
remained fairly autonomous. The more industrious of these local rulers, like the Buyids 
                                               
300 Michael Bonner, “Ibn Ṭūlūn’s Jihad: The Damascus Assembly of 269/883,” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, vol. 130, no. 4 (2010): 573.  
301 Mona Hassan, Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 
2016), 7. 
302 Hassan, Longing, 7. 
303 Hassan, Longing, 13. 
304 Noelle, Crusades, 18. 
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(934-1055) and the Seljuqs of Iran (1040-1196), even exercised dominance over the 
caliphate.305  
The extent of “centralization” of command over Muslim fighting forces is 
important for considering when they began to function like an army as opposed to 
separate fighting forces joined in a common effort. However, as touched on earlier, 
central command is conceived of differently in the premodern context than the modern 
one. Fred Donner speaks of a “broad spectrum of centralization,” dividing it up into three 
levels: conceptual, strategic and tactical. He notes that the absence of centralization at 
one level does not necessarily mean it will be absent at another level. For example, a 
“lack of Caliphal oversight over details of tactical disposition does not necessarily mean 
that the Caliphs had no strategic or operational oversight.”306 Over time, even as this 
caliphal oversight diminished significantly and governance became more decentralized, 
the office of the Caliph still represented and gave meaning to an imagined center, 
                                               
305 Buyid rule in Baghdad occurred from 945 and led to the “complete collapse of the administration of 
the Abbasid caliphate” for two generations. Kennedy, Caliphate, 129. 
306 Donner, “Centralized Authority,” 339. Paul Cobb has noted that it is perhaps better to refer to this 
process as “centralizing” as opposed to “centralization” since the “direct power of the caliph over 
provincial matters was at no time a fait accompli. Cobb, “Empire in Syria,” 241. 
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highlighting “the elusive desire for a righteous locus of central authority and leadership 
grounded in the Islamic tradition.”307  
Despite the ever-evolving lived reality, the ideal of the earliest Caliphs seems to 
persist in the Muslim imagination and fundamental to every conception of the caliphate 
over the centuries was an “idea of leadership which is about the just ordering of Muslim 
society according to the will of God.”308 As Mona Hassan notes, the caliphate was: 
an institution enmeshed with the early history of Islam, which circulated widely 
across Afro-Eurasia and created a shared sense of community among disparate 
peoples at the same time as it gave rise to differing and competing visions of the 
community’s past, present and future.”309  
 
The caliphate had a “deep-seated cultural” association alongside the political.310 
These “associations” often merged and among the consistently important tasks sought 
from the caliph was conferring titles on leaders of dynasties and emirates to legitimize 
their authority with a broader populace.311 For both political and cultural reasons then, 
many of the dynasties that came to exercise actual control of the caliphate “never 
claimed for themselves any special political authority independent of the caliph’s,” at 
                                               
307 Hassan, Longing, 13. 
308 Kennedy, Caliphate, xiii. Mona Hassan frames this as the “elusive desire for a righteous locus of central 
authority 
309 Hassan, Longing, 2. 
310 Hassan, Longing, 3. 
311 These titles included standard ones like that of vizier or commander (amīr), but also more descriptive 
ones like rukn al-dawla (pillar of the dynasty) or adud al-dawla (support of the dynasty). 
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least until the rule of the Seljuqs.312 Hence, the Buyids never displaced the Abbasids to 
establish a caliph from their own tribal or sectarian ranks because, among other reasons, 
it allowed them to acquire some “constitutional legitimacy.”313 Even when armies gained 
a measure of independence they often maintained a symbolic relationship with the state. 
For instance, the armies of the Ayyubid empire (1174-1250) were not “always loyal 
servants” but were “nevertheless an instrument of state.”314 
By way of further background, there are two primary categories of fighters in this 
early Islamic context.315 The first was the “volunteer” (mutaṭawwiʿ) who performed 
military service without compensation (ʿāṭāʾ), but who was apportioned parts of the war 
                                               
312 Deborah Tor, “The Political Revival of the Abbasid Caliphate: Al-Muqtafī and the Seljuqs,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, vol. 137, no. 2 (2017): 301. Tor argues the Seljuqs were an exception to this 
because the “legal fiction” of deference to caliphal power despite its diminished role could not be 
maintained by the Seljuqs who were “too powerful” to be seen as simply governors. In addition, they had 
also been responsible for “liberating” the caliphate from the Shiʿī Buyids. She argues that their expanded 
claim of “universal” political authority can be seen in their adoption of the title sulṭān which had 
previously been associated with the caliph alone. Ibid., 302-303. 
313 Kennedy, Caliphate, 130. 
314 R. Stephen Humphreys, “The Emergence of the Mamluk Army,” Studia Islamica, no. 45 (1977): 69. No 
single Ayyubid army existed subsequent to the death of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and instead there was a group of 
armies, each attached to different principalities. They were recruited and organized based on the 
“traditions, needs and capacities” of their particular principality. Humphreys, “Mamluk Army,” 70. 
Structurally, they did not have “units or subdivisions” and were generally “loose and improvisatory,” 
able to respond to the “needs of the moment.” Humphreys, “Mamluk Army,” 83. 
315 There are other categories and subcategories of soldiers as well, like the paramilitary groups known as 
the ʿayyar. See generally, D. G. Tor, Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry and the ʿAyyar Phenomenon in the 
Medieval Islamic World (Istanbul: Orient-Institut/Würzburg, 2007). However, for our purposes here the 
most important division is between those we might consider “salaried” fighters versus non-salaried 
fighters.  
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booty and promised divine recompense. The second category was the “non-volunteer 
fighter” (muqātil) who received a stipend, was registered in the dīwān and eventually 
formed the basis of a professional military class.316 That said, jurists were generally 
uncomfortable with the commodification of religious duties, like jihād, and many 
prohibited payment in return for fulfilling obligatory acts. For instance, Sarakhsī 
considers it impermissible to wage jihād as mercenaries for rent, in the sense of one 
individual hiring another individual for substitute performance, because you cannot 
“rent an act of worship or the performance of a religious duty.”317 Ghazālī also reports 
that the Shāfiʿīs reject the hiring of a Muslim to perform jihād on someone else’s behalf 
because jihād is a duty and cannot be transferred in that fashion.318 However, Ghazālī 
argues that the head of state (imām) is permitted to hire slaves for jihād (if their masters 
give permission), as well as hire people who don’t meet the legal standard for 
                                               
316 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 8-9 and 149. Māwardī refers to muqātila by a different term with a more 
implicit connotation of mercenary: mustarziqa. Māwardī, Kitāb al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya, ed. Aḥmad Mubārak 
al-Baghdāwī (Kuwait: Maktabah Dār Ibn Qutaybah, 1989), 48. He notes that they receive reward from the 
war booty according to their wealth and need. Ibid. It is not entirely clear how the kifāya-duty in theory 
was reconciled with these different categories of soldiers that eventually developed in practice. When 
discussing kifāya-duties, jurists do not seem to raise these different terms for the types of soldiers. While 
they clearly expressed reservations about mercernaries fulfilling the kifāya-duty, it is not clear that those 
individuals would lose the status of martyr if they were killed in battle. The prevailing assumption seems 
to be that in this regard there is no distinction.  
317 Sarakhsī, Sharḥ al-Siyar, 944.  
318 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 18. 
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performance of religious duties, for instance, minors and non-Muslims. As justification, 
he cites the fact that the Prophet permitted hiring Jewish fighters for certain military 
expeditions.319 Māwardī explains that the volunteer fighters do not receive anything 
from the war booty (fayʾ) but instead receive a portion of the ṣadaqāt (referring to zakat 
or the wealth tax levied on Muslims).320 
 
Jurists and the Ideal State 
Against this historical backdrop, jurists continued to actively try to “reconcile 
contemporary circumstances with the ideals of Islamic political theory” even as caliphal 
power abated in the tenth and eleventh centuries and the “idealized conception of the 
caliphate less and less mirrored reality.”321 In the process, regardless of the diminished 
political realities of the caliphate in real life, jurists tried to incorporate the caliphate 
“into Islamic law as a legal necessity and a communal obligation.”322 To some degree, this 
context suggests that jurists might have utilized the kifāya-duty as a way to navigate 
                                               
319 He gives the ruler broad latitude over the circumstances when it would be appropriate to hire people 
for jihād. Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 16. There is a fair amount of evidence of the non-Muslim participation in 
Muslim military campaigns during the premodern period despite no obligation existing for them to do so. 
See, Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, x-xi. 
320 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 48-49. This includes their cost of travel and other expenses. Ibid., 158. 
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between theory and practice: they articulate an overarching command structure over 
jihād, but leave space to accommodate various local realities.323 Thus, as will be shown 
later, a role is often articulated for the state in the expansion of territory and 
determination of how many forces are needed, but the practicalities of producing, 
equipping and sustaining these fighters was left to the tribal model; jurists remained 
silent on these matters. In fact, even as Islamic armies became more professional and less 
voluntary, jurists continued to articulate the duty as though the context was the same as 
the earliest period. Jurists do not mention compensated professional fighters when they 
speak of the jihād-duty even when those fighters had come to play a prominent role in 
military campaigns. One might hypothesize that increasing state control over jihād up 
through the caliph Hārūn, when it became a state institution, defined the contours of 
juristic speculation in this space. The Prophetic ideal combined with the subsequent two 
centuries of general emphasis by the caliphs on state oversight over jihād, left an 
indelible mark on juristic discourse on the jihād-duty. This became the ideal and despite 
changes in the organization of the military, jurists did not diverge from this as their base 
model. 
                                               
323 In fact, “Muslim sources suggest that the Caliphs in Madīna exercised a considerable degree of control 
over the armies of conquests.” Kennedy, Armies, 4. 
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An illustration of this juristic commitment to the ideal despite their lived 
experience was the scholarship of Māwardī, a jurist keenly aware of the political realities 
of his time, having been “active in the diplomatic service” of the Abbasid caliph Qāʾim (r. 
1031-1075).324 In that role, he negotiated various agreements with local Buyid and then 
Seljuq sovereigns, including securing bayʿa for the caliph in 1031 from Abū Kālījār, a 
powerful Buyid sovereign in Shiraz.325 Māwardī begins his Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya by stating 
that the “rulership (imāmah) is the task (mawḍūʿa) of the successors to prophethood who 
will defend the faith and manage worldly affairs (ḥirāsat al-dīn wa-sīyāsat al-dunyā). He 
goes on to note that whoever takes on these tasks is “obligated by consensus” to assume 
the mantle of ruler (wa-ʿaqduhā li-man yaqūm bihā fī al-ummah wājib bi-l-ijmāʿ).326 Having 
established the obligation of rulership, he notes that it is a kifāya-duty similar to jihād 
and seeking knowledge (fa-farḍuhā ʿalā al-kifāya ka-l-jihād wa-ṭalab al-ʿilm) and says that as 
long as one person from the governed takes up the position (idhā qāma bihā man huwa min 
                                               
324 Kennedy, Caliphate, 162. 
325 Kennedy, Caliphate, 162. 
326 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 4. He goes on to discuss whether this obligation is one that is reasoned (bi-l-ʿaql) or 
from revelation (bi-l-sharʿ). Those who advocate for reason argue that human beings naturally incline to 
submit to authority in order to prevent injustice, settle disputes and generally prevent chaos. Others 
argue that rulership is obligated by revelation because the imām is undertaking the commands of divine 
law. Ibid.  
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ahlihā) it is no longer obligatory for anyone else.327 If no one steps forward, then Māwardī 
says that two groups of people, and no one else, are responsible for addressing the 
situation: electors (who will choose an imām) and potential candidates for imām.328 He 
goes on to describe the conditions necessary to be an elector, as well as those needed to 
be an imām. Among the qualities an imām must possess are bravery and courage to 
“defend territory” (ḥimāyat al-bayḍa) and “wage war against enemies” (jihād al-ʿadūw).329  
Māwardī also discusses the extent to which authority over jihād can be delegated, 
noting that it is permissible for a wazīr (minister), appointed by the imām, to administer 
the waging of war himself (yajūz an yatawallā al-jihād bi-nafsihi).330 He must meet two 
general conditions though. First, the wazīr must keep the imām informed about any 
actions he takes in his name in order to avoid any threat of usurping his power. Second, 
the imām must proactively remain aware of what the wazīr is doing.331 Similarly, if an 
imām appoints an amīr over a particular portion of the territory, then that person 
acquires certain responsibilities including the obligation to wage war if the amīr is in a 
                                               
327 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 4. The obligation of having an imām is widely agreed upon by Sunni scholars. See, 
Hassan, Longing, 99-101. 
328 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 4-5.  
329 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 5.  
330 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 33.  
331 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 33.  
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territory bordering a hostile neighbor.332 However, the obligation to pursue an aggressive 
jihād against a hostile enemy is only triggered for an amīr of a frontier town if he receives 
permission from the ruler (lam yakun lahu an yabtadiʾ jihād illā bi-idhni al-khalīfa); no such 
permission is needed if the jihād is for defensive purposes due to an attack.333 Finally, 
Māwardī says that one of the obligations on fighters is that they are required to submit 
to the authority of the amīr and be obedient to his commands.334 
 Bearing the above in mind, the remainder of this chapter examines the jihād duty 
as a way to both appreciate different elements of this duty and inform the larger category 
of kifāya-duties. It begins by exploring discussions around jihād as a required duty versus 
an optional pursuit as well as questions relating to obligatory acts, as a whole, specifically 
the relationship between ʿayn (“individual”) obligations and kifāya (“collective”) duties 
in the jihād context. There is also some exploration of questions relating to who exactly 
bears legal responsibility for this duty and when it is triggered. Finally, the discussion 
concludes by examining how the jihād duty is regulated by both state and third parties. 
                                               
332 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 41.  
333 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 44. It should be noted that Māwardī uses the terms imāmah and khalīfa 
interchangeably throughout the text. As Mona Hassan points out, Sunni scholars would refer to the 
leader as “caliph (khalīfah) in his capacity of succeeding the Prophet’s guardianship over the 
community’s affairs, imām in reference to his leadership position, or amīr al-muʾminīn for his role in 
commanding the faithful.” Hassan, Longing, 99. 
334 Māwardī, Aḥkām, 66.  
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Jihād as a Legal Duty 
 Although the earliest legal works treat jihād as a kifāya-duty, and that is how it is 
treated in this chapter, the discussions around this duty indicate that at least two other 
opinions about the duty exist among pre-modern Muslim jurists. One set of jurists 
believe that a proper reading of the Qurʾān reveals that jihād is both an ʿayn-obligation 
and kifāya-duty.335 Furthermore, they note that the verses highlighting jihād as an ʿayn-
obligation abrogate those indicating it is a kifāya-duty and thus deserve precedence. 
Hence, these jurists interpret the jihād duty in very stringent terms: every person is 
legally responsible for carrying out the duty. On the opposite end of the spectrum a 
smaller group of scholars propose a more radical thesis: jihād is not a duty at all. Their 
argument is a linguistic one and centered on the claim that the Qurʾān’s discourse 
relating to jihād was read incorrectly. For them, the Qurʾānic text does not obligate but 
rather recommends (nadaba) that people participate in jihād.336 In other words, the 
                                               
335 Qarāfī quotes al-Māzarī who reports that Ibn al-Musayyab and others said that jihād was actually a farḍ 
ʿayn based on Q 9/Tawba:36. Qarāfī rejects this by suggesting that the verse in question was actually 
abrogated by Q 9/Tawba: 122 and Q 4/Nisāʾ:95. Qarāfi, Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 385. Baghawī mentions that Ibn 
ʿAbbās also felt Q 9/Tawba:122 abrogated verses requiring all believers must fight. al-Ḥusayn b. Masʿūd al-
Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna vol. 10, ed. Shuʾayb al-Arnā’ūt (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Salāmī, 1983), 375.  
336 Jaṣṣaṣ reports this as the view of Ibn Shubruma and Sufyān al-Thawrī. They specifically refer to the verse 
2/al-Baqara:216 {fighting is ordained for you (kutiba ʿalaykum al-qitāl)…}. They compare it linguistically to 
the verse 2/al-Baqara:180 {it is prescribed (kutiba ʿalaykum) that he should make a proper bequest to 
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instruction contains an “option” since it is possible to turn down an invitation whereas 
a duty must be performed. For these scholars jihād was purely voluntary with no notion 
of compulsion involved. The majority opinion lies somewhere in between these two 
positions: jihād is required to be performed by some individuals within a group, but not 
obligated on any specific one of them. As long as some carry out the duty, then it is 
completed for everyone else as well.  
  As previously mentioned, one of the earliest discussions of jihād as a duty is by 
Shāfiʿī. In al-Umm, he begins with a lengthy discussion of the phases prior to jihād 
becoming a duty, starting before Muḥammad’s prophethood to the requirement of hijrah 
(migration) and the permission (not obligation) to undertake jihād.337 He argues that jihād 
only becomes a duty once the Muslims attained numerical strength, as a consequence of 
their migration, that would allow them to confront their foes (quwwa bi-l-ʿadad lam takun 
                                               
parents and close relatives…} and suggest that the imperative form of the verb kataba operates with the 
meaning of “recommendation” in both verses. Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām, vol. 4, 311. Others primarily read kutiba 
ʿalaykum as “invariably paraphrased” as furiḍa ʿalaykum (“is commanded upon you”). Firestone, Jihad, 60. 
Jaṣṣaṣ also narrates a tradition, with disputed authenticity, that once Ibn ʿUmar angrily corrected 
ʿAbdullah b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ after he overheard him include jihād in response to a man’s request for a list of 
religious obligations. Ibn ʿUmar listed all the same obligations, but left out jihād. Similarly, he mentions 
this as the opinion of ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ and ʿAmr b. Dīnār. Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām, vol. 4, 311. The same story is 
reported by ʿAbd al-Razzāq, who says Ibn ʿUmar considered jihād a “good act” (al-ʿaml al-ḥasan) and not in 
the category of prayer, fasting, hajj, etc. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 5, 173. Ibn Rushd notes that this 
is the view of ʿAbd Allah b. al-Ḥasan. Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid, vol. 1, ed. ʿAbd 
al-Haqq al-Nadawī (Lahore: al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, 1984), 278. 
337 Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 5, 361-366. 
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qablahā fa-faraḍa Allāh ʿalayhum al-jihād).338 Shāfiʿī outlines two interpretations of the 
Qurʾānic command relating to jihād. Both interpretations center around jihād being an 
obligatory act; he does not contemplate it as anything but a duty. First, he outlines the 
position that jihād is an ʿ ayn-obligation, obligatory on everyone without exception, in the 
same manner as prayer.339 In this case, no one can perform the duty for anyone else. 
Second, Shāfiʿī presents the position that the obligatory act is collective, unlike prayer, 
and those who perform it get supererogatory merit, fulfill the duty for others, and 
remove other people’s liability (specifically, prevent them from being “sinful”).340 Shafiʿī 
himself supports the position that jihād is a kifāya-duty. His argument centers on Q 4/al-
Nisāʾ:95, which speaks about those who join the fight and those who stay behind both 
receiving a reward, noting that the verse’s literal implication is that the duty is 
incumbent upon everyone. However, Shāfiʿī concludes that no penalty exists for failing 
to fulfill this obligation since a later portion of the verse states, with regard to those who 
fight and those who stay behind, “He [God] has promised all believers a good reward.”341 
                                               
338 Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 5, 367. 
339 Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 363. Of course, this obligation is operational only after the pre-requisites for legal 
responsibility are met, for instance being mature, free, Muslim, etc. In addition, Shāfiʿī requires soldiers to 
bring his own “provisions, weapons, equipment and mount, all out of his own wealth.” Bonner, “Jaʿāʾil and 
Holy War,” 60. 
340 Shāfiʿī, Risāla, 362. 
341 Shāfiʿī, Risāla, 365. 
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He understands this to mean that staying behind does not imply a failure to fulfill the 
duty, because there is no penalty associated with it, but rather the very opposite: God 
promises both parties, fighters and those who stay behind, “a good reward.” For Shāfiʿī, 
this indicates a kifāya-duty, which is the same position held by later jurists.342 As further 
proof of his position, Shāfiʿī cites Q 9/al-Tawba:122, which states that “it is not right for 
all believers to go out [to battle] together: out of each community, a group should go out 
to gain understanding of the religion, so they can teach their people.” To support this 
point, Shāfiʿī notes that in various battles that Muḥammad fought, different Companions 
were reported to have stayed behind without suffering any repercussions, including ʿAlī 
b. Abī Ṭālib, who did not join the battle of Tabūk.343 
  Like Shāfiʿī, Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣaṣ (d. 981) interprets verses relating to jihād as 
specifying an obligatory act that everyone bears legal responsibility for until it is 
completed either by them or someone else. He discusses Q 9/al-Tawba: 38-39 as proof of 
a universal jihād duty since it strongly admonishes those who don’t join the fighting 
ranks: “if you do not go out and fight, God will punish you severely and put others in 
                                               
342 For instance, see Ismāʿil b. Yaḥyā al-Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998), 
353; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 2, 265; Ibn ʿ Abd al-Barr, Jāmiʿa bayān al-ʿilm wa-faḍilhu, vol. 1, ed. Abī al-Shabāl 
al-Zahīrī (Riyādh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1994), 60; Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-sanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 98; Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 5, 
453. 
343 Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 365. 
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your place.” Hence, liability for the jihād duty extends to those who stay behind.344 Of 
course, Jaṣṣaṣ is mindful of the potential contradiction that exists between this verse and 
other verses that carry no punitive consequences for failure to join the battle. As noted 
earlier, some scholars explain these verses by reading one verse as abrogating the other. 
However, Jaṣṣaṣ avoids this approach instead preferring to reconcile the verses by 
suggesting they contemplate different circumstances which lead to different types of 
duties. In particular, he emphasizes that an enhanced duty exists when one resides in the 
“frontier,” Muslim lands bordering enemy territory. Jaṣṣaṣ argues that the verses address 
two different situations involving people in frontier lands. First, if people residing in the 
frontier lands fail to take up arms against the enemy, despite being individually obligated 
to fight because of their geography, the jihād duty is triggered for everyone else until the 
borders are secure. In this scenario, since the primary people responsible for 
performance have been derelict in their duty, legal responsibility extends broadly to 
everyone outside the frontier. The second scenario is where the frontline is maintained 
and people in that region carry out the jihād duty. In this case, the duty does not extend 
to anyone else assuming the frontier fighters are sufficient to continue countering any 
threats. For Jaṣṣaṣ the duty here is collective; anyone from the “interior” lands (i.e. lands 
                                               
344 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 309. 
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beyond the frontier) who wishes to join the fight may do so, but it is also permissible for 
them to stay behind.345 Hence, he explains the two seemingly contradictory verses as 
addressing two different scenarios. 
  Other jurists also speak of jihād as a kifāya-duty. For example, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 
mentions a tradition where the Prophet is unable to secure a riding animal for every 
fighter that wishes to participate in the jihād, resulting in those people without a mount 
having to remain behind. More importantly, the Prophet also remains behind, leading 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr to conclude that the duty must be kifāya otherwise Muḥammad would 
not have exempted himself or permitted others to stay behind.346 Similarly, Ibn Rushd (d. 
595/1198) goes so far as to claim consensus (ʿijmā) among jurists with regard to jihād 
being a kifāya-duty as opposed to an ʿayn one. The only exception he notes is ʿAbd Allah 
b. al-Ḥasan (d. 145/763), who does not consider jihād obligatory, but rather optional. The 
evidence Ibn Rushd presents for the collective nature of the obligation is a combination 
of Qurʾānic verses and Muḥammad’s historical precedent of always leaving some people 
behind when he went out to battle.347 Qarāfī addresses the counter-argument by Ibn al-
                                               
345 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 310. 
346 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istidhkār, vol. 14, 292. 
347 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 278. Specifically, he cites Q 2/al-Baqara:216 as the basis of juristic 
consensus that jihād is an obligation and not voluntary: “fighting is ordained for you, though you dislike 
it. You may dislike something although it is good for you, or like something although it is bad for you: God 
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Musayyab and others that jihād is individually obligated based on Q 9/al-Tawba:36. He 
states that this verse should be considered abrogated by other verses including Q 9/al-
Tawba:122 (“it is not right for all believers to go out [to battle] together”) and Q 4/al-
Nisāʾ:95 (regarding those who stay behind being promised good).348 
 Kāsānī adds some additional layers to how the jihād duty should be understood. 
He notes that the jihād duty is collectively obligated in those situations where there has 
not been a general call to arms (al-nafīr al-ʿāmm); in other words, in its “latent” form. He 
bases this opinion on the verse previously mentioned that promises “the best (reward)” 
(al-ḥusnā) to those who go forth to battle as well as those who stay behind. Furthermore, 
he states that the duty to stay behind is in order to engage in promoting a better 
understanding of the faith, which Kāsānī implies is individually obligated. Like Ibn ʿAbd 
al-Barr, Kāsānī mentions the fact that the Prophet did not participate in certain types of 
military expeditions (sarāyā) he dispatched. Hence, for him, it is inconceivable that the 
jihād duty be an ʿayn-obligation in all circumstances.349 Kāsānī says that, when there is a 
general call to arms due to an enemy attack, only then is fighting obligatory for every 
                                               
knows and you do not.” He then cites Q 9/al-Tawba:122 (previously quoted) as the reason why it is a kifāya-
duty as opposed to an ʿayn-obligation. 
348 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 385. 
349 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 98. 
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able-bodied Muslim. Furthermore, in this scenario, even individuals in subordinate 
relationships, like slaves, can answer the call without permission of those with authority 
over them.350 
 The opinion that jihād does not constitute a duty seems to have been a minority 
opinion, although it was apparently held by luminaries like Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 778).351 
Jaṣṣaṣ also mentions the narrative in which Ibn ʿUmar corrected ʿAbdullāh b. ʿAmr b. al-
ʿĀṣ’s opinion on what constitutes a religious obligation. In this instance, a man 
approached ʿAbdullāh and asked him what acts were obligatory. In response, ʿAbdullāh 
noted the five standard individual obligations – confession of faith, performance of 
prayer, paying the charitable tax, undertaking the major pilgrimage (ḥajj), and fasting in 
Ramadan. However, he also added “jihād for the sake of God” as a sixth obligation. This 
last point apparently angered Ibn ʿUmar, who had been within earshot of this 
conversation. As a result, he interjected and answered the question himself, listing the 
same obligations, but leaving out jihād.352  
 Similarly, Jaṣṣaṣ cites another narration in which ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ (d. 734/35) 
was asked whether military raids were obligatory and he, along with ʿAmr b. Dīnār (d. 
                                               
350 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 98; Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 12; Samarqandi, Tuḥfat al-Fuqahāʾ, vol. 3, 294. 
351 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 311. 
352 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 311. 
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744), responded “we didn’t know it to be such.”353 However, Jaṣṣaṣ felt there was a subtext 
to the opinions of Ibn ʿUmar, ʿAṭāʾ, and ʿAmr b. Dīnār that jihād is not a duty: it is not 
obligatory on everyone, in the same way as fasting or prayer, but is still a kifāya-duty. 
Jaṣṣaṣ, and others, reconcile statements that seem to disassociate jihād from the category 
of obligatory acts by qualifying what their predecessors meant by the term “obligation.” 
He argues that their use of the term “obligation” in certain contexts denotes obligatory 
acts that people are individually responsible for, but not ones in which there is collective 
responsibility.354 Jaṣṣaṣ supports this qualification by mentioning another tradition of Ibn 
ʿUmar in which a man came to him and declared that he would not join the military 
expedition because Muḥammad had only required Muslims to fulfill five obligations and 
jihād was not one of them. Ibn ʿUmar affirms this view, but says that “the Prophet 
abridged the obligations to just these five because what he intended to refer to were 
obligatory acts that were not collective.” Ibn ʿUmar goes on to note that “commanding 
the right and forbidding the wrong, carrying out the ḥudūd punishments, learning 
religion, washing the dead, wrapping and burying them” are all obligatory acts, but the 
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Prophet does not include them in the five obligations he mentioned because, in that 
instance, he was speaking of ʿayn-obligations.355 
 
Kifāya-duty versus ʿayn-obligation  
 As mentioned previously, the legal literature contains discussion of how jihād can 
be both a kifāya-duty and ʿayn-obligation. In general, the literature focuses on two 
primary areas of inquiry. First, whether the origins of an obligatory act indicate that it 
began as an ʿayn-obligation or a kifāya-duty. Second, whether it is possible for a kifāya-
duty to be transformed into an ʿ ayn one and, if so, how this would take place. With regard 
to the first question of origins, Ibn al-Jawzī puts forward an interesting framework for 
the stages through which the jihād duty passed. He begins by stating that fighting was 
initially prohibited, basing this on the Qurʾānic injunction in Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:77 that 
instructs believers to “drawback your hands” (kaffū aydīkum) in a posture of restraint.356 
The next stage involved the imposition of the jihād duty for everyone based on the verse 
Q 9/al-Tawba:41 that seems to require everyone to go forth. Finally, he states that the 
duty evolved such that if some performed it then it was no longer required for everyone 
                                               
355 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 313. 
356 Ibn al-Jawzī, Nawasikh al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥammad Ashraf ʿAlī al-Malabārī (Medina: Al-Majlis al-ʿIlmī, Ihyāʾ 
al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1984), 194. 
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else. Ibn al-Jawzī tries to explain that in the final analysis the correct position is that the 
jihād duty is in fact obligatory for everyone, but that the burden of the duty can be 
removed through its performance by some.357  
 
Originally kifāya or ʿayn? 
 Mawārdī raises the question of whether jihād was originally an ʿayn-obligation 
and then became kifāya or whether it has always been kifāya. He recounts an opinion 
attributed to Abū ʿAlī b. Abī Hurayra, who argued that legal responsibility for the jihād 
duty lies with the individual based on Q 9/al-Tawba:41, which speaks of going forth to 
battle regardless of whether you are “light or heavy.” The suggestion here is that “light” 
and “heavy” are descriptions of the quality of fighters, representing opposite ends of a 
broad spectrum and thus indicating that everybody is included. Mawārdī describes seven 
different explanations scholars make for the terms “light” and “heavy,” each 
explanation casting a wide net over various populations including rich/poor, young/old, 
mounted/marching and healthy/sick.358 To support individual responsibility for the jihād 
duty, Mawārdī also discusses Q 9/al-Tawba:118 in which three people are apparently 
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“forgiven” for voicing “opposition” to jihād on one occasion during Muḥammad’s 
lifetime. After offering a few interpretations of what their opposition might have 
entailed, Mawārdī uses the specific event that gave rise to their opposition, the Tabūk 
military expedition, to explain why the duty triggers individual responsibility. In that 
expedition, Muslim forces were said to number 30,000 people. Mawārdī argues that if the 
duty had been kifāya then surely 30,000 troops would have been sufficient and the 
absence of three soldiers would not have resulted in a rebuke or the need for forgiveness. 
359 Shīrāzī, on the other hand, offers a response that aims to address questions of this 
nature.360 He notes that the needs of a fighting force are determined by the governing 
authority and the state may have determined the sufficient number of troops required 
for this particular expedition were greater than 30,000, thus requiring every able-bodied 
person in the vicinity to participate in order to satisfy the kifāya-duty.361 Hence, in this 
case, three soldiers would not be negligible. In addition, there may also be a legal 
distinction between liability incurred for silently staying behind despite being aware of 
                                               
359 Ibid., 111. 
360 By way of background, Shīrāzī moved from Mesopotamia to the Mecca under Mamluk suzerainty, 
taught there and grew in fame. He benefited from the “munificence and patronage” of the sulṭāns that 
came to power in Cairo and “continued to uphold and venerate the Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo as the 
bedrock of all society and politics.” Hassan, Longing, 131. 
361 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269-270. 
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the military campaign, versus affirmatively refusing to fight and thus impacting the 
morale of other fighters. Mawārdī offers a scenario that would reconcile the issue: the 
duty may have been individualized for those three people while being a kifāya-duty for 
everyone else.362 In other words, in military engagements different actors can have 
different levels of legal responsibility with regard to the duty to fight.  
 Mawārdī also advances arguments as to why the jihād duty has always been kifāya. 
He bases his opinion on Q 9/al-Tawba:122 which notes that “it is not right for all the 
believers to go out [for battle].” In his view, this verse suggests that the duty was kifāya, 
not ʿayn.363 However, Mawārdī’s own view was that jihād originated with both ʿayn and 
kifāya responsibility. He states that jihād was an individual obligation for “the emigrants” 
(muhājirūn), those people who followed the Prophet to Medina from Mecca, but his 
reasoning as to why this was the case is not entirely clear. He argues that it was an ʿayn-
obligation because these emigrants were “deeply devoted to the idea of seeing the 
Prophet victorious” and were with him from the start.364 Hence, in arguably the first 
major military engagement of the nascent Muslim polity, the Battle of Badr, the fighting 
force was primarily made up of these emigrants; everyone else was exempt because jihād 
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was only a kifāya-duty for them.365 However, Mawārdī notes that subsequent to that 
initial period, where jihād functioned both as a kifāya-duty and ʿayn-obligation, the duty 
came to operate only as a kifāya one.366  
 Mawārdī was not alone in concluding that jihād functioned as both a kifāya-duty 
and ʿ ayn-obligation in the earliest period. Ghazālī similarly maintained that jihād is kifāya, 
but was an ʿayn-obligation for the Prophet’s immediate Companions (ṣaḥāba).367 In fact, 
even those instances where the Companions reportedly failed to join the forces being 
deployed they were not perceived as abdicating their duties. Instead their absence was 
framed as the performance of another type of jihād: guarding the city.368 Similarly, 
according to Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArābī, both ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ and al-Awzāʿī believed that 
fighting was individually obligatory on the Companions while being a kifāya-duty on 
everyone else.369 
 
The Issue of Proximity: From Kifāya to ʿAyn  
                                               
365 Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 112.  
366 Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 112. 
367 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. 
368 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 5. 
369 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 1, ed. Muḥammad ʿ Abd al-Qādir ʿ Aṭāʾ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
2003), 205. 
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 As mentioned in earlier chapters, jurists also envision kifāya-duties transforming 
into ʿayn-obligations in a given set of circumstances.370 This is true for the jihād duty as 
well, especially in three scenarios: circumstances where the jihād duty’s performance has 
been initiated, where inhabitants of frontier territory under Muslim sovereignty come 
under attack and situations involving sudden encounters with enemy forces. In the first 
case, the jihād duty transforms into an ʿayn-obligation for an individual as soon as they 
initiate performance. For jurists, every kifāya-duty becomes an ʿayn-obligation once 
someone takes substantial steps towards satisfying the duty. In the jihād context, jurists 
differ as to when exactly performance can be considered “initiated” with views ranging 
from as soon as the army begins to march to when one enters the battlefield. This 
condition of “obligation through initiation” proved particularly important in the context 
of cases involving substitution (jaʿāʾil): having someone else perform the duty on your 
behalf.371 Shīrāzī discusses cases where people attempt to transfer their jihād duty to 
                                               
370 There is some mention of this in the secondary literature as well, but the discussion is often incomplete. 
Rudolph Peters mentions three instances where jihād becomes an ʿayn-duty: appointment by the caliph, 
swearing an oath to fight and defending one’s region if it is under attack. Rudolph Peters, Jihad, 3-4.  
371 Substitution, in the sense of military substitute (juʿl), seems to be “first clearly attested” in the reign of 
Muʿāwiya, but there were “scattered references” prior to this as well. In the battle of Badr, “one of every 
two warriors” stayed at home and Abū Bakr even summoned an “army of substitutes” in his caliphate. The 
early references to substitution were referred to as badīl, which contains differences from the later concept 
of jaʿāʾil. Bonner, “Jaʿāʾil and Holy War,” 47. 
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someone else, at times in return for compensation.372 In his opinion, this transfer is not 
valid because once the substituted individual is present on the battlefield the duty 
becomes ʿayn for him. In other words, it is no longer possible for him to satisfy a duty on 
behalf of someone else because he is now legally responsible for the duty himself. For 
Shīrāzī, the jihād duty’s exact nature, kifāya or ʿayn, depends on proximity to an area of 
conflict: being present in the conflict zone automatically obligates a person individually 
regardless of why they joined the battle.373 This speaks to the spatial requirement that 
exists for two key kifāya-duties, the duty to rescue and jihād; a sufficient number of people 
in proximity to where performance must take place are obligated to act. The Qurʾān refers 
to this spatial requirement in Q 9/al-Tawba:123: “You who believe, fight the disbelievers 
near you (alladhīna yalūnakum min al-kuffār) and let them find you standing firm: be aware 
that God is with those who are mindful of Him.” 
                                               
372 In general, leasing individuals to fight on your behalf was not permitted by jurists. For instance, 
according to Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī, Awzāʿī did not allow someone to be hired for the purpose of fighting 
(samiʿnā ʿannahu la yasham li-l-ʿabīd wa-l-ujarāʾ). He also did not require the participation of slaves (ʿabīd), 
blacksmiths (ḥaddād) and farriers (bīṭār) in this category. Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī, Kitāb al-Siyar (Beirut: 
Muʿasasat al-Risāla, 1987), 193-94; see also, Bonner, “Jihad on the Arab-Byzantine Frontier,” 21. There are 
several ḥadīth from the early period as well that make a distinction between someone who stays back from 
war, but provides a donation to a fighter versus someone who hires someone else to go in his place. Bonner, 
“Jaʿāʾil and Holy War,” 52. Unlike hiring someone, donations do not involve a quid pro quo. 
373 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 266.  
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 Other jurists also hold similar views regarding the impact of initiating (shurūʿ) 
performance on the nature of the duty. Sarakhsī advocates for an arguably stricter 
position with regard to when initiation occurs, suggesting that as soon as someone steps 
forward the jihād duty is assigned to them individually (wa-huwa in kāna farḍ kifāya fa-man 
bāsharahu yakūn muʾaddiyyan farḍan ʿ alayhi).374 Ibn Qudāma suggests that jihād can become 
an individual obligation even if the initiation of performance was unintentional, such as 
an unexpected encounter with enemy forces;  in this case, whoever is present is required 
to fight.375 Ghazālī also engages the question of whether “initiation” of a kifāya-duty 
transforms it into an ʿayn-obligation particularly in the case of jihād. He says that some 
of his colleagues believe the kifāya duty becomes ʿayn as a result of initiation and, 
subsequently, those people who have reached the age of maturity must complete the 
performance (man anisa fī al-taʿalum rushdan fī nafsihi lazimahu al-itmām). Hence, he says 
that even the funeral prayer becomes individually designated through commencement 
of the act.376 On the other hand, Ghazālī reports Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Qaffāl’s (d. 975) 
opinion that funeral prayer cannot become an ʿ ayn-obligation through initiation because 
                                               
374 Sarakhsī, Sharḥ al-Siyar, vol. 3, 74. 
375 Ibn Qudāma, Kāfī, vol. 5, 456. 
376 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 11. Nawawī also reports Ghazālī stating that “all collective duties are individualized 
on the basis of initiating performance” (al-ṣahh anna al-ʿilm wa-sāʾir furūḍ al-kifāya tataʿayyan bi-l-shurūʿ). 
Nawawī, Rawḍa al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 7, 416. 
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unlike other obligatory acts, prayer is one complete action (al-ṣalāt khuṣla wāḥida) that 
cannot be split into parts.377 Nawawī’s remarks in this regard are quite similar to 
Ghazālī’s, even at times replicating the same language. He states categorically that the 
jihād duty becomes “assigned to” any person that initiates performance of the duty as 
part of the fulfillment of their kifāya-duty (al-jihād yaṣīr mutaʿayyanan ʿalā man huwa min 
ahl farḍ al-kifāya bi-l-shurūʿ).378  
 The other main scenario in which jurists allow the jihād duty to transform from 
collective to individual involves an enemy attack on a particular locality, usually on the 
frontier of Muslim territory. This is a classic defensive scenario where, among other 
things, the preliminary steps for determining the requirements of a kifāya-duty (i.e. how 
many forces, from which localities) are not possible given the imminent nature of the 
attack. The situation’s urgency requires everyone in proximity to the attack to engage in 
the fight and there are a variety of opinions that jurists put forward to regulate this 
scenario. One of the central questions underlying their discussion is when exactly the 
transition from kifāya-duty to ʿayn-obligation takes place. There seems to be an implied 
consensus that if enemy forces actually enter a Muslim city then it becomes immediately 
                                               
377 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 11. 
378 Nawawī, Rawḍa al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 7, 416. 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
obligatory for everyone to rise to its defense. However, differences exist as to the duty 
prior to the enemy’s actual entrance into the city.  
 Ibn Qudāma notes that in those instances where “disbelievers set up camp in 
Muslim land” (nazala al-kuffār bi-balad al-Muslimīn) it is obligatory for its inhabitants to 
resist through armed force. He does not consider it permissible for any inhabitant to 
disengage unless they must secure “family,” “property,” or “wealth,” and alternatively, 
if the local authority (amīr) has “forbidden them from engaging in the battle.”379 Mawārdī 
frames his opinion somewhat similarly but with an important distinction. He notes that 
jihād becomes obligatory where forces are necessary both to resist enemy seizure of 
Muslim-controlled lands and to help secure Muslim lives and property. He does not 
convert the duty from kifāya to ʿayn immediately, but rather places it initially as a kifāya-
duty for everyone. However, for Mawārdī the key to transitioning the duty is not 
necessarily the location of the enemy, whether they are in the city or on its outskirts, but 
the persistence of the attack. If the attack persists and threatens to place frontier lands 
in the possession of hostile forces, Mawārdī broadens the jihād duty and individually 
obligates it for “all able-bodied inhabitants of the besieged land.”380  Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr is 
                                               
379 Ibn Qudāma, Kāfī, vol. 5, 456. 
380 Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 112-113. It should be noted that he continues to hold it as a collective 
duty for everyone else. 
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in agreement, noting that if the enemy attack continues, then the duty becomes 
individually designated on “every person in that vicinity” especially those with the 
“requisite strength necessary to achieve victory” regardless of whether they are “lightly 
armed” and “young.”381   
 Nawawī mentions three scenarios prior to the actual entrance of the enemy that 
will convert jihād as a kifāya-duty to an ʿayn-obligation: if the disbelievers “set foot on 
Muslim land” (fa-idhā waṭiʾa al-kuffār baldah li-l-muslimīn),  “shed innocent blood” in the 
land (aṭallū ʿ alayhā) or “set up camp outside its gates, but not enter” (nazalū bābahā qāṣidīn 
wa-lam yadkhulū).382 The ʿayn-obligation is based on the capacity of the individual and has 
two levels. The first is for each person, rich or poor, to gather and prepare for battle 
based on their ability. The second is where they are surrounded by the disbelievers and 
it is not possible to gather and prepare. In that case, whoever comes across a disbeliever 
and knows that he will be killed if caught, it is obligatory upon him to escape and 
preserve his life.383 In fact, Nawawī notes that it is permissible to surrender in these 
circumstances as well with one interesting exception: a woman who feels surrendering 
                                               
381 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istidhkār, vol. 14, 292. 
382 Nawawī, Rawḍa al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 7, 416. He does note that this opinion is not shared by everyone, for 
instance, Ibn ʿAbī Hurayra believed it was still a collective duty. 
383 Ibid.  
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would lead to her being physically violated (imtaddat al-aydī ilayhā) should continue to 
fight.384 Al-Ḥusayn b. Masʿūd al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122) says that jihād is individually 
obligated in situations where the enemy actually “enters the homes of some Muslims” or 
descends on the gates of a city under Muslim control. In these instances, the jihād duty 
applies to every able-bodied man in the particular town under attack, regardless of that 
person’s status.385 Jaṣṣaṣ explains that the jihād duty converts from kifāya to ʿayn even in 
hopeless situations. He engages an interlocutor’s question as to whether it is better to 
fight jihād against the nonbelievers or seek knowledge. Jaṣṣaṣ responds that for those 
situations in which there is a fear of the enemy “disgracing” Muslims or overpowering 
them or when an insufficient number of people are available to defend the land, jihād 
becomes an individual duty and preferred to the pursuit of knowledge (idha khīfa maʿarrat 
al-ʿadūw wa-iqdāmuhum ʿalā al-muslimīn wa-lam yakun bi-izāʾihi man yadfaʿuhu fa-qad 
taʿayyana farḑ al-jihād ʿalā kull aḥad).386  
 Ghazālī individualizes the jihād duty in these defensive contexts, specifically 
requiring performance from both able-bodied men and women.387 While many scholars 
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385 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna vol. 10, 375. 
386 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 318. 
387 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 11. 
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place the duty on the “inhabitants” of the frontier generally, Ghazālī mentions women 
specifically, presumably to stress a more important point about the rights that third 
parties might have on an individual and the corresponding duties they are owed. 
Ordinarily, a woman would need permission from a guardian, a husband or parent, to 
participate in jihād when it is a kifāya-duty.388 However, in situations where an attack has 
occurred and there is no time to prepare, third party rights are suspended in favor of the 
locality’s need for defense. In other words, everyone, regardless of their social status, is 
required to fight and the ordinary constraints that previously limited an individual’s 
involvement are no longer valid.389 Hence, groups normally exempt from the jihād duty, 
like slaves and married women, are required to perform it, if they possess the requisite 
strength, regardless of whether they receive permission from their masters or husbands, 
respectively.390 Shīrāzī also creates a similar exemption. He notes that once an enemy 
attack gets to the point where a Muslim population is “surrounded,” the kifāya-duty 
becomes ʿayn and standard pre-requisites for participation in jihād are suspended. In 
particular, he emphasizes that there is no longer a requirement to seek the permission 
of one’s creditors and parents prior to engaging in battle, despite both groups of people 
                                               
388 The same holds true for sons with regard to their parents. 
389 Ibid., 12. 
390 Ibid., 11. 
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having rights over you. The reason is simple: seeking permission to defend oneself from 
an imminent attack is a formula for “self-destruction.” As a result, in this situation the 
“right” of self-defense for a besieged town’s inhabitants takes precedence over any rights 
that parents or creditors might have over them.391 
 In addition to the duties of the frontier inhabitants, jurists also sought to explain 
the level of responsibility for those residing outside the frontier. For instance, Ghazālī 
requires non-frontier participation only if the kifāya-duty is not adequately addressed 
without it.392 Similarly, Baghawī states that Muslims who reside outside a besieged town, 
but are the nearest fighting force, will be collectively bound to join the fight if the 
townspeople under attack cannot adequately fulfill the duty. However, if the 
townspeople are sufficient, then “outside” help is classified as optional, but not as a 
duty.393 Jaṣṣaṣ explains that where people in the frontier fear the enemy, lack the ability 
to resist and fear for their lands and offspring, then the duty automatically extends to 
the entire “community,” which must respond promptly.394 He also placed responsibility 
on those people that “remained behind” and let others fulfill the collective duty, noting 
                                               
391 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269-270. 
392 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 12. 
393 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna, vol. 10, 375. 
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the opinion of Ibn Shihāb that people who stay behind are required to remain “alert” so 
they are ready to respond should they be called on to assist in the frontier.395 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn 
al-Samarqandī (d. 593/1144) considers jihād to be kifāya, but configured differently for 
the people who are on the borders between Muslim land and hostile territory. If the 
people on the front lines do not participate and the people in nearest proximity to them 
don’t participate, then the jihād duty becomes obligatory, either in the form of fighting 
or supplying provisions, for everyone who is able.396  
 Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148) configures the kifāya and ʿayn relationship 
slightly differently in this context. He suggests that if Islam is dominant, then the duty 
is kifāya. However, if the enemy is dominant in a particular locality, then fighting is an 
ʿayn-obligation on everyone.397 Kāsānī shares the views stated above, but makes an 
interesting, though straightforward, assertion with regard to the regulatory authority of 
the state. He notes that while normally any jihād duty can only be discharged with 
specific instruction from the “leader” (imām), in cases of imminent attack the inhabitants 
of a besieged town do not need to wait for the state’s instruction as long as they are 
capable of handling the hostile situation themselves. However, if they are too weak, then 
                                               
395 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 312. 
396 Samarqandī, Tuḥfat al-Fuqahāʾ, vol. 3, 294. 
397 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 1, 205. 
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the duty falls on the people in closest proximity to the besieged town and presumably, 
based on how the situation develops, the state would determine whether the duty 
required additional support in order to be fulfilled.398 While this affirms the role of the 
state in regulating jihād as a whole, behavior independent of the state in these situation’s 
is conditioned on a locality’s ability to secure its own defense. 
 
The Obligor 
 A key component of discussions on the jihād duty is focus on determining who 
precisely is obligated to fight. As with every other legal duty, the general prerequisites 
for legal responsibility must first be met: being Muslim, mature of age, sane, a male, free 
and able (anna al-jihād lā yajib illā ʿalā muslim bāligh ʿāqil dhakar ḥurr mustaṭīʿ).399 According 
to Ibn Rushd, there is no dispute that jihād is obligatory on free men, who have reached 
the age of maturity, have the means to go to war, are of sound health, and have no 
illness.400 Ibn Qudāma also lists five similar conditions that must be met prior to engaging 
in jihād: legal capacity, absence of physical deficiency, free status, being male, and 
                                               
398 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 98.  
399 Nawawī, Rawḍat, vol. 7, 412. For a more extensive discussion, see also, Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 367-369. 
400 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 278. 
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physical capacity.401 Qarāfī puts forward six pre-requisites for carrying out the jihād duty: 
being Muslim (islām), mature (bulūgh), sane (ʿaql), free (ḥurriyya), male (dhukūra) and 
physically, as well as, financially capable (istiṭāʿa).402 Once these are satisfied, then the 
requirements specific to the jihād duty arise. In the jihād context, the idea that not 
everyone has to fight is reinforced by a Qurʾānic verse explicitly stating as much.403 Shāfiʿī 
notes that as long as someone with capacity undertakes jihād the duty is fulfilled and he 
allows people to refrain from putting their name forward for jihād when others can fulfill 
the obligatory act for them.404  
 Furthermore, according to Ibn Ḥazm, during a military engagement with the 
Banū Liḥyān, Muḥammad apparently sent fighters from Hudhayl with the instruction 
that “one of every two men” should join the expedition, and the reward (ajr) would be 
shared between them.405 Another Prophetic ḥadīth clarifies what is meant by this 
account by stating that “for every one man who is sent (to battle) out of two, the reward 
will be for both.”406 Shīrāzī notes that this tradition relates to when the Prophet sent 
                                               
401 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 5, 454-456. ʿAbd al-Razzāq reports that 15 was the age when the duty to fight 
attached. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 5, 310. 
402 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 393. 
403 See, Q 9/al-Tawba:122. 
404 Zarkashī, Baḥr al-muḥīṭ, vol. 1, 243.  
405 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 37 [Muslim, 3:1507; Ahmad, Musnad 3:49.13-15; Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, 7:291.11-
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406 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, vol. 7, 291. 
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troops to Banī Liḥyān and those who stayed behind were told that if they supported the 
effort with their possessions, then they would receive half the reward of going.407 In other 
words, some type of “performance,” aside from fighting, was expected and required of 
those who stayed behind in order to receive a reward; complete inaction was not 
compensated.408  
 In general, scholars begin by broadly defining the categories of who is required to 
perform the duty. They use a key verse of the Qurʾān to try to develop the parameters of 
participation in jihād. The verse Q 9/al-Tawba:41 says: “So go out, no matter whether you 
are light or heavy (khifāfan wa-thiqālan), and struggle in God’s way with your possessions 
and your persons…”409 According to Jaṣṣaṣ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728), Mujāhid b. Jabr 
(d. 102/720) and al-Ḍaḥḥāk (d. 105/723) all believed that “light and heavy” refers to 
“young and old.”410 Ibn Abī Ṣāliḥ (d. 84/703) is reported to have said it is a reference to 
                                               
407 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 265-266. 
408 In Egypt, Arabic papyri evidence from the early 8th century suggest that this was done through “specific 
tax-districts” that “were responsible for supporting certain contingents of troops.” Donner, “Islamic 
State,” 285. 
409 A slight amendment has been made to M.A.S. Abdel Haleem’s translation of this verse because he 
includes his own interpretation within the text. Instead of using his terms “lightly or heavily armed” I 
have simply used the literal translation: “lightly or heavily.” This is to allow for the subsequent point 
regarding the different ways in which jurists have interpreted these terms. See, The Qurʾān trans. M.A.S. 
Abdel Haleem (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 120. 
410 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 316; Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 110-111 (cites al-Ḥasan’s opinion). 
The scholars mentioned here are likely al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Mujāhid b. Jabr and al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāḥim. 
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“rich and poor.”411 Haṣan also reportedly said that it is both people who are 
“preoccupied” with other matters and those who are not.412 Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 68/687) and 
Qatāda (d. 117/735) reportedly said it means people who are “energetic or lazy.”413 Ṭabarī 
(d. 310/922) says it is in reference to the size of the military force, suggesting that it can 
be either “small or large.”414 Other reports claim the terms refer to those who “have a 
profession and those who do not.”415 Jaṣṣaṣ says that the language of the verse is able to 
accommodate all these interpretations so the best course is to have a broad, general 
meaning of the duty when there is no evidence to suggest it should be narrowly 
construed.416 As Shīrāzī notes, a broad definition was necessary since requiring everyone 
to fight would have preoccupied the people with fighting (ishtaghal al-nās bi-hi) to the 
detriment of the land (kharāb al-arḍ) thus leading to destruction.417 
 
Equipped for Battle 
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In the early period, a critical requirement for the obligated individual was to have 
the necessary provisions for war. In any particular locality, it was rare that everyone 
would have the equipment to participate. As a result, not everyone could join the jihād 
campaigns; some would stay behind, a behavior known as takhalluf. An early tradition 
attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās notes that the community was often divided into “small groups 
of four, ten, etc.” and each group was required to collectively provide one fully equipped 
man for war.418 The earliest traditions from Kufa suggest that, from these small groups, 
one man was sent to war and the others were burdened with “supplying the fighter with 
mount, weapons and supplies.”419  
In addition, during this early period, the Islamic state was not supplying its forces 
with provisions, instead, as previously mentioned, it imitated the pre-Islamic practice of 
fighters being supported with provisions from their communities.420 As one jurist notes, 
everyone who wished to fight “must bring his own provisions, weapons, equipment and 
                                               
418 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 33. Sometimes you also had a drawing of lots. Ibid., 20. 
419 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 37. 
420 It should also be noted that scholars contend there is evidence that by the “early eighth century,” the 
state “maintained a standing force for defense” which was “carefully organized and not merely 
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Empire,” 11. 
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mount, all out of his own wealth. Only one who has access to (wajada) these things enters 
the category of those upon whom the performance of jihād is incumbent. All others are 
exempt.”421 Shāfiʿī goes so far as to say that a fighter who sets out on a campaign but then 
runs out of the prerequisite provisions is allowed to return home without incurring any 
liability.422 Although technically obligated to fulfill the duty once performance is initiated 
(through joining the military expedition) the exhaustion of provisions negates the duty. 
That said, Shāfiʿī indicates that, while it would no longer be obligatory for the person to 
fight, it is preferable for them to remain with the military campaign voluntarily as 
opposed to returning home.423 
The opinion that requires possessing necessary “provisions” as a precursor to 
joining the jihād also seems to derive from the previously mentioned Qurʾānic verse 
regarding going forth “lightly or heavily.” In addition to the various interpretations 
already cited, some early authorities, like Ibn ʿUmar and ʿAbdullāh b. Jubayr, interpret 
the verse as speaking specifically of fighting provisions since the Qurʾān also mentions 
“riding mounts” and requires one to go forth for jihād whether “riding or walking.”424 Ibn 
                                               
421 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 39. 
422 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 39. 
423 Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 39. 
424 Jaṣṣaṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 4, 316 (citing Ibn ‘Umar’s opinion); Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 110-
111 (citing Jubayr’s opinion). 
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Ḥazm mentions Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī (d. 50/670) who, commenting on this verse, said 
that it applied to weaponry and noted that it covers virtually every human being since 
most people inevitably fall within the spectrum of “either lightly or heavily armed.”425 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr mentions a tradition where the Prophet laments the fact that neither he 
nor members of his community were able to find the necessary riding animals to allow 
everyone from the community to join the jihād. As a result, the tradition puts forward an 
excuse for participation due to a lack of necessary equipment for battle, an essential one 
being a riding mount.426 Ibn Qudāma includes the possession of “equipment” and “riding 
animals” as specific aspects of the “physical capacity” required for fulfilling the jihād 
duty; “physical capacity” is one of the prerequisites he has for legal responsibility.427 Of 
course, this prerequisite has exceptions. For instance, Ghazālī notes that in situations 
where an attack is transpiring, it does not matter whether you have a riding animal or 
not; jihād is obligatory.428 He also connects the requirement of having a riding beast to a 
potential fighter’s proximity to the conflict zone, noting two opinions in this regard. If 
someone is a sufficient distance from the conflict zone, then some say the absence of a 
                                               
425 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 7, 291. Note the individual quoted is also known as Khālid b. Zayd b. Kulayb. 
426 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istidhkār, vol. 14, 291. 
427 Ibn Qudāma, Kāfī, vol. 5, 456. 
428 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 12. 
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riding beast excuses performance of the duty. However, others argue that the 
importance of fulfilling this particular duty is so high that performance cannot be 
excused due to the absence of transportation, since presumably one could find another 
way to the conflict zone.429 
Among other things, the subtext to the preceding discussion seems to be jurists’ 
concern with outlining the scope of an individual’s religious obligation when it comes to 
taking up arms, either defensively or offensively, in light of their context, specifically 
their financial standing. If they are unable to afford to equip themselves for battle, or 
have no one else that can equip them, and they are without a mount, their moral 
obligation is mitigated to some degree. As we will see later, this is mitigated even further 
when jurists begin to examine the clashing moral obligations that arise out of legal 
responsibilities to the state versus third parties.  
            
State Authority 
 The assumption that underlies most pre-modern juristic discussions on the jihād 
duty is that it is regulated in some fashion by a governing authority.430 Unlike many 
                                               
429 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 12-13. 
430 The Twelver Shiʿī opinion on this is even more narrowly constructed: jihād can only be waged “under 
the leadership of the rightful Imām” and after 873 CE, “theoretically no lawful jihād” can be fought because 
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modern Muslim expositions on armed struggle, pre-modern jurists did not believe every 
individual possessed the right to declare jihād.431 As Khaled Abou El Fadl notes: 
Muslim jurists also concede a considerable amount of discretion to the ruler over 
issues involving dealing with foreign powers. Therefore, their discourses 
evidence a great amount of deference to the ruler as to when a ruler may or may 
not enter into a peace treaty or wage war against non-Muslims.432 
 
The discussion of the ruler or state’s authority in the context of jihād revolves 
around two central points.433 The first is a general affirmation of the state’s authority to 
declare jihād. The second is the different opinions regarding the authority to obligate 
participation in a defensive jihād, meant to protect Muslim territory, as opposed to an 
offensive one, meant to engage the enemy within its own lands in order to expand 
Muslim territory.  
                                               
no Imām exists. There is an exception for “defensive jihād” though and in practice various wars that have 
been fought since then have been framed as jihād. Rudolph Peters, Jihad, 4. That said the acceptance of 
state authority in this realm was not universal. In fact, one of the “distinguishing features” of the scholar-
ascetics in the frontiers during the early Abbasid period was their “indifference to and at least partial 
rejection of the authority of the caliphs in the conduct of war.” Bonner, “Jihad on the Arab-Byzantine 
Frontier,” 6. Bonner notes that Abū Isḥāq al-Fazārī came to understand “proper authority” as being present 
in the “religious scholar, rather than in the delegated representatives of the imam.” Ibid. at 19. 
431 See, for example, ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām, Al-Difāʿ ʿan arāḍī al-Muslimīn: ahamm furūḍ al-aʿyān (n/a: Minbar al-
Tawhīd wa-l-jihād, 1984); Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj, Al-Jihād: al-Farīḍa al-ghāʾiba (n/a, 1981). 
432 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources,” The Muslim World, 
vol. 89, no. 2 (April 1999), 150. 
433 I am taking the ruler to be equivalent to the state for reasons that I outlined earlier in this chapter. 
Generally speaking, jurists speak of the ruler using three interchangeable terms: khalīfah, imām and 
sulṭān. For instance, see Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 373 (sulṭān), 378 (imām) and 386 (khalīfah). The term sulṭān 
eventually acquired a non-caliphal meaning during the Seljuq period as they took it for a title despite not 
being caliphs. 
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The State’s Exclusive Authority 
With regard to the state’s authority, Shīrāzī explicitly states that it is “detested 
for an attack to occur without the prior approval of a ruler or commander” (yukrah al-
ghazw min ghayr idhn al-imām aw al-amīr min qablihi).434 His reasoning is that any attack will 
require determining whether this course of action is necessary (ʿalā ḥasab ḥāl al-ḥājah) 
and the ruler, as well as his commanders, are best situated to make this determination 
(aʿraf bi-dhālik).435 Ibn Qudāma has the same opinion as Shīrāzī, except he is more 
categorical, stating that it is “not permissible” (lā yajūz), as opposed to simply “detested,” 
to leave for an attack without the permission (al-khurūj ilā al-ghazw illā bi-idhnihi) of the 
commander (amīr).436 Like Shīrāzī, Ibn Qudāma also offers reasons for why this 
permission was necessary based on the relative superiority of the commander’s (amīr) 
knowledge regarding the “strategic advantages in warfare” (maṣāliḥ al-ḥarb), supply 
routes (ṭuruqāt), places of potential enemy ambush (makāmin al-ʿadūw) and their 
numerical strength (kathratihim wa-qillatihim).437  
                                               
434 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 270. 
435 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 270. 
436 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, v. 5, 497. 
437 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, v. 5, 497. He brings it up again and notes that there is also a fear that ill-conceived 
plans of attack that occur without the commander’s position could demoralize the troops. Ibid, 499. 
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Interestingly, Ibn Qudāma makes no mention of the imām (or khalīfah) whereas 
Shīrāzī mentions both the imām and the amīr. This is likely an indication of their different 
geographies, political environments and their individual relationships with the 
governing authorities of the time. Shīrāzī spent his life between Khurasan and Baghdad, 
living under Seljuq rule and maintaining close ties to the state such that the vizier in 
Baghdad, Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), constructed a school in his honor.438 On the other 
hand, Ibn Qudāma spent most of his life in close proximity to the frontier, under Ayyubid 
rule, even fleeing to Damascus from near Jerusalem due to the Franks’ mistreatment of 
Muslims. Most importantly, later in life, Ibn Qudāma actually joined Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in his 
jihād to conquer Jerusalem.439  
For his part, Ibn Ḥazm states that whoever is commanded by the ruler to join the 
jihād in the “enemy territory” (dār al-ḥarb), they are obligated to follow his command 
unless they have a legitimate excuse (ʿudhr qāṭiʿ).440 He quotes a famous tradition of the 
Prophet that the obligation to emigrate, as in the emigration to Medina, is no longer 
operative after the conquest of Mecca. The only exception is in the context of the jihād 
duty; hence, if you are summoned (by the ruler) to emigrate for the sake of jihād you must 
                                               
438 E. Chaumont, “al-Shīrāzī,” EI2. 
439 G. Makdisi, “Ibn Ḳudāma al-Maḳdīsī,” EI2. 
440 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 7, 291. 
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go forth.441 Qarāfī reports a similar opinion from Saḥnūn b. Saʿīd (d. 240/854) that jihād is 
no longer obligatory (as an ʿayn-obligation) after the conquest of Mecca unless “the ruler 
commands it.”442 In other words, only the ruler has the ability to physically displace you 
either through a general command to emigrate (now inoperative) or relocation for the 
sake of fulfilling the jihād duty.  
Aside from a declaration by the ruler, the only other way a jihād duty can be 
activated is in defense of a besieged territory. In that situation, there is no need to wait 
for the leader’s direction. For Mawārdī, the duty is kifāya at first and becomes an ʿayn-
obligation for everyone in the immediate vicinity depending on the duration and 
intensity of the attack.443 Ibn Qudāma notes that these are situations where the fear of 
harm (yukhāf al-ḍarar) from a surprise attack by the enemy (mufājaʾat ʿadūw) requires not 
delaying confrontation.444 This scenario is discussed in greater detail in the section on 
moving between kifāya and ʿayn obligations. 
 
Limits on the State’s Authority 
                                               
441 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 7, 291.  
442 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 385. 
443 Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 113. 
444 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, v. 5, 497. 
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While the authority to declare jihād clearly resides with the state, Shīrāzī does 
note some limits to the state’s ability to determine who specifically will comprise the 
battle ranks. Hence, while he discourages individuals from participating in jihād without 
permission from the imām or amīr, he does not forbid it. Although the governing 
authority determines when the military engagement will occur, what the needs are for 
the fighting force, and which individuals will participate, there is no liability if an 
individual joins the fight regardless of not receiving permission from the state.445 Of 
course, it is not clear whether this situation is the same as receiving a direct order not to 
participate, but either way it highlights the tension that exists when the state has 
authority to regulate religious obligations. While warfare was often in the pursuit of 
“secular” aims, it also contained religious undertones.446 Hence, Shīrāzī seems to, at least 
in part, be making space for fulfilling the jihād-duty to satisfy one’s inner conviction even 
if it has not been sanctioned by the state. It is for this reason he says that while only the 
state can give permission to attack, if an attack were to occur without its permission it 
                                               
445 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269-270. 
446 An example of this dual function where jihād functions as both religious obligation and state policy is 
Maḥmud al-Ghaznvi’s expedition to India, which provided legitimacy for his rule and elevated him to 
hero status. However, the campaign did “little to spread Islam or Muslim power” and was primarily 
aimed at gaining resources to “maintain the army,” among other things. Hugh Kennedy, “The late 
ʿAbbāsid pattern 945-1050,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, Vol 1: The Formation of the Islamic World, 
Sixth to Eleventh Centuries, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 377. 
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would not be unlawful (lā yuḥarram).447 This is because the act is nothing more than self-
deception (laysa fīhi akthar min taghrīr bi-l-nafs) and, in the context of jihād, this is 
permissible (yajūz fī al-jihād) presumably because it results from the heat of the 
moment.448 In this way, Shīrāzī is highlighting the major tensions that exist for the jurists 
regarding the state’s authority over jihād: it is fundamentally an expression of religious 
passion and fervor for the sake of God. To allow the state to regulate it completely not 
only channels significant power to them, but in some respects might serve to dampen 
that passion that is so essential to the religion in the first place. 
There is also a difference of opinion among jurists as to how far the state can 
extend its authority with regard to the jihād-duty. The question arises as to whether a 
fighter is still duty-bound to engage in battle if the enemy, although present, no longer 
poses a threat because their ranks have been significantly depleted. Specifically, does a 
fighter’s duty persist after securing Muslim lands and their populations? Does it extend 
into other territory and remain intact until the enemy converts to Islam or pays a poll 
tax (jizya)? According to the reported opinions of Ibn ʿUmar, ʿAṭāʾ, ʿAmr b. Dīnār and Ibn 
Shubruma, if Muslim lands and populations are secure, then neither the leader nor those 
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following him are required to engage in an offensive attack on the enemy; the jihād duty 
can be completed without pursuing the enemy beyond Muslim territory.449 Others 
disagree and argue that the leadership and fighting force must persist in their assault 
until conversion or payment of the poll tax takes place. This is the position of Jaṣṣaṣ’s 
colleagues and was reportedly also the position of some important early luminaries like 
al-Miqdād b. al-Aswad (d. 33/654) and Abū Ṭalḥa (d. 34/654).450 The view is also shared by 
Qarāfī, who considers jihād not only a collective duty, but one that, once engaged, must 
be carried out until the specific adversary has either accepted Islam or paid the poll tax.451 
Regarding the transformation of a defensive jihād duty into an offensive one, like 
other scholars noted above, Jaṣṣaṣ states that if enough inhabitants of the frontier are 
able to gather into an armed force and repel the invaders then there is technically no 
additional obligation, especially for people further inland. However, a point of dispute 
among jurists is what happens when, despite the collective duty being fulfilled, a ruler 
wishes to go further and issues a general call to arms for a more aggressive engagement 
with the enemy in order to inflict a harsher blow. Put another way, to what extent does 
the jihād duty accommodate a ruler’s ability to craft military strategy. In this dispute, 
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Jaṣṣas privileges the state’s authority to utilize the jihād duty for strategic objectives 
beyond territorial defense. If the state mandates it, he requires those summoned to 
offensively engage the enemy.452 Jaṣṣas does, however, cite early authorities, like Ibn 
Shubruma, who reject this executive privilege because jihād is voluntary, not obligatory, 
and who interpret the Qurʾān ’s verses on jihād as invitations, not commands. These early 
authorities compare jihād verses to other verses relating to inheritance where a similar 
linguistic formula is used, but with the meaning of “exhorting,” not requiring.453 Jaṣṣaṣ 
discusses this distinction between encouragement to engage in an activity versus a duty 
to perform. He argues that there must be evidence or a signifier that supports reading a 
phrase simply as encouragement as opposed to establishing a rule, and he considers the 
linguistic default for any imperative verb to be a command, not an invitation. In the case 
of jihād there is no evidence to suggest that it is not a rule, hence Jaṣṣaṣ considers it 
obligatory for all legally capable people and for everyone else according to their 
capability.454  
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Mawārdī turns to the issue of what imperative verbs signify when discussing what 
triggers the jihād duty. He notes that aside from a defensive duty to protect Muslim lands, 
the duty also extends to military campaigns in the “land of disbelievers” where they are 
either fought until they embrace Islam or, if they do not accept Islam, agree to pay a poll 
tax. He argues this on the basis of Q 2/al-Baqara: 193, which uses an imperative verb to 
instruct people to “fight them till there is no longer chaos and all of religion belongs to 
God.” For Mawārdī, this verse does not individually obligate jihād, but rather leaves it as 
a kifāya-duty.455 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr notes that jihād involving military expeditions with 
troops into enemy territory is a kifāya-duty as long as the capacity to defeat the enemy 
exists for those who participate.456 Again we see the tension between jihād as pietistic 
duty and jihād as the mechanism for achieving a ruler’s ambitions, as well as the state’s 
potential monopoly on participation in an activity commanded by the Qurʾān. In the 
defensive context, the duty to engage the enemy before you is clear but becomes less 
apparent when pursuing that enemy into his own lands. The pious justification weakens 
outside the defensive context, but jurists recognize the state’s need (supported by 
                                               
obligatory acts are decreed.” Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī uṣūl 
al-fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 48. 
455 Mawārdī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 14, 113. 
456 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istidhkār, vol. 14, 292. 
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historical precedent) to expand its territory and continue to pursue the enemy. Hence, 
they create a pious motivation beyond defense of one’s land, which also allows one to go 
on the offensive: the duty to convert people to Islam. 
 
Impious Leaders    
 The tension between the state’s authority and an individual’s religious obligation 
is also highlighted in one minor point. Jaṣṣaṣ addresses the question of how the state’s 
authority, specifically that of the head of state, is impacted by their level of piety. In 
other words, is it permissible to engage in jihād following the command of someone who 
is impious? Jaṣṣaṣ replies in the affirmative, stating that in the years after the four leaders 
who succeeded the Prophet, when there was a “decline in leadership,” the Companions 
of the Prophet still engaged in jihād behind the leadership of impious commanders (al-
umarāʾ al-fussāq). He specifically cites the case of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī, who was involved 
in a military expedition led by Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, whom Jaṣṣaṣ refers to as al-Laʿīn (“the 
Cursed”).457 The question itself is revealing since it betrays the pietistic concerns that 
underlies many of the discussions regarding kifāya-duties. In practice, jihād could appear 
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unsacred since it simply represented military activities in service of the state. However, 
its sacred place within the Qurʾān, its early history and the fact that it was a religious 
duty meant it carried significant devotional value. Hence, jurists struggle with the 
tension between jihād being regulated by the state and the dangers of its misuse by an 
unethical authority. In other words, they wrestled with whether it was moral to always 
obey the command of those in authority especially in those circumstances where the 
state was obligating people to behave sacrilegiously. 
 
The State’s Responsibility 
  With regard to the responsibilities of the state regarding the jihād-duty, Mawārdī 
notes that taking personal charge of the jihād is part of the imām’s official 
responsibilities.458 For Shīrāzī, the imām is required to “gather an army to remove 
disbelievers from Muslim lands.” Subsequent to that, he must place “trustworthy 
commanders” (umarāʾ thiqāt) throughout the retaken territory to secure it and must also 
provide security by building “fortresses” (ḥiṣn) and “digging trenches” (ḥafr khandaq).459 
Ghazālī expands the role of the caliph (imām) even further when it comes to jihād. Not 
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only does he give the leader the sole right to wage jihād, but obligates him to make sure 
the duty is fulfilled regularly. He mandates that every leader raise an army annually to 
undertake military excursions in order to demonstrate “Islam’s presence” and put 
forward a “compelling propagation.”460 Ghazālī notes that these campaigns should not 
focus broadly on regions under the control of disbelievers, but rather advance on areas 
of strategic importance.461 Ibn Qudāma reasons that a minimum of one military 
engagement per year is necessary because a tribute (jizya) must be collected from “non-
Muslim subjects” (dhimma) annually “in exchange for providing them protection, which 
is an alternative to waging war against them” (wa-hiya badalun ʿan al-nuṣrah fa-kadhālik 
mubdaluhā wa-huwa al-jihād).462 Qarāfī reports that ʿAbd al-Malik mandated that the ruler 
                                               
460 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 6. Some have argued that jihād actually functioned as a way to legitimate a ruler, 
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more than once a year. He does note that not all engagements with “non-Muslims” are divided into either 
getting tribute or fighting. For instance, fighting might be excused (or postponed) if these non-Muslims 
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send troops on a military expedition (ighzāʾ ṭāʾifa) against the enemy once a year, either 
led by the ruler or a deputy of his. The purpose would be to “call them to Islam” 
(yadʿūhum ilā al-islām), “stop the harm they are causing” (yakuffu adhāhum), make Islam 
known to them, fight them till they enter the faith or pay a tribute.463 In addition, he 
notes that the ruler must take care to treat those people who join the military expedition 
fairly, without discrimination (presumably regarding the distribution of war booty). 
  
Third Party Rights 
 While there are various reasons why individuals might be excused from the duty 
to participate in jihād, the reasons generally relate to personal characteristics that 
disqualify the individual’s participation, for instance, mental deficiency, not having 
reached the age of majority, or even poverty. However, the discussion of the jihād duty 
also reveals another set of “rights” owed to third parties, which exert a power over 
individuals that, at times, supersedes the state’s authority. These third parties include 
creditors, slave masters, husbands and, most importantly, parents. In these cases, even 
if an individual is not disqualified due to a personal characteristic, their subordinate 
status in relation to a third party might make them ineligible to perform. Third parties 
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are particularly interesting because ordinarily only two authorities, other than God, 
require subordination in Islamic law: the ruler and the jurists.  These cases are especially 
instructive because they suggest that asserting third party rights can directly challenge 
a state’s ability to compose its armed forces, the very backbone of its coercive power. 
Interestingly, discussion on third parties in the jihād context is relatively absent in the 
earliest juristic discussions though it is based on material in ḥadīth literature and so 
possibly has an an early origin. However, in later centuries jurists begin an earnest 
examination of the role of parents, slave owners, creditors and husbands in curtailing 
the jihād duty for their subordinates. The basic question they are looking to answer is 
how the jihād duty, made operative by the head of state or arising out of a particular set 
of circumstances, contends with competing duties owed to third parties. 
It is clear from the legal literature that the primary competitor to the state’s 
authority in the jihād context is the duty owed to parents. Most jurists cite the famous 
Prophetic tradition, narrated by Ibn ʿAbbās, in which a man requests permission from 
the Prophet to join the jihād. The Prophet counters by asking whether the man’s parents 
are still alive, to which the man responds in the affirmative. The Prophet then tells him 
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“your jihād is with them” (fa-fīhimā fa-jāhid).464 In many respects, examining parental 
authority in the jihād context is instructive for understanding how all third party rights 
function. Ibn Ḥazm states that, generally speaking, it is not possible to participate in 
fulfilling the jihād duty without permission from one’s parents. This is his default 
position. However, he goes on to note that there are exceptions, and even exceptions to 
the exceptions. For instance, parental permission is not required in situations of 
imminent danger where the “enemy attacks a population of Muslims.”465 In this case, the 
duty extends to everyone in the vicinity who has the capacity to help, regardless of 
whether they have obtained parental permission or not. However, Ibn Ḥazm adds an 
exception to this: even in these circumstances, if participating in the jihād would 
“destroy” either of the parents (i.e. cause them serious emotional or physical harm) then 
it is not permissible to participate in the jihād even in the exceptional circumstances 
described.466 He bases his opinion on a number of commonly cited Prophetic traditions 
indicating the role of parental permission. He also mentions a tradition that “listening 
                                               
464 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 7, 292; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269; Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna, vol. 10, 377; ʿAbd 
al-Razzāq, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 5, 175. 
465 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 7, 292. 
466 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 7, 292. 
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and obeying” one’s parents is a right they have over you, as long as they do not order 
you to be disobedient to God.467 
In Shīrāzī’s discussion on jihād and parental permission he broadly contends that 
being righteous to one’s parents is an ʿayn-obligation and thus takes precedence over the 
kifāya-duty of jihād.468 Shīrāzī points to a tradition of the Prophet in which he mentions 
righteousness towards one’s parents as taking precedence over jihād when considering 
which actions are most praiseworthy.469 Similarly, he recounts a story in which a man 
approached Ibn ʿAbbās, having vowed to invade Byzantine territory, but his father had 
forbidden it. Ibn ʿAbbas instructed him to obey his father since other fighters could be 
found to invade the territory, but he alone was responsible for his parents’ well-being.470 
Shīrāzī continues his discussion by also contemplating whether the duty would remain 
when neither parent was alive. First, in cases where both parents have passed, he 
automatically extends authority over the child to the default guardians: the 
grandparents. Hence, where parents are deceased, the rights owed to them are now owed 
to the grandparents: an orphan is not permitted to pursue jihād without their 
                                               
467 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 7, 292.  
468 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269. This is also the opinion of Ibn Qudāma. See, Ibn Qudāma, Kāfī, vol. 5, 457. 
469 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269. 
470 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269. 
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grandparent’s permission. In situations where only one parent is alive but there is also a 
grandparent present, some debate arises as to whether any duty is owed to the 
grandparent. One opinion contends that parental authority, even of just one parent, 
eclipses all other claims of familial authority. The second opinion, which is the one 
Shīrāzī himself adheres to, is that the presence of a parent does not negate the 
requirement to be righteous towards grandparents, thus they maintain rights over the 
child and their permission must be sought prior to engaging in jihād.471 
Other jurists also articulate similar arguments for requiring parental permission. 
Ghazālī states that parental permission is a condition for fulfilling the jihād duty 
primarily because of the potential dangers an individual will face and the resulting 
emotional anxiety it may cause his parents.472 Kāsānī also requires a son to get permission 
to fight from his parents, or one parent if the other has passed, because “devotion to 
parents” is an ʿayn-obligation that takes precedence over the kifāya-duty of jihād.473 
Baghawī states that there is no jihād without the permission of Muslim parents, even if 
                                               
471 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269. 
472 To support his point Ghazālī cites a ḥadīth in which a man approached the Prophet asking him for 
permission to join the jihād. The Prophet responded by asking “in what condition did you leave your 
parents?” The man responded that he had left them “in a state of tears” (taraktuhumā yabkiyān). The 
Prophet then told the man to go back to his parents and “make them laugh in the same manner that you 
made them cry” (irjaʿ wa-aḍḥikhumā kamā abkaytahumā). Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 9. 
473 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 98. 
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only one of them is alive, when jihād functions as a kifāya-duty. When jihād has become 
ʿayn, for whatever reason, no permission is required.474 Baghawī notes that Awzāʿī 
requires permission from both parents as a condition to participating in jihād; one 
parent’s permission is insufficient.475 He narrates a lengthy tradition from Awzāʿī 
recording an exchange he had with an interlocutor. After asking Awzāʿī about the need 
for both parents’ permission, the interlocutor complicates the question by wondering 
whether the opinion would change if the father requests the son to fight “alongside him, 
serve him and help him,” but the mother forbids it. Awzāʿī reiterates his position that 
one parent’s permission is not sufficient. The interlocutor continues to add qualifiers and 
asks whether it would be different if the parents were disbelievers. Awzāʿī again insists 
on both parents’ permission even if they are not Muslim, but adds a caveat. He states that 
“if your mother was to forbid you out of animus towards Islam, then don’t obey her. 
However, if she forbids you due to her own needs, then stay with her.”476 According to 
                                               
474 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna, vol. 10, 378 (holds the same position with regard to creditors). 
475 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna, vol. 10, 379. 
476 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna vol. 10, 379. He notes that this position with regard to disbelieving parents was 
also held by Sufyān al-Thawrī. It is interesting here that Awzāʿī focuses on the responsibility to the needs 
of one’s mother as opposed to one’s father. To some degree the greater responsibility owed to her suggests 
different, possibly higher, authority a mother has in comparison to the father. Baghawī reinforces this 
view by noting some scholars’ view that if you are performing the supplemental (nafl) prayers and your 
mother calls to you out of need, then you must respond. However, if your father calls then praise God, 
complete your prayer and then answer. Ibid., 379. Of course, the greater authority conferred upon the 
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Baghawī, both Awzāʿī and Sufyān al-Thawrī follow a similar opinion with regard to 
grandparents: permission is required from them as long as they have “need” for their 
grandchild. However, he does not extend the permission to uncles and aunts.477 
In certain cases there is debate as to whether parental authority is superceded by 
other considerations. For instance, where parents are not Muslims, some jurists argue 
that their children no longer have to seek their permission to participate in jihād. 
However, Ibn Rushd notes that there is disagreement on this.478 Those jurists, such as 
Shīrāzī, who do not require permission from non-Muslim parents argue that it is because 
these parents are likely to have a hostile relationship to Islam.479 However, if the parents 
convert prior to the army marching into battle, then there is additional debate over 
whether permission would now be required. One opinion holds that once the individual 
has stepped forward to participate in jihād, the duty becomes an ʿayn-obligation for him 
and cannot be removed simply because the requirement of parental permission is now 
operative whereas it was not previously. The other opinion contends that new 
developments can negate the jihād duty, in the same way that getting sick would, and the 
                                               
mother may simply reflect the reality that she is less likely to be self-sufficient in the pre-modern era as 
compared to the father. 
477 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna vol. 10, 379. 
478 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 278. 
479 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269.  
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absence of parental permission should be considered a legitimate excuse since one of the 
conditions for engaging in jihād is no longer being met.480 Similarly, Baghawī notes that 
if a Muslim man’s parents are disbelievers then he can go forth without their permission 
regardless of whether the jihād is obligatory or voluntary.481 However, he mentions a 
different position held by Sufyān al-Thawrī, who requires permission even from 
disbelieving parents. As noted above, for Awzāʿī, this is qualified by the fact that the 
disbelieving parents’ decision to forbid their child from participation in jihād cannot be 
assumed to arise out of animus towards Islam, but should be presumed to stem from the 
need for their son’s assistance.482 Ibn Qudāma rejects the idea of getting permission from 
disbelieving parents by citing historical precedent: Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, Abū Hudhayfa b. 
ʿUtba and others waged jihād without the permission of their disbelieving parents.483 
Similarly, some scholars debate whether slave parents have the right to forbid 
their children from participating in jihād. Ibn Qudāma outlines two main views in this 
regard. The first is that permission must be sought from them because they are entitled 
to the same kindness (birr) and compassion (shafaqa) as free parents, as long as they are 
                                               
480 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269. 
481 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna, vol. 10, 378. 
482 Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna, vol. 10, 379. 
483 Ibn Qudāma, Kāfī, vol. 5, 457. He does include an additional reason, saying that their respective parents’ 
“religious commitments were suspect” (muttahamān fī al-dīn). Ibid., 457. 
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also Muslim.484 The second position is that permission is not necessary because they have 
no authority (wilāya), offer no support (nafaqa) and are unable to even grant themselves 
permission.485 Shīrāzī disputes this claim, arguing that despite being slaves, parents have 
a right to “righteousness” from their children, as commanded in the Qurʾān, and that the 
same anxiety over a child’s participation in jihād that establishes the general 
requirement to seek parental permission also exists in the slave context for slave 
parents.486 
Bearing the above in mind, there are limitations to parental authority with regard 
to the jihād duty, specifically when the duty is transformed from a kifāya-duty to an ʿayn-
obligation. Asad al-Karābīsī (d. 570/1174) notes that in situations where there is a hostile 
party encamped in one’s territory permission is not required. For him, any pain that the 
son would cause his parents must be justified; hence, if there is no hostile party 
approaching, the duty remains kifāya and does not take precedence over an ʿayn -
obligation to care for one’s parents.487 In cases where a hostile party is approaching, 
                                               
484 Ibn Qudāma, Kāfī, vol. 5, 457.  
485 Ibn Qudāma, Kāfī, vol. 5, 457-8. Shīrāzī also takes note of this view, though he disagrees with it, 
specifically in relation to the inability to grant permission in other contexts. Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 
269. 
486 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 269. 
487 Asad al-Karābīsī, Al-Furūq fī al-Furū’, vol. 2, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
2005), 210. 
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permission is not required because the jihād duty has become ʿ ayn and Karābīsī privileges 
it over the ʿayn-obligation to care for one’s parents.488 Alāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī notes 
that if there is a general call to arms then it is obligatory for the son to join without the 
permission of his parents or without the permission of one of them if the other has 
passed. However, he notes that if the duty is already being fulfilled by some people then 
the requirement to seek permission in all the above relationships is reinstated.489 Ibn 
Rushd states that jurists generally agree that parental permission is a condition for 
fulfilling the jihād duty except when circumstances require the duty’s universal 
application. For instance, when there are an insufficient number of people to carry out 
the duty, then the duty no longer requires parental permission.490  
The same thinking applies in the context of other third parties. For instance, 
Kāsānī does not permit the slave to join the fight except with the permission of his 
master.491 His reasoning is that “service to one’s master” (khidmat al-mawlā) is an ʿayn-
obligation, thus must take precedence (muqaddaman ʿalā) over any kifāya-duty.492 Qarāfī 
                                               
488 Karābīsī, Al-Furūq fī al-Furū’, vol. 2, 210. 
489 Samarqandī, Tuḥfat al-Fuqahā’, vol. 3, 294. 
490 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 278. 
491 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 98. Kāsānī also mentions similar third parties as operating parallel to 
this: parental authority and the requirement that a woman seek her husband’s permission to join the 
jihād. Ibid.  
492 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 98. 
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states the same, indicating that the “rights of the masters” (ḥuqūq al-sādāt) are farḍ ʿayn 
and thus precede any kifāya-duty.493 Mawārdī holds the same position and cites a 
Prophetic ḥadīth in support of his view that a master’s permission is required. He 
narrates on the authority of ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿĀmir b. Rabīʿa that once when a raiding party 
was passing through a town, one of the slaves of a local townswoman joined the jihād. 
When the Prophet came to know this he asked the slave whether his master had granted 
permission for his participation. The slave responded in the negative and the Prophet 
instructed him to return to his master and seek her permission. In addition, he instructed 
him that if he were to die there would be no prayer said for him (law mutta lam uṣalli 
ʿalayka).494 Similarly, Ghazālī allows a ruler to hire slaves for jihād, but only after receiving 
their master’s permission.495 At the same time, Ghazālī argues that a slave cannot be 
compelled to participate in jihād by his master since the master’s authority over the slave 
does not extend to putting his life in danger.496 If the enemy has entered into Muslim 
territory, he notes two valid opinions: the slave exemption from the jihād duty applies 
                                               
493 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 3, 393. 
494 Māwardī, Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, vol. 14, 114.  
495 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 16. In fact, he allows disbelievers (mushrikīn) to be hired as well as long as “one is 
safe from their mischief” and notes that the Prophet permitted hiring Jewish fighters for certain military 
expeditions. Ibid., 16. 
496 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 8-9. 
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even in these circumstances; however obligating their participation is permissible as 
long as you can establish that they possess the ability to fight (lahum ahliyyat al-qitāl).497 
In other words, you cannot send them knowing they lack the physical capacity to fight 
because this would mean certain death. Furthermore, the slave has no obligation to 
defend his master if the master decides to participate in a jihād himself. If the master 
goes out to battle, then the slave can accompany him to perform the tasks that he 
normally would do, but cannot be ordered to fight involuntarily.498 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
As the discussion above suggests, the jihād duty is instructive in helping examine 
the category of kifāya-duties as a whole. Aside from a general illustration of how kifāya-
duties operate, the jihād duty also illustrates how kifāya-duties are transformed into ʿ ayn-
obligations, in which the jihād duty functions as both kifāya and ʿ ayn at the same time and 
where it becomes ʿayn. Additionally, the discussions of jihād bring in important 
considerations regarding the ability of state and third parties to regulate kifāya-duties. It 
raises vital questions about how to reconcile the moral dimension of jihād for the 
                                               
497 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 18; Samarqandī notes that it is obligatory for the slave to join the fight without the 
permission of his master in these situations. Samarqandī, Tuḥfat al-Fuqahāʾ, vol. 3, 294. 
498 Ghazālī, Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 8-9. 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
individual believer and the state’s need for a military force to pursue its objectives. 
Furthermore, it complicates the absolute authority of the state by introducing 
competing third parties that possess rights over the individual fighter that supersede 
those of the state. Jihād illustrates how the discourse on duties moves between pragmatic 
rules and theoretical principles, at times providing guidance for likely scenarios, while 
at other points giving space for jurists to engage in moral speculation unhindered by the 
constraints of practical reality. In addition, the jihād-duty brings to the forefront the 
manner in which kifāya-duties define the boundaries of the moral community. The jurists 
use jihād not only to tell us who must defend this community, and how sacred that duty 
is, but also use it to demonstrate the instrumental role of the state in giving jihād 
direction and form. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DUTIES TO THE DEAD 
Introduction 
The previous chapter on jihād demonstrates how the kifāya doctrine functions 
within arguably its most prominent duty. As noted, jihād is one of the illustrative duties 
in the kifāya category that jurists frequently reference. Another kifāya-duty frequently 
referenced by jurists is the one owed to the dead: funeral rites. Aside from its well-
recognized role as a kifāya-duty, discussion of duties to the dead serves a broader 
purpose. Drawing on Marion Katz’s observation that Islamic legal discourses relating to 
the body are important to analyze, the discourse on dead bodies is particularly revealing 
of the “Muslim understanding of the human experience.”499 These duties traverse the 
boundaries of practical necessity and symbolic meaning, providing insights into 
preferences and hierarchies within the Islamic discourse, and impacting questions of 
                                               
499 Marion Katz, Body of Text: The Emergence of the Sunnī Law of Ritual Purity (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2002), 1. The discussion around duties to the dead extends beyond the Islamic tradition, even 
receiving commentary from philosophers who speak of the “serious practical ethical problems” arising 
out of not recognizing “the moral interests of the dead.” Jeff Noonan, “Duties to the Dead and the 
Conditions of Social Peace,” The European Legacy 17, no. 5 (2012): 594. Likewise, other premodern religious 
traditions navigated similar questions around the dead. For instance, in the Jewish tradition, the rules 
around burial were “an elaboration of meticulous behavioural rules designed to protect the living from 
contamination at the same time as they carry out the serious obligation on all Jews to participate in the 
burial procedures.” Jon Davies, Death, Burial and Rebirth in the Religions of Antiquity (New York: Routledge, 
1999), 95. Furthermore, the “task of burial” was considered “incumbent upon the whole community” and 
a “particular duty of the family.” Jon Davies, Antiquity, 104. 
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gender, kinship, purity and religion itself. In some respects, this discourse represents a 
departure from Mary Douglas’ claim that “practical interest in living and not an 
academic interest in metaphysics” is what produces significance of ritual; in the duties 
to the dead pragmatism and metaphysics have equal space in the construction of 
meaning.500 As with previous chapters, the focus here is on the juristic dialectics 
exploring these matters in treatises of substantive law, specifically chapters devoted to 
“funerals” (kitāb al-janāʾiz) and how it might inform our understanding of kifāya-duties. 
As Leor Halevi has noted, “funerary traditions played a special role in Muslim societies” 
and form “part of an ideological discourse on everyday life.”501 Within this space then 
there is much to be gained not only concerning the parameters of legal obligation in 
Islamic law, but also how these obligations order Muslim life even at the end. In this 
ordering, jurists address three primary objectives: how to be pragmatic regarding the 
dead, how to preserve a sacred ritual dimension within the funerary duties and how to 
navigate the boundaries of the Muslim community. These objectives are not necessarily 
                                               
500 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Routledge, 
2001), 90. 
501 Leor Halevi, “Wailing for the Dead: The Role of Women in Early Islamic Funerals,” Past & Present, no. 
183 (May, 2004): 11. These traditions were not fixed though; ritual practice was not static, but rather the 
law around it developed over time. Khaled Blankenship, review of Muhammad’s Grave: Death Rites and the 
Making of Islamic Society, by Leor Halevi, American Historical Review (Dec. 2009): 1572. 
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in conflict, but at times one objective might be emphasized over another. In the same 
vein, the boundaries of the Muslim community highlight the tensions between religious 
and familial affiliations.  
Regarding what the core sources have to say about duties to the dead, while the 
other original duties, jihād and the pursuit of knowledge, are connected by their mention 
in the same verse, the Qurʾān makes no mention of funeral rites or the obligation to 
perform them. This absence of funeral rites in the Qurʾān is especially peculiar given the 
numerous mentions of death throughout the text, primarily to exhort people to perform 
acts in anticipation of an afterlife. The earliest chapters of the Qurʾān, commonly 
associated with the Meccan period of Muḥammad’s revelation, are dominated by 
apocalyptic themes, reward and punishment. The only verse that speaks of funeral 
prayers, Q 9/al-Tawba:84, is one that prohibits its performance for the “hypocrites” 
(munāfiqūn) who refused to participate in jihād: “do not hold funeral prayers for any of 
them if they die, and do not stand by their graves—they disbelieved in God and His 
Messenger and died rebellious.”502  
                                               
502 The term “hypocrites” does not cover the full range of the Arabic word being translated, but is a 
Medinan term of abuse in the Qurʾān. Broadly speaking, “hypocrites are considered half-hearted 
believers who outwardly profess Islam while their hearts harbor doubt or even unbelief. Camilla P. 
Adang, “Hypocrites and Hypocrisy,” in Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe, 
https://bit.ly/2w1BR39. 
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The ḥadīth literature provides more references to the particulars of funeral rites, 
but scarcely mentions the nature of the obligation owed. In fact, explicit proof-texts from 
Muḥammad’s statements are seldom used by jurists as the primary justification for 
specific obligations. When jurists rely on the core sources they tend to utilize scriptural 
proof-texts tangentially connected to their arguments. However, despite the absence of 
direct proof-texts, virtually all legal manuals, across the schools, obligate the 
performance of certain duties to the dead. In addition to the limited proof-texts, jurists 
also rely on reported practices of Muslims from earlier periods, as well as their own 
intuitions, to construct a framework of duties owed to the dead. Notably, there is never 
any discussion of the origin of these rites, although Kāsānī does offer one interesting 
exception to this. He relates that when the prophet Ādam passed away, angels bathed 
him then said to his son “this is a sunnah of death, and it is a categorical sunna (sunnah 
muṭlaqah) meaning [it is] obligatory (wājib).”503 Kāsānī claims that these rites were passed 
down from the time of Ādam and then abandoned just like other “inherited sunnah” 
(sunnah mutawārithah).504  
                                               
503 Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 299. 
504 Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 299.  
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The legal literature discusses five primary rites as funerary duties: ritually 
washing the body, shrouding it, praying over the body, carrying and burying it.505 These 
duties are typically found either in standalone chapters on funerals (janāʾiz) or as part of 
chapters on other topics, such as the ones on prayer. The duties in this context are 
generally framed as “rights” (ḥaqq) owed to the dead.506 In addition to these main duties 
to the dead, jurists also explore more minor questions connected to funerals such as who 
is permitted to attend the burial, whether someone can cry at the gravesite, what to do 
when an individual is close to dying, etc. Not all of these issues are characterized as 
obligations; as with other kifāya-duties, jurists intersperse discussion of obligatory acts 
with acts that are merely preferred or recommended. Hence, there is a significant 
amount of material concerning death and funerals, but this chapter focuses exclusively 
on matters related to duties owed to the dead. Even in this regard, it is not possible to 
cover every aspect of these duties, and so the aim will be to cover major points of 
                                               
505 Kāsānī frames it as six main topics, considering martyrdom to be a standalone topic. I discuss 
martyrdom in this chapter separately as the last exceptional category of standard funerary duties. 
Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 299.  
506 For instance, Shāfiʿī reportedly said that one should not be “negligent of the rights of their brother” 
after death. Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. Likewise, there is mention in a Prophetic ḥadīth that 
among the rights owed to other Muslims (ʿalā al-Muslim sittun ḥuqūqun) is the right to be washed after 
they pass. Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 299. In another tradition, this is spoken of as a “debt” that is 
owed to the dead. Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, vol. 5, 115. 
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emphasis and dominant themes that emerge.507 It is neither feasible nor arguably 
necessary to cover everything else.  
Regarding classification of funeral rites, jurists tend to be aligned in their view 
that these acts are obligatory. Kāsānī states categorically that there is ijmāʿ on these acts 
being obligatory.508 Furthermore, he says that the nature of the obligation is kifāya: as 
long as some undertake the obligation it is suspended for everyone else. For Kāsānī, he 
reads the kifāya doctrine as centering on the attainment of an obligation’s purpose (ḥuṣūl 
al-maqṣūd) and once that occurs the obligation is satisfied such that replicating it leads 
to no additional benefit.509 Similarly, Mawārdī says that washing the dead, shrouding 
them, praying over them, and bringing them to the burial site are all “duties upon 
Muslims collectively, but addressed to them individually” (furiḍa ʿalā kāffat al-Muslimīn 
wa-l-kull bihi mukhāṭabūn).510 Ibn Ḥazm affirms what Kāsānī says regarding ijmāʿ, noting 
that “there is no difference” among scholars on the fact that funeral rites are kifāya-
                                               
507 That said, at certain points it may be relevant to the discussion to also explore acts that are classified 
as preferred or recommended. 
508 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 299. 
509 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 300. 
510 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
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duties. Within these rites he includes “washing the dead,” “shrouding them,” “burying 
them” and “praying over them.”511  
With this in mind, the present chapter will explore various components of the 
kifāya-duties relating to funeral rites. It begins with an exploration of what I characterize 
as the “standard” funeral rites: those duties owed to a deceased Muslim male of legal 
capacity. These standard duties will be explored for the four main funeral rites, listed in 
order of occurrence: ritual washing, shrouding, prayer and burial.512 Having established 
baseline duties relating to funeral rites, the chapter then turns its attention to jurists’ 
exploration of “exceptional” circumstances that require departures from standard 
duties. These circumstances demonstrate how the identity of the deceased impacts the 
duties owed and the manner in which those duties are performed. The chapter identifies 
six exceptional categories, based on the characteristics of the deceased, that are the 
jurists’ primary concern. First, gender, namely whether the deceased is a woman, plays 
an important role in altering both how a rite is performed and who performs it. Second, 
the deceased’s association with sinfulness: specifically, whether they have committed 
crimes, been labelled a hypocrite or branded a rebel. Third, whether the deceased was a 
                                               
511 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 121. 
512 The last rite, burial, includes both transporting the body to the burial site and the actual burial itself. 
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child, in other words whether they satisfied the necessary conditions to be liable for their 
actions. Fourth, when the deceased is a nonbeliever; specifically, those scenarios where 
the deceased is not Muslim, but is related to Muslims. This raises the possibility of non-
Muslim relatives performing funeral rites on the basis of kinship or having Muslim rites 
performed for them when they die. Fifth, when the deceased cannot cannot be identified 
(are essentially “strangers”), but die in areas where the Muslim polity or community has 
jurisdiction. In these circumstances, a decision has to be made as to what rites should be 
performed for them, with an eye towards accounting for the possibility they are not 
Muslim. Finally, the sixth case, when the deceased is classified as a martyr, whether in 
the context of war or outside of it. The war context is especially fascinating since it allows 
certain characteristics to attach to the individual temporarily at the onset of battle and 
permanently if they are killed.  
After exploring the particulars of the duties in each of the rites that are 
performed, the chapter concludes by trying to use a wider lens to uncover broader 
themes within the duties to the dead. Specifically, I explore how jurists discuss the 
purpose of these rites and the obligations attached to them. The discussion centers on 
whether the objectives of these duties are for reasons pertaining to mere efficacy or 
some higher purpose. In addition, I look closely at the discourse on praxis, namely the 
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process by which the obligation is fulfilled. There are two themes that emerge in this 
regard. The first is the sequence jurists require in the performance of the duty; what 
specific steps need to occur before others can be taken. The second is the hierarchy 
jurists outline for who performs the duty; in other words, which performers must be 
given precedence over other performers in carrying out the duty. In both cases, the 
method of performing funeral rites, as well as the hierarchies of performers and 
performance, are considered essential to the obligation.  
 
Standard Duties 
 This section discusses the standard duties that the dead are entitled to. The 
framework for these duties assumes that the deceased, as well as those performing the 
rites, are male, Muslim and fulfill the conditions for legal liability. The standard duties 
set the baseline from which the exceptional cases derive and help establish the 
parameters of this category of “funerary” duties. 
 
Funeral Prayer 
 As noted earlier, funeral rites are often discussed in their own separate chapters 
of legal manuals but also in those that deal with prayer. Like funeral rites as a whole, 
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there is broad agreement among jurists that funeral prayer is obligatory. Ibn Rushd notes 
that the majority of scholars (ahl al-ʿilm) permit praying over anyone who says “there is 
no deity, except for God,” an idea they derive from a Prophetic tradition stating the 
same.513 Ibn Ḥazm explicitly states that the obligation is for both male and female 
Muslims to be prayed over.514 Māwardī cites a Prophetic ḥadīth stating it is “obligatory 
upon my community to pray over their own.”515 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr claims there is a 
consensus that it is not permissible to forgo the funeral prayer of any Muslim, whether 
sinful or righteous, except martyrs, fornicators and religious innovators.516 Ghazālī and 
Qarāfī echo this sentiment, emphasizing that while funeral prayer must be performed on 
every Muslim, it cannot be performed on anyone who has been martyred, an exceptional 
circumstance taken up later in this chapter.517 In addition, Ghazālī says that once initiated 
the funeral prayer becomes obligatory.518 Ibn al-ʿArabī addresses the absence of any 
direct proof-text from the Qurʾān regarding funeral prayer. As noted at the start of the 
chapter, the sole verse that mentions funeral prayer, Q 9/al-Tawba: 84, does not 
                                               
513 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. 
514 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113 and 115. 
515 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 52. 
516 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Tamhid 6:331-332.  
517 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 375; Qarāfī, Kitāb al-furūq, 236. 
518 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 7, 11. 
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explicitly obligate it, but only prohibits it for non-believers.519 He notes that just as every 
action taken in obedience to a command implicitly contains a prohibition, prayers—
including funerary prayers—required to be said over a believer imply the 
impermissibility of saying prayers over nonbelievers. Hence, there is no need to specify 
that funeral prayer is required for believers.520 
Regarding the nature of the obligation itself, most jurists considered funeral 
prayers to be farḍ kifāya.521 Ibn Qudāma actually utilizes the same ḥadīth proof-text that 
Ibn Rushd puts forward to establish a general obligation to perform funeral prayers, but 
claims it also proves that funeral prayer is a farḍ kifāya: “pray upon the one who says 
there is no deity but God.”522 Ibn Ḥazm narrates a similar ḥadīth, but, like Ibn Rushd, 
characterizes it as a “general command” to pray over the dead.523 The ḥadīth recounts 
the Prophet praying over a deceased man from the Anṣār, then commanding others to 
                                               
519 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām, vol. 2, 559. 
520 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām, vol. 2, 559.  
521 Abū Bakr al-Shāshī, Ḥilyat al-ʿUlamā’ fī maʿrifat madhāhib al-fuqahāʾ, vol. 1, eds. Saʿid ʿAbd al-Fattaḥ and 
Fatḥi ʿAṭiyya Muḥammad (Mecca: Maktabat Nizār Muṣtafā al-Bāna, 1998), 287; Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, vol. 
8, 20; Qarāfī, Furūq, vol. 1, 236; Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 52; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Death, 
Funeral Processions and Articulation of Religious Authority in Early Islam,” Studia Islamica, no. 93 (2001), 
28. 
522 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 37. It is not immediately clear how this Prophetic statement is indicative of 
a collective duty, but one might argue that the command to pray over Muslims creates a general 
obligation, the nature of which is not explicitly individual or collective. 
523 Ibn Hazm, Muḥallā, vol. 2, 144. 
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“pray over your companions, for there is a debt you owe them.”524 However, despite using 
the proof-text to demonstrate a general obligation, Ibn Ḥazm emphatically notes that 
with regard to the nature of the duty, there is “no difference of opinion”: it is kifāya and 
once someone undertakes it then the obligation is suspended for everyone else.525 As with 
jihād and other kifāya-duties, jurists permit individuals to refrain from performing the 
funeral prayer as long as someone else fulfills the duty.526  
Not all jurists classify funeral prayers as farḍ kifāya.  The Mālikīs are particularly 
keen on discussing the issue of how they classify funeral prayers. For example, Qarāfī 
brings up the topic in a discussion regarding the kifāya doctrine (discussed earlier in 
Chapter One). Specifically, he mentions a hypothetical interlocutor who asks how it is 
possible, based on the stated rules governing kifāya and cayn obligations, to consider 
funeral prayer as a kifāya duty?527 The reference to “stated rules” is with regard to 
distinguishing between types of duties on the basis of whether additional performance 
of the duty is futile or not. The interlocutor points out that in the kifāya context the 
                                               
524 Ibn Hazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 115. The Ansār or “helpers” were members of the Aws and Khazraj tribes 
based in Medina who had converted to Islam and settled Meccan Muslims after they migrated to Medina 
with the Muḥammad. Jonathan E. Brockopp, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Muḥammad, 
ed. Jonathan E. Brockopp (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8. 
525 Ibn Hazm, Muḥallā, vol. 2, 144. 
526 Zaman, “Death,” 28. 
527 Qarāfī, Kitāb al-furūq, vol. 1, 237. 
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benefit of performing a duty cannot be attained again by repeated performance; 
however, the ʿayn-duty allows for repeated benefits to be acquired through additional 
performances.528 The specific challenge here is that the benefit one gains from 
performing funeral prayer is “forgiveness for the deceased” (al-maghfira li-l-mayyit), a 
benefit that we can never know with any certainty has been attained (wa-lam taḥṣul bi-l-
qatʿ).529 Since one cannot know whether a benefit has been acquired there is still the 
possibility that additional performance will also produce a benefit. This possibility 
means that it is more theoretically consistent to include funeral prayer within the ʿayn-
category rather than the kifāya-category. 
In response to the interlocutor’s challenge, Qarāfī agrees that the benefit of 
funeral prayer can either be “probable” (ẓannan) or “certain” (qatʿan). The latter is invalid 
due to its impossibility (bāṭil al-taʿdhdhur), so the only possibility is that the benefit is 
probable.530 Thus, when a group performs the funeral prayer, forgiveness is attained but 
not with epistemological certainty. However, supplication during the prayer is accepted 
and, on this basis, Qarāfī says the prayer can be “included” as a kifāya-duty (fa indarajat 
                                               
528 Qarāfī, Kitāb al-furūq, vol. 1, 237.  
529 Qarāfī, Kitāb al-furūq, vol. 1, 237.  
530 Qarāfī, Kitāb al-furūq, vol. 1, 237.  
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ṣalāt al-janāza fī furūḍ al-kifāya).531 Furthermore, this is the reason one cannot obtain 
additional benefit from performing another funeral prayer for the deceased: that benefit 
is premised on the existence of an obligation, which would have already been satisfied. 
All that remains is the benefit that can be obtained from “repeated supplication” (takthīr 
al-duʿāʾ) which, in this case, is gained from continuing to lament the dead (maṣlaḥa 
nadbiyya).532 
On the other hand, Abū Bakr al-Shāshī reports that at least one of Mālik’s 
companions considered funeral prayer to be a sunna, not even a farḍ.533 Shīrāzī provides 
a possible explanation for this distinction by suggesting that generally funeral prayer is 
a kifāya-duty, but performing it in congregation is sunna.534 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr also 
acknowledges this difference and tries to explain the nature of the duty to pray over the 
dead. While he recognizes that most people consider it a farḍ kifāya, he notes that others 
                                               
531 Qarāfī, Kitāb al-furūq, vol. 1, 237.  
532 Qarāfī, Kitāb al-furūq, vol. 1, 237. He also notes, with some incredulity, that Shāfiʿī promotes the idea 
that funeral prayer cannot be supererogatory and only fulfills an obligation; hence, its performance 
cannot be repeated.  
533 Shāshī, Ḥilyat al-cUlamā’, vol. 1, 287. 
534 Shīrāzī, Tanbīh, 35. This distinction implies that a congregation is not a requirement for funeral prayer 
and, at least in theory, even one individual is sufficient to perform prayer over the deceased. This of 
course makes sense depending on the context. For instance, one might imagine that premodern travelers 
encountered situations where they were required to pray over a deceased traveling companion by 
themselves. 
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refer to it as a sunna wājiba ʿalā al-kifāya.535 In practice, there does not seem to be much 
difference between these classifications: both permit non-participation as long as others 
fulfill the duty.536 Even more of an outlier position from the predominant view is that 
funeral prayer is not legally prescribed in any sense, but rather a duʿāʾ or request for 
forgiveness. Māwardī attributes this position to ʿĀmir b. al-Sharāḥil b. al-Shaʿbī (d. 
105/724) and al-Ṭabarī, who apparently believed this was not prayer (ṣalāh) because it 
could be performed without ritual purification. Māwardī himself dismisses this position 
as a statement that violates consensus (qawl kharqan). Furthermore, he points out that 
the Qurʾān refers to this act as a funeral prayer in Q 9/al-Tawba: 84, thus triggering all 
pre-conditions for prayer including ritual purity.537 Ibn Rushd notes that some scholars 
are more forgiving in their analysis of the position as to whether this act is a prayer or 
not. They interpret the definition as being one that hinges on procedure: unlike daily 
prayers, in the funeral prayer there is no “bowing or prostration” (laysa fīhā rukūʿ wa-lā 
sujūd), so it does not qualify as prayer.538 
                                               
535 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istidhkar, vol. 3, 29. 
536 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Tamhid, vol. 6, 331-332  
537 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 52. This relates to what was mentioned earlier about Qarāfī’s position 
regarding the subsequent performance of funeral prayer for the deceased after the prayer has already 
been performed once. Unlike Qarāfī though, this position considers even the initial performance of the 
act to be a duʿāʾ and not prayer.  
538 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, vol. 1, 47. The discourse on this topic often moves fluidly between the ideas of 
permissibility, obligation and prohibition. This is best illustrated by the question on funeral prayer 
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The question also arises as to whether the corpse must be present for the prayer 
to be validly performed. Ibn Ḥazm says there is an indisputable proof-text (naṣṣ qāṭiʿ) on 
the matter, a prophetic ḥadīth which says you should “pray over your companions” and 
does not specify whether they need to be present or not. As a result, Ibn Ḥazm says both 
scenarios are permitted: the presence or absence of the corpose.539 He argues that the 
obligation for Muslims collectively is to perform prayers for any Muslim who has been 
buried without a funeral prayer. As evidence he offers the death of the ruler of Abyssinia 
and the Prophet praying for him in absentia with “four takbīrs.” Ibn Ḥazm also cites 
another tradition on this occasion where the Prophet remarked “today a righteous man 
from the Abyssinians passed away, so pray for him,” at which point everyone lined up 
and prayed.540 In his view, a consensus exists regarding the occurrence of this prayer in 
absentia for the Abyssinian ruler and he considers the report to be a mutawātir 
transmission, thus possessing significant authority because considered unassailably 
                                               
timing: when is it permissible to perform the prayer and when is it prohibited? Ibn Ḥazm says there are 
three times of day that the Prophet forbade praying over (or burying) the dead: when the sun rises, at 
midday, and from the point when the sun begins to set until it actually sets. However, he seems to 
indicate that these times are simply less desirable, as opposed to completely prohibited; the general goal 
being to encourage people not to delay performance of the prayer. Hence, despite placing various 
limitations on when burial can take place, Ibn Ḥazm notes that funeral prayers can be performed at all 
times. Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 114. 
539 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 139. 
540 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 139. 
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authentic. However, despite this, he concedes that while there is a consensus on the 
details recounted, it may not relate to all the specific ritual details. There are varying 
degrees of support as both Mālik and Abū Hanīfa consider the act a prayer, but qualify it 
as specific to the Abyssinian ruler and not a general rule.541 
 
Ritual Washing 
 Like prayer, most scholars also agree that ritual washing (ghusl) of the dead is a 
farḍ kifāya.542 Unlike the obligation to perform funeral prayers, which is tangentially 
mentioned in the Qurʾān, there is no Qurʾānic reference to ritually washing the 
deceased.543 However, Kāsānī suggests that proof of the obligation to wash the dead 
                                               
541 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 139. 
542 For example, Shīrāzī, Tanbīh, 35. 
543 Of course, this does not mean that it was an unfamiliar concept. In fact, the concept appears 
historically in other societies. For instance, in Jewish tradition, the body was cleansed, sometimes with 
the same water infused with spices that had been used in the funeral procession and the Mishnah states 
that the body should be anointed and washed. Jon Davies, Antiquity, 105. Typically, there was a ritual bath 
(miqveh) where these funerary rites would take place. Rachel Hachlili, Jewish Funerary Customs, Practices 
and Rites in the Second Temple Period (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 59-60. In ancient Greece, washing the body was 
often performed by women or sometimes, when it came to be known that death was imminent, by the 
person dying himself. Robert Gurland, The Greek Way of Death (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 24. 
Interestingly, in Jewish tradition, burial of the dead is a duty, but is also a contaminating activity that 
requires anyone who touches the body to purify themselves subsequently. Hachlili, Jewish Funerary 
Customs, 487. That said, some scholars believe that the Islamic funeral “came to differ significantly from 
the funerals and social norms of the Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians who inhabited the world of Islam.” 
Leor Halevi, Muhammad’s Grave: Death Rites and the Making of Islamic Society (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 3. For a more detailed look at the Christian, Jewish and Zorastrian contexts, see 
Halevi, Muhammad’s Grave, 76-83. 
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comes from both text (ḥadīth) and consensus (ijmāʿ). He specifically mentions the 
Prophetic saying that “there are six rights that a Muslim is owed by another Muslim” 
and one of those rights is to be washed after dying.544 Ibn Qudāma also relates a ḥadīth 
that mentions a man who was crushed to death by his she-camel and the Prophet ordered 
people to “wash him with water and lotus leaves.”545 Māwardī cites a Prophetic ḥadīth 
regarding the collective nature of ritual washing: “it is obligatory for my community to 
wash their dead…”546 He notes there are three types of ritual bathing, two of which are 
individual obligations while the third is communal. The communal one is for the dead 
and is a duty collectively owed by all Muslims (faraḍa ʿalā kāffat al-Muslimīn wa-l-kull bihi 
mukhāṭabūn).547 Māwardī indicates that these obligations, collective and individual, start 
off the same, but diverge when it comes to performance (furūḍ al-kifāyāt wa-furūḍ al-aʿyān 
qad yashtarikān fī al-ibtidāʾ wa-yaftariqān fī al-fiʿl).548 This is a common way of 
conceptualizing the relationship between collective and individual obligations. In 
general, every obligation begins as an individual obligation that must be performed. If 
the act is never performed then everyone is held liable for it. The difference between 
                                               
544 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 299 
545 Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 11. 
546 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
547 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
548 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
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collective and individual obligations is that with individual obligations a person 
continues to be liable untill they themselves perform, while for collective duties liability 
disappears once performance is initiated by anyone.  
 Regarding the nature of the obligation, similar debates on classification occur 
that were discussed in the context of funeral prayers. For instance, Mālikī jurists apply 
their distinction between farḍ kifāya and sunna ʿalā al-kifāya to the context of ritual 
washing as well. Ibn Rushd notes that both classifications exist within the Mālikī school 
and suggests the reason for this is that the concept has been transmitted by communal 
practice (ʿamal) as opposed to verbal statements (qawl). Communal practice contains no 
signifier to explain the obligation (wa-l-ʿamal laysa lahu ṣīghah tufahhim al-wujūb aw-lā 
tufahhimuhu).549 He illustrates the difference between these classifications through a 
Prophetic statement, relayed by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 422/1031), which discusses the 
procedure for a ritual washing of one’s daughter upon her death: “wash her three times 
or five times.”550 One opinion is that this statement arose as a lesson to describe one way 
of washing the deceased, but not as a command entailing an obligation that it only be 
                                               
549 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 226, 164. 
550 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 226, 164. 
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done in this way. Another opinion says that a command is contained within this 
statement and the description indicates that this must be treated as an obligation.551     
 
Shrouding 
 While funeral prayer and ritual washing are the primary acts in the funeral rites, 
shrouding is also of considerable importance. As with other duties, there is no Qurʾānic 
reference to shrouding, however, scholars generally consider it obligatory and some 
claim there is consensus on this.552 Ibn Ḥazm states that shrouding is obligatory for both 
male and female Muslims.553 He stresses the importance of shrouding by requiring it even 
be performed for people who have already been buried without being washed or 
shrouded; they are to be exhumed, washed, shrouded and reburied.554 Ibn Qudāma notes 
that shrouding the deceased is a kifāya act and “forgoing it is an outrage on decency” (fī 
tarkihā hatkan li-hurmatihā).555 Kāsānī speaks about shrouding as a sunnah muṭlaqah that 
has the legal force of the obligatory (wājib).556 He says that the nature of the obligation is 
                                               
551 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 226, 164. 
552 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113. 
553 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113. 
554 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 114. 
555 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 55. 
556 This is the same term he used to refer to ritual washing. See, supra p. 1. 
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“along the lines of kifāya” and “fulfills the rights of the dead.”557 Māwardī says that the 
“consensus” opinion is on the general idea that shrouding the deceased is an obligation 
(wājib). He argues that common practices related to shrouding (jarā al-ʿamal) are, 
however, simply sunna.558  
 Jurists also discuss what obligations exist regarding the cloth used to shroud. For 
instance, there are different opinions on the number of sheets of cloth necessary for the 
deceased. Māwardī cites an opinion which requires only one piece of cloth, of sufficient 
length: any additional pieces are optional.559 He does acknowledge that the common 
practice is to use three pieces of cloth, but suggests this is a choice, not an obligation.560 
Māwardī arrives at this conclusion despite noting a widely reported ḥadīth, from ʿĀ’isha, 
that the Prophet was buried in three pieces of cloth of one kind of thread, with no shirt 
and no turban. The report is not enough for him to classify this as an obligation as 
                                               
557 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 299. 
558 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20. 
559 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 30. The practice of shrouding the dead is evidenced as early as the 
Epic of Gilgamesh and was also a “standard part of Persian, Greek and Hellenistic prothesis.” Jon Davies, 
Antiquity, 15. In fact, “nearly all cults and religions” from that period agreed on the “paramount 
importance of formally disposing of the dead, of providing special burial clothes, a shroud at least.” Jon 
Davies, Antiquity, 64. The ancient Greeks also required only a single piece of cloth that could be either 
bier-cloth, shroud or mantle. Gurland, Greek Way, 24. There was no burial in Zoroastrian teaching because 
of the belief in the corpse being left exposed to nature. Jon Davies, Antiquity, 66.  
560 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20. 
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opposed to a choice.561 Māwardī also cites Shāfiʿī as saying that being buried in five pieces 
of cloth is permissible, but as an absolute limit.562 However, despite discussing the 
number of pieces required for the shroud, Māwardī stresses that the key requirement is 
for the deceased’s nakedness to be covered based on the principle that “what is 
obligatory after death is what was obligatory before it” (li-annahu yajib min sitrihi baʿd 
mawtihi mā kāna yajib min sitrihi qabl mawtihi).563  
Picking up on this last point, Ghazālī does not set the obligation on the basis of 
the number of pieces of cloth, but rather what coverage the cloth provides. He sets the 
requirement at the least amount of cloth needed to cover the entire body.564 Similarly, 
Ibn Ḥazm notes that the shroud must be of “sufficient length” to cover the deceased.565 
For men he says this is “three pieces of cloth,” and no shirt, turban or under garments.566 
Like Māwardī, Ibn Ḥazm also relies on the above cited ḥadīth by ʿĀʾisha.567 Ibn Ḥazm 
                                               
561 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20. Interestingly, Māwardī reports a dispute on this point from the 
eponyms of two legal schools, Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa. For his part, Mālik chose a turban for deceased men 
and women while Abū Ḥanīfa chose to have the deceased wear a shirt. Mālik relies on the fact that this 
was a practice of the people of Medina. In fact, he notes that ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib had a turban on when he 
was buried. Māwardī rejects both these opinions on the basis of ʿĀʾisha’s ḥadīth. Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-
kabīr, vol. 3, 20. 
562 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20. 
563 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20. 
564 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 370. 
565 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113. 
566 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 117-119. 
567 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 118. 
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places similar requirements on cloth for deceased women, but says there should be two 
additional pieces (a total of five) of cloth. If even this is insufficient to completely cover 
the deceased woman’s body then more cloth can be used.568 Contrary to a widely held 
position prohibiting the use of stitched garments for the shroud, Ibn Qudāma argues that 
the best option is to bury people in a long shirt (qamīṣ) as opposed to any other type of 
wrapping.569 He permits shrouding with two long pieces of cloth or, citing Awzāʿī, even 
one piece of cloth as long as it covers the entire body.570  Some scholars also permit 
modifying the obligation based on availability of material. As in other areas of Islamic 
law, the doctrine of necessity relaxes the requirements. As a result, Ibn Ḥazm states that 
if only one piece of cloth is found for two people then they should be shrouded together 
in one cloth (fa-in lam yujad li-l-ithnayn illā thawb wāḥidan darjan fīhi jamīʿan).571 
Furthermore, despite the requirement that men and women should be fully covered by 
the shroud, in this scenario he says there is “no harm” if they are shrouded in “less.”572 
To support this view he reports that when Muṣʿab b. ʿUmayr died at Uḥud there was not 
                                               
568 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 118-119. 
569 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad 
al-Ḥilwa (Riyadh: Dār ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1997), 386. 
570 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, 386. 
571 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 118. It is not clear whether Ibn Ḥazm requires this to be two people of the 
same gender or whether he would permit two spouses to be buried together.  
572 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 118. 
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enough cloth to cover both his head and his legs. As a result, the Prophet required the 
head to be covered all the way down to his legs such that Muṣʿab’s private parts were 
completely covered.573 
The type of cloth used for the shroud must also follow certain guidelines. Ghazālī 
states that “silk is forbidden” for men and “not recommended” for women because of its 
association with “opulence.” Instead, the preferred material is either cotton (quṭn) or 
linen (kattan).574 In line with this, Ibn Ḥazm says the shroud must be of “good quality,” 
citing a Prophetic ḥadīth that if you “shroud your brother then shroud him well.”575 In 
fact, he mentions a report that Ibn Masʿūd bequeathed 100 dirhams towards a fine quality 
shroud.576 At the same time, Ibn Ḥazm is clear that the “expense” of a shroud is not the 
sole factor determining whether it is “good quality” or not.577 In fact, he clarifies that if 
                                               
573 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 118. 
574 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 370. There is also discussion of some “preferences” relating to the shroud, for 
instance its color should be white. Ibid. There seemed to be a divergence between jurists who argued for 
a simple shroud of white and others who allowed for more luxury in death, possibly reflecting a division 
between audiences of ascetic and merchant Muslims. Halevi, Muhammad’s Grave, 95-96. 
575 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113. 
576 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113. Interestingly, the ancient Greeks also stipulated restrictions on the cost 
of the shroud with some laws placing a limit of 300 drachmas and others restricting the expenditure to 
35 drachmas. Gurland, Greek Way, 25-26. 
577 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113. 
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the shroud is simply extravagant, not only does it fail to satisfy the shrouding obligation, 
but it is disliked in itself.578  
Furthermore, Ibn Ḥazm notes that it is not permissible to bury someone in cloth 
that they were not allowed to wear when they were alive. This includes silk, clothes 
tinged with a gold color (mudhahhab) or those containing red-dye (muʿaṣfar). Of course, 
he makes clear that since these are permissible for women to wear when they are alive, 
they are all permissible for a woman’s funeral shroud.579 This reference to what was done 
when the person is alive is a common theme for jurists as they seek symmetry between 
life and death, a point we will return to later. In a related discussion on extravagance, 
there is also discussion on whether it is obligatory to put scent (ḥunūṭ) on the deceased. 
Māwardī notes an opinion that says it is obligatory just like the shrouding. Another 
opinion says it is not obligatory because “smelling sweet in life is not obligatory” (ṭīb al-
ḥayy ghayr wājib) so it is not obligatory in death either.580 Regarding the color of the 
shroud cloth, there is a general preference for white. Ghazālī does not explicitly obligate 
                                               
578 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 114. On a related note, there is also discussion on where to place the 
obligation to pay for the shroud of indigent individuals who pass away. Ghazālī notes that if these 
individuals have wealth, then it must be utilized for the shroud. Likewise, their estate or wealthy spouses 
are responsible for the shroud. However, if none of these options exist for them then their shroud will be 
paid for from the state treasury. See, Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 371. 
579 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 122. 
580 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 30. 
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the use of white cloth, but states that it is “God’s preferred” color (aḥabb al-thiyāb ilā Allāh 
al-bayḍ).581 Māwardī gives a choice with regard to the color of the shroud, but also 
indicates a preference for white.582 As support for this position he notes that both the 
Prophet and the Prophet’s uncle, Hamza, were buried in white cloth.583 While Ibn Ḥazm 
also notes a preference for white, he rejects the idea that it is obligatory to wear white 
since the Prophet wore other colors during his lifetime.584  
 
Carrying and Burying 
The final category of funeral rites comprises carrying the body towards the 
gravesite and the actual burial. Unlike the other funerary duties, there is slightly more 
variation in the scholarly opinions regarding the legal nature of these last two rites. The 
prevalent position among most jurists is that this is also an obligation and is kifāya. 
However, many do not merge carrying and burial as part of the same obligation. In 
discussing carrying the body to the funeral or walking to the funeral, jurists tend not to 
                                               
581 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 370. Interestingly, this also seems to be the preference in Jewish tradition and 
ancient Greece. White was the “usual” color of the Greek shroud although there was differentiation in 
color based on the status of the dead. Gurland, Greek Way, 24-25. In Jewish tradition, the body would be 
dressed in white linen that lacked ornamentation. Jon Davies, Antiquity, 105. 
582 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20. 
583 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 20 (Prophet’s shroud) and 35 (Hamza shroud). 
584 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 118. 
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elevate it to the level of a legal duty. Ibn Rushd states that this is only a sunna and does 
not include it within the category of funeral obligations.585 Māwardī supports this 
position generally, citing Shāfiʿī’s statement that there is “no requirement to carry the 
deceased to burial,” but that it is permissible to do so.586 That said, despite not being 
required, when the deceased is carried to the grave Māwardī includes stipulations on 
who is permitted to carry the deceased and who is not, specifically noting that only men 
should carry the corpse regardless of whether it is a male or female body.587 As with the 
earlier funeral rites, Ibn Qudāma introduces a different position on this matter in 
comparison to other jurists, possibly indicative of a broader dissenting Ḥanbalī posture 
on funeral rites. In his view, in addition to the burial itself, the act of carrying the dead 
to be buried is also a kifāya-duty that must be performed.588 
On the other hand, Shīrāzī only considers burying someone as a kifāya; he does 
not mention carrying them to be buried as a similar type of obligation.589 The same 
position is held by Ghazālī, Māwardī, and Ibn Ḥazm.590 Ibn Rushd goes so far as to argue 
                                               
585 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 233. 
586 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 40. 
587 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 40. 
588 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 55. 
589 Shīrāzī, Tanbīh, 36. 
590 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 388; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 116; Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
215 
for a consensus regarding the obligation to bury the dead, indicating that the obligation 
has its origin in two Qurʾānic verses: Q 77/al-Mursalāt: 25-26 and Q 5/al-Māʾidah: 31.591 
Of course, he recognizes that consensus on obligating burying the dead does not indicate 
consensus on every aspect of the burial. Jurists often disagree on details such as whether 
anything can be built on top of the grave (i.e. a gravestone or something more elaborate) 
or what materials can be used for the gravesite.592 However, these aspects tend to be 
discussed alongside the corresponding prohibitions that may be associated with the 
main obligatory act.593 Like Ibn Rushd, Māwardī also speaks of the obligation originating 
with the story of Cain and Abel recorded in Q 5/al-Māʾidah: 31.594 One aspect of the burial 
that jurists discuss as part of the obligation relates to the depth of the grave. Ibn Ḥazm 
                                               
591 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 244. The first verse, Q 77/al-Mursalat: 25-26, states: “Did We not 
make the earth a home, for the living and the dead?” The second verse, Q 5/al-Māʾidah: 31, relates to the 
story of the Prophet Adam’s sons [Cain and Abel], one of whom killed the other: “God sent a raven to 
scratch up the ground and show him how to cover his brother’s corpse and he said, ‘Woe is me! Could I 
not have been like this raven and covered up my brother’s body?’ He became remorseful.” 
592 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 244. Other examples include whether the grave can be pargeted 
(tajṣīṣ al-qubūr), writing on the grave (al-kitābah ʿalayhā), sitting on it (al-julūs ʿalayhā) to relieve oneself. 
Ibid. 
593 Another example of prohibitions associated with obligatory funeral acts is that of timing. For instance, 
Ibn Ḥazm lays out some very specific times as to when burial is not permitted except out of necessity. For 
instance, he says that it is not permissible for anyone to be buried at night, at sunrise or when the sun is 
starting to set. Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 114. Anticipating a criticism of this viewpoint, Ibn Ḥazm relates 
the fact that the Prophet himself, his wives and various Companions were buried at night, but all of these 
were done out of necessity (li-ḍarūra awjabat). Ibid. In order to support his position further Ibn Ḥazm cites 
the authority of Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab who had a noted dislike of burials taking place at night. Ibn Ḥazm, 
Muḥallā, vol. 5, 115. 
594 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 24. 
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discusses the fact that digging a deep grave (iʿmāq ḥafīr al-qabar) is obligatory and it is 
permissible to bury one, two or three bodies in a single grave.595 Māwardī also states that 
“if burying the dead is obligatory then one must choose the [appropriate] depth of the 
grave.”596 Ghazālī provides additional guidance that the hole should be large enough to 
conceal the body, cover the corpse’s smell and protect the body from birds of prey.597 
 
Exceptions to the Standard Duties 
 Having outlined general guidelines for the duties to the dead, the remainder of 
this chapter investigates how jurists navigate what they consider to be “exceptional” 
circumstances that arise in the context of death. Specifically, this section examines the 
categories of individuals whom jurists place outside the default status of free, mature, 
sane, law-abiding Muslim males who did not die while engaged in warfare. These 
exceptional individuals are addressed in their capacity as deceased to whom duties might 
be owed. For purposes of clarity, I divide them into six broad categories: women, 
children, sinners, disbelievers, strangers and combatants. Each category contains some 
“deficiency” in comparison to the default. For women, jurists create distinctions in the 
                                               
595 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 116. 
596 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 24. 
597 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 388. 
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performance of each of the four funeral rites, altering the associated duties because 
either the deceased or performer of the funeral rite is a woman. The second category are 
children, or more broadly speaking the morally “blameless.” Jurists are concerned with 
individuals who lack the requisite maturity to be culpable for their actions and how this 
impacts the funerary duties owed to them or their own performance of these duties for 
others. The third category are sinners, consisting of four types: hypocrites, criminals, 
suicides and rebels. The fourth category are nonbelievers, primarily those with kinship 
ties to Muslims either through marriage or blood and the extent of performance required 
of or for them. The fifth category are strangers, usually individuals whose identities are 
unknown for one reason or another, such as travelers in foreign territory or even 
unidentified limbs found on the battlefield. The final category are fighters participating 
in war, but also bystanders to war and those distant from the battle. On its face, the level 
of involvement in hostilities determines the extent of rites performed upon them.  
The discussions of these exceptional categories of persons has to be read in light 
of the default positions discussed above, where the basic obligations are outlined; here 
the question is how and when departures from those obligations arise. However, there is 
a larger objective for jurists, particularly in determining who is not entitled to receive 
funeral rites or perform them: crafting the boundaries of the moral community. The very 
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fact that there are Islam-specific final rites suggests that performance of these duties is 
a lasting statement of the inclusion (or exclusion) of the deceased within the moral 
community. The discourse on these funerary duties navigates significant theological 
questions of what actions or circumstances are disqualifying. Of course, as with other 
duties, alongside determining the contours of the moral community, jurists are also 
addressing functional questions on how these duties should be performed and what 
conditions might excuse aspects of the performance without giving rise to any inference 
that the deceased might be excluded from the community. 
 
Women 
 In general, funeral rites for women mirror those of men, but with certain 
dispensations to account for matters of modesty. Most of the discussion centers on who 
is permitted to perform the obligatory funeral rites upon women, as opposed to the 
affirmative duties required of women. For the most part, funeral rites are performed 
exactly the same for women as they are for men, especially funeral prayers and burying 
the deceased.598 Jurists outline different requirements for women almost exclusively in 
the context of ritual washing, and, to a lesser degree, shrouding. Their concern here is 
                                               
598 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302.  
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twofold. First, they are broadly interested in preserving modesty between the sexes even 
at the time of death; that issue does not come up with prayer or burial in any significant 
way.599 Second, jurists insist on maintaining a degree of symmetry between the rites 
performed at death and analogous rules for the living. For example, they argue that 
because there is no difference in how men and women pray while they are alive, there is 
no difference in how the genders perform funeral prayers over them.600 On the other 
hand, since living women are required to have more extensive covering of their bodies, 
as compared to living men, jurists require their funeral shrouding to also be more 
extensive. Ibn Qudāma states this outright, noting that there is a strong preference that 
a deceased woman be covered with five pieces of cloth because they have more private 
areas to conceal while they are alive and so must do the same in death. He suggests a 
general principle that differentiation in dress at the time of death should be similar to 
differentiation when alive.601 Māwardī echoes this principle of modesty, extending the 
                                               
599 This is not to say that modesty concerns or the desire to analogize do not arise in the context of 
funeral prayers as well, specifically regarding the makeup of the congregation performing the prayer. 
Māwardī notes that if a man dies somewhere and there are only women around, then they should pray 
individually without a prayer leader because women are not allowed to lead men in prayer, although he 
notes that Shāfiʿī explicitly allows them to pray in congregation. On the other hand, if the deceased is a 
woman and there are only women who can pray over her then they should pray in congregation because 
it is permissible for women to lead other women in prayer. Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 58. See also, 
Halevi, Muhammad’s Grave, 52-64. 
600 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 58. 
601 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, 391.  
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default position that the shroud should cover the deceased’s “entire body” by stating 
that, in the context of women, “entire body” is more extensive and means everything 
“except their face and hands.”602 
Regarding ritual washing, the main concern is whether a man can wash a 
deceased woman, and vice versa. Jurists are sensitive about the idea of men and women, 
especially those who are not related, seeing each other naked.603 The discourse typically 
begins by considering whether someone is permitted to wash their spouse. Māwardī’s 
position is in the affirmative, pointing to the precedent set by the first caliph, Abū Bakr 
b. Siddīq, who was washed by his wife upon his death.604 That said, Māwardī recognizes 
that differences of opinion exist on this point outside of the Shāfiʿīs, his own school, and 
the Mālikīs. These differences are based on the fact that the Prophet never washed any 
of his wives who passed during his lifetime.605 As a result, both Abū Ḥanīfa and Sufyān al-
Thawrī do not allow spouses to wash each other.606 However, Māwardī counters this 
opinion with a narration from ʿĀʾisha that the Prophet told her “if you die before me 
                                               
602 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 28. 
603 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 228. 
604 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 16. 
605 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 16. 
606 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 16. 
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then I would wash you and shroud you.”607 In addition, he mentions Asmāʾ b. ʿUmays’s 
narration that Fāṭima was washed by ʿAlī and no Companion objected to this. For 
Māwardī this by itself is proof of consensus on the issue.608 
Ibn Ḥazm picks up this issue by first stating broadly that it is “obligatory to wash 
a male and female Muslim,” noting that this was the opinion of both Shāfiʿī and Dāwūd. 
He points to when the Prophet’s daughter died and he told people to wash her three or 
five times. For Ibn Ḥazm this is indicative of the fact that there is no difference between 
men and women when it comes to washing the dead (ḥukm al-rajul wa-l-marʾah fī dhālika 
siwāʾ) and ridicules those who claim that it is not obligatory for women.609 Kāsānī 
supports this position, noting that the “ruling on [the steps involved in] washing [the 
dead] is the same for women as it is for men” (wa-ḥukm al-marʾah fī al-ghusl ḥukm al-rajul). 
He argues for symmetry between life and death: ritually washing the deceased must 
include the same elements as ritual washing when they were alive because both are pre-
conditions for prayer. The deceased is thus considered a participant in the funeral prayer 
and so must fulfill the pre-requisites for a valid prayer, which includes ritual purity. 
Hence, there is no distinction in the sequence of body parts that are washed for a 
                                               
607 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 16. 
608 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 16. 
609 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 113. 
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deceased man versus a deceased woman because no distinction exists when they are 
alive.610 To this end, Kāsānī does promote a level of modesty between the genders noting 
that “each gender should wash itself” (al-jins yughassil al-jins) such that men wash men 
and women wash women. He bases this on the fact that, when a person is alive, “a non-
lustful touch is permitted within a gender” and so should be “permitted after death.”611 
Along these lines, Ghazālī also allows any man to wash another man, or any woman to 
wash another woman, but says the opposite sexes cannot wash each other unless they 
are married or closely related (maḥram).612 In those situations where a woman dies with 
only a non-relative male present or a man dies with only a non-relative female present, 
Ghazālī permits the washing by whoever is present as long as they “lower their gaze.”613 
He applies the same for cases involving the hermaphrodite (khunthā), whose washing can 
                                               
610 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
611 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. This is also the view held by Ibn Rushd. See, Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-
mujtahid, vol. 1, 240. 
612 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 366. The one additional exception he makes in this context is with regard to 
slaves. Ghazālī notes that a master is permitted to wash his slave, whether female or male. He then asks 
whether the opposite is permissible? Here he notes two opinions. The first says, yes, it is permissible for 
the right-hand possession (a Qurʾānic euphemism for slave-ownership) to wash the master just as it is 
permissible for the wife to do so. The second position says no, because once death occurs the slave is 
emancipated from the master, often passed on in the inheritance, and they become strangers. As a result, 
the rule regarding non-related individuals becomes operative. Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 366. 
613 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 366.  
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be done by either a man or a woman “based on what gender was established for them in 
infancy” (istiṣḥāban li-ḥukm al-ṣighar).614  
The one requirement that Ghazālī applies here is that in scenarios involving non-
relatives, the washing should be done without water; instead, tayammum should be 
performed because the lack of a maḥram to fulfill the obligation is analogous to the lack 
of water for ritual washing.615 Consistent with his position on analogies generally, Ibn 
Ḥazm also disagrees with this analogy to tayammum. Instead, he notes that where there 
are only non-relative men or women present with the body of the opposite sex, water 
should be used but the body should be covered with a thick (kathīf) garment. The washers 
should pour water over the entire body without using the hands to touch the body 
directly. Unlike Ghazālī, he believes tayammum is only possible when water is actually 
                                               
614 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 366. Paula Sanders argues that in reviewing medieval Islamic legal texts there 
is not “even the slightest suggestion that a khuntha is both a man and a woman.” For medieval Islamic 
jurists, “human beings had to be either male or female; sometimes they seemed to be neither, but they 
could not be both.” Paula Sanders, “Gendering the Ungendered Body: Hermaphrodites in Medieval 
Islamic Law,” in Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries of Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender, 
ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 77. As a result, jurists were 
concerned with assigning a sex to a child who had both sexual organs and the general rule was to assign 
sex based on the urinary orifice (al-ḥukm li-l-mabal), a “pre-Islamic Arabian custom.” Sanders, 
“Gendering,” 77. There were also rare circumstances where a child passed puberty without having their 
sex determined (khuntha mushkil) and at this point a “gendering” process had to take place to assign the 
appropriate rules for socialization. For our purposes, “determining sex was important because the 
relationships of the living to the khuntha were not altered by the fact of death.” Sanders, “Gendering,” 82. 
615 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 367. Shāshī reports that there are two opinions in this regard. The first says 
that you should perform tayammum as Ghazālī notes, and this was the opinion held by Mālik and Abū 
Ḥanīfa. The second opinion is more in line with Ibn Ḥazm’s. Shāshī, Ḥilyat al- ʿUlamāʾ, vol. 1, 284. 
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absent.616 Ibn Mufliḥ potentially requires less physical contact between the washer and 
the deceased than exists through use of tayammum or covering the body with a thick 
garment. Instead, he requires that when a man dies surrounded only by women, or vice 
versa, or in the case of hermaphrodites, the washing should be carried out with a 
barrier.617 He makes no mention of using one’s hands at all. In fact, Ibn Mufliḥ says that 
even in cases where no barrier is warranted, for instance with maḥram relations of the 
opposite sex, the body should still be washed without touching and with a shirt covering 
the corpse.618 Ibn Qudāma states that there is consensus (la khilāf) that a woman is allowed 
to wash her deceased husband.619 However, the reverse, where a man washes his 
deceased wife, is permitted by some jurists and prohibited by others.620 Of course, 
regarding the actual procedure for washing, that remains unchanged for all the funeral 
rites except shrouding. Ibn Qudāma says this mirrors the situation of living men and 
                                               
616 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 176. This is not surprising since, as a Ẓāhirī, Ibn Ḥazm rejected legal 
reasoning by analogy. For Ibn Ḥazm, “analogical reasoning violates the principle of certainty,” which was 
“fundamental” to Ibn Ḥazm’s concept of Sharīʿa. Adam Sabra, “Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism: A Critique of 
Islamic Legal Theory (I),” Al-Qanṭara, vol. 28, no. 1 (July 2007).  
617 Ibn Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-Furūʿ, vol. 3, 293. 
618 Ibn Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-Furūʿ, vol 3, 293. 
619 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 12. 
620 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 12.  
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women: there is no difference in how they bathe, but there is a difference in how they 
must dress.621 
 
Children 
 The second category of exceptions discussed is children. For jurists, children 
present a number of interesting questions beginning with their status as inculpable 
actors and how this impacts duties that are owed to them (or that they owe to others). 
The question that seemed to preoccupy jurists the most in the context of funeral rites 
for children was determining the exact moment of their death. In particular, they were 
concerned with ascertaining whether the child “lived” post-birth or not and, if he did, 
for how long. As a result, they create two broad categories of deceased children: pre-
birth (intra-uterine fetal death) and after birth (neonatal death). These categories 
determined which funerary duties are performed on the child and the exact nature of 
those duties.  
 The primary inquiry jurists make is ascertaining the length of the child’s life 
starting with conception. Through prooftexts in the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth, jurists 
construct a framework of rules (including what factors signify life), which change the 
                                               
621 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, 391. 
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duties owed to the child on the basis of how long they were “alive.” A tangential insight 
gained from their discussion on children is the hierarchy jurists read into the duties 
owed at death. They contemplate scenarios where not all the funerary duties will be 
performed, with some duties having a higher priority in comparison to others.622 Within 
this hierarchy, funeral prayer is an important indicator of what duties will be performed 
since it is ordinarily the duty with the highest priority of performance. Hence, if jurists 
require the performance of funeral prayer it usually signals that all other duties must be 
performed as well. After prayer, ritual washing of the deceased also indicates that both 
shrouding and burial must take place, but may not necessarily signify anything about 
whether funeral prayer should be performed or not. In other words, it has a lower 
priority of performance than prayer. Shrouding and burial have comparatively fewer 
restrictions since they function as basic obligations owed to the deceased.  
With the above in mind, in the context of children, premodern jurists centered 
“proof of life” on a few different factors, but the most important seems to be whether 
the child made any type of sound subsequent to birth. Ibn Rushd reports that both Mālik 
and Shāfiʿī prohibit prayer over a child until it makes a sound (la yuṣallā ʿalā al-ṭifl ḥattā 
                                               
622 For example, Ghazālī explicitly suggests as much when he says that complete shrouding is not 
necessary except if prayer is obligatory. Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 376. 
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yastahilla ṣārikhan).623 Māwardī provides further explanation of Shāfiʿī’s position that 
obligates prayer over a deceased child only if it makes a sound after birth. He notes that 
Shāfiʿī discusses deceased children under a broad term: al-siqṭ. This term is used by jurists 
to cover a range of pediatric deaths, including miscarriages, stillbirths and infants who 
die shortly after birth.624 For his part, Shāfiʿī focuses his discussion solely on neonatal 
death (shortly after birth) and stillbirth.  
For children who die after birth, Shāfiʿī considers it sufficient proof of life that 
the child makes a sound, thus entitling it to have the same funerary duties performed on 
its behalf as an adult: prayer, washing, shrouding and burial.625 Māwardī contends that 
“all jurists” (kāffat al-fuqahāʾ) agree on this position except Saʿīd b. Jubayr who prohibits 
performing funeral prayers in these circumstances, even if the child lives for a significant 
period after birth.626 Saʿīd b. Jubayr bases this on a report that the Prophet never 
performed funeral prayers for his son Ibrāhīm, who died at 16 months (or 18 months) 
after birth.627 In addition, he reasons that prayer is meant as an intercession and 
                                               
623 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 240. There are also other factors that some jurists use like the 
divine spirit being blown into the child. Māwardī reports that Abū Ḥanīfa and Ibn Abī Laylā only allow 
the child to be prayed over if the spirit (ruḥ) has been blown into it, in other words, if the mother’s 
pregnancy was past the first trimester. Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 240. 
624 There does not seem to be a single English word that encompasses the breadth of the term al-siqṭ. 
625 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 30. 
626 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 30. 
627 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31.  
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invocation (shafāʿah wa-duʿāʾ) for the forgiveness of people’s sins and shortcomings; 
however, this is pointless for a child who has no sin and whose shortcomings are already 
forgiven.628 Māwardī counters this position by citing a contrary report indicating support 
from the Prophet for the obligation to pray over the child if it makes a sound before 
dying. Specifically, he mentions a ḥadīth from Ibn ʿAbbās that the Prophet said “if a 
newborn makes a sound then the child [is entitled to] inherit and give inheritance, so 
pray over the child [if it subsequently dies].”629 As noted earlier, the requirement to 
perform funeral prayers signals the requirement for all other “lesser” rites also to be 
performed. Māwardī considers it obligatory to treat this situation as analogous to 
praying over someone who commits a major sin, an issue taken up later in this chapter.630  
Furthermore, Māwardī also directly addresses the tradition that Saʿīd b. Jubayr 
mentions and suggests that the issue is simply a misinterpretation of the report’s 
meaning. He reconciles the potentially conflicting reports by arguing that the fact that 
the Prophet did not pray over Ibrāhīm simply means that he did not personally lead the 
prayer.631 This was because at the time of Ibrāhīm’s passing the Prophet was preoccupied 
                                               
628 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
629 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
630 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
631 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. Likewise, with regard to those who say that the Prophet prayed 
over Ibrāhīm, Māwardī  says they actually mean that the Prophet ordered prayers to be said over Ibrāhīm, 
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with a rare event: a lunar eclipse and the prayer that accompanies it (ṣalāt al-khusūf).632 
Ibn Rushd also explains the discrepancy by trying to reconcile how jurists dealt with 
conflicting reports on what the Prophet did or said about the obligations to deceased 
children. He notes that one set of jurists holds that “[for] the child, do not pray over 
it…until it makes a sound” while another set says “as for the child, pray over it” [without 
any conditions].633 Regarding the first position, those jurists reason that a general (ʿāmm) 
statement is being made that is then qualified with an explanation. The person 
performing the obligation must interpret the general statement in light of the 
explanation.634 As for the second position, it is a broader view premised on a jurist’s 
posture with regard to life. As Ibn Rushd notes, if the child moves then he is alive and 
subject to the same ruling as all Muslims: every living Muslim that dies is prayed over.635 
Shāfiʿī’s position finds support with jurists like Ghazālī, who state that if a fetus 
makes a sound after birth, and prior to dying, then it should be prayed over.636 He makes 
burial obligatory with even “one sound.”637 Kāsānī also revolves his position around 
                                               
not that the Prophet necessarily performed them himself, thus dealing with two potentially conflicting 
ḥadīth. Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
632 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
633 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 241 (emphasis added). 
634 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 241. 
635 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 241. 
636 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 375-376. 
637 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 376. 
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sounds made after birth. He states that if a sound is made, then the child is to be named, 
washed and prayed over. However, if the child makes no sound then no ritual washing 
(and presumably no prayer) should be performed.638 This is a more extensive prohibition 
than Māwardī, who notes that even if no sound is made the child is entitled to be washed, 
shrouded and buried, despite the prohibition on performance of funeral prayer.639 Kāsānī 
continues his discussion of ritual washing for children by noting another distinction 
beyond the utterance of sounds. He notes that the ruling concerning ritual washing with 
regard to deceased pre-pubescent boys is by default the same as for adult men (wa-l-ṣabī 
fī al-ghusl ka-l-bāligh) for whom preconditions for washing the dead are similar to 
performance of prayer.640 However, it is different for a pre-pubescent boy who dies at an 
age when he is still unable to comprehend what he says during prayer. In this case, that 
boy has no obligation to pray while alive, let alone perform ablution as precondition for 
prayer.641 As a result, Kāsānī argues that the ablution (wuḍūʾ) component of the ritual 
washing (ghusl) at death can also be dispensed with.642 This is yet another example of the 
                                               
638 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
639 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 30. 
640 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
641 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
642 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. An interesting additional point that Kāsānī makes is that it does not 
matter if a child is a product of an illicit relationship between a Muslim mother and a non-Muslim father: 
funerary duties will still be conferred upon the child. This is because the child is not prevented from 
“righteousness” simply due to a disbelieving father. Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 303. 
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symmetry jurists attempt to impose on life and death, a topic that will be discussed in 
greater detail at the end of this chapter. 
As for the child that is stillborn, lacking any movement or making no sound 
subsequent to birth, the opinion regarding performance of funerary duties depends on 
when precisely the child died in the womb. On this basis, Māwardī reports two types of 
stillborn children. The first is a child that is miscarried within the initial four months. He 
suggests that every legal school prohibits the performance of both funeral prayer and 
ritual washing in this scenario.643 Instead, the child should be wrapped in a cloth 
(shrouded) and buried.644 The second type is a child who is miscarried after the four-
month mark. In this case, the divine spirit (rūḥ) has been blown into the fetus. As a result, 
there are two different positions that jurists take. One position says that you should pray 
and wash it because the rules pertaining to living creatures apply to them as soon as the 
spirit has been blown in.645 The other position says that, despite the spirit being blown 
                                               
643 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. Kāsānī reports that Shāfiʿī’s opinion was that if the “fetus is 
aborted before four months then…you don’t need to pray over it.” Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
644 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. This is based on Q 15/al-Ḥijr: 29 that suggests God only blows His 
“spirit” into human beings at the four month mark, indicating a new phase in the development cycle that 
many jurists came to associate with the actual beginning of life. Ibn Qudāma also mentions that it is 
sufficient to just shroud the “young child” in one small piece of cloth (khirqa) or up to three pieces, but 
he does not elaborate on what constitutes a small child. One might infer from his other discussions 
relating to funerary duties that his position may be close to that of Saʿīd b. Jubayr. Ibn Qudāma, al-
Mughnī, vol. 3, 369. 
645 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32. 
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in, the rulings of life are not yet applicable so no prayer should be performed (though it 
is unclear whether it should be washed or not).646  
Ghazālī speaks of the stillborn child as one for whom you do not see any “signs of 
life.”647 He also advocates neither washing nor prayer, but simply wrapping the child in 
a cloth and burying it because “his life never came to be” (lam yataḥaqqaq ḥayātuhu).648  
That said, he does include a significant, and unusually subjective, exception, noting that 
if the fetus has an “outward appearance” of a “human being” (ẓahara shakl al-ādamī) then 
this complicates the picture.649 Unlike other factors like making a sound or passing the 
first trimester, having the appearance of a human seems, on its face, open to significant 
levels of interpretation. It could be that Ghazālī was creating a broadly inclusive rule in 
order to promote the default performance of funeral rites for children except in very 
rare circumstances. By constructing such a subjective rule, Ghazālī is at once 
acknowledging that children should be treated differently for the reasons jurists note, 
while at the same time suggesting that the difference should not be too great. Hence, 
Ghazālī mentions three different opinions as to what should be done in circumstances 
                                               
646 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32.  
647 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 375-376. 
648 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 375-376. 
649 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 376. 
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where the child has recognizable features. The first argues that all death rites should be 
conferred upon the child. In this case, the common definition of life as the presence of 
movement or sound is expanded to include a vaguer idea of appearance as a fully formed 
human being. The second opinion states that the fetus should not be washed or prayed 
over and the third opinion charts a compromised course that allows for it to be washed, 
but not prayed over.650 Among other things, these distinctions reinforce the hierarchy, 
mentioned earlier, that jurists create within funerary duties. 
Kāsānī argues that numerous narratives confirm that one need not pray over a 
stillborn child, but a difference of opinion exists as to whether a stillborn infant needs to 
be washed or not.651 He reports Shāfiʿī’s opinion that if a fetus is aborted in the first four 
months of pregnancy then it does not need to be washed.652 After four months, Kāsānī 
notes that there are two different views, returning again to the significance of the 
utterance of sounds. If the child makes a sound such that you are able to get an indication 
of life through its movement or crying, then the consensus (ijmāʿ) is to wash the child. 
These are all signs of life, meaning the child was alive, died and now must be washed.653 
                                               
650 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 376. 
651 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
652 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
653 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
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Unlike other jurists, Kāsānī also describes how this evidence for life would need to be 
proved, indicating that it only needs to be attested to by the mother or midwife to trigger 
the funerary duties. He reasons that this is sufficient by analogizing to singular reports 
(khabar al-wāḥid) which are acceptable in matters of religion as long as the source is 
trustworthy.654 This is indicative of the common disposition in Islamic law, and law in 
general, towards some symmetry in the law, if not always broader consistency. 
 
Sinners: Hypocrites, Criminals, Suicides and Rebels 
 While the first two categories pertain to exceptional situations involving non-
adult males and women, the remaining categories relate to adult males. In other words, 
these are adult males whose status departs from the default position mentioned earlier. 
In this regard, the third category discussed can be broadly construed as that of the 
sinner. This includes a variety of types including hypocrites, criminals, suicides and 
rebels, as well as general sinners. The larger question jurists seem to wrestle with is 
whether heterodox beliefs or illicit behavior, as opposed to the more extreme case of 
complete absence of belief, disqualifies a believer from being owed funerary duties. To 
some degree this question connects to larger theological discussions on the relationship 
                                               
654 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
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between faith and acts with regard to a believer’s status. Apart from the issue of 
martyrdom, these exceptions implicate the issue of the community’s boundaries. Who is 
a Muslim for ritual purposes? Who is a Muslim human being? What is the minimum 
criterion for inclusion in the category? It is not simply salvation that is at stake here, but 
the organization of communal life around religious identity over any tribal affiliation.655 
Regulating death is not simply about the deceased, but about asserting which community 
he belonged to and binding the members of that community together through their 
particular method of paying final respects to one of their own.  
 This point is made by Ibn Rushd in his discussion of duties owed to sinners. He 
begins by stating that most scholars agree that as long as you have made the declaration 
of faith then you will receive the funeral rites owed to all Muslims. He bases his opinion 
on a Prophetic tradition that says “pray over whoever says there is no deity but God.”656 
This is regardless of whether one is guilty of committing major sins (ahl al-kabāʾir) or 
heresy (ahl al-bidaʿ).657 One notable exception to this is Mālik, who did not endorse 
performance of this prayer in this context. As Ibn Rushd explains, the difference in 
                                               
655 This is partly because the funeral becomes an occasion to regulate the community. It would bring 
together a “community of mourners…perhaps a hundred individuals” and this “fraction of a society 
could feel the power of orderly, communal action.” Halevi, Muhammad’s Grave, 235. 
656 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. 
657 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. 
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opinion centers on the extent to which jurists consider sin to be grounds for 
excommunication from the faith. For him, this type of excommunication is not the 
“practice of the ahl al-sunna” and jurists are not obliged to conform to it, hence prayer 
(and in turn all other funerary duties) should be performed over such persons.658  
On the other hand, while Māwardī does not necessarily stake a claim with regard 
to funerary duties for sinners, he does take issue with the justification for why funeral 
prayer should be said for “those guilty of moral offenses and sins” (ahl al-dhunūb wa-l-
khaṭāya).659 The standard justification is that funeral prayers are performed for sinners 
as a way of interceding (shafāʿah) on behalf of the deceased.660 Māwardī notes two 
examples that refute this suggestion. First, if this was the purpose of the funeral prayer 
then there would seemingly be no reason to pray over the insane (majnūn), dim-witted 
(ablah) or any mentally challenged person (lā ʿaql lahu) either, since it could be argued 
that these individuals lack culpability for their actions and so are technically sinless. 
Hence, a prayer for expiation would be pointless.661 Second, prophets also do not need 
these prayers since they are sinless because God has forgiven them; technically prayer 
                                               
658 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. 
659 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
660 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
661 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
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would not be necessary for them either then. However, he points out that we know that 
the Prophet is prayed for by multitudes (afwājan) of people since the request for prayer 
for him is part of every liturgy.662 
 With regard to hypocrites and heretics, Mālik’s view was that not only was there 
no obligation to pray over them, but this prayer was actually forbidden. The reason was 
simple: denying them funeral prayers was a form of punishment for their behavior, 
presumably because it excludes them from the community.663 Explaining this further, Ibn 
Rushd argues there is actually consensus among jurists that funeral prayers should not 
be performed for the “heretic” whose heresy was “so severe” that it results in far-fetched 
interpretations (al-tāʾwīl al-baʿīd) that amount to disbelief (kufr).664 He also justifies 
dispensing with prayer for hypocrites based on Q 9/al-Tawba: 84, which states that “do 
not ever pray over any of them who die and do not go to their graves.”665 Ghāzalī held 
the same position, stating that you can never pray over someone whose heterodoxy had 
risen to the point of kufr.666 However, Ibn Rushd notes that jurists place acts of hypocrisy 
along a spectrum. Some considered implausible interpretations (al-taʾwīl al-baʿīd) to be 
                                               
662 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 31. 
663 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 240. 
664 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. 
665 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. 
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enough to constitute kufr and remove the obligation to pray. Others did not consider 
implausible interpretations, as opposed to accusing the Prophet of falsehood (takdhīb al-
Rasūl), enough to impute kufr to someone and permitted prayer over them.667  
Whereas hypocrites or innovators were blameworthy for how their ideas created 
confusion in belief, other sinners were strictly assessed on the basis of their acts, 
regardless of their beliefs. For instance, what duties were owed to criminals created 
considerable debate among jurists. Ibn Rushd reports Mālik’s position as prohibiting the 
performance of funeral prayers on people whose criminal acts rise to the level that they 
are eligible for ḥadd punishment.668 The reasoning was based on the Prophet’s decision 
not to pray over Māʿiz, a famous historical case involving ḥadd punishment.669 Māwardī 
                                               
667 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239.  
668 Ḥadd crimes are “offenses with fixed, mandatory punishments (ʿuqūbāt muqaddara) that are based on 
the Koran or the Sunna.” In addition, it also includes “intentional homicide and wounding.” The crimes 
in this category include theft (sariqa), banditry (ḥirāba), unlawful sexual intercourse (zināʾ), defamation 
regarding unlawful sexual intercourse (qadhf), drinking alcohol (shrub khamr), and apostasy (ridda). 
Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53. For some jurists, ḥadd punishment serves as 
expiation and they allow major sins to be atoned for through “earthly punishment.” Christian Lange, 
“Sins, Expiation and Non-rationality in Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī fiqh,” in Islamic Law in Theory: Studies on 
Jurisprudence in Honor of Bernard Weiss, eds. A. Kevin Reinhart and Robert Gleave (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 148. 
In fact, Shāfiʿī notes in al-Umm that the testimony of a slanderer cannot be accepted before they are 
punished with ḥadd; only after that are they are fit to testify. Lange, “Sins,” 151fn59. Interestingly 
enough, none of this seems to impact whether or not funeral prayers should be said over the deceased or 
not. 
669 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 240. The case of Māʿiz was of “central concern to Sunnī Muslim 
jurists” and crucial for the “development of Islamic criminal law.” It involved a man named Māʿiz, a new 
convert who wished to confess to the crime of adultery. He approached the Prophet and begged him to 
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mentions that similar positions were held by both Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742) and 
al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. Zuhrī notes that funeral prayer should not be performed over anyone 
who receives capital punishment by stoning (al-maqtūl ḥaddan bi-l-rajm) or capital 
punishment in retaliation [for murder] (maqtūl qawadan).670 Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī makes the 
same point, but cites the example of a fornicating woman who dies while serving her 
punishment of confinement. He reportedly argued that neither she, nor any child in her 
womb, should be prayed over.671 That said, Māwardī does report a significant caveat in 
Mālik’s position. He confirms that while Mālik considered it impermissible for someone 
executed by ḥadd punishment to be prayed over, this was not an absolute prohibition. 
Instead, Māwardī contends that Mālik prohibited the state (specifically, the ruler or 
imām) from carrying out these prayers but did not extend this prohibition to relatives of 
the deceased criminal.672 That said, Mālik’s position regarding criminals seems to be in 
                                               
punish him. The Prophet initially declined to hear the case, but Māʿiz returned a second and third time 
with the same request. Finally, at the fourth instance, the Prophet inquired into the case and tried to 
explain the acts as not having reached the level of adultery. However, this too was unsuccessful and 
eventually the Prophet found him guilty but did not institute a punishment. Instead, the townspeople 
seem to have carried out the punishment themselves: death by stoning. See, Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic 
Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation and Islamic Criminal Law (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 26-27. 
670 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 51. 
671 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 51. 
672 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 51. Ibn Rushd notes that not only was Mālik opposed to the ruler 
praying over the deceased, but he was never himself seen to have prayed for someone who was killed by 
ḥadd punishment. Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. 
 
 
 
 
 
240 
the minority. Māwardī himself supports the obligation to wash and pray over the 
criminal who is killed by ḥadd punishment.673  
Suicide also presented a challenge for jurists since the act was considered sinful 
and prohibited, and for some jurists even criminal (a taʿzīr offense), but only harmed the 
perpetrator. More importantly while other criminal acts might easily be divorced from 
belief, suicide could be perceived both as indicating a lack of faith and as a sinful act. 
Hence, the question was how to categorize suicide? Should the act itself determine how 
it is treated or should one inquire into the faith or lack thereof of the person who kills 
him or herself? This challenge is reflected in the diversity of opinion among jurists 
regarding obligations owed to someone who commits suicide. Māwardī reports that 
Awzāʿī takes a position on suicide similar to Mālik’s with regard to criminals, arguing 
that you should not pray over anyone who commits suicide (lā yuṣallī ʿalā man qatala 
nafsahu).674 Māwardī’s own opinion regarding suicides is that they should be prayed over 
because of the general rule established by the Prophet saying it is “obligatory upon my 
                                               
673 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 51. The treatment of dead criminals also was discussed by other 
traditions. For instance, Plato recommended that, at least murderers, should have their corpses “cast out 
of the victim’s country unburied” after they are executed. Gurland, Greek Way, 95. 
674 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 51. 
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ummah to wash their dead and pray over them” (furiḍa ʿalā ummatī ghusl mawtāhā wa-l-
ṣalāh ʿalayhā).675  
Ibn Rushd says jurists are divided into two groups on the issue of suicide: one 
group believes no prayer should be performed while another permits prayer. Notably, 
Ibn Rushd indicates that the same group that does not permit prayer for suicide also does 
not permit it for major sinners, rebels (baghy) or innovators.676 Ibn Rushd attributes part 
of the difference here to the interpretation of a ḥadīth in which the Prophet reportedly 
rejected praying over a man who had killed himself.677 Those jurists who considered this 
to be an authentic account created a rule that you do not pray over a person who 
commits suicide. Others who did not consider it authentic still account for it by noting 
that even if someone might go to hell for committing suicide, the Prophet has said that 
a person with even a “seed of faith” will “eventually be expelled from hell.”678 In other 
words, they argue that funerary duties should still be performed because there can be 
                                               
675 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 51. 
676 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 239. For a more comprehensive look at the subject of rebels see 
generally Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
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redemption after suicide and the person must still be considered a believer. In both cases 
though, “belief” is the focus for jurists more than the act. 
The final group within the category of sinners is rebels. The primary doctrinal 
challenge raised by this group is the fact that neither their beliefs nor their acts are 
necessarily problematic. However, in particular contexts these same acts are 
transformed from licit to illicit. Hence, one question is the extent to which carrying out 
actions in a particular context can disqualify someone from receiving the funeral rites 
owed to them. The question might also be reframed as asking what are the political limits 
of the Muslim community for ritual purposes? As with other types of sinners, there is a 
fair amount of debate with regard to duties owed to rebels. However, jurists begin by 
making an important distinction, both explicitly and implicitly, based on whether a rebel 
is justified (ʿādilan) or unjustified (bāghiyan) in their rebellion (bughā).679 For “unjust” 
rebels, Abū Ḥanīfa does not allow the performance of funeral prayers and his two most 
prominent students, Abū Yūsuf and Shaybānī, agreed with this.680 The prohibition was 
apparently meant as a way to disassociate the unjust rebel from other Muslims, disparage 
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him for his actions and give him the legal status of an enemy combatant.681 For rebels 
whose position is “just,” Abū Ḥanīfa takes a different position, requiring that they be 
washed and prayed over when they die, a position that Shāfiʿī apparently shared.682 
Others, such as Abū al-Ḥasan al-Rustughfanī (d. 350/961), an adherent of Maturīdī 
theology, only obligated ritual washing to be given to rebels, but not funeral prayers.683 
This was because they viewed washing as a right owed to the deceased, whereas the 
funeral prayer was God’s right (bi-anna al-ghusl ḥaqquhu wa-l-ṣalāh haqq Allāh).684  
Māwardī offers a prooftext from the Prophetic tradition to support the obligation 
to wash and pray over rebels. The ḥadīth says that you should “pray over anyone who 
says ‘there is no deity but God’ and behind (i.e., be led in prayer by) anyone who says 
‘there is no deity but God.”685 In another tradition, the Prophet says “do not declare 
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anyone a disbeliever from the people of your community, even if they commit a major 
sin…and pray over all your dead.”686 Hence, for Māwardī the fact that the deceased rebel, 
just or unjust, is a professed Muslim means they are owed duties of prayer and ritual 
washing, in the same way as fornicators or murderers. This is because the very act of 
prayer is a means of seeking “forgiveness and mercy for the unjust rebel.”687  
Regarding the just rebel, Māwardī takes note of two positions. The first is that 
they should be prayed over and washed. The second is to not pray over them or wash 
them because of the historical precedent set by the case of ʿAmmār b. Yāsir, who was 
killed at Ṣiffīn and was neither washed nor prayed over.688 At first glance, this position 
seems counterintuitive: why confer funeral rites on an unjust rebel, but not a just one? 
However, a closer examination reveals that the just rebel is in a favored position based 
on the analogous situation jurists are using to develop the duties owed to different types 
of rebels. Hence, the unjust rebel is likened to the sinner; as long as he professes to be 
Muslim then his actions will not disqualify him from receiving funeral rites. However, 
the just rebel is compared to the martyr, a position of much greater esteem. As will be 
                                               
686 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 37. 
687 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 37. 
688 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 38. 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
discussed later, no funeral rites are performed for martyrs, seemingly in recognition of 
the sacred status they have secured because of the manner of their death.689 
 
Nonbelievers 
The fourth category impacting the performance of funerary duties is that of 
nonbelievers. In general, funeral rites for nonbelievers are not a primary concern for 
jurists since Islamic ritual law does not apply to non-Muslims. As Ghazālī states, “you can 
never pray over a non-Muslim.”690 Ibn al-ʿArabī cites the prooftext from Q 9/al-Tawba: 
84, which prohibits praying for or standing at the grave of anyone that “rejected God and 
His Messenger.”691 However, it is not simply a neutral non-application that jurists are 
discussing here; they also believe that non-Muslims are not entitled to receive the 
benefits associated with performance of these funerary duties. As Kāsānī explains, it is 
“not necessary to wash the disbeliever (kāfir) because washing should only be done out 
of dignity and respect for the deceased, but the disbeliever is not someone deserving of 
dignity and respect.”692 However, this is the easy case and despite the sweeping 
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statement, there are circumstances in which the duty to perform some or all of the 
funeral rites for non-Muslims might be triggered, or where non-Muslims may be 
permitted to perform the rites. Specifically, there are two primary contexts discussed: 
nonbelievers with kinship ties to Muslims and the nonbelievers killed during warfare 
that also involved Muslims. Jurists seek to answer the question whether non-Muslim 
family members can perform funeral rites for their relatives and what should be done 
when Muslim and non-Muslim dead are mixed together after a battle? The answers 
reveal how jurists navigate between profane pragmatism and preserving the sacrality of 
these rites, as well as the limits of kinship before moral community in the context of 
religious obligation. As Ibn Rushd notes, juristic differences here revolve around 
perception of the rites being carried out: is ritual washing a sacred ritual or simply for 
cleanliness? Those who permit the washing of a nonbeliever will say it is for cleanliness, 
while those who argue against it will say it is a sacred ritual.693 
 To begin, jurists explore several different scenarios involving non-Muslim kin to 
try to develop the parameters for their participation in the performance of funerary 
duties. The most relevant cases arise out of interfaith marriages between Muslim men 
and non-Muslim women. Jurists address the issue by re-categorizing certain acts as 
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permissible, as opposed to obligatory, with regard to non-Muslim spouses. Hence, 
Māwardī discusses the case of a non-Muslim wife passing away; he permits her Muslim 
husband to wash her body according to Islamic custom as long as this is amenable to the 
patrons of her own religious community (awliyāʾuhā min ahl millatihā).694 The same also 
holds true for the opposite scenario: if a Muslim man dies his dhimmī wife is permitted to 
wash him.695  
From Shāfiʿī’s perspective, this is permissible but strongly disliked because 
funerary duties are obligations for members of the Muslim man’s religious community; 
there is no such obligation for the non-Muslim wife.696 However, he permits the wife’s 
performance because even though the duty is an obligation for the Muslim community 
to fulfill, it is also a right that the living owe the dead.697 The latter is arguably more 
important and its fulfillment is enough to overcome the shortcoming of depriving the 
Muslim community the opportunity to complete their obligation. It is also sufficient to 
overcome another central challenge for the performance of funerary duties: the 
presence of the proper intention. However, Māwardī states that “intention” cannot be a 
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condition for the washing because a dhimmī could not then be permitted to perform the 
duty since a dhimmī cannot make the appropriate intention.698 Instead he reasons that 
because the act of purification is a duty owed to someone else, the person whose act will 
achieve the purification (i.e. the washer) does not require the intention. Māwardī 
analogizes this situation to the case of a mentally challenged wife. He notes that her 
husband is permitted to wash her after her menstrual cycle in order to have sexual 
relations with her even though she is not capable of forming the requisite intention 
needed for washing after the menses.699 Similarly, it does not matter whether the dhimmī 
can form the requisite intention or not because, like the husband, he is carrying out the 
washing as a proxy for the deceased.  
Aside from the spouse, there is also a question as to restrictions on other non-
Muslim family members performing the funerary duties. Ibn Rushd raises the issue of 
whether it is possible for the non-Muslim father to wash and prepare his Muslim child’s 
body for burial. He reports that Mālik considered this unacceptable and did not even 
allow the non-Muslim father to bury the child except for some limited exceptions.700 
Shāfiʿī considers it acceptable for a Muslim to be washed and buried by close family 
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members, even those who are pagan. This opinion is supported by Abū Thawr, Abū 
Ḥanīfa and his students.701 Ibn al-Mundhir reportedly recognized that there was 
precedent for a pagan washing a Muslim but said that it was not a sunna that required 
following.702  
Kāsānī supports this view; even though there is nothing in the Qurʾān that 
provides guidance on this, he says it simply cannot be possible because ritual washing 
must be done by Muslims. As evidence, he cites the case of a Jewish boy who passed away 
while employed by the Prophet. The Prophet apparently encouraged the boy to convert 
to Islam before dying and the boy became a Muslim. After his death, the Prophet told his 
Companions, “come and take your brother,” in other words, perform the funerary duties 
you owe him. Kāsānī uses this story to illustrate a rule created by the negative 
implication of the Prophet never asking the boy’s Jewish father, who was present, to 
participate in the funeral rites.703 For Kāsānī, this means that despite the father/son 
                                               
701 Ibn Rushd, vol. 1, 227. This opinion of Shāfiʿī’s is also reported by Māwardī. See, Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-
kabīr, vol. 3, 19. 
702 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 227. 
703 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 303. Aspects of this story remain confusing. First, we do not actually 
know what transpired with the performance of the funeral rites; all we have is the command that these 
rites should be performed. Maybe the instruction was simply to prepare the boy for the performance of 
funeral rites and the father would be the one performing them. Or maybe the command was also meant 
to include the father in the first place. Second, Kāsānī makes an additional omission: the boy converts to 
Islam on the encouragement of his Jewish father. See, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 1356 (Book 23, Ḥadīth 110). This 
seems a bit odd: why would a Jewish father jeopardize his son’s afterlife on the son’s deathbed by 
 
 
 
 
 
250 
relationship, the link to a particular religious community was more determinative of who 
performed funeral rites.  
On the other hand, Māwardī reports that Shāfiʿī permitted the closest relatives of 
a Muslim to wash him and join his funeral procession, even if they were polytheists 
(mushrikīn).704 Likewise, Māwardī notes that if a pagan dies, and his closest relatives are 
Muslim, then they are required to wash him, shroud him and lead the funeral procession. 
He notes that the Prophet told cAlī to wash, shroud and bury his nonbelieving father, but 
not to perform the funeral prayer.705  However, if the disbeliever has both pagan and 
Muslim relatives, then the nonbelieving relatives are prioritized for performance over 
the Muslim relatives.706 This is because although the Muslims and nonbelievers are both 
relatives, a shared faith, even if an idolatrous one, gives those relatives increased rights 
with regard to the deceased.707 This is an even stronger indication of the priority jurists 
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placed on religious identity versus kinship ties. Not only do they promote this in the 
context of performing Muslim funerary duties, but also non-Muslim funeral rites. The 
deceased’s religion, even if it is not Islam, will be the first point of reference over what 
duties are performed and who performs them. Jurists further affirm the boundaries of 
the moral community for Muslims by prioritizing the same premise of that community, 
religious affiliation, in defining other communities. 
 Another outgrowth of the interfaith marital context is the scenario where a non-
Muslim spouse and her unborn Muslim child are both killed. Here again, the issue of the 
boundaries of the community arises, and the tension between religious and familial 
affiliation. Jurists ask what happens if there are duties owed to the child, but performing 
them would mean bestowing those same rites upon the nonbelieving mother? The issue 
for jurists is not necessarily one of disparate treatment for these women, but recognizing 
their particular faith identity and not simply imposing a Muslim one on them because of 
the child. They seem to agree that funeral prayer should not be performed and are 
generally indifferent about washing and shrouding in this context. However, burial is of 
special concern.  
For instance, Ibn Ḥazm asks where the non-Muslim wife will be buried if she dies 
with a Muslim child in her belly? His answer suggests determining the location of the 
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non-Muslim mother’s grave based on where the unborn child is in the lifecycle. If the 
woman dies less than four months into her pregnancy then her unborn child has not yet 
received the divine spirit (rūḥ); as a result, the non-Muslim mother should be “buried 
with the people of her religion,” not among Muslims.708 In some respects it is as though 
the unborn child’s religion is not yet operative and so has no impact. However, if the 
pregnancy is past four months, then the spirit has been breathed into the child and the 
mother should be buried with Muslims. This is because her child is now entitled to all the 
privileges owed to a Muslim and one of them is to be buried among Muslims.709 This is a 
stark example of how communal boundaries are set based on religious as opposed to 
familial affiliation. Membership in the Muslim community occurs even prior to the child 
leaving the mother’s womb and is consequential enough to overcome even the mother’s 
own affiliations.  
As Kāsānī asks in relation to this scenario: “what is her [the mother’s] status since 
she has a Muslim inside her?” He notes that there is “consensus” that funeral prayers 
should not be performed for her, but she should be washed and shrouded. This is because 
neither the woman nor what is inside of her are entitled to funeral prayers.710 Unlike Ibn 
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Ḥazm, Kāsānī does not mention the divine spirit being breathed into the child. This is 
not entirely surprising since he does not raise the idea of the divine spirit in any 
meaningful way during his discussion on deceased children and the duties owed to them. 
Instead, Kāsānī notes that juristic differences on this topic are connected to whether the 
child’s status as a Muslim alters the mother’s status. Some jurists argue that the mother 
should be buried in a Muslim cemetery because her child is Muslim. Others say that even 
though the child is Muslim, it is still a part of her and not a separate entity, thus she 
should be buried in a non-Muslim cemetery.711 This seems to be Kāsānī’s position as well, 
arguing that “what is in her womb is not deserving of prayer either, but she should be 
washed and shrouded (wa-mā fī baṭnihā la yastaḥiqq al-ṣalāh ʿalayhi, wa-lākinnaha tughasal 
wa-tukaffan).712 
As mentioned earlier, the other area where nonbelievers are discussed is in the 
context of war. Several questions are raised about funerary duties owed to non-Muslim 
fighters and civilians in warfare. Jurists also address more complicated situations such 
as duties owed when Muslim and non-Muslim dead cannot be distinguished from each 
other at the end of battle. Ghāzalī mentions two types of non-Muslim fighters involved 
                                               
711 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 303. 
712 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 303. 
 
 
 
 
 
254 
in warfare: those that oppose Muslims and those who side with them. The default, easy 
case is that no burial duty is owed to the non-Muslim who fights against Muslims.713 
However, not all non-Muslims fight against Muslims. Hence, the dhimmī who dies in 
warfare should be buried and shrouded as a kifāya-duty, but cannot be prayed over. 
Ghāzalī relays the opinion of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ṣaydalānī who said that the dhimmī who 
fights with the Muslims is like a battlefield warrior and will not have the status of dhimmī 
after death.714 
Ibn Ḥazm notes that there are conflicting reports on how non-Muslims should be 
treated when it comes to their death. In one instance, there are various ḥadīth suggesting 
that no funeral rites should be conferred upon them. For instance, he mentions the Battle 
of Badr where the Prophet apparently “ordered twenty-four men from the Qurayshi 
force to be cast into one of the wells of Badr” as opposed to being buried.715 Likewise, in 
another narration the Prophet instructed people that if they killed someone from the 
Banū Qurayẓa they should dig a trench and throw them in it.716 On the other hand, Ibn 
Ḥazm also reports that when the Prophet’s nonbelieving uncle Abū Ṭalib passed away, 
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ʿAlī, his son, asked “who will bury him?” The Prophet instructed him: “bury your 
father.”717 Likewise, Ibn Ḥazm mentions an incident where someone asked Ibn ʿAbbās, 
what should be done about a Christian man who passed away leaving only a son; Ibn 
ʿAbbās told him, “it is necessary for you to walk with [the son] and bury [the father].”718 
Another tradition recalls that the mother of al-Ḥārith b. Abī Rabīʿa died and she was a 
Christian, but her final rites were performed by the Prophet’s Companions.719  
A closer look at these apparently contradictory reports suggests the difference is 
due to the two contexts we began with: family and war. In the context of war, funeral 
rites are not conferred on non-Muslims, but this is consistent with how Muslim martyrs 
are treated as well: warfare suspends some funerary duties. Of course, for Muslim 
martyrs this suspension also contains an elevated status: their death is so pure of purpose 
it does not require cleansing. In the context of familial relationships, certain 
requirements persist even if a family is of mixed faith. 
The primary situation jurists are preoccupied with in the context of non-Muslims 
and warfare is when, after a battle, Muslim and non-Muslim dead are mixed together, 
such that they either cannot be distinguished from each other or it is not practically 
                                               
717 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 117. 
718 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 117. 
719 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 117. 
 
 
 
 
 
256 
possible for them to be separated. In these situations, the question arises as to what type 
of duties are owed to the dead and how to reconcile this with the general prohibition not 
to perform funeral rites on non-Muslims opposing you in battle. Ghazālī obligates 
washing and shrouding the mixed dead, but when it comes to prayer, it must be 
performed with an intention (niyyah) that distinguishes between Muslim and non-
Muslim.720 Māwardī suggests that when the dead are mixed in this way, the obligation is 
to pray over groups of them at a time and make intention specifically with regard to the 
Muslims in each group.721 The relative ratio of Muslims to non-Muslims in each group 
does not matter to him; the same instruction applies to one Muslim with a hundred 
disbelievers or one disbeliever among a hundred Muslims.722 This is as opposed to Abū 
Ḥanīfa who reportedly held the opinion that you can only pray over the group if the 
Muslims are in the majority, but not if they are equal or in the minority.723 Māwardī 
disagrees with this position, arguing that if you pray over a group where Muslims are the 
majority the intention is for your prayer to be on every Muslim present and not on the 
non-Muslims. The same would be true if Muslims were the minority in the group. In the 
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same vein, if the fear is that you might mistakenly pray over a nonbeliever, this will 
remain the case whether Muslims are in the minority or majority in the group.724 
Kāsānī addresses the situation by proposing some precursors to fulfilling the 
funerary duties. To begin with, he suggests attempting to separate Muslims from non-
Muslims, since this a preferred option. To this end, he recommends investigating four 
common external signs of a Muslim: circumcision (khitān), henna dyed hair of the beard 
or head (khiḍāb), black clothing (labs al-sawād) and shaved pubic hairs (ḥalq al-ʿāna). If the 
first step is unsuccessful, then Kāsānī suggests, similar to Abū Ḥanīfa, determining 
whether most of the dead are Muslim or not. If they are, then he obligates the 
performance of all four funeral rites: prayer, washing, shrouding and burial. On the other 
hand, if most of the people are non-Muslim and you suspect someone to be Muslim from 
among them, but there are no clear signs, they should be washed but not prayed over.725  
Kāsānī reports an even more pragmatic approach from Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 
321/933) for situations where the religion of an individual is unclear. Ṭaḥāwī begins by 
discussing those funerary duties that are obligatory and those that are permitted. For 
prayer, he notes that it is never permissible to pray over a non-Muslim, suggesting that 
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it is better to forgo the obligation to pray over a Muslim than to pray over a nonbeliever 
(tark al-ṣalāh ʿalā al-Muslim awlā min al-ṣalāh ʿalā al-kāfir).726 As a result, the only duties that 
one may consider performing for a nonbeliever are washing, shrouding and burial. 
Ṭaḥāwī also discusses the permissible and obligatory in the context of ritual baths, noting 
that it is obligatory to wash a Muslim and generally permissible (jāʾiz fī al-jumla) to wash 
a non-Muslim. As a result, he advocates being guided by the following legal maxim: 
“perform that which is permissible, in a general way, in order to satisfy the obligation 
[in all its parts]” (fa-yuʾtā bi-l-jāʾiz fī al-jumla li-taḥṣīl al-wājib).727  
 
Strangers 
Thus far, the exceptions to the funerary duties pertain to individuals whose 
bodies are whole and whose identities are known, which includes females, children, 
sinners, Muslims and non-Muslims. However, another category of exceptions involves 
individuals who may be “incomplete” in either body or person, where their identities 
may not be fully known or only physical fragments of their bodies exist, which makes 
them in some sense strangers. These two situations are grouped together because they 
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raise similar issues for jurists: what types of duties are owed to people who are not 
“whole?” Jurists discuss two different situations in which knowledge of the identity of 
the deceased is incomplete. First, the main discussion centers on duties owed to the 
person to whom the human limbs once belonged before they were separated from his 
body. Second, “john doe” or deceased individuals who have not been identified are 
discussed. Aside from specific questions as to whether funeral rites are required for 
fragments of the body, there is a broader question on what funerary duties are owed to 
people whose identity you cannot determine. What is the default set of rites to be 
performed for them? Is it worse to perform impermissible acts on someone or omit the 
performance of required duties they are owed? 
Jurists devote most of their discussions to limbs that are separated from the body. 
In general, but not always, this occurs as a byproduct of warfare, when a weapon has 
severed parts of the body. The main question is whether funeral rites need to be 
performed on a partial body. Other questions include whether it is necessary to 
determine if the person who lost the limb is still alive, whether they are Muslim, what 
their gender is, etc. In this regard, it is prudent to begin with Abū Ḥanīfa’s widely 
reported opinion on this matter. He argues that only if most of the person is still intact 
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should they be prayed over (yuṣallā ʿalā aktharihi wa-lā yuṣallā ʿalā aqallihi).728 Hence, only 
if at least half a person is found, with a head or more than half the body with no head, 
then can they be washed, shrouded and prayed over.729 With regard to limbs, Shāfiʿī 
focuses attention on what to do with the limbs if the person who lost them is still alive. 
He notes that jurists have held two opinions: to either wash and pray over the limbs as 
though they belonged to a dead person or not to perform any funeral rites over them.730  
Māwardī supports this latter position. He considers it problematic to pray over 
severed limbs of someone who is alive since you will not be praying over the rest of the 
body.731 If the person is deceased and their severed limbs are found, Māwardī says you 
should wash and pray over them.732 However, he allows limbs not to be buried if they have 
been separated from the body, except for private parts: those must be shrouded and 
buried after praying over them.733 This is a rare occasion where the hierarchy of 
performing funeral rites is disrupted. Ordinarily if a prayer or washing had been 
performed for a deceased person then shrouding and burial would automatically occur 
                                               
728 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32; Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 375; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 138. 
729 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 138. 
730 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32. 
731 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32. 
732 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32.  
733 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32. 
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as well. However, here, despite washing and praying over them, burial is not required. 
The performance of prayer was justified by some jurists as the recognition that the 
sanctity of the limbs was by necessity connected to the sanctity of the whole body.734  
This is also Ibn Ḥazm’s position regarding limbs of the deceased: nothing of the 
body is prohibited from being washed or shrouded for burial simply because the 
deceased is dismembered by injury or wound.735 In fact, he goes so far as to say that you 
should pray over any part of the dead Muslim you find: even a fingernail or hair.736 This 
a prime example of Ibn Ḥazm’s commitment to the consistent application of his strict 
constructionist approach to texts: practical considerations should not disrupt adherence 
to the text regardless of where it leads. Part of his argument is that in theory you can 
pray over a dead Muslim even when there is nothing present, prayer in absentia (ṣalāt al-
ghāʾib), thus performing the remaining rites when only some parts of the body are 
present is not problematic. In fact, he argues that it is impermissible to forgo these 
funerary duties upon separated limbs.737 Ibn Ḥazm also critiques Abū Ḥanīfa’s position 
                                               
734 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 32. He cites some historical precedent for this, mentioning the fact 
that ʿUmar apparently prayed over bones in Syria and that the finger of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAttāb b. Asīd 
was prayed over when a bird carried it to Mecca from the Battle of the Camel. Apparently, the ring on the 
finger allowed people to identify it as belonging to ʿAbd al-Raḥman. Ibid. 
735 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 114. 
736 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 138. 
737 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 138. 
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that conditions performance of funerary duties on how much of the body is found. He 
finds this distinction to be baseless, arguing that not only does it lack any textual support 
but it creates confusion by requiring people to determine the percentage of the body 
taken up by a particular limb, but not providing any guidance on how precisely to do 
this.738 Ghazālī also connects funeral prayer over limbs to “prayer for the dead who are 
absent” (ṣalāh ʿalā al-mayyit al-ghāʾib). If the owner of the limb is alive then it should not 
be prayed over, but if they are dead then it should be prayed over, washed, wrapped and 
buried.739 
While limbs are the primary issue discussed in this category, there are also 
situations where there is incomplete information about deceased individuals whose 
bodies are still intact. In other words, they are whole physically but their identity is not 
fully known. For instance, Shāfiʿī reportedly discussed the situation of someone who dies 
while traveling. The question arises as to what duties are owed to this person if their 
identity is unknown. He notes that individuals travelling with the deceased have to be 
mindful not to neglect “the rights of their brother” relating to death. Māwardī reports 
Shāfiʿī as saying that “the best course is for a Muslim [traveler] to bury him [i.e., the 
                                               
738 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 138. 
739 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 375. 
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stranger]” because if the deceased is left in the desert and no one passes (thus, no rites 
are performed) then this will be considered “sinful and disobedient to God’s 
command.”740 More importantly, he stresses the importance of fulfilling this duty by 
making a rare comment about worldly punishment for failure to perform. Specifically, 
Shāfiʿī says that the Sulṭān is charged with punishing anyone who omits the performance 
of these acts (wa-ʿalā al-sulṭān an yuʿāqibahum ʿalā dhālik). Their crime is “negligence 
towards the right of God” and “belittlement of what is obligatory upon” their Muslim 
brother.741 Of course, he makes an exception for situations of necessity, namely where 
they are fearful of hostile territory or becoming vulnerable to attack while they perform 
rites owed to the deceased.742 Regardless, this is a rare instance where failure to perform 
a duty, collectively owed by Muslims, is assigned some measure of earthly accountability. 
Māwardī also discusses cases of unidentified individuals who are entirely 
unknown. The scenario that he, and other jurists, often note is the passerby who comes 
across a dead person in the desert: what obligation is he owed? Māwardī says that the 
passerby is required to perform funeral rites upon the deceased (lazimahum al-qiyām bihi) 
regardless of whether it is a man or a woman. Furthermore, if the duty is disregarded 
                                               
740 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
741 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
742 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
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then he explicitly states that they are in error and sinful.743 Māwardī also considers the 
possibility that the body has already had funeral rites performed for it, but either was 
never buried or has somehow been removed from the grave. The passerby is instructed 
to examine the body for any signs of washing or shrouding, and if none are present then 
these rites, along with the other ones, should be performed.744 Alternatively, Māwardī 
says if there are indicators that funeral rites have been performed then the body should 
simply be buried. If anyone wishes to pray over him they may do so only after burial 
since there is a strong likelihood that funeral prayers have already been performed even 
though there are no indications of this on the body. If there are signs of washing, 
shrouding or embalming on the body then they must simply be buried. If they decide to 
pray upon him then they should pray upon his grave after he has been buried because 
he has already been prayed over.745  
Kāsānī also discusses situations in which one comes across a dead body. However, 
he does not base his analysis on indications that funeral rites had previously been 
performed; instead he focuses on other markers of identity and location. He begins by 
requiring an examination of the body to see if there are attributes suggesting that it 
                                               
743 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
744 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 6. 
745 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 7. 
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belongs to a Muslim. If there are, then he obligates performance of funeral rites on the 
deceased including burial in a Muslim cemetery.746 However, he notes that jurists are 
divided as to whether these rites should still be conferred upon the deceased if no 
attributes linking them to Islam are found.747 For Kāsānī, the same obligations may exist 
even when there are no attributes to identify the person as Muslim, as long as the body 
is discovered in Muslim territory (dār al-Islām). That fact alone creates a high enough 
probability that the person was Muslim to allow the confidence of funerary duties.748 In 
essence, location functions as the identity marker. On the other hand, if the body is found 
in enemy territory (dār al-ḥarb) then the attributes on the person indicating they are 
Muslim carry more weight than the location.749 If those attributes are found, then the 
consensus is that all funeral rites should be conferred. However, if they are not found 
then nothing should be done.750 
 
Martyrs 
                                               
746 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 303. 
747 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 303. 
748 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 303. 
749 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 304. 
750 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 304. 
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 The final exception to funerary duties is an individual whose death is considered 
martyrdom. In general, martyr status is acquired in the context of war and jurists 
primarily concern themselves with whether or not this context should alter duties owed 
to the dead. Specifically, when a person becomes a martyr does this excuse the 
community’s performance of funerary duties for him? For the most part, jurists respond 
in the affirmative: funeral rites should not be conferred. They mainly base their opinion 
on a few reports from the Prophetic tradition. Jurists develop their framework for 
funerary duties on the basis of these ḥadīth prooftexts. In doing so, they seem to keep 
two connected, but often conflicting objectives in mind: practical necessity and purity. 
Regarding practical necessity, the rules reflect the jurists’ understanding that conferring 
funeral rites on fallen fighters is not always possible given the circumstances of war. 
During battle, the risks are too significant for someone to both fight the enemy and 
perform funeral prayer, ritual washing, shrouding or burials. Even when the conflict is 
over, the impracticality of performance often persists, especially if the number of dead 
are so significant that performance of rites for each person individually becomes 
untenable.751  
                                               
751 Some scholars have also advanced the idea of practical necessity behind the law for martyrs because 
the “Islamic funerary law was designed for an urban environment.” See also, Halevi, Muhammad’s Grave, 
160. 
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Regarding purity, jurists are keen on preserving the elevated status of martyrs in 
comparison to those who die outside the context of war. An exclusively practical calculus 
for their funerary duties diminishes the elevated status of martyrs; jurists are not 
comfortable with this. How can it be possible for those who make the ultimate sacrifice 
for their religion to have rites around their death determined by practical considerations 
alone? Arguably, in their search for more profound reasons to forgo funerary duties, they 
offer ideas that further a sacred conception of martyrdom. The nonperformance of funeral 
rites then becomes indicative of greater worth; the martyr’s blood accomplishes the 
same purpose as water and purifies the body after death. In many respects, they are 
outlining the boundaries of who the community should consider a “hero” and who is not 
worthy of that label. This is an extension of their attempt at other places to establish the 
boundaries of the Muslim community itself. 
However, these two objectives present challenges for the jurists, especially when 
we try to reconcile how they work in conjunction with one another. If we accept that 
funerary duties should be suspended for practical reasons then is it possible to also argue 
that martyrs have an elevated status? Similarly, if we argue that martyrs have an 
elevated status, it seems counterintuitive since they receive the same treatment as 
nonbelievers when it comes to funeral rites. How is it possible for the most elevated 
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status and, arguably, the least elevated status to receive the same treatment? Practical 
necessity alone does not allow martyrs to claim an elevated status, so some sacrality must 
be inserted into the martyr’s death. However, this does not address the equivalency in 
performance accorded nonbelievers and martyrs: neither receive funeral rites. One 
might explain this apparent equivalency by distinguishing between nonbelievers not 
receiving Islamic funeral rites, but being eligible for funeral rites from their own 
communities. Hence, nonperformance of funeral rites for nonbelievers is because they 
are not entitled to them, whereas nonperformance for martyrs is because they do not 
require them even though they are entitled. Or put another way, nonbelievers do not 
receive Islamic funeral rites because they are not part of the moral community; martyrs 
do not receive these funeral rites because they have given their lives to preserve the 
moral community, demonstrating the ultimate indication of membership. They require 
no additional affirmation through the conferring of funeral duties upon them.  
This section proceeds by first examining how the general rules for funeral rites 
are altered by the specific context of martyrdom. This includes each of the four rites 
discussed: prayer, ritual washing, shrouding and burial. In the process, the martyrdom 
context will also acquire its own set of “general rules” and so the examination will turn 
to the variations in these rules that developed for the special case of martyrdom. 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
Following that, atypical situations of martyrdom will be explored along with any 
accompanying rule changes. Finally, the question of purpose will be examined, namely 
what objectives are the rules seeking to accomplish? Here the debate is whether funeral 
rites, particularly ritual washing, seeks to cleanse the martyred corpse as a means of 
achieving physical purity or ritual purity. 
With regard to the duties framework for martyrs, there is a fair amount of 
consensus with regard to nonperformance of most funerary duties for those martyrs who 
die while fighting nonbelievers on the battlefield. Where differences emerge, it is due 
primarily to a change in the location of the death (removed from the battlefield) or a 
change in how the fighter was killed (not by a nonbeliever). Among the early jurists, 
Mālik and Shāfiʿī reportedly said prayer should not be performed for a martyr who dies 
in battle, whereas Abū Hanīfa required it.752 Ibn Rushd attributes the difference of 
opinion to the primacy that these jurists respectively give to two main ḥadīth narrations. 
In one of them, Abū Dawūd recounts that the Prophet ordered martyrs to be buried in 
their clothes with no ritual washing or prayer. In another, Ibn ʿAbbās narrates that the 
Prophet performed funeral prayers for people who had been killed, including his uncle 
                                               
752 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 240; see also, Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 116; Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-
kabīr, vol. 3, 33-35. 
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Ḥamza, but did not wash them.753 Later jurists seem to follow the respective positions of 
their school’s eponym, for instance, Māwardī notes that his fellow Shāfiʿīs agree that a 
martyr should not be prayed over.754 For Māwardī, the martyr’s situation can best be 
understood by analogizing it to the stillborn child: “everything not required to be 
performed for the stillborn is not required to be performed for the martyr” (kull mā lā 
yalzam fiʿluhu fī al-siqṭ la yalzam fiʿluhu fī al-shahīd).755 Elaborating on the position of 
nonperformance of funeral prayers for martyrs, Ghazālī goes beyond making it non-
obligatory and holds performance to be forbidden (ḥarām).756 
The ritual washing of martyrs is governed by principles similar to those 
pertaining to prayers for martyrs killed by nonbelievers on the battlefield. Mālik, Abū 
Ḥanifa and Shāfiʿī agreed that the martyr who dies in battle should not be washed.757 Ibn 
Rushd says that this is the majority position and is based on a Prophetic ḥadīth that 
commanded neither prayer nor washing for the people who were killed at Uḥud; instead, 
they should be buried in their clothes.758 Shāfiʿī reportedly held that martyrs should not 
                                               
753 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 240. 
754 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 37. 
755 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 34. 
756 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 379. He acknowledges that some of his fellow Shāfiʿīs permit prayer over 
martyrs, but adds that they do not make it obligatory. Ibid. 
757 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 240. 
758 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 227. Māwardī mentions the same tradition by Jābir b. cAbd Allah 
and Anas b. Mālik. Māwardī, See, Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 34. 
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be washed or prayed over, but instead buried in the clothes that they died in. He bases 
this view on the fact the Prophet apparently never prayed over martyrs or washed 
them.759 Māwardī reports that Mālik, and others from the “people of Mecca and Medina,” 
as well as Abū Ḥanīfa held the same opinion that those killed in battle with disbelievers 
should not be washed. The opposite opinion was apparently held by Ibn ʿUmar, Saʿīd b. 
al-Musayyab and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī.760 Māwardī himself says that if it is established that a 
person was killed in battle, then they should not be washed or prayed over and that the 
manner in which they were killed makes no difference (sawāʾun qutila…ʿalā ayyi ḥālin 
kāna).761  Ghazālī also states explicitly that the martyr should not be washed.762 Ibn Mufliḥ 
goes so far as to say that if a person is killed while fighting, but lacks legal capacity (ghayr 
mukallaf), they should still not receive a ritual washing. Strictly speaking, because they 
lack legal capacity they are not eligible, according to many jurists, for martyrdom status. 
Hence, their ineligibility removes the justification for others’ nonperformance and they 
should receive the same funeral rites as a non-martyr. However, despite this narrow 
construction, Ibn Mufliḥ does not require this and treats them like martyrs.763 
                                               
759 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 33. 
760 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 33.  
761 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 35.  
762 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 377. 
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For the remaining two funerary duties, while the obligation to bury the martyr is 
widely agreed upon by jurists, there is a difference of opinion as to whether shrouding 
should take place or not. One group of jurists believed martyrs should be shrouded, while 
others required them to be buried in their clothes. Māwardī obligates both shrouding 
and burial of martyrs. His position is that after a person dies their clothes become the 
property of their guardian (walī). It is up to the guardian to decide whether to bury the 
martyr in those clothes or not.764 Māwardī discusses opposition to his position by citing 
Abū Ḥanīfa, who did not give guardians this right and required martyrs to be buried in 
the clothes they died in.765 Ibn Ḥazm supports this position, requiring burial, but not 
washing or shrouding. Instead, he says they should be buried “with their blood and 
clothes.”766 Ghazālī also says that martyrs should be buried like everyone else, except that 
their “blood stained clothes” should not be removed (though coarse garments are an 
exception).767  In responding to these other opinions, Māwardī offers historical precedent 
                                               
764 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 35.  
765 Māwardī, vol. 3, 35. 
766 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 115 and 138. The only thing he requires being removed from them is their 
weapons. Ibid., 115. 
767 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 380. Shields should also not be removed. Ibid. 
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for his position. When Ḥamza, the Prophet’s uncle, was killed in battle his daughter 
brought white pieces of cloth to shroud him in and removed his battle clothes.768 
Even those who agreed that martyrs in a war with the polytheists should not be 
washed disagreed with regard to people martyred by bandits (luṣūṣ) or by non-
polytheists (ghayr ahl al-shirk). Awzāʿī and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal agreed that the victims of 
such persons should be treated in the same manner as those who were killed by the 
polytheists; Mālik and Shāfiʿī said that they should receive the ritual washing.769 The 
difference between them revolves around whether the suspension of the duty to perform 
a ritual washing is for every martyr without exception or only those martyrs who are 
killed by nonbelievers. Those who say it is for every martyr without exception apply it 
across the board for everyone the Prophet explicitly stated was a martyr, including those 
who did not die on the battlefield. Others consider the suspension to be more limited, 
only applying it to a specific type of martyr: the ones killed by nonbelievers and on the 
battlefield.770 
Within the discussion on funerary duties for martyrs, the assumptions that 
structure discussions of funerary duties owed to martyrs have to do with how and where 
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the individual died. As noted earlier, there is a baseline assumption that a martyr is 
someone who died while fighting, that the fight was against disbelievers and that their 
death occurred on the battlefield. However, jurists are fully aware of the fact that various 
other situations can arise that alter the manner in which the martyr died, for instance 
the location of their death. Hence, they are concerned with determining how broadly to 
apply the label of martyr: who qualifies for martyrdom and what is the definition of a 
martyr? Through this definition they regulate what constitutes a “Muslim hero” for the 
community. For instance, one common situation involves a fighter being injured on the 
battlefield but dying while receiving treatment away from battle or subsequent to the 
conclusion of war. Should they be considered martyrs? If so, what type of funerary duties 
are they owed? And, if the funerary duties are different than those owed to a battlefield 
martyr then what does this say about the role of practical necessity in determining 
guidelines for these duties?  
Jurists opine on the injured fighter who dies away from the battlefield. Ibn Rushd 
claims a consensus among jurists that any Muslim not killed on the battlefield fighting 
nonbelievers should, unlike other martyrs, receive the ritual washing.771 Ibn Ḥazm notes 
that if a person is wounded on the battlefield but dies after being carried off the field, 
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one may still wash and shroud him.772 Ghazālī acknowledges the existence of conflicting 
opinions with regard to injured fighters who die after removal from the battlefield, but 
fails to elaborate further.773 Māwardī provides a more robust framework, discussing three 
scenarios in which fighters die away from the battlefield. In the first, a fighter is injured 
in battle, then rescued but dies as a result of his injuries while the war is still ongoing.774 
In the second, the injured fighter is rescued but dies shortly after (bi-zamān qarīb) the war 
concludes. In both these scenarios, Māwardī does not allow the fighter to be washed or 
prayed over, just like those killed in battle.775 The third scenario he describes is one where 
a fighter is injured during battle, dies after the war concludes, but his body is not 
discovered for a “long time after” (zamān baʿīd). In this case, he requires both washing 
and prayer to be performed.776 Some jurists condition the duties performed on whether 
the injured fighter is able to consume food or not; food consumption also serves as a 
proxy for both the severity of the injury and the extent of time after war where 
someone’s injury will be still be considered a battlefield death. Hence, Abū Ḥanīfa 
reportedly said that an injured fighter who dies without eating anything (because their 
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injury is so severe) should not be washed (idhā māta qabl akl al-ṭaʿām lam yughsal). 
However, if he dies after eating something then the ritual washing should take place.777  
In addition to the injured fighters, there are also individuals who are removed 
from the battlefield because of capture then subsequently die in captivity. The question 
arises whether they are also entitled to a suspension of duties or should receive all the 
funeral rites. Māwardī discusses the situation where a fighter is captured by 
nonbelievers, then dies (or is killed) and the body is presumably returned to the 
Muslims.778 He says there are two opinions about the funerary duties owed to this 
individual, each analogized from different parts of the general funerary duty framework. 
The first opinion holds that one should wash and pray over them just as one would for 
an injured person who is rescued from the battlefield and subsequently dies. This is 
because, just like the injured fighter, in this case the “spirit departed [the body when it 
was] away from the battle” (khurūj rūḥihi fī ghayr al-muʿtarak): they should have funerary 
duties performed.779 The other opinion is that the dead captive should be treated like a 
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martyr on the battlefield, neither washed nor prayed over, because his death occurred 
unjustly at the hands of a disbelieving combatant.780  
Ibn Rushd asks an additional question with regard to non-Muslim children who 
are captured and die in captivity. Does age alter the duties owed to a captive even if they 
are non-Muslim (al-aṭfāl al-musabbayīn)?781 He notes that Mālik and Shafiʿī held the same 
opinion on the matter with one difference. They both agreed that you should not pray 
over a child unless he is at an age where he can grasp what Islam is (yaʿqil al-Islām). This 
is the case regardless of whether the child is captured along with his parents or 
separately from them.782 At this point, Mālik and Shafiʿī diverge. Mālik argues that the 
ruling for the parents will be followed for the child unless the father converts to Islam; 
in that case, the child will follow the father’s ruling.783 This would not be the case if the 
mother converted. For Shafiʿī, the ruling for the child will follow either of the two 
parents who convert to Islam.784 Abū Ḥanīfa requires prayer over the non-Muslim child 
because the ruling (ḥukm) for it is based on whoever captures it.785 Awazāʿi says that if 
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Muslims end up buying these non-Muslim children while they are captives and 
unaccompanied, then funeral prayers must be performed for them.786 If the minor is not 
alone, but rather a captive along with his non-Muslim father, then no duty is owed to 
them because their ruling is that of their parents.787 The difference is based on whether 
nonbelieving children will be saved (ahl al-jannah) or damned (ahl al-nār). Some jurists 
hold that their fate is the same as their disbelieving parents, while others cite the 
Prophetic tradition that “every being is born with an innate disposition for religion 
(fitra); in other words, they should be treated like believers because they have not yet 
become disconnected from their original situation at birth.788 
Jurists also discuss the question of martyrdom and the associated funerary duties 
for those individuals that are killed outside the context of war, but might still be 
considered martyrs. Shāfiʿī mentions the case of the caliph ʿUmar, who was not killed in 
battle, but was still considered a martyr, but was washed and prayed over.789 Ibn Ḥazm 
provides a short list of non-conflict martyrs: those who die due to an intestinal ailment 
                                               
786 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol.1, 241. 
787 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol.1, 241. 
788 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol.1, 241. 
789 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 33. Regarding this report, Ibn Rushd says that it is reported that ʿUmar 
received all the funeral rites “and was martyred.” Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 227. 
 
 
 
 
 
279 
(mabṭūn), the plague-stricken (maṭʿūn), drowned (gharīq), burned (ḥarīq), etc.790 He argues 
that there is scholarly agreement that not only did the Prophet classify these people as 
martyrs, but he also shrouded and washed them during his lifetime.791 Furthermore, Ibn 
Ḥazm notes that ʿUmar, ʿUthmān and ʿAlī were all martyrs, who were washed, shrouded 
and had prayers said over them.792 Ghazālī also attaches the label of martyr more broadly; 
for instance, he considers any person, Muslim or dhimmī, who is killed “unjustly” to be a 
martyr, as are those who die from intestinal afflictions or those killed while foreigners 
(gharīb) in another land. However, unlike other martyrs, he says that all these people 
should be “prayed over” even though they are “considered martyrs.”793 Māwardī holds a 
similar opinion regarding those killed unjustly and cites the Prophet as saying that if 
“someone is killed unjustly then it is obligatory to pray over them as you would for 
someone who was not killed in battle” (li-annahu qutila ẓulman fa-wajaba an yuṣallā ʿalayhi 
ka-man qutila fī ghayr al-muʿtarak).794 Like Ibn Ḥazm, he also notes other categories of 
people who should be treated like martyrs and require no funeral rites: those who die by 
                                               
790 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 116. 
791 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 116. 
792 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 116. 
793 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 377-378. Ibn Ḥazm takes a more neutral position on whether or not to pray for 
martyrs, classifying both praying or not praying as good (ḥasan) acts.793 As for the issue of someone who 
later dies away from the battle of wounds suffered on the battlefield, Ibn Ḥazm permits praying over 
them. Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 115. 
794 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 34. 
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drowning, by fire, are crushed to death (taḥt hadm), assassinated (qutila ghīlatan) or killed 
while being robbed (qatalahu al-luṣūṣ).795  
Both practical and symbolic considerations play a role in the distinction between 
duties for battlefield martyrs versus non-battlefield martyrs: the absence of war zone 
conditions permits the performance of funerary duties, but also eliminates the need to 
specially commemorate the dead. For instance, burying martyrs in “blood-stained 
clothes” is the most reasonable course of action in the context of war when their bodies 
are not going to be ritually bathed, shrouds are not readily available, and the enemy has 
the potential to attack. Likewise, it is instructive that the final location of the fighter’s 
death plays a significant role for many jurists in what funerary duties, if any, should be 
performed. The fact that funerary duties are no longer suspended if one is removed from 
the battlefield suggests that for many jurists the practical needs of war were a major 
consideration.  
However, jurists are unsatisfied with simply practical justifications for these 
rules. The ritual celebration of martyrdom necessarily involves remaining in a context 
with all the markings of battle. They want to attach more meaning to why the standard 
funerary duties are not performed for martyrs. For instance, Māwardī offers one 
                                               
795 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. 
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explanation for nonperformance by means of a creative reading of Q 3/al-ʿImrān: 169.796 
This verse says that martyrs should not be thought of as “dead” but “alive with their 
Lord.”797 Hence, Māwardī argues that since funeral prayers can only be carried out for 
the dead and the Qurʾān clearly states that martyrs are not dead, they don’t need 
expiation or a plea for forgiveness for their transgressions.798 He applies the same logic 
to ritual washing and shrouding. However, Māwardī conspicuously does not apply it to 
burial and offers no explanation as to why burial rights should be conferred on martyrs 
if they are considered alive. While there is clearly a distinction being made between 
corporeal death of the body (which everyone experiences) and complete death of both 
body and soul (which martyrs do not experience), it is not clear why this distinction 
                                               
796 A similar verse occurs in Q 2/al-Baqarah: 154: “Do not say that those who are killed in God’s cause are 
dead; they are alive, though you do not realize it.” 
797 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. The relevant part of the verse reads: “…do not think of those who 
have been killed in God’s way as dead. They are alive with their Lord…” In his commentary on the Qur’ān, 
Ṭabarī says this is in reference to the martyrs from Badr and Uḥud, who are considered literally to be 
alive. He quotes several ḥadīth that speak of the Prophet describing those who were killed as having 
their “spirits placed inside green birds that return to the rivers of Paradise, eat from its fruits and nestle 
by golden lamps in the shade of the [Divine] Throne” (arwāḥahum fī ajwāf ṭayr khuḍr tarid anhār al-jannah 
taʾkul min thimārihā wa-taʾwī ilā qanādīl min dhahab fī ẓilli al-ʿarsh). Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī jāmiʿ al-
bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān, vol. 6, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī (Cairo: Markaz al-buḥūth wa-
dirāsāt al-ʿarabiyya wa-l-Islāmiyya, 2001), 228-236. For similar opinions, see also, Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī al-
Naysābūrī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, n.a.), 95-96; Ibn Abī Zamanayn, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-ʿazīz, 
vol. 1, ed. Ḥusayn b. ʿUkāsha and Muḥammad b. Muṣṭafā al-Kanz (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadītha, 2001), 333-
334. In his commentary to the related verse Q 2/al-Baqarah: 154, Ṭabarī explicitly states that the martyrs 
will receive sustenance from Paradise “prior to their resurrection” (qabl baʿthihim). Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, vol. 2, 
701.  
798 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. 
 
 
 
 
 
282 
explains the negation of all the funerary duties except for one. Why is a martyr 
considered “alive” for three funerary duties, but “dead” for another?  
In some respects, this further highlights the theme running through the chapter 
of jurists seeking piecemeal symmetry not holistic consistency in their explanation of 
kifāya-duties. As long as their logic enables them to solve some of the dilemmas they are 
presented with, jurists are content to continue utilizing that logic regardless of other 
theoretical challenges it might pose. Hence, ethereal life in a hidden plane of existence 
allows them to produce a satisfactory explanation for suspending funeral rites for 
opposite ends of a spectrum: believers who have made the ultimate sacrifice for the faith 
and disbelievers who are the antithesis of the faith. Yet, jurists ignore the issue of burial 
even though it poses a serious challenge to the completion of their reasoning. How is it 
possible that for certain funeral rites the deceased is considered “alive” due to their 
martyr status, but for burial they are considered dead? 
Another important meaning that jurists apply to these situations involves purity 
and centers on two aspects. First, they want symmetry between the performance of 
funerary duties and rules around ritual purity for the living. Second, some discuss what 
we might term a “sacred” purity that comes with martyrdom; where the very status of 
martyr is itself purifying. With regard to the first aspect, Ghazālī notes that one of the 
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ways in which a martyr can be distinguished from others is that washing a martyr would 
be a violation of his rights even if he is in a state of impurity (fa-innahu ḥarāmun fī ḥaqqihi 
wa-in kāna junuban), whereas for everyone else it would be the opposite.799 Māwardī raises 
the issue in a discussion on what should happen to women and children that die in battle 
with disbelievers. He contends that they should not be washed or prayed over, similar to 
mature men (al-rijāl al-bālighīn) who are killed in battle.800 Abū Ḥanīfa reportedly agreed 
with this position as it relates to women but disagreed with regard to children, who he 
felt should be washed and prayed over. His argument is based on purity. Essentially, he 
says suspension of funeral rites, such as washing, are a cleansing from God (taṭhir min 
Allāh). However, since children are sinless they do not require this cleansing (la yalḥaquhu 
al-taṭhīr), thus funerary duties should not be suspended for them.801 Māwardī disagrees 
with this reasoning, arguing that matters of purity and removal of impurities are not 
obligatory for the child till he reaches puberty. Since the washing is suspended even for 
people who have purity obligations during their lifetime, it is even less necessary for 
                                               
799 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 379. For some, like al-Ḥasan and Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, every Muslim should be 
washed because every dead body is in a state of actual impurity (kull mayyit yujannib). In terms of historical 
precedent against this, specifically the nonperformance of funeral rites for the dead at Ụhud, Ibn Rushd 
believes these jurists considered that a response to the necessity of the situation given the difficulties of 
performing rites in that context. Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 227. 
800 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. 
801 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. 
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children, who have no such obligations in their life.802 He also disagrees with the idea that 
suspension of washing is a cleansing from God, noting instead that suspending the duties 
is an exception arising out of God’s generosity (istaghnā bi-karāmat Allāh).803 
Ghazālī is particularly concerned with attaching greater meaning to the 
suspension of funeral rites for martyrs and uses his rhetoric to emphasize this point. He 
cites a ḥadīth that says martyrs should be wrapped with “their wounds and their blood” 
because they will be “resurrected on the Day of Judgment and brought forth with their 
blood.” He is especially laudatory in his remarks about their resurrection. He speaks of 
them being brought forth dressed in the color of blood (lawn al-dam) and emitting the 
fragrance of musk (rīḥ al-misk).804 Ghazālī’s language is instructive on how the martyr’s 
blood is purifying. The blood takes the place of water, performing the same function of 
removing impurities in order to cleanse, except the martyr’s blood not only negates the 
impurity of everything on the body it also negates the fundamental impurity of blood 
itself. Moreover, it both plays the role of water and that of musk. While not obligatory, 
jurists speak of adorning the deceased with musk as a way of purifying their scent as well. 
                                               
802 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. 
803 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. 
804 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 379. 
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For the martyr, Ghazālī suggests his blood serves this function.805 In this way then he 
reimagines blood, a cause of ritual impurity, as a purifying element; a status blood only 
acquired based on the deceased’s classification as a martyr.806  
Another question that arises is what action must be taken regarding other 
impurities, aside from blood, that may be on the martyr’s body. These impurities may 
have come about during battle or existed prior to battle. Does blood purify these other 
impurities as well? Ghazālī says there are three perspectives on this. The first advocates 
for removing these impurities because they “erase the signs of martyrdom” (al-muʿfū 
ʿanhu athar al-shahāda).807 The second opinion believes these impurities should not be 
removed because that process would also remove the signs of martyrdom. Finally, there 
is the perspective that takes a position between the two. If removing impurities will 
result in removing the blood, then they should not be removed; however, if that will not 
occur, then removing impurities is permitted.808 This again reinforces the idea that blood 
                                               
805 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 379. 
806 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 379. This contrasts with how blood has been discussed in academic studies of 
purity. For instance, Marion Katz speaks of blood as najāsa, and notes that these are “substances or beings 
that are inherently impure.” She goes on to state that “something that is substantively impure or najis, 
can never be rendered pure; it is essentially and unalterably defiling.” Katz, Body of Text, 2. However, the 
case of martyr’s blood directly contradicts this and is an exception to Katz’s general account. See, A. 
Kevin Reinhart, “Impurity/No Danger,” History of Religions, vol. 30, no. 1 (1990): 7fn16.  
807 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 379-380. 
808 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 379-380. 
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carries a level of sacredness and not washing the martyr has to do with more than just 
cleanliness otherwise removing blood along with other impurities would not be an issue. 
The martyr’s blood attains a distinct status: not like other impurities, let alone like blood 
itself. 
For those who advocate washing martyrs who entered war with impurities, the 
rationale is fairly straightforward. There is agreement that they should not be prayed 
over. For his part, Shāfiʿī says there is no proof text to support obligating their washing, 
but his disciples disagreed about this.809 Ibn Surayj said it is obligatory to wash them 
because of the ritual impurity not because of their death (yajib ghusluhu li-l-janāba la li-l-
mawt); this is also Mālik’s position. The textual basis for this position is a situation 
described in a Prophetic tradition about the martyr Ḥanẓalah al-Rāhib being washed by 
angels after he was killed at Uḥud.810 The Prophet inquired about his circumstances, 
arguably to understand the reason for this strange occurrence of angels washing a 
                                               
809 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36. 
810 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 36-37. Ḥanẓalah al-Rāhib is better known as Ḥanẓalah b. Abī ʿĀmir. Ibn 
Saʿd reports that Ḥanẓalah married Jamīlah bint ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī b. Salūl and their wedding night was 
the night before Uḥud. He was intimate with his wife that night and left for the battle in the morning still 
in a state of impurity. He was subsequently killed in battle. Ibn Saʿd, Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr, vol. 4, ed. 
ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿAmr (Cairo: Maktabat al-khanji, 2001), 290-291. 
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human’s body. People reported that Ḥanẓalah was with his wife before he left for battle 
and in a state of ritual impurity (kharaja ilā al-ḥarb junuban) and required cleansing.811  
This position also seeks symmetry between life and death. It argues that when 
the circumstances are such that it would be necessary to wash the deceased’s entire body 
had they been alive, then that is what should also be done after they are killed. The 
obligation that existed prior to death is not suspended because of death. Others who say 
it is not obligatory to wash argue that the person who is alive and in a state of ritual 
impurity only purifies themselves in order to be able to pray.812 However, the non-
martyred deceased is washed so that they can be prayed over. The case of one who is 
killed in a state of impurity involves a situation where prayer could not be performed 
over them (since they are martyrs), thus washing them becomes pointless (lā maʿnā li-
ghuslihi).813 
                                               
811 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 37. 
812 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 37. 
813 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 37. Māwardī outlines a distinction here between the types of 
impurities that exist and what different obligations they trigger. He is primarily speaking of substantive 
impurity (najāsa) versus personal impurity (janāba). While there are various ways in which these two 
impurities are distinct, here Māwardī seems to associate personal impurity as the greater impurity 
requiring washing of the entire body while substantive impurity just requires ablution. Hence, he says 
that if you are removing substantive impurity in order to erases signs of martyrdom then this is 
unnecessary and should be dispensed with. If it is because of reasons other than martyrdom then you are 
permitted to wash the body. Māwardī notes that the difference between substantive and personal 
impurity is that when you require removing a little substantive impurity you are also required to remove 
most of it whereas “whenever you are not required to remove a small personal impurity then you are not 
required to remove a larger one” (wa-lammā lam yajib izālat al-ḥadath al-aṣghar lam yajib izālat al-akbar). In 
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Concluding Thoughts 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, funerary duties are a unique part of the 
category of kifāya-duties. They have no basis in the Qurʾānic text for their existence other 
than a tangential reference in one verse. Their periodic mention in ḥadīth literature is 
the primary source of prooftexts for the duties, but are not extensive enough to explain 
why they were universally considered part of the original kifāya-duties. Yet, it is not 
unusual that such a significant act of communal responsibility as conferring final rites 
upon the dead should be included in the original duties. These are acts that cannot be 
performed by the individual who requires them; the deceased are completely reliant on 
the performance of others. Unlike jihād or duties to rescue where an individual can step 
up to fulfill the duty for themselves and others, in the funeral context the deceased plays 
no role and requires assistance. 
In addition, certain themes emerge within the discussion of these duties that 
prove useful for understanding the juristic thought process, the types of juristic 
reasoning they employ and the overarching goals that might influence their thinking. 
                                               
the context of personal impurity there are no degrees. Ibid. For more on substantive versus personal 
impurity, see Katz, Body of Text, 146-149. 
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For instance, jurists consistently try to find symmetry through analogy between rules 
they create for the living and those for the dead. As a result, they match rules for funeral 
washing and who is required to perform them with parallel rules for ablutions and post-
intercourse washing for the living. Often they will raise an issue, like using perfume on a 
dead body, and apply a straightforward rule on symmetry: since it is not required that a 
living person wear perfume, it cannot be required that the dead do so.  
Similarly, jurists are concerned with pursuing objectives that lend purpose to 
these duties beyond the functional role they might play. Issues of purity dominate the 
discourse as do questions of process and hierarchy. In the latter case, jurists create 
priorities with regard to performance even as they establish a broad obligation for a 
larger group of people. This hierarchy overlaps with the concurrent discussion around 
purity since preference is often based on what may be perceived to be a “purer” 
relationship between the deceased and the potential performer of the duty. 
 
Between Functionality and Meta-Meaning 
An area that jurists spend a significant amount of time on is balancing between 
the practical or functional necessity and the desire for meta-meaning. Ritual washing is 
the most illustrative example since its apparent objective should be to achieve physical 
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cleanliness.814 However, there is also an aspect of “purity” beyond the cleansing achieved 
by washing. Some jurists, like Ibn Mufliḥ will state categorically that the “purpose of 
washing is cleanliness.”815 Kāsānī will also note that the purpose of washing is to “remove 
any ritual impurities (ḥadath)” and since this can be achieved in one washing he will set 
that as the minimum.816 However, Ibn Rushd notes that jurists differed as to whether the 
actual purpose was physical cleanliness or not. In particular, they contend with a report 
of the Prophet requiring his uncle, a nonbeliever, to be washed when he passed. Jurists 
argue that if this was a ritual washing, then it is not permissible to wash a nonbeliever. 
However, if it was simply for cleanliness then it is permissible to wash him.817 In some 
respects then, jurists must allow for both purposes to function at the same time. If they 
only allow washing for the sake of cleanliness, then there is seemingly no difference 
between the rites performed upon a believer versus a nonbeliever.  
A question also arises as to whether a functional or meta-meaning approach is to 
be utilized in the context of washing during rainfall or after drowning. This situation 
                                               
814 Reinhart makes the same argument with regard to ablution, noting that it is “not cleanliness in the 
hygenic sense, but, rather, in the ritual sense” that is at stake here. Hence, even if a person is very clean, 
but their ablution has been negated, they are not permitted to worship. Reinhart, “Impurity/No Danger,” 
6. 
815 Ibn Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-Furūʿ, vol. 3, 293. 
816 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 300. 
817 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 227. 
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poses even greater difficulty for those jurists who wish to argue for a greater purpose to 
the ritual washing beyond physical cleanliness. Since cleanliness has presumably 
occurred due to immersion in water, a greater purpose would mean performing an 
additional washing on a body that is already “clean.” Most jurists do not find this 
additional step necessary. Thus, Kāsānī notes that if a dead body is found immersed in 
falling rain, it is not permissible to perform a washing. The obligation is connected to the 
actual act of washing and this is no longer an option during rainfall: you cannot clean a 
body that has already been washed.818 Likewise, he notes that if a person drowns then 
their body should be shaken to remove excess water, but the obligation to perform a 
ritual washing is suspended.819 Māwardī agrees stating that if a deceased is washed by 
“flood waters” (sayl) or “rain” (maṭar) then you are not permitted to wash him. He 
reasons that the obligation is not on the deceased, but on the collective in relation to the 
deceased (al-ghusl la yajib ʿ alā al-mayyit wa-innamā yajib ʿ alaynā fī al-mayyit).820 Hence, if the 
flood water and rain have already accomplished the washing then it is not necessary to 
perform an additional washing since the “act required of us is no longer possible.”821 He 
                                               
818 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 300. 
819 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 300. 
820 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 17.  
821 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 17. Another interesting point Māwardī raises, which is tangential to 
the discussion here, relates to intention. He asks whether it is obligatory to have a particular intent 
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notes the same is true for a drowned person. This returns to a point raised much earlier 
in Chapter One on the kifāya-doctrine and how the obligation is suspended due to the 
absence of a reason to perform. 
 
Structuring the Duty: Process and Hierarchy 
Aside from the issue of whether rules for the duties are developed for pragmatic 
reasons versus symbolic ones, there is also a question of process and hierarchy. Two main 
hierarchies exist in the framework of funerary duties: those relating to performance and 
those relating to performers. Hence, while these are kifāya-duties that fall within the 
responsibility of the entire collective, there are certain people whose obligation takes 
precedence over others. Similarly, the steps in the performance of the actual duty must 
occur in a particular order.  
Beginning with the preference for certain performers, jurists center the 
hierarchy of performance on a number of factors. The primary concern is with 
maintaining a measure of modesty for the dead particularly in the context of ritual 
                                               
before performing the washing. There are two opinions he notes in this regard. The first says that 
intention is obligatory because it is required for ablution and ablution is a step within the ritual washing 
of the deceased. The second says that intention is not necessary because this is a kifāya-duty and it is not 
specific to any one person, such that their intention becomes a required component of the performance. 
Ibid.  
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washing. Hence, they frame their discussion around kinship and gender, as key pivot 
points for societal modesty. However, modesty is not the only concern. Jurists still 
pursue the symmetry between life and death discussed earlier. Religion also arises as an 
important consideration and for some jurists it supersedes kinship, thus asserting the 
primacy of the moral community. In this regard, there is a related preference given to 
individuals who possess lauded personality traits, such as trustworthiness, thus 
suggesting that in addition to modesty there is a particular communal ethos and 
character, connected to religion, which is consciously being promoted and which 
transcends kinship. 
For example, in the context of ritual washing, Shīrāzī says the order of preference 
for a deceased male is his “father, grandfather, son, tribe, men outside his tribe, wife and 
then female relatives.”822 As for a deceased woman, first are “female relatives” then “non-
relative females,” her husband, male relatives (with an additional preference for those 
who are maḥram).823 Ghazāli gives the same order of preference for women.824 However, 
                                               
822 Shīrāzī, Tanbīh, 35. Shāshī reports Abū Ḥanīfa as saying that the order is “father, grandfather, son, 
grandson, brother, nephew, uncle, uncle’s son, then mother.” Shāshī, Ḥilyat al- ʿUlamāʾ, vol. 1, 287. This is 
also Shāshī’s position, except that he says the scenario is when there is no wife present. If the wife is 
present then she is permitted to wash her husband before everyone else. Ibid., 283. 
823 Shāshī, Ḥilyat al- ʿUlamāʾ, vol. 1, 287.  
824 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 367. 
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he says that while the order between men and women is obligatory, the order within each 
category can vary.825 Hence, he notes that “Iraqi” jurists give preference to husbands over 
female relatives because they argue those men have already seen what the women have 
not seen: the deceased’s nakedness.826 He also mentions the argument some jurists make 
for male relatives getting preference over husbands because death severs the marital tie 
thus rendering the husband a stranger.827 As a stranger he is treated as any other non-
relative male. This is an interesting distinction since one approach emphasizes 
familiarity resulting from kinship as a governing principle while the other is focused on 
familiarity arising out of a contractual relationship.  
Ibn Mufliḥ notes that an important additional condition that supersedes kinship 
ties is that the person carrying out the duty should be Muslim. He says it is not permitted 
for a non-Muslim to perform the ritual washing of a deceased Muslim.828 Furthermore, 
among Muslims, he says that the best person to do the washing is someone who is 
trustworthy (thiqa) and knowledgeable about the rules of washing. In fact, he notes that 
                                               
825 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 368. 
826 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 367. 
827 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 367. Shāshī reports that Abū Ḥanīfa had a similar view, stating that a wife can 
wash her husband, but the husband cannot wash her. Furthermore, if he dies during her idda period, 
then she cannot wash him. Shāshī, Ḥilyat al-ʿUlamāʾ, vol. 1, 283. 
828 Ibn Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-Furūʿ, vol. 3, 275. 
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Abū al-Macālī (a reference to al-Juwaynī) considers this obligatory.829 Ghazālī goes so far 
as to say that the non-relative Muslim is preferred to the relative who is a nonbeliever.830 
Ibn Qudāma also adds another category of performers who supersede any fixed order: 
those who are appointed by the deceased prior to their death. He cites historical 
precedent with Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq who appointed (awṣā) his wife, Asmāʾ b. ʿUmays, to 
wash him upon his death and she performed this task before anyone else.831 Ibn Qudāma 
notes that the ability to appoint someone to perform the washing at the time of death is 
the right of the dead (ḥaqq li-l-mayyit). This appointed person takes precedence over 
anyone else.832 After the appointed person, his list is similar to those of other jurists.833 
 As for performance of the ritual washing, there are also obligatory steps and 
minimums that must be observed, which tend to reflect concerns around cleanliness, but 
also other ritual and symbolic purposes. However, as with priorities relating to 
performers the issue of modesty is also present with regard to performance and the 
restrictions around the naked body. Hence, Ibn Mufliḥ says that the body must be washed 
                                               
829 Ibn Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-Furūʿ, vol. 3, 276. 
830 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 367. 
831 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 11. Another example is Anas b. Mālik who appointed Muḥammad b. Sīrīn (d. 
110/729) to wash him. Ibid. 
832 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 12. 
833 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 12. 
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once with clean water in order to satisfy the kifāya-duty.834 Kāsānī agrees that the 
obligation is to only wash the body once, but repeating the process is a sunna. Of course, 
he notes that the single washing must be sufficient to accomplish the purpose of 
removing any ritual impurities.835 On the other hand, Ibn Ḥazm cites numerous 
authorities that say the washing must take place three times or an odd number of times 
more.836 Ghazālī agrees with this, noting that each step in the performance of the washing 
must occur three times and the minimum amount of water should be what is enough to 
cover all the limbs, similar to the bath that occurs to remove personal impurity after 
sex.837 A question that arises here, which does not seem to be taken up by the jurists, is 
how the additional washing should be considered if the corpse is cleansed of impurities 
                                               
834 Ibn Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-Furūc, vol. 3, 275. 
835 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 300.  This position is similar to how the Ḥanafī madhhab considers 
repetition in the context of wuḍuʾ. While they noted that it is obligatory (farḍ al-ṭahārah) to “wash the 
limbs three times” (ghasl al-aʿḍāʾ al-thalāthah) this does not mean using “new” water each time; it could 
simply involve running one’s wet hand over the limbs three times. It is only a sunna (sunan al-ṭahārah) to 
“repeat the washing three times” (takrār al-ghasl ilā al-thalāth). Qudūrī, Mukhtaṣar, 11. For the general 
Ḥanafī position on this, including present day, see, Wahabah al-Zuḥaylī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa-l-adillatuhu, 
vol. 1 (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2000), 394.  
836 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 122. He also says that the water should include cedar and camphor, and, in 
the absence of water, the dead should be washed with earth. Ibid. Its noteworthy that this could be 
perceived as Ibn Ḥazm analogizing from tayammum to washing the corpse, but it is likely that he is simply 
indicating that the obligation continues from life to death. In other words, it is not a question of 
analogizing, but simply performing the same washing that would take place in life and, as in life, doing it 
with earth when water is absent. 
837 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 363.  
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in a single washing? Are the washings done for a functional purpose (i.e. ensuring 
complete removal of impurities) or something more symbolic?  
Furthermore, Ghazālī requires steps that will remove impurities, but also 
preserve the deceased’s modesty. Hence, the process includes beginning from the right 
side, starting at the head, and having each step performed three times, including 
pressing the stomach to remove any gas or excrements.838 Ibn Qudāma adds an additional 
condition: he notes that Ibn Ḥanbal expressed a preference for the deceased to be washed 
with their clothing on and the washer placing their hand under the clothing to wash the 
body. He notes that al-Qāḍī—likely reference to Abū Yaʿlā Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-
Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066)—was of the opinion that that the sunna is to wash the dead body 
while they are still wearing a thin shirt (qamīṣ raqīq) such that water “passes through it 
onto the body” and the hand “enters through the shirt’s opening,” passing over the body 
while water is poured.839 
 Likewise, with the performance of funeral prayers, there are distinct steps that 
are obligatory for those who perform the prayers. This includes guidelines for the actual 
                                               
838 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 2, 365. He also suggests using “cold water” and allows for pressing the stomach 
more than three times if necessary to remove gas and excrements in the stomach, but there must be an 
odd number of total presses. 
839 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, 368. He claims this is the position of the Shāfiʿī school as well because 
they narrate that the Prophet was washed with his shirt on. Ibid. 
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performance (how many prostrations, etc.), as well as the location of the performance 
and timing. Ibn Rushd notes that the scholarly positions on different parts of the funeral 
prayer often map scholarly positions on regular daily prayer. Thus, if a scholar thinks 
only one salām is required at the conclusion of a daily prayer then they will likely only 
require one for the end of the funeral prayer. Likewise, if jurists think something is 
obligatory in the daily prayer they will consider it obligatory in the funeral prayer (in 
kānat farḍan fa hādhihi farḍ).840 Ibn Ḥazm notes that there is no bowing (rukūʿ) or 
prostration (sujūd) in the funeral prayer, nor the adoption of a seated position.841 Jurists 
also focus on the number of people necessary for a valid congregation. Ghazālī says that 
the kifāya-duty is only satisfied if there are at least four men praying together or 
individually for the deceased. The threshold for a deceased woman seems to be less and 
according to Ghazālī can be as few as one person.842 Ibn Qudāma supports this last point 
for everyone, male or female, noting that one person is sufficient for funeral prayer 
because he does not consider congregation a condition for the prayer.843 
                                               
840 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, vol. 1, 236. 
841 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 5, 123. He says there are five takbīrāt, but four can be done as well. In addition, 
you only raise your hand in the first and then finish off with two salāms. Ibid., 124. 
842 Ghazālī, al-Wasit, vol. 2, 387. 
843 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, 37. In fact, he notes that at times the Prophet performed the funeral prayers 
alone, without any congregants praying behind. Ibid., at 38. He also discusses the question of where the 
prayer should be performed, but there is nothing obligated on this matter. Hence, he says it is 
permissible for the funeral prayer to be held inside the mosque because ʿĀʾisha said the Prophet did not 
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State Authority in Funerary Duties 
The same dynamic of process and hierarchy occurs in the context of funeral 
prayer, even when the focus is on state authority. In this scenario, the hierarchy of 
performers is based on whether a political leader receives preference in performing the 
obligation in comparison to everyone else. Māwardī quotes Shāfiʿī as saying that “the 
legal guardian is more deserving of [leading] the [funeral] prayer as opposed to the 
governor because this is a private [as opposed to public] matter” (al-walī aḥaqqu bi-ṣalāh 
min al-wālī li-anna hādhā min al-umūr al-khāṣṣah). However, Māwardī notes that this was a 
newer position for Shāfiʿī (madhhab al-Shāfiʿī fī al-jadīd), likely an indication of the 
doctrines developed in Egypt.844 On the other hand, his older position (madhhab al-Shāfiʿī 
                                               
pray over Suhayl b. Bayḍāʾ in the mosque, but Abū Bakr and ʿ Umar were prayed over in the mosque. Ibid. 
He also said it is permissible to perform the funeral prayer at the gravesite because this was also done by 
the Prophet. Ibid., 38. 
844 Nawawī states that “every issue has two opinions from Shāfiʿī, new (jadīd) and old (qadīm).” In general, 
he says that the newer opinion is controlling and supersedes the older one except in twenty cases that 
some of Shāfiʿī’s students prefer the older opinion. Nawawī, Kitāb al-majmūʾ sharḥ al-mahadhdhab lil-
Shirāzī, vol. 1, ed. Muḥammad Najīb Muttiyya (Jeddah: Maktabat al-Irshād, n.a.), 107-108. See also, Joseph E. 
Lowry, “Ibn Qutayba: The Earliest Witness to al-Shāfiʿī and his Legal Doctrines,” Abbasid Studies: Occasional 
Papers of the School of ‘Abbasid studies (July 2002): 318; Ahmed El-Shamsy, “Rethinking Taqlīd in the Early 
Shāfiʿī School,” Journal of American Oriental Society, vol. 128, no. 1 (2008): 11. See generally, Lamīn al-Nājī, Al-
Qadīm wa-l-jadīd fī fiqh al-Shāfiʿī, vol. 1 & 2 (Egypt: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 2015). The new and old opinions are 
thought to represent different stages of the development of Shāfiʿī’s legal thought. His old (qadīm) phase 
was when he “lived and studied” in Baghdad and the new (jadīd) phase was when he “lived and taught” in 
Egypt. Kevin Jacques, “The Other Rabīʿ: Biographical Traditions and the Development of Early Shāfiʿī 
Authority,” Islamic Law and Society, vol. 4, No. 2 (2007): 145. It is possible that the difference between old 
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fī al-qadīm), from the doctrines developed in Iraq, was similar to Abū Ḥanīfa, and 
considered the governor of the locality (wālī al-balad), as well as higher authorities 
(sulṭānuhu), to have preference in leading the prayer over the deceased in comparison to 
any of the deceased’s relatives (min sāʾir awliyāʾihi).845 Ibn Qudāma confirms this view, 
stating that the majority of scholars believe the amīr (political leader) should be given 
preference over the family in leading prayer for the dead.846  
                                               
and new Shāfiʿī positions as it relates to the role of political authority in the performance of communal 
religious obligations reflects the difference between the contexts in Iraq and Egypt. In the former, the 
Ḥanafīs, with whom Shāfiʿī spent much time, “enjoyed vigorous support of the imperial administration” 
and that patronage might explain their elevation of the governor’s status in leading the funeral prayer. 
On the other hand, in Egypt, Shāfiʿī’s ideas faced significant hostility from the “old normative order” 
allied with the state, possibly forcing Shāfiʿī to reconsider his earlier position. Ahmed El-Shamsy, 
Canonization, 118.  
845 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 45. Academics continue to debate the role of religion and state during 
the early Abbasid period. Some view this period as indicating a “definitive and enduring separation 
between religion and politics” while others argue that political leadership “continued to be 
recognized…as an active participant in religious life.” Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and Politics Under 
the Early ʿAbbāsids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunni Elite (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 70. Zaman goes so far as to 
suggest that, “as far as the proto-Sunni ʿulamāʾ are concerned, it was their support, not their opposition 
to the Abbasids, which was to become the most distinctive feature of their relationship with the caliphs.” 
Zaman, ʿAbbāsids, 82. See also, Patricia Crone, God’s Rule, 87-98. Hence, Abbasid patronage of the Ḥanafīs 
served multiple purposes. First, it might have contributed to the favored status they gave political 
authorities in the performance of funerary duties. Second, an alliance with the scholarly class was “good 
politics” and necessary to neutralize the “extremist” forces that helped them to power. Their takeover 
created a “rupture in the continuity and prestige” of political authority and allying with other religious 
actors countered the “extremist” influence in the various groups making up the Abbasid ranks. Ovamir 
Anjum, Politics, Law and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 80-81. At the same time, while the well-documented refusal of many scholars, 
including Abū Ḥanīfa, to associate with political authority indicates possible distrust of the ruler (and 
surely was perceived as an affront by the ruler), it did not necessarily result in an absolutist position in 
opposition to religious roles for the ruler.  
846 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, 406. 
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The “newer” Shāfiʿī opinion says that an appropriate person from among the 
guardians (al-walī al-munāsib) of the deceased should receive priority over the political 
leader (wālī al-balad).847 This is a rare intra-madhhab distinction in the context of funerary 
duties and possibly indicative of the changing role of political power within Muslim 
societies and the more pronounced role later jurists articulated for themselves in place 
of political leadership. After all, if the political leader was not given preference then it 
stands to reason that the priorty would be for those presumed to have the requisite 
knowledge to carry out the duties: religious scholars. The diminishing role for political 
leaders in the administration of the law may also be indicative of the altered framing of 
the law as a whole. In this new framing the traditional enforcement mechanism for the 
law, political authority, is marginalized but without an explicitly stated replacement. 
Furthermore, it might also demonstrate how the traditional role that political leaders 
played in administering religion impacted how religious law came to be understood in 
later generations.  
Māwardī notes that the two groups of Shāfiʿīs rely on different support from the 
sources. The earlier Shāfiʿīs point to the example of al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī who allowed Saʿīd 
b. al-ʿĀs to lead the prayer for his brother al-Ḥasan stating “if this was not the sunna then 
                                               
847 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 45. 
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I would not have let you go forward.”848 The argument is that because this prayer requires 
a congregation, it is obligatory for the political leader to lead, as is the case for all 
congregational prayers.849 Ibn Qudāma mentions this same precedent, noting that as 
governor of Medina at the time of Ḥasan’s death, Saʿīd b. al-cĀṣ, was required to fulfill 
this role.850 He notes that ʿAlī stated “the Imam has the most right to lead the funeral 
prayers” (al-imām aḥaqqu man ṣallā ʿalā al-janāza) and that there is consensus on this. 
Hence, the Prophet always led funeral prayers despite the presence of the deceased’s 
relatives.851 On the other hand, the later Shāfiʿī position is based on Q 8/al-Anfāl: 75: “and 
those of blood relations are more entitled according to God’s decree.”852 Thus, they argue 
                                               
848 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 45. 
849 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 45. Māwardī actually sides with the later jurists, explaining that 
Ḥusayn’s saying reflects a distinction between sunna and obligation noting that “it is part of the sunna to 
put the political ruler ahead to lead the prayer out of courtesy (adab) as opposed to obligation.” 
Furthermore, he notes that Saʿīd actually sought al-Ḥusayn’s permission to lead the prayer; if he had the 
right to lead the prayer then there would be no need to seek this permission. Ibid. 
850 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, 407. He also mentions that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal narrates from ʿAmmār, the 
mawla of Banī Hāshim, that he witnessed the funeral of Umm Kulthūm bint ʿAlī and her son Zayd b. 
ʿUmar (both of whom died at the same time), and the prayer over them was performed by Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ 
who was governor of Medina at the time. This despite the fact that there were close to eighty 
Companions of the Prophet present that day including Ibn ʿUmar, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. Ibn Qudāma, al-
Mughnī, vol. 3, 407. 
851 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 3, 407. It seems evident that a proto-Sunni argument is being made here 
that privileges the political leader over the family. Specifically, at the time of the Prophet’s death it was 
Abū Bakr who led the funeral prayer indicating that he was the new political leader. See, Wilferd 
Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) 356 -360. 
852 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 45. 
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that the guardian is more entitled than the political leader and analogize to the case of 
the marital ceremony (nikāḥ) instead of congregational prayer. They create an order of 
preference based on the nikāḥ, where the guardian is given priority, and state that 
whichever blood relation is put forward in that context is the one put forward for the 
funeral prayer.853 
 
Juristic Methodology 
Finally, a few insights regarding juristic methodology can also be gained from the 
discourse on funerary duties. In this context, jurists have to contend with the fact that 
the prime sources of law, the Qurʾān and Sunna, provide limited guidance for developing 
a framework of obligations. In the context of funerary duties, there are a handful of 
references in these sources; the rest of the law has to be articulated by the jurist. The 
manner in which the jurist decides to articulate the law, in the absence of explicit 
prooftexts, is illustrative of the approach jurists’ employ that infuses their independent 
opinions with the sacredness of divine law. In other words, in theory, jurists could 
employ two approaches. One approach would be to recognize that there are a set of 
limited rules that the Qurʾān and Sunna provide in this space and distinguish that from 
                                               
853 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 3, 45. 
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additional rules that the jurist is creating. The distinction then acknowledges that the 
two sets of rules–scripturally based versus juristic creation–should carry different 
weight: a rule based on scripture obligates performance while a rule created by jurists, 
without an explicit text, might simply be recommended.  
However, this is rarely the approach jurists take, though the Ḥanafīs arguably 
allude to it in their distinction between wājib and farḍ.854 Instead, law that jurists create 
without textual support is often afforded the same weight, and sacred status, as law 
directly from the primary sources.  Jurists generally pursue avenues to extend the reach 
of religious law beyond the scope imagined by the prime sources and in the process 
maintain the value of their opinions on a broader range of issues. The alternative 
approach, which I might characterize as “legally minimalist,” is rare: limiting the ability 
for jurists to extend the reach of religious law by requiring an explicit connection to the 
primary sources.855  
                                               
854 See generally, A. Kevin Reinhart, “Like the Difference between Heaven and Earth:” Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī 
Discussions of Wājib and Farḍ,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 
205-234. 
855 The legal minimalism I refer to is related to the theory of “judicial minimalism” that Cass Sunstein 
developed which argues that judges on the U.S. Supreme Court more often than not restrain themselves 
from making decisions that have a broad impact beyond the specific case before them. In other words, 
they “make deliberate decisions about what should be left unsaid.” See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, One Case 
at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999)(specific 
quote on p. 3). His argument focuses on how this minimalism reduces the burdens of judicial decision 
making and decreases the frequency of judicial error, but it might also be understood as allowing a 
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This can be illustrated more clearly by examining how the juristic approach 
functions in general in the context of martyrdom and funeral rites. The general rule with 
regard to nonperformance of funerary duties for martyrs is derived from the Prophetic 
Sunna. Additional rules are developed to address how and when nonperformance would 
be warranted. These rules are primarily developed for practical reasons, but because 
they are seen as an extension of religious law, the rules are accompanied by rationales 
connected to sacred symbolism. Hence, despite the fact that specific funerary rules are 
based on practical considerations, as opposed to divine command, they are all marked by 
a sacredness justified by the initial general rule which was derived from a sacred source. 
Once that initial rule exists, jurists are able to open a doorway to classifying their 
derivate opinions as sacred as well.  
 
 
                                               
greater variety of legal opinion by withholding a broader opinion on constitutional validity. See also, Cass 
Sunstein, “Problems with Minimalism,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 58 (April 2006); Cass Sunstein, “Beyond 
Judicial Minimalism,” Tulsa Law Review, vol. 43, no. 4 (Summer 2008). Initisar Rabb has discussed 
Sunstein’s theory in the context of al-Juwaynī’s (d. 1085) proposed “legal minimalism” for a situation 
where the legal authorities succeeding the Prophet – the Shīʿi Imāms and Sunnī scholars – disappear. See 
generally, Intisar A. Rabb, “Islamic Legal Minimalism: Legal Maxims and Lawmaking When Jurists 
Disappear,” in Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought: Studies in Honor of Professor Hossein Modarressi, 
eds. Michael Cook, Najam Haider, Intisar Rabb and Asma Sayeed (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 
145-166. A more closely aligned discussion of what I am suggesting here is raised by Adam Sabra in his 
discussion on Ibn Ḥazm’s legal theory as one that, more than simply literalism, centers around curtailing 
the jurist’s ability to “speak on behalf of God’s law.” See, Adam Sabra, “Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism,” 7. Ibn 
Ḥazm does this by suggesting that the law itself is “finite in scope” and thus the jurist is unable to 
develop “an infinite range of divine commands and prohibitions.” Sabra, “Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism,” 10. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DUTY TO RESCUE 
Introduction 
 As previously noted, the doctrine around kifāya-duties was initially discussed and 
developed around three main acts: participating in military jihād, pursuing religious 
knowledge and performing funeral rites. Of these, jihād was arguably the most important 
as the entire category of collective duties was premised on the Qurʾānic command to 
fight.856 A second duty, the pursuit of religious knowledge (or “knowledge-duty”), arose 
as a corollary to jihād out of a verse authorizing the duty to fight:  
Yet it is not right for all the believers to go out [to battle] together: out of each 
community, a group should go out to gain understanding of the religion, so that 
they can teach their people when they return and so that they can guard 
themselves against evil.857  
 
The “knowledge-duty” allows some individuals to avoid military service if they 
acquire and disseminate religious knowledge. Unlike the other duties, the third 
“original” duty, performing funeral rites, has no Qur’anic textual support justifying its 
inclusion in the kifāya category. Nonetheless, almost without exception, legal literature 
                                               
856 There are various verses containing the imperative to fight. See, supra note 209. As many 
commentators have observed, in most cases the Qurʾān uses the word qitāl for “fighting” as opposed to 
jihād, but this is because jihād is a broader category. As some scholars have noted, “in a specifically 
religious context, and as understood and articulated by almost every Muslim religious scholar past and 
present…jihād has one meaning: to exert one’s effort in fighting the enemies of God by acts or by words.” 
Mourad and Lindsay, Sunni Jihad Ideology, 16. 
857 Q 9/al-Tawba: 14-15. 
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classifies performance of funeral rites as a kifāya-duty. The link between these three 
duties is not immediately obvious, but each duty seems to serve overlapping social and 
religious functions. This is a feature of the kifāya category that distinguishes it from many 
other duties in Islamic law and, in the kifāya discourse, jurists routinely justify rules with 
the legal objective of benefitting society.  
Another distinguishing feature of the development of kifāya-duties is that they 
seem to have expanded rapidly in the post-formative period, with jurists more readily 
classifying certain acts as kifāya in comparison to their predecessors. In doing so, they 
created issues of theoretical consistency for these duties, specifically in relation to 
accountability for nonperformance. The kifāya-doctrine is structured around the idea 
that while there is shared responsibility for performance, in the absence of performance, 
everyone is liable for punishment. In the original set of kifāya-duties, not only were the 
acts underlying the duties significant enough to motivate performance, but they were 
limited in number so easily accounted for and fulfilled. As the category expanded, the 
number and types of acts considered kifāya-duties grew and the burden of performance 
increased significantly along with the likelihood of nonperformance. Expanded duties 
actually raised the potential for collective “sin” by increasing the likelihood of non-
performance.  
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This dynamic is best illustrated by the knowledge-duty, which was an original 
kifāya-duty that jurists later expanded. In its initial formulation, the duty centered on 
the acquisition of religious knowledge, but in the post-formative period jurists 
broadened it to include various other types of knowledge. For example, the expanded 
knowledge-duty contained expertise in areas, such as, carpentry and alchemy. In theory, 
a greater range of activities simply accounted for a fuller definition of what constitutes 
“knowledge.” However, in practice, adding numerous new activities as kifāya-duties 
meant that inevitably there would be nonperformance: the supply of potential 
performers was not sufficient to meet the demand for performance. As a consequence, 
acts that were previously labeled “recommended” or “commendable” took on added 
significance when made “obligatory” because now liability for nonperformance was 
attached. Classification as a kifāya-duty increased society’s overall burden by creating 
responsibility for the performance of previously “optional” acts. 
Bearing the above in mind, the prior two chapters discussed kifāya-duties that are 
extensively treated in the legal literature and focus special attention on practical 
implementation.858 On the other hand, the current chapter examines another kifāya-duty, 
                                               
858 For instance, as Leor Halevi notes the “early Islamic funerary law was…prescriptive, and it includes 
many rules against practices that traditionists despised…Laws of this kind did not come into being in a 
mental vacuum––they arose in opposition to underlying practices.” Leor Halevi, Muhammad’s Grave, 11. 
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the duty to rescue, which has an associated discourse dominated by numerous 
theoretical challenges. The duty to rescue plays a seminal role in the kifāya category, 
illustrating how the duties function and providing a platform for a rich discourse on 
ethics. Hence, exploring duties to rescue is separately useful for two primary reasons. 
First, it uncovers a pattern within the kifāya category that suggests the need to create a 
subcategory of “rescue” kifāya-duties. These duties range from saving someone’s life to 
more complex notions of rescue. Second, the discourse on these duties goes beyond the 
practicalities of performance that dominate discussion of other duties. Instead, in this 
context, jurists utilize different forms of “rescue duties” to explore the ethical 
underpinnings of the kifāya category as a whole. While jurists were consistently 
concerned with the practical fulfillment of kifāya-duties, they were also cognizant of 
moral dilemmas that accompany these positive duties. In particular, the duty to rescue 
someone from impending catastrophe offered a compelling case of the challenges that 
come with positive duties, where performance exposes the rescuer to risk and might 
require personal sacrifice. The issue is especially salient in cases, arguably the majority, 
where the rescuer is not responsible for causing the dangerous situation in the first place 
and only acquires a duty to rescue by happenstance.  
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Furthermore, a number of ethical questions also arise around burden sharing as 
it relates to these duties. The duties are collectively owed, but not collectively performed; 
instead, small numbers of individuals perform the duties for everyone else. Hence, a 
natural question that arises is: to what extent must an individual make sacrifices on 
behalf of others? Do they have to risk their lives? Or to a lesser degree, to what extent do 
they have to compromise their own well-being in some manner by redirecting their time 
and wealth toward vulnerable third parties? These questions lead to more encompassing 
inquiries on what members of a given society owe to each other. Or even further, 
whether there are duties owed simply because someone is a member of the human race.  
These questions are fundamental to how any law or legal system accommodates 
positive duties. As Liam Murphy notes, “legal duties to rescue provide an excellent case 
study for thinking about the appropriate methodology for moral and political argument 
about what the substantive content of the law should be.”859 Applied to the Islamic 
context, the duty to rescue is an opportunity for jurists to reveal their aspirations for the 
law and the unstated principles that guide their construction of legal rules. In particular, 
while premodern legal treatises tend to focus on rules specifically for Muslims, the duties 
                                               
859 Liam Murphy, “Beneficence, Law and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue,” Georgia Law Journal 89, no. 
605 (2000-2001): 610. 
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to rescue also allow jurists to present perspectives on the law that extend beyond 
Muslims and expand the moral community. Unlike other kifāya-duties that are narrowly 
constructed, such as funerary duties, the duty to rescue has broad application to all 
human beings.  
Questions of moral obligation and self-sacrifice in relation to other human beings 
are brought into focus beginning with the quintessential rescue: saving a drowning 
person. In this scenario, observers on the shore of a river witness an individual drowning 
in the water. Jurists then pose the question: what are these observers required to do? Do 
they have to attempt a rescue? In answering the question about moral obligation to the 
drowning victim, jurists also draw conclusions relevant for other scenarios involving 
vulnerable individuals. Although the context of drowning involves an emergency 
requiring immediate attention, the underlying “rescue” provides a premise that is 
present even where urgency is absent. Hence, this new subset of kifāya-duties to rescue 
includes taking responsibility for foundlings, marrying widows and providing support to 
the poor.860  
                                               
860 In fact, one might imagine stretching the definition further to include the duty to pursue knowledge, 
which grew in the post-formative period to include socially beneficial knowledge, and arguably contains 
the same ethos of rescue. 
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 Given the relatively sparse discussion, if any, on practical issues of enforcement 
or punishment, it is not unreasonable to assume jurists were using rescue duties for 
moral speculation. In general, matters like enforcing duties and punishing 
nonperformance are not commonly discussed for kifāya-duties, which can be perplexing 
at times when practical instruction seems warranted. However, for duties to rescue, this 
type of instruction is unnecessary, as the duty is not addressing a practical problem. 
There is no pressing issue or burning social problem that requires the law’s attention.861 
For instance, it seems unlikely that jurists are developing doctrine on rescuing because 
of actual drownings where no one attempted a rescue. Similarly, the rules for foundlings 
are unlikely to be a response to a sudden increase in the discovery of abandoned children. 
On the other hand, one might argue that funeral rites and jihād were acts that required 
perpetual performance, and thus more practical guidance. Hence, it seems likely that 
jurists use rescue duties to contemplate the ethical limits of moral action: who is owed a 
duty to rescue, who is burdened with the duty and how much must an individual sacrifice 
to fulfill this obligation? In the process, key factors are considered such as immediacy of 
                                               
861 In fact, the same absence of a burning need for a legal duty to rescue is cited by modern jurists as to 
why the entire debate is “somewhat pointless, because so little turns on it in practice.” In essence, there 
is a “low level of need for a legal duty to rescue” because it is the rare “moral monster” who actually fails 
to perform an easy rescue. Murphy, “Beneficence,” 608. 
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need, proximity to the person requiring rescue, capacity of the potential rescuer, etc. 
While these factors have practical or functional aspects, the purpose behind the inquiry 
does not seem to be based on encouraging performance, but determining how the ethical 
obligation is theoretically altered by these variables. 
This type of moral speculation is not unfamiliar to Islamic scholars, especially in 
discussions of Islamic theology. As Mohammad Fadel notes,  
…as a result of the centrality of rational inquiry in the quest for salvation and 
conceiving the basics of the ethical good life, Islamic theology and ethics placed 
relatively greater emphasis on the procedural integrity of inquiry rather than its 
substantive conclusions.862 
 
For instance, Sophia Vasalou’s study on Muʿtazilite ethics looks at how they 
thought about the “moral force or connection” that determined whether administering 
pain or pleasure on people was “reasonable” and what made “one’s conduct a decisive 
determinant of one’s otherworldly destiny.”863 They focused on two themes—divine 
unity (tawḥīd) and principles of justice (ʿadl)—and Vasalou notes that the topics discussed 
in the latter:  
percolated into seminal streams of Islamic thought and practice to a greater 
extent than did the theological discussions of divine unity. This was in great part 
                                               
862 Mohammad Fadel, “The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of 
Public Reason in Islamic Law,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence vol. 21, No.1 (January 2008): 3. 
863 Sophia Vasalou, Moral Agents and their Deserts: The Character of Muʿtazilite Ethics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), ix. 
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a function of the relations these topics bore to legal thought, in which the values 
of acts were theorized, making works on legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and often also 
substantive law (fiqh) vehicles for the expression of theological commitments. 
This in turn was a reflection of the multiple roles Muslim thinkers frequently 
bore, for they were never just jurists or theologians but quite often served in both 
capacities.864 
 
 In addition, there are also parallels in Muʿtazilite discourse and the question, 
taken up later, as to whether a duty to rescue can be known outside of revelation or is 
intuitive. For Muʿtazilites, they argued “moral truths are apprehensible by reason” 
because the “moral obligation to reflect on the existence of God is a rational one that 
precedes revelation.”865 Furthermore, they also justified their belief that God is “bound 
by the same code of value as human beings” because “moral values are independent from 
revelation.”866 
                                               
864 Vasalou, Muʿtazilite Ethics, 4-5. 
865 Vasalou, Muʿtazilite Ethics, 6. 
866 Vasalou, Muʿtazilite Ethics, 5. It should be noted that this exercise of reason by the Muʿtazilites was 
subordinate to a “set of clear theological concerns.” Vasalou, Muʿtazilite Ethics, 18. Their pursuit of truth 
was “theological truth” as opposed to a “self-contained ethical one” as some have suggested. Ibid., 28. 
Sophia Vasalou argues that it would be wrong to “suggest a kinship of purpose” between Muʿtazilite 
ethics and that of “Greek or British philosophers.” Ibid. As Mairaj Syed notes, the “Muʿtazilites are no 
more rationalist than the Ashʿarites,” their difference in reasoning rested upon their respective 
“commitment to certain core positions.” Syed, Coercion, 17. Mohammad Fadel argues that because of a 
“normative pluralism” built into its structure, “Islamic jurisprudence grew to recognize the legitimacy of 
rule-making based on arguments whose premises—while consistent with revelation—were non-
revelatory. Fadel, “Public Reason,” 3. 
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Similarly, Mairaj Syed explores another area of the jurists’ ethical discourse: the 
question of moral responsibility in contexts where an actor is coerced to do evil. Syed 
constructs a “constraint” and “contingency” model to understand juristic reasoning and 
argumentation on this topic. He argues that jurists are at once constrained by features 
of their “context that are responsive to the logical force of an argument” while at the 
same time required to account for features that “influence argumentation, but are not 
reducible to an argument’s logical force.”867 In line with the discussion here, Syed notes 
that for the topic of coercion, “casuistry, abstract moral and legal principles, and claims 
regarding coercion’s empirical effect on the coerced” are as important, if not more so, 
than scripture. In fact, he notes that casuistry is the “dominant method of analysis” for 
Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī scholars in discussions of coerced rape and murder.868 
Building on the above discussion, the purpose of these duties to rescue is 
markedly different from others in the kifāya category. Aside from serving as a space for 
moral speculation, the kifāya category may have also been expanded in response to a 
growing Muslim polity that faced a myriad of novel challenges. Communal life arising 
out of the heterogeneity produced by assimilating conquered communities into the 
                                               
867 Syed, Coercion, 4. 
868 Syed, Coercion, 17. 
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Muslim polity might have spurred jurists to find ways to produce an overriding cultural 
ethos that promoted behavior in service of a broader communal purpose.869  Hence, the 
need arose to create new duties for both practical purposes and to encourage social 
cohesion. As Chase Robinson notes: 
For as memories of the foundational periods of prophecy and conquest faded, and 
as Arab Muslims settled and mixed with non-Arabs in provinces that were at great 
geographical and cultural distances from Arabia, new bridges had to be built to a 
past that was at once increasingly remote from, and increasingly significant for, 
Arab and Muslim identity.870 
 
Unfortunately, one can only speculate on the potential external reasons for the 
creation of these duties as the historical record presently available to us is incomplete 
and too diffuse to allow a comprehensive examination of the influence of each individual 
jurist’s context. That said, even if the record was greater, more compelling insights can 
nonetheless be gained from the juristic discourse on duties to rescue. In particular, the 
                                               
869 Ira Lapidus notes that there was a “fundamental assumption of the conquest empire” that the Arab 
and non-Arab populations would be segregated, but this proved to be “untenable.” Instead, they were 
forced to assimilate together and create new communities based on new identities. Ira Lapidus, A History 
of Islamic Societies, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 58-59. 
870 Chase Robinson, “Conclusion: From formative Islam to classical Islam,” in The New Cambridge History of 
Islam: Volume 1, The Formation of the Islamic World Sixth to Eleventh Centuries, ed. Chase Robinson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 687. He also notes that as “society grew more complex, especially 
through conversion and acculturation,” legal authorities were produced to rationalize and codify “legal 
practice with reference to a past that they claimed to preserve and interpret.” Ibid, 686.  
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contribution these duties make in helping us uncover the posture of Islamic jurists on 
ethical and moral questions that transcend any particular context. 
 
The Duty to Rescue in Western Thought 
 Philosophical speculation through the duty to rescue is not unique to the Islamic 
tradition and versions of it can be found in older traditions, like Judaism, as well as in 
modern Western thought. The latter is particularly helpful in setting up a framework for 
the types of inquiries jurists might make on this topic and the factors favoring or 
disfavoring the duty. Of course, considering the Islamic duty to rescue in isolation is 
valuable in itself, but the far-reaching discussions by thinkers in other traditions opens 
up new avenues of understanding on related concerns that arise in the Islamic legal 
discourse.  
Any inquiry into the duty to rescue must begin by placing it within the category 
of duties as a whole. Western scholars first distinguish between moral and legal duties, a 
division that has become more easily delineated in modern discourse, but was more 
conflated in the premodern period.871 Immanuel Kant uses coercion (or its absence) as 
                                               
871 A reason for this conflation is that the premodern scholar views the purpose of the law like the legal-
moralist, as opposed to a Millian liberal. Enforcement of a duty to rescue is to enforce morality “for its 
own sake,” as opposed to benefiting society. Murphy, “Beneficence,” 630. Interestingly enough, James B. 
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the premise for the distinction between duties: morality is a duty that is freely fulfilled 
by a person using “pure practical reason” legislated upon himself while the law imposes 
the duty.872 Moral duties are “inherently social in scope and function” and “allocate 
shares of social responsibility to individuals” as, essentially, dues for membership in the 
collective.873 However, while moral duties can be considered duties of beneficence (where 
benefit is conferred on other members of society), legal rules that mandate conferring 
benefit present a more complicated proposition.874 This points to one of the major 
criticisms of the duty to rescue: enforced benevolence. The claim is that creating statutes 
with a duty to rescue would mean getting a positive benefit from others as a matter of 
right.875 For critics, this not only undermines the duty itself, but is deeply problematic 
from the perspective of individual liberty. 
                                               
Ames frames the historical relationship in opposite terms, suggesting that “the spirit of reform which 
during the last six hundred years has been bringing our system of law more and more into harmony with 
moral principles has not yet achieved its perfect work.” James Barr Ames, “Law and Morals,” Harvard Law 
Review 22, no. 2 (Dec. 1908): 114. My sense is that he is not suggesting that morality played no role in the 
law previously, but rather that what we considered to be moral before may not have been moral in itself. 
872 Ernest J. Weinrib, “The Case for a Duty to Rescue,” Yale Law Journal 90, no. 2 (Dec. 1980): 266.did not 
believe that law could make someone virtuous, even though at times the law and one’s internal ethics 
could legislate the same act; virtue could not be coerced. Weinrib, 266. 
873 Joel Feinberg, “The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan,” Criminal Justice Ethics 3, no. 
56 (Winter/Spring 1984): 67. 
874 Not everyone is comfortable with this idea of moral duties being duties of beneficence because it 
would mean that those being rescued do not have a right on the rescuer that he take action. Hence, if the 
rescuer fails to take action, even though this act might have been wrong, they would not have violated 
anyone’s rights. Murphy, “Beneficence,” 627.   
875 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 58 (citing Jeffrie G. Murphy’s opinion on the matter). 
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In a more pronounced way than his predecessors, the modern jurist is especially 
mindful of protecting individual liberty when imposing duties. This raises another 
important distinction helpful for the category of rescue duties: positive versus negative 
duties. Negative duties tend to be universally accepted and are generally 
noncontroversial; they are duties not to act such that you violate someone else’s rights. 
For example, you have a duty not to kill anyone or steal from them. Generally speaking, 
these negative duties do not interfere with personal liberty and hence are preferred by 
critics of the duty to rescue. On the other hand, positive duties present a direct challenge 
to personal liberty since they are duties of commission, as opposed to omission.876 
Individuals are asked to sacrifice something they possess—wealth, person, time—on 
behalf of someone else. Moreover, a positive duty that creates a legal rule would need to 
be enforced and be accompanied by punishment for noncompliance. In other words, 
positive duties require people to be held liable for failing to confer a benefit upon 
                                               
876 In fact, the “main normative ground for the rejection of positive legal duties” is that they “constitute 
excessive interference with individual liberty.” Murphy, “Beneficence,” 605. Liam Murphy notes that this 
is not necessarily a concern about liberty, but rather the serious potential material costs that are 
associated with positive duties; costs that impact our well-being.   
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someone else.877 For our purposes, only positive duties are relevant since this is how 
duties to rescue would be classified. 
One of the most prominent, and frequently cited, critiques of the duty to rescue 
comes from the Chairman of the First Law Commission of India under British colonial 
rule: Lord Thomas B. Macaulay. In his report on the Indian Penal Code, Macaulay suggests 
that the key issue with codifying a duty to rescue is that of deciding where to draw the 
line because “there are objections to every line which can be drawn, and some line must 
be drawn.”878 Macaulay laments that “wherever the line of demarcation may be drawn, 
it will, we fear include some case which we might wish to exempt, and will exempt some 
which we might wish to include.”879 In particular, the question of line drawing relates to 
distinguishing between what constitutes a rescue versus a non-rescue situation and what 
are valid exemptions for a rescuer’s duty to act. 
For acts that are rescue versus non-rescue, once the law intervenes to distinguish 
between these acts, assigning liability for nonperformance when it is a rescue and no 
                                               
877 This is a rare occurrence in the American legal system, with the only reported prosecution being from 
State v. La Plante, in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (1994), that upheld the constitutionality of a provision 
imposing a duty to assist crime victims. Murphy, “Beneficence,”608fn13.  
878 Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Introductory Report upon the Indian Penal Code,” in The Complete Works 
of Lord Macaulay, vol. 11 (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1906): 115. 
879 Macaulay, “Code,” 111. 
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liability when it is not, then containing the scope of the duty becomes challenging. If one 
decides that the circumstances of a particular case are sufficient to create a duty to 
rescue, then one must also be prepared to distinguish that case from similar situations 
were certain elements are missing. For instance, if one distinguishes cases on the basis 
of the level of emergency involved, then the question arises as to when the urgency is 
not great enough to trigger a duty? The argument is that once “criminal liability for 
samaritan omissions” is allowed then “precise-line drawing” will be impossible.880 In the 
second case, the line drawing involves the person doing the rescue. Macaulay pointedly 
asks “what is the precise amount of trouble and inconvenience which he [the rescuer] is 
to endure?”881 Macaulay offers the case of beggars and wonders what duty the rich owe 
them. If the rescuer is required to act in a case where someone faces death from 
drowning, then why not where death is virtually certain from starvation?  
Another example he mentions is the case of a surgeon who refuses to travel from 
“Calcutta to Meerut,” one corner of India to another, in order to perform a surgery. He 
is the only person in the country who can do it and if the surgery is not performed the 
                                               
880 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 65. Feinberg views Macaulay’s discussion as one that creates a division 
between clear cases that are not unreasonable for the rescuer, clear cases that are unreasonable for the 
rescuer and everything in between. Ibid. 
881 Macaulay, “Code,” 114-115. 
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patient will die.882 Macaulay notes that if the surgeon has a duty to travel in this case, 
then we would have to require “unlimited aid to those in need” for all other cases.883 The 
legal philosopher Liam Murphy refers to the rescue duty as a “duty of beneficence” and 
suggests that Macaulay’s claim is that the duty would require us to continue “benefitting 
others until the point where further benefits will burden the donor as much as they will 
benefit the donee.”884 That said, Macaulay recognizes the moral and legal distinction, 
noting that it is “highly desirable” that people should “render active services to their 
neighbors,” but he thinks the law should restrict itself to negative duties.885 As for 
positive duties, he argues that we must “grant impunity to the vast majority of those 
omissions which a benevolent morality would pronounce reprehensible” simply because 
it would create preposterous situations.886  
Despite the reticence about positive duties, even critics acknowledge the 
possibility of positive duties in certain circumstances and proponents of the duties use 
these to center their arguments. In particular, three contexts prove to be especially 
                                               
882 Macaulay, “Code,” 110. 
883 Arthur Ripstein, “Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil and Criminal,” Law and Philosophy 19, no. 6 (Nov. 
2000): 744. 
884 Murphy, “Beneficence,” 644. 
885 Macaulay, “Code,” 115. James B. Ames suggests that the “practical difficulty” of creating legislation for 
a duty to rescue “would be in drawing the line.” James Barr Ames, “Law and Morals,” 112. 
886 Macaulay, “Code,” 115. 
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compelling for positive duties: where a special relationship exists with the person to be 
rescued, where there is an immediate need for rescue and where the rescuer is in close 
proximity to the one requiring rescue. In the first context, most thinkers recognize that 
certain relationships come with special duties attached to them, including the one 
between parents and their children or those between a doctor and her patients.887 Where 
a relationship of care has been assumed by one of the parties, positive duties will attach 
to them in relation to that care. Although many critics of the duty to rescue would accept 
this duty within a special relationship, they would likely limit which relationships are 
able to trigger the duty. However, this raises important questions about the scope of the 
duty. For instance, how close does a relationship need to be before a special duty 
attaches: does an aunt owe a duty to her nephew or a grandparent to a granddaughter? 
What about relationships outside the family, for instance between two neighbors? By 
extension, can shared “humanness” alone trigger a special duty? While critics of the 
                                               
887 These special duties can be derived from a job, role or prior commitment. Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 
60. Alternatively, one might consider that they are created by “statute,” “family relation,” or “custom.” 
Frances H. Bohlen, “The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability,” University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 56 (1908): 220. It should be noted that in recent years American “courts have increased the 
number of special relationships” that require one person to aid another. Weinrib, “Rescue,” 248. Even 
Lord Macaulay acknowledges as much in his argument against the duty to rescue, noting that while “line 
drawing” is an issue, there are cases where special relationships exist and people must be held 
accountable. For example, he cites the case of a nurse who is responsible for the well-being of a child. 
Macaulay, “Code,” 110.  
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rescue duty would never accept that human beings are in special relation to each other, 
it is not quite clear what their rationale is for drawing the line where they do.  
The second context is when a rescue is characterized as “easy.”888 Easy rescues 
involve emergency situations where a rescuer, without significant sacrifice on his part, 
could save another human being in peril. The situation is summarized by Jeremy 
Bentham, the founder of modern utilitarianism, who asks, “in cases where the person is 
in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every man to save another from 
mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing himself…?”889 The legal philosopher 
Joel Feinberg advocates for a duty in these easy rescues based on the rationale that 
omission here would cause severe harm and “being a fellow human being” is enough of 
a relationship to “ground a duty to rescue.”890 One of the issues why easy rescues require 
                                               
888 Of course, there is still a criticism of an easy rescue since “the fact that a rescue would be easy to make 
does not create a duty where there was none before” because that would mean that a “person’s 
entitlement to be rescued varies with the rescue’s subjective difficulty for the rescuer.” Ripstein, “Three 
Duties,” 771. In fact, even Kant considered the moral duty to help in an easy rescue as “indistinguishable” 
from the moral duty to help the needy; neither could be a legal duty. Weinrib, “Rescue,” 267. 
889 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1823), 323. Bentham goes on to cite various examples of this such as when a woman’s head-dress 
catches fire and a man who has water in his hand just laughs as opposed to putting out the fire; or when 
a drunk man falls into a puddle and all it would take is to turn his head to the side for him not to 
suffocate, but another man lets him drown. Ibid. The rationale is simple: “human life is important” and 
“when lives can be saved without sacrificing anything of moral (or other importance) they should be.” 
Ripstein, “Three Duties,” 752. 
890 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 60. The Law Reform Commission of Canada addressed the question of 
liberty in the easy rescue scenario by noting that it will be “seldom that one person will be called upon to 
forego his own freedom for the benefit of others” and refusal to shoulder a minor inconvenience to save 
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a duty relates to intentionality or the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. 
Misfeasance involves “active misconduct working positive injury to others” while 
nonfeasance is “a failure to take positive steps to benefit others or to protect them from 
harm” you did not create.891 For misfeasance, where acts are committed that 
intentionally cause harm, there is little debate about liability (and punishment): most 
agree it exists. However, a question arises as to intentionally failing to act: can omission 
be considered intentionally causing harm and should liability attach? One might argue 
that intentional omission is not the same as commission because in the former a rescuer 
must sacrifice something. However, if sacrifice is removed from the equation, as in the 
case of easy rescues, then an intentional harm occurs that is equivalent to commission. 
As one scholar observes, “if I fail to rescue a child I know to be drowning in front of me, 
for no reason other than that I cannot be bothered to get out of my chair, it is not at all 
unnatural to say that I intentionally failed to prevent the drowning.”892  
An easy rescue usually involves both immediacy and proximity. Hence, aside 
from distinguishing this type of rescue on the basis of urgency, some Western scholars 
                                               
a life would shock the community’s conscience. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Omissions, Negligence 
and Endangering (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985), 19. 
891 Bohlen, “Moral Duty,” 219. 
892 Murphy, “Beneficence,” 619. As Murphy notes, “we can ignore any duty to rescue that requires an 
agent to sustain expected burdens greater than the expected benefit of her act.” Ibid, 649. 
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have also argued that proximity might intuitively create a duty. After all, shouldn’t the 
fact that someone is near a potential rescuee trigger a duty to rescue? If it does, then how 
close do they need to be physically?893 This again raises Macaulay’s problem of line 
drawing, but even he recognized a distinction between the doctor treating a patient in 
his own clinic versus four hundred miles away. Our “common-sense intuitions” seem to 
suggest that sometimes there is a “stronger obligation to help those in need who are 
physically near us than those who are at a greater distance.”894  
The American philosopher Frances Kamm provides two scenarios that illustrate 
the intuitive difference here. In the first, she describes walking past a shallow pond and 
seeing a child drowning in it. Saving the child will require wading into the water and 
ruining a $500 suit. She suggests that intuitively, she “ought to wade in to save him.” In 
another scenario, there is a child overseas who is starving to death. To save the child, 
$500 must be sent; in this case, she says there is no intuitive obligation to help. Among 
other reasons, she notes that in the “pond” scenario, she may be the only one who can 
help, but that is likely not the case in the “overseas” scenario. Furthermore, there might 
                                               
893 As one philosopher notes, “if it is reasonable to impose a duty to walk one step…surely it is reasonable 
to require two steps.” Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 65. 
894 Frances M. Kamm, “Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue,” Law and Philosophy 19, no. 6 
(Nov. 2000): 656. 
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be other children equally deserving of her help overseas, but there is only one in the 
pond.895 Hence, “nearness” is what determines who should be helped and would be the 
case even if the numbers were reversed: only one person in need of help overseas, but 
many drowning in a nearby pond.896 Kamm argues that a sign that we intuitively believe 
nearness is what obligates us is that once you are near someone who needs help, you no 
longer think it is permissible to move “a greater distance merely in order to avoid being 
near.”897 Her arguments here parallel some of the thinking that Islamic jurists have not 
only in the context of the duty to rescue, discussed later, but with regard to jihād and the 
manner in which the kifāya-duty attaches based on proximity to the conflict.  
                                               
895 Kamm, “Distance,” 656-657. 
896 Kamm proceeds further into a fascinating discussion on what proximity actually means. She notes 
that we might think it is physical distance from the “extended parts of the agent’s body to the extend 
parts of the victim’s body,” but it could also be the “length of time” to “traverse a physical distance.” Or 
additionally, it could be the proximity to tools that need to be activated to initiate the rescue. Kamm, 
“Distance,” 662 and 664. Peter Singer rejects the idea that the number of potential rescuers makes a 
difference to assessing the morality of acting to rescue; whether he is the only one or one of a million. 
Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 3 (Spring 1972): 232. 
As he very poignantly asks, "Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the 
pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child 
but are doing nothing?" Singer, “Morality,” 233. He is especially cognizant of the fact that our “global 
village,” with “communication” and “swift transportation,” has altered the situation and “made an 
important, though still unrecognized, difference to our moral situation." Singer, “Morality,” 232. 
897 Kamm, “Distance,” 666. On the other hand, Peter Singer rejects this role for proximity. He argues that 
a person’s physical proximity to us, such that “personal contact” can be made with them, might make it 
“more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him” as opposed to 
someone further away. Singer, 232. He also states that even in the case of the child drowning in a shallow 
pond, we ought to “wade in and pull the child out” because although one’s clothes might get muddy, this 
is “insignificant” as compared to the death of a child. Singer, “Morality,” 231. 
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Western thinkers have proposed various ways in which to address the problem 
of codifying duties to rescue with limited encroachment on personal liberty. For 
instance, Liam Murphy suggests we adopt a “collective principle of beneficence,” which 
would require people to “sustain only that amount of sacrifice they would be required to 
sustain if everyone were doing their part.”898 Unlike an optimizing principle of 
beneficence, where those complying with the duty “take up the slack left by others,” in 
the collective version you are only responsible for your fair share.899 This would also 
account for each individual’s capacity and probability for success. In other words, from 
a utilitarian perspective, "the fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have 
personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does 
not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further 
away."900  If people lack the skills needed for the rescue, meaning their chance of success 
is quite low, their liability under criminal law decreases as well.901 Other scholars propose 
thinking of the duty to rescue as an obligation owed to society rather than any individual. 
Hence, equal distribution of benefits is not essential, similar to how public law does not 
                                               
898 Murphy, “Beneficence,” 651-52. 
899 Murphy, “Beneficence,” 651-52. Of course, he notes that “in some contexts, doing one’s fair share” 
may not be enough. Ibid., 652. 
900 Peter Singer, “Morality,” 232. 
901 Murphy, “Beneficence,” 656. 
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confer benefits equally on everyone. The duty to rescue is a “non-relational duty, a duty 
owed to society at large rather than to some particular individual” and failing to 
contribute means a breach of the “duty to society as a whole.”902 
Joel Feinberg offers a similar proposal arguing that we are faced with a need to 
be practical, fair-minded and humane. This requires a “scheme of coordination” that 
allows people to be rescued while preventing “unjust enrichments of the unworthy” or 
“unfair disproportions in the contributions” made by some.903 He suggests that the 
“modern state’s welfare system” is precisely the solution for this: it maintains an 
“income floor for indigents” through taxes that it acquires from those who can pay.904 
For Feinberg, this system solves the problem of the extended duty to rescue by removing 
the charge that the rich failed to “prevent a beggar’s death” since everyone contributes 
their “fair share” in taxes; in essence, he creates a “general duty” to “support welfare 
with taxes.”905 These are distinct from what Feinberg considers “random and 
                                               
902 Ripstein, “Three Duties,” 775. 
903 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 66.  
904 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 66. These funds can then be used by the state to create institutions that 
specialize in rescuing individuals, such as local firefighters. Feinberg notes that: “the reason we have the 
duty to report the fire but not the duty to fight it is not just that there is minimal effort required in the 
one case and not in the other. It is rather that the very strict social duty of putting out fires is most 
effectively and equitably discharged if it is split up in advance through the sharing of burdens and the 
assigning of special tasks.” Ibid., 67.  
905 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 66.  
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unpredictable emergencies of life that require time and effort,” in other words like the 
easy rescue.906 In these cases, “imminent peril cannot wait for assistance from the 
appropriate social institutions” and, as a result, he argues that the “chance rescuer” is 
unfairly burdened.907 Hence, Feinberg advocates statutes that require performance of 
easy rescues, while the state system handles all other types of “rescue.” The rationale is 
simple: an individual duty cannot be determined in isolation without taking into account 
the “nature and scope” of duties that are assigned to everyone else.908 The only exception 
to this are those situations that “cannot be discharged by institutional mechanisms and 
special assignments” because they are so sudden and a bystander can either make a 
rescue or alert others without risk.909 We see a similar rationale play out in Islamic law, 
specifically in the context of foundlings. 
Bearing the above in mind, as a practical matter, in modern legal systems the 
resistance to positive legal obligations has been more pronounced in common law 
countries, largely due to their opposition to criminalizing omissions while civil law 
                                               
906 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 66.  
907 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 66.  
908 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 67.  
909 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 68.  
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countries tend to recognize a general duty to rescue.910 In the context of drowning, the 
most commonly cited case from the United States is Osterlind v. Hill from the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1928, where two drunk individuals were drowning, 
cried out for help, but were ignored by an individual fully capable of saving them. The 
Court ruled that the failure to respond was immaterial because there is “no legal right” 
that was “infringed.”911 Among European nations, Portugal was the first to enact a duty 
to rescue statute in the mid-19th century and over the next hundred years fifteen other 
European nations joined them.912 Interestingly, the different cantons in Switzerland are 
                                               
910 Edward A. Tomlinson, “The French Experience with Duty to Rescue: A Dubious Case for Criminal 
Enforcement,” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 20 (2000): 451-452. Hence, 
the opposition to a duty to rescue seems to be most pronounced in “English-speaking” countries as 
opposed to continental Europe and Latin America. Murphy, “Beneficence,” 605. In fact, these countries 
have left these failures to rescue unpunished even when the omissions are of an “immoral kind.” 
Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 57. 
911 Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928). In fact, Hill apparently sat smoking with the boat and a rope 
close at hand, actively choosing to do nothing. Murphy, “Beneficence,” 622. This case alludes to the rule 
that, in most cases, there is no criminal liability for omission. Another U.S. case illustrating this rule is 
People v. Beardsley where a man failed to come to the aid of his intoxicated mistress, whom he left in the 
basement of his house. He was initially convicted of manslaughter, but on appeal the Michigan Supreme 
Court ruled that no legal duty existed. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206 (1907). That said, there are states 
where duty-to-aid provision are in force, such as Rhode Island, Minnesota and Vermont. Murphy, 
“Beneficence,” 611fn23. In addition to the states cited, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Washington and Wisconsin 
have duties to aid crime victims or report an ongoing crime. Florida and Nevada have duties to report 
certain sexual offenses. Ibid. 
912 Feinberg, “Bad Samaritan,” 57. This includes the penal codes of Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy and Poland. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Omissions, Negligence and Endangering (Ottawa: Law 
Reform Commission of Canada, 1985), 17. The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Poland and a few other 
countries restrict the duty to “situations involving sudden and imminent danger to human life.” 
Aleksander W. Rudinski, “The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis,” in The Good Samaritan and the Law, 
ed. James M. Ratcliffe (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966): 91. In fact, Norway, Germany and 
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particularly useful in that they reflect the range of rescue duties that this chapter argues 
qualify as duties to rescue in Islamic law. For instance, several cantons in Switzerland 
have general provisions “concerning persons in immediate danger” that need to be 
rescued, while other cantons “restrict the duty to abandoned children and old or sick 
people” and a few preserve the “medieval obligation” to take an “active part in saving 
life and property during general disasters.”913 
 
Moral and Legal Duties in Islamic Law 
The preceding discussion provides a broad theoretical framework within which 
to examine the ideas Islamic legal thinkers presented on duties to rescue. Through this 
framework some of the broader implications of the discourse on kifāya-duties to rescue 
will come to light, as well as the potential significance of points where Islamic thought 
diverges or converges with the framework. For instance, when considering the duty 
                                               
Denmark require that the danger to life be “obvious” or “evident.” Rudinski, “Comparative,” 102. 
France’s law is arguably the most harsh and criminalizes a failure to rescue with sanction of up to five 
years in prison and a significant fine. Murphy, “Beneficence,” 610. The French first enacted a criminal 
statute concerning duties to rescue in 1941 and French scholars have argued that at the very least the 
statute has created a vocabulary and mentality among French citizens that it is an offense not to render 
aid to people in peril. Tomlinson, “French Duty,” 453. French courts have gone so far as to convict 
physicians who fail to visit a sick person that is in danger of death. In one case, a hospital director was 
convicted for failing to aid when he refused a patient admission despite a physician indicating that the 
patient was in a “dangerous condition.” Rudinski, “Comparative,” 102. 
913 Rudinski, “Comparative,” 92. 
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owed to someone in need of rescue, whether urgent or not, it can be argued that modern 
Western and premodern Islamic legal philosophers diverged in their thinking on the role 
of morality and the state in the law. For Western philosophers an essential question 
surrounding legal duties is the extent to which they can or should be enforced. For them, 
a failure to consider the state’s coercive power to punish the duty to rescue means that 
it is a largely empty theoretical question with simple answers. They are generally in 
agreement that it is a moral duty, but disagree as to whether the law should punish 
someone for not performing it.  
Premodern Islamic jurists do not view state action for these duties as essential in 
any sense. While there is the obvious fact that the modern administrative state was 
something alien to premodern jurists, their crafting of legal rules for rescue did not rely 
on the coercive power of any political entity. In some sense, one might argue that 
coercion is hardwired into Islamic law for other reasons: it is a legal regime where divine, 
as opposed to state, accountability is an underlying premise. For the same reason, Islamic 
jurists also generally do not recognize a division between law and morality. While natural 
law theorists and legal positivists in the Western tradition allow morality to influence law, 
Islamic jurists might argue that morality informs the law. In other words, moral duties 
will always be legal duties as well. 
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This chapter examines the duty to rescue in the Islamic context in light of these 
broader questions above. The primary aim is to use this subset of kifāya-duties to 
demonstrate how the legal discourse and juristic thinking on kifāya-duties evolved in 
later centuries. The chapter proposes to answer questions on a variety of matters 
including the possible functions of these duties in society and for jurisprudence, as well 
as the problems they create for theoretical consistency and their impact on the 
boundaries of the moral community. The chapter focuses its main attention on two 
duties: the duty to perform an easy rescue and the duty to rescue foundlings (iltiqāṭ).  
 
Easy Rescues in Islamic Law 
 When discussing the duty to rescue, secondary literature on Islamic law generally 
restricts itself to examining the discourse on “enjoining right” and “forbidding wrong.” 
Most prominently, Michael Cook credits his knowledge of “Muslim views on rescue” to 
what he has been able to derive from “material incorporated into accounts of forbidding 
wrong.”914 He suggests that while conceptually the duty to rescue and “forbidding 
wrong” might be distinct, they “overlap in a sufficiently intimate way to make them 
                                               
914 Cook, Commanding Right, 588. 
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broadly comparable.”915 This view is not without merit, but it fails to take sufficient 
account of the prominent role the duty to rescue has within kifāya-duties as a whole.916 
As mentioned above, the duty to rescue is routinely used as a model for illustrating the 
prototypical scenario where a kifāya-duty is triggered. In its simplest form, the duty is 
“an obligation to come to the aid of people in trouble.”917  
More specifically, the duty to rescue under consideration is what Western 
thinkers would classify as an “easy rescue,” involving distinguishing specific elements 
relating to urgency and proximity. The vast majority of discussions use one scenario of 
an easy rescue: the drowning person (inqādh al-gharīq). The standard account describes a 
scenario where individuals on the shores of a river observe someone drowning and 
contemplates the obligation owed to the drowner. Jurists argue that it is not sufficient 
for bystanders to remain onlookers: their proximity to the imminent emergency 
situation triggers a duty for each of them. Similar to Frances Kamm, premodern Islamic 
jurists seem to rely on common sense intuition to establish liability for performance 
based on physical proximity to the rescue. In addition, where more than one potential 
                                               
915 Cook, Commanding Right, 590. 
916 The “forbidding wrong” context is not the only one in which the duty to rescue plays a 
complementary role. For instance, both Māwardī and Ibn Qudāma mention its function in the discussion 
on foundlings. Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 18, 34; Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 3, 465. 
917 Cook, Commanding Right, 587. 
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rescuer is present, jurists require performance based on proximity, but allow it to be 
done collectively. At least one potential rescuer must attempt to save the drowning 
person and, in the process, absorbs responsibility from everyone else. Simply attempting 
a rescue is sufficient to fulfill the duty, regardless of whether it results in success. If no 
one attempts to rescue the drowning person, then every onlooker is considered equally 
liable.  
However, jurists operate with two fundamental assumptions. First, the standard 
prerequisites for legal liability to attach (i.e. maturity, sanity, etc.) must exist for easy 
rescues as well.918 Thus, regardless of proximity, if the potential rescuer is a child or lacks 
mental capacity, no duty attaches. This is further proof of the jurists not distinguishing 
between moral and legal duties; in the absence of legal capacity, nonperformance of a 
duty is both moral and legal. Second, some duties require special skills for performance. 
However, certain duties require performance despite the absence of the necessary skills. 
For instance, in order to save a drowning person, the individual attempting to perform 
the easy rescue should ideally know how to swim, but Qarāfī says that performance of 
the duty cannot be delayed even if they lack this ability (lā yatruk inqādh al-gharīq man la 
                                               
918 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 10, 24; See also, Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 485. 
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yaʿūm).919 This is indicative of a simpler principle underlying certain kifāya-duties: they 
obligate performance even in the absence of the requisite capability to perform. This 
point seems to address a key question in duties to rescue: what level of sacrifice is 
necessary from the potential rescuer? Qarāfī seems to suggest that despite the decreased 
probability of a successful rescue, one cannot abandon an easy rescue. This constrasts 
with the utilitarian perspective mentioned earlier, which decreases liability based on 
whether the skills necessary for a successful rescue are present. Essentially, Qarāfī is 
suggesting that even an improbable rescue will not negate an easy rescue.   
 Jurists also utilize the easy rescue scenario to highlight different aspects of the 
kifāya-doctrine. Qarāfī uses easy rescues to emphasize broad principles underlying kifāya-
duties. For instance, he notes that the duty to rescue here illustrates how “divine reward” 
for performing a kifāya-duty cannot always be replicated by repeat performance. In the 
case of a drowning person, once that individual has been rescued, the duty is suspended. 
Anyone who subsequently jumps into the river intending to perform a rescue will not be 
eligible to receive a reward: the act no longer has value.920 He notes that if you “descend 
                                               
919 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 10, 24. 
920 The only exception discussed in the literature is where the subsequent rescuer has no knowledge of 
the fact that the drowning person has been saved. The absence of knowledge suggests that the attempted 
rescue was genuine and since only an “attempt” is required to be eligible for commendation, this rescue 
will be treated the same as the actual one. 
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[into the water] after the rescue has happened, no benefit is gained.”921 In other words, 
the initial performance of the obligation satisfies the requirement completely.922 Qarāfī 
explains his logic as follows: if Zayd is drowning and someone saves him, then there is 
no “reason” to rescue him because Zayd is no longer drowning and the duty to rescue no 
longer exists.923  
 The duty to perform an easy rescue also appears in discussions tangential to the 
kifāya-duty, specifically when exploring whether it is possible to know good and evil 
outside of religion and the relationship between rights owed to humans and those owed 
to God. With regard to good and evil, the question revolves around whether human 
beings should be expected to recognize the “goodness” (ḥusn) inherent in saving a life 
without the aid of religion.924 Zarkashī mentions that some jurists argued religion was 
not necessary for determining whether to save someone from drowning or starvation.925 
                                               
921 Qarafi, Dhakhīra, vol. 10, 23. 
922 Qarafi, Dhakhīra, vol. 1, 83. 
923 Qarafi, Furūq, vol. 1, 212. There is some additional discussion in the literature as to whether cessation 
of the duty occurs due to the completion of performance or the absence of a reason to perform. 
924 The question of how to determine what is good and evil is a prominent theme in Islamic theology. For 
the Ashʿarites, the meaning of good is “an act whose agent is commended in the Law” and the meaning of 
evil is “an act whose agent is reproached in the Law.” Vasalou, Muʿtazilite Ethics, 7. On the other hand, 
Muʿtazilites believed that “moral values are generated by objective features of acts that are accessible to 
human reason.” Vasalou, Muʿtazilite Ethics, 15. 
925 Zarkashī, Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 1, p. 153. He uses the term “starvation,” but presumably means starvation 
that will lead to imminent death and not starvation in general, which would account for neither 
imminence nor proximity, thus be too dissimilar to drowning. 
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For example, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī concludes that religion is not a prerequisite for 
determining every evil (qubḥ). He crafts his argument by considering the ruling that 
“telling a lie” is a deplorable act (qabḥ al-kadhib) because “in its essence it is against what 
is beneficial to society.”926 The logical corollary, he argues, is that the “goodness of telling 
the truth” is apparent because in its “essence it must align with what is beneficial to the 
world.”927 In this context, Rāzī then mentions the inherent “goodness of rescuing a 
drowning person” (ḥusn inqādh al-gharīq), or even of attempting a rescue, “because it 
encompasses what we consider good character” (li-annahu yataḍamman ḥusn al-dhikr).928  
Furthermore, even if good character is not found in a person, the inherent 
goodness of rescuing someone is in every human being because “whoever sees someone 
from their own species in pain, their heart feels pain” (man shahida shakhṣan min abnāʾi 
jinsihi fī al-alam taʾallama qalbuhu).929 Hence, Rāzī considers the rescue necessary to 
“prevent [the rescuer from] feeling pain in the heart” (dafaʿa al-alam ʿan al-qalb), and this 
is why he inclines towards this path; presumably, to both avoid the pain of watching 
                                               
926 Rāzī, Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, 131.  
927 Rāzī, Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, 131. The Muʿtazilites provided another explanation for why lying is evil: in order 
to “trust in revealed truth” you had to be certain that “God would not lie” under any circumstances. This 
is also why they said the evil of lying must be prior to revelation. Vasalou, Muʿtazilite Ethics, 28. 
928 Rāzī, Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, 131. 
929 Rāzī, Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, 131. 
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another person suffer and failing to do anything about it.930 For him, the desire to avoid 
this pain, including guilt of nonperformance, is what motivates him to step forward to 
perform the rescue. Since this pain and guilt are independent of religion, Rāzī concludes 
that rescuing someone is inherently good and the duty to rescue exists even when 
religion is absent.931 This argument by Rāzī presents a unique take on the ethical question 
of self-sacrifice. Ordinarily, the assumption is that any steps the potential rescuer takes 
to perform a duty to rescue will risk harm to himself. Rāzī, on the other hand, proposes 
something counterintuitive; he argues that a failure to perform the duty is what leads to 
harm because it negatively impacts the psyche of any potential rescuer. 
Jurists also use the duty to rescue as a means to discuss the relationship between 
duties owed to human beings and those owed to God. Āmidī discusses whether the rights 
of human beings should receive precedence over the rights of God and seems to suggest 
that at times “human” rights are more important.932 In fact, he notes that what is 
“beneficial to the person” (maṣlaḥat al-nafs) should be given precedence over what is 
“beneficial to religion” (maṣlaḥat al-dīn).933 Āmidī arrives at this conclusion because of the 
                                               
930 Rāzī, Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, 131. 
931 Rāzī, Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, 131. 
932 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 4, 338-339.  
933 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 4, 338-339.  
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leniency that he sees built into the performance of religious acts. For instance, the 
performance burden of various acts of worship can be decreased in order to 
accommodate different circumstances. This is generally done through suspending, 
delaying or modifying an act of worship. For example, when someone is traveling, they 
are permitted to decrease the length of certain prayers and are allowed to postpone 
obligatory Ramadan fasts that fall within days of travel. Similarly, a sick person may 
modify their prayer by performing it without observing otherwise required details of the 
prayer ritual. They may perform the entire prayer while seated, bypassing the portions 
that require standing or prostration. For Āmidī these are all reasons why what is 
beneficial to the person receives precedence over individualized (ʿayn) religious 
obligations. Hence, in the context of rescuing a drowning person, Āmidī says that prayer 
should be suspended, despite its benefits, in order to secure the greater benefit of saving 
a life (qaddamnā maṣlaḥat al-nafs ʿalā maṣlaḥat al-ṣalāh fī ṣūrat injāʾ al-gharīq).934 Affirming 
this last point, Ibn Mufliḥ, in his book al-Furūʿ, mentions the legal opinion of Ibn al-
Zāghūnī (d. 1132), a teacher of Ibn al-Jawzī, on fasting, stating that “whoever finds an 
innocent person in danger, like someone drowning or in a similar predicament” they 
                                               
934 Āmidī, Iḥkām, vol. 4, 338-339. He goes on to note that this is not really an instance of giving preference, 
but simply postponing the prayer to a later point. Ibid., 340. 
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must save them even if it requires breaking their fast.935  
Like prayer, fasting is considered a primary religious obligation and this 
exception seems to acknowledge that a singular obligatory act is not equivalent to acts 
that may secure someone’s well-being. Qarāfī frames his views slightly differently but 
arrives at the same conclusion. He focuses on when the obligation must be performed and 
within this reflects the distinction between a singular act fulfilling a core obligation and 
a general act in preservation of life. In other words, Qarāfī centers his distinction on the 
question of immediacy. Specifically, he notes that the duty to rescue is a type of 
obligation that involves special circumstances requiring delayed performance of other 
core duties in order to focus on preserving someone’s life. This is contrary to ordinary 
circumstances where immediate performance of core duties is preferable over anything 
else.936 He explicitly states that “preservation of life and limb…takes precedence over 
obligations of worship (ʿibādāt), thus the duty to save a drowning person or someone 
burning in a fire, or something similar, takes precedence even over prayer.”937 Clearly 
                                               
935 His full name is ʿAlī b. ʿUbayd Allah. Ibn al-Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-Furūʿ, vol. 4, 448. He considers this situation 
to fall within the “category of al-diyāt” and goes on to discuss whether there is kaffara associated with 
breaking one’s fast here. 
936 Qarāfī, Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʿ al-furūq, includes the book Idrār al-shurūq ʿalā anwāʿ al-furūq by Qāsim b. 
ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Shāṭir, edited by n.a., vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998), 331-333. 
937 Qarāfī, Furūq, vol. 2, 332. Interestingly, Qarāfī seems to add a condition to the rescue duty which allows 
it to supersede worship obligations: the duty must be designated to a specific person such that only they 
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when he speaks of preserving life and limb he is referring to easy rescues and not the 
broader notion of rescue absent the requirement of immediacy. The two examples Qarāfī 
uses, drowning and burning in a fire, confirm the easy rescue context. 
Returning again to the question of how much self-sacrifice is required of the 
potential rescuer, Islamic jurists look beyond risk to one’s life and advocate the delay of 
other personally beneficial required duties for the sake of performing easy rescues. In 
other words, they must perform something of benefit to someone else, while doing 
“harm” to themselves by forgoing acts of personal benefit. This can be best understood 
if considered within the larger Islamic eschatological framework. While theological 
schools differ on the precise details of Islamic eschatology, at the most basic level there 
is an understanding that some combination of an individual’s deeds and beliefs will be 
assessed after his death to determine whether they are worthy of reward or punishment. 
Among their deeds will be the duties they were required to perform, most prominent of 
which are those they are personally responsible for: the ʿayn obligations. Since these are 
required duties, failure to perform will count against the individual in his final 
accounting. This would put them worse off than prior to the rescue, suggesting that the 
                                               
can perform. Ibid. Elsewhere, he also states that saving a human life takes preference over saving an 
animal. Ibid., 234. 
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rescue itself must confer enough of a benefit to outweigh the harm of not performing 
other individually required duties. The idea that rescue itself provides a benefit to the 
rescuer complicates any analysis of self-sacrifice especially in comparison to Western 
thinkers, who do not generally account for “divine reward” in their cost/benefit 
assessment. In essence then, the question of self-sacrifice may not even exist for Islamic 
jurists since they conceive of the reward for saving a life as extending beyond earthly 
existence. 
Bearing the above in mind, the duty to rescue is important for a number of 
reasons. First, it aptly demonstrates how jurists conceive of kifāya-duties as having a 
more universal application to humanity. Second, since there is no explicit textual 
support for the duty, jurists routinely employ deductive reasoning as proof of why the 
duty to rescue exists and why, at times, it should receive preference over other duties. 
This is especially instructive in cases where jurists deduce that the rescue-duty must be 
pursued over an ʿayn-obligation. Finally, attempted performance of a duty is considered 
equivalent to its successful performance. This highlights the fact that jurists are not 
necessarily as concerned with outcomes as they are with cultivating a certain hierarchy 
of values.   
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Duty to Rescue Foundlings (iltiqāṭ) 
Although the duty to perform an easy rescue is helpful for framing, the kifāya 
duty in the realm of rescue that contains the most detailed discussion is the duty owed 
to foundlings (laqīṭ).938 In many respects, the foundling-duty represents a midpoint 
between an easy rescue and a more expansive notion of rescue. This is primarily because, 
while the foundling-duty lacks the same immediacy as drowning, the involvement of a 
vulnerable child creates a heightened degree of urgency. Substantively, the foundling-
duty is premised on a broader obligation to preserve anything that might be diminished 
or even perish without proper care. Specifically, Shāfiʿī reportedly stated that “taking 
custody of everything exposed to waste, when no one else can secure it, is a collective 
duty (farḍ kifāya).”939 Hence, it is not surprising that the foundling-duty, as well as other 
kifāya acts, are frequently justified through reference to general principles requiring the 
                                               
938 Sometimes also referred to as manbudh. There does not seem to be a clear distinction between the two 
terms and they are often used interchangeably.  
939 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 374. Interestingly, Shāfiʿī does not seem to extend collective duty to the 
foundling context. He makes no mention of caring for foundlings being a kifāya-duty in the brief section 
on foundlings in al-Umm. See, Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 4, 73-74. Furthermore, he also makes no mention of 
foundlings when listing examples of kifāya-duties. However, there could be various explanations for why 
foundlings are not mentioned with the other kifāya-duties. For instance, Shāfiʿī may be emphasizing 
certain duties as the primary kifāya-duties while others, like the foundling duty, are more marginal. At 
the same time, he may simply list some kifāya-duties together to illustrate what they are, but with no 
intention of creating a comprehensive list. The lists simply may not be exhaustive of all the acts he 
considered under the category of kifāya.  
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preservation of life and property. On the other hand, some jurists propose that the 
foundling-duty should not be considered an obligation at all. They argue that 
performance of this act of rescue was actually just “recommended” (mandūb) and rises 
to the level of a collective duty only when the child is “exposed to danger.”940 Put another 
way, the argument seems to be that only when the scenario involves an imminent loss 
of life, what we might classify as an “easy rescue,” is the urgency sufficient to warrant 
the creation of a duty to rescue the foundling. According to one scholar, different views 
on how to classify taking custody of a foundling are the result of “jurists’ own 
independent reasoning (ijtihād),” since there are no statements regarding the foundling-
duty in either the ḥadīth literature or the Qurʾān.941 
Generally speaking, a foundling is a “human child whose parentage and whose 
status (free or slave) is unknown.”942 In the literature on positive law, foundlings, as well 
as the duties associated with them, are often discussed immediately following sections 
on rules for handling intentionally abandoned property (luqṭa). Even superficially, the 
link between abandoned property (luqṭa) and foundlings (laqīṭ) is evident from their 
                                               
940 M.S. Sujimon, “The Treatment of the Foundling (Al-Laqīt) According to the Ḥanafīs,” Islamic Law & 
Society, vol. 9, no. 3 (2002). 360. 
941 Sujimon, “Foundling,” 360. 
942 A.M. Delcambre, “Laḳīṭ,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. C.E. Bosworth, et. al. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1982): 639; See, Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 4, 73. 
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shared linguistic root (l-q-t). Where a subject is discussed in a particular legal text is 
indicative of the jurist’s approach to the topic and the types of inquiries they will make. 
Here, it is fair to conclude they consider foundlings an extension of property law, 
suggesting that the questions on abandoned children should relate to those on 
abandoned property. The questions jurists pose regarding abandoned property are easily 
applied to foundlings. For instance, jurists ask whether an individual is permitted to take 
possession of abandoned property or must avoid doing so? In cases where possession is 
taken, is there any obligation on the property finder (multaqiṭ) to search for the actual 
owner? Furthermore, how should this abandoned property be used? Can a finder utilize 
the property before securing ownership rights over it? Jurists apply each of these 
questions to the foundling context as well, considering abandoned children as analogous 
to abandoned property. As a result, one of the central questions jurists sought to answer 
was whether a foundling can be treated like a slave or if they should be considered a free 
person, an issue that again takes jurists into the implications of ethical considerations 
underlying a duty to rescue.943  
                                               
943 The question of whether the foundling is free or not is usually connected to whether anyone has 
patronage (walāʾ) over him and, if so, who is entitled to be the foundling’s patron. The determination 
often comes with associated responsibilities including financially supporting the child, etc. Ulrike Mitter, 
“Origin and Development of the Islamic Patronate,” in Patronate and Patronage in Early and Classical Islam, 
eds. Monique Bernards & John Nawas (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 94. 
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Definitions and Classifications 
Most jurists define a foundling (laqīṭ) as a “young, abandoned child” who is 
subsequently found.944 In addition to the linguistic meaning, Kāsānī says the term has a 
customary meaning as the name given to a “lost child” (al-ṭifl al-mafqūd).945 Ghazālī has a 
definition similar to most other jurists, but includes the requirement that the lost child 
must have “no guardian.”946 Nawawī also includes the absence of guardianship as part of 
his definition.947 He notes that there are a few different words for a “lost and abandoned 
child” (al-ṣabī al-mulqā al-ḍāʾiʿ): laqīṭ, malqūṭ or manbūdh.948 Jurists also offer opinions on 
the exact age for a foundling to be considered a lost child as opposed to an adult. For 
instance, Ibn Rushd notes that in terms of age, a laqīṭ is a “minor child, who has not 
attained puberty.”949 Nawawī excludes from the definition any child who has attained 
puberty (bāligh), arguing that they are not in need of assistance in their upbringing.950  
                                               
944 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, vol. 8, ed. M. Munīr al-Dimashqī (Cairo: Idārat al-Ṭabāʿat al-Munīrat, 1928-34), 
274; Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 3, 465; Ghazali, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 4, 303 & 306; Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 
484. 
945 Kāsāni, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanā’iʿ, vol. 6, 197. 
946 Ghazali, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 4, 303 & 306. This was Shāfiʿī’s opinion as well, though he presumes a t of who 
qualifies as a foundling. See, Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 4, 73. 
947 Nawawī, Rawḍat, vol. 4, 484. 
948 Nawawī, Rawḍat, vol. 4, 483. 
949 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 372. 
950 Nawawī, Rawḍat, vol. 4, 484. 
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The issue of how a child actually becomes abandoned is not discussed by most 
jurists. The one exception is Māwardī who begins his discussion on foundlings by 
mentioning three scenarios leading to a child’s abandonment. First, is the case of a child 
whose parent passes away and it has no other guardian. Second, is a child whose mother 
concludes that she is too weak to care for the child (taḍʿaf ʿan al-qiyām bihi) and so 
abandons him.951 And finally, he mentions the child who is conceived out of an illicit 
sexual relationship (fāḥisha) and subsequently abandoned by his mother, who fears being 
dishonored.952  
To fully appreciate the discussion on foundlings, it is important to expand on the 
underlying definitions and framework, namely “abandoned property,” or luqṭa. Ibn 
Rushd notes that broadly speaking luqṭa is the “property of any Muslim that is exposed 
to loss” regardless of whether it is lost in an inhabited area or a “desolate area.”953 He 
cites three types of found property, based on Anas b. Mālik’s categorization, as 
understood by his followers. The first type of property is the kind that would be 
                                               
951 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 8, 34. 
952 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 8, 34. Interestingly, each scenario Māwardī highlights presumes the 
absence of the father and places the onus for abandonment on the mother. This discussion of causation 
does arise with other jurists as well. Many Ḥanafīs, for instance, “define a foundling as a living child who 
has been abandoned by its parents out of fear of destitution or to avoid an accusation of fornication.” See, 
Sujimon, “Foundling,” 358. 
953 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 369. 
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squandered if left unclaimed. The second, is a type of property that is not yet in 
someone’s possession, but may be destroyed if it isn’t secured. The final type of property 
is the kind where there is no fear of it being lost.954 Jurists create analogs to these types 
of properties when discussing foundlings. 
 
Free or Slave? 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important questions that arises in this 
context is what status to give foundlings since their origins are unknown.955 Essentially, 
how far should the analogy to property extend? Should a foundling be considered “free” 
for legal purposes or can they be classified as a slave? This determination is important 
since it alters the nature of the finder’s guardianship. If the child can be considered a 
slave then the finder can assert ownership rights, which allow him to derive economic 
benefit from the child. The child’s status is also crucial in determining whether property 
law applies (since slaves were property) or another set of legal rules. In addition to these 
                                               
954 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 372. 
955 This is not a discussion unique to Islam, but present within the larger discourse around slavery. In 
Roman civil law, later adopted into British and American law, the concept of partus sequitur ventrem (“that 
which is brought forth follows the womb”) dictated the child’s status. This only applied to cases extra 
matrimonium, but if the child was conceived in matrimonio then “its condition dates from its conception.” 
George Leapingwell, A Manual of the Roman Civil Law: Arranged After the Analysis of Dr. Hallifax (Cambridge: 
Deighton, Bell and Co., 1859), 39. 
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practical considerations, the determination of a child’s status also carried obvious ethical 
implications about how unknown human beings should be classified. Simply put, taking 
custody of any foundling means incurring a potentially significant cost, which a “slave” 
foundling could recompense through forced servitude, but not a “free” foundling.  
In general, jurists respond to this question by following the presumption (aṣl) 
held by Shafīci that foundlings are “free by default” because freedom is the original state 
of human beings.956 Ibn Qudāma classifies foundlings as free based on a narration from 
ʿUmar where Sunayn Abū Jamīla said: “I found a foundling, so I brought him to ʿUmar 
who said: “Go away, he is free and upon you is his guardianship and for us are his financial 
expenses.”957 Kāsānī also says it is vital to know whether the child is free or a slave and 
what his lineage is. He suggests that the child is free by default and subject to laws 
specific to free people until evidence to the contrary appears.958 Shīrazī takes it one step 
further, requiring no investigation into the child’s status and simply presuming that he 
is free when he is found.959 Ibn Ḥazm expands on the notion that the original state of 
                                               
956 Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 4, 73. See also, Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185. In fact, this opinion was adopted by the 
majority of other jurists as well. See, Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya sharḥ badāya al-mubtadī, vol. 
4, ed. Nacīm Ashraf Nūr Aḥmad (Karachi: Idārat al-Qurān wa-ʿulūm al-Islamiyya, 1996), 362; Ibn Qudāma, 
al-Kāfī, vol. 3, 465; Kāsāni, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanā’iʿ, vol. 6, 197; Sujimon, “Foundling,” 361 (“the majority of Muslim 
scholars…declare that man is born free.”).  
957 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 3, 465. 
958 Kāsāni, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanā’iʿ, vol. 6, 198. 
959 Shīrāzī, al-Muhadhdhab vol. 2, 312. 
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human beings is freedom, noting that the reason a foundling (laqīṭ) is free, without any 
other authority over them, is because everyone is a child of Adam and Eve, the “original” 
humans.960 Both Adam and Eve were free and legally children of free people acquire their 
parents’ status without exception. The only possible exception, Ibn Ḥazm concedes, 
might arise out of a specific text from the Qur’an or Sunna rejecting the default “free” 
state, but he contends no such text exists regarding foundlings.961An outlier opinion was 
held by jurists like Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Qudūrī (d. 428/1037), who permitted a finder to hire 
out the services of the foundling.962 Burhān al-Dīn Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197) rejects this 
opinion and argues that the only circumstance in which a child may be put to work in 
this manner is as an apprentice with the express purpose of helping the child develop 
the ability to “stand on his own two feet.”963  
 
Conditions for the Finder 
 Jurists also consider the qualities necessary in the person who discovers the 
child, the “finder” (multaqiṭ), and acquires the duty to rescue. The pre-modern literature 
                                               
960 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, 274; see also, Kāsāni, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanā’iʿ, vol. 6, 197. 
961 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, 274. 
962 Qudūrī, Mukhtaṣar, 134. 
963 Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 4, 366. The basic idea is that the finder does not have the authority to 
“destroy his (foundling’s) benefits,” thus functioning more as an “uncle” than a “mother.” Ibid. 
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includes some debate over who precisely carries the burden of guardianship over the 
child. Some argue that guardianship belongs to the finder while others suggest it resides 
with the community collectively.964 In cases where the finder is judicially granted 
guardianship, jurists are primarily interested in certain criteria being met, which are 
necessary for custodianship over property in general. Hence, as a bare minimum the 
finder must be “free,” not a slave, “trustworthy” and “sane.”965 Muzanī also mentions the 
requirement that a finder be trustworthy  (thiqa).966 If the finder is discovered to be 
untrustworthy then Muzanī places the child in the care of the state, a point we will return 
to later. In a similar vein, Nawawī also raises the issue of impartiality (ʿadāla) in the 
context of a discussion on the elements of Islamic custodianship (arkān al-iltiqāṭ al-sharʿī). 
Like Ghazālī, Nawawī requires that the finder certify his uprightness through testimony 
(under oath) prior to assuming responsibility for the child.967  
It should be noted that jurists did not necessarily conceive of these qualities as 
absolute pre-requisites, but preferences in cases where more than one finder existed. For 
instance, Shāfiʿī reportedly preferred that a finder be a free person, but does not preclude 
                                               
964 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 374. 
965 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 374; Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 4, 364-65; Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 
485. 
966 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185. 
967 Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 484. 
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a slave from ever acquiring guardianship over a foundling.968 Similarly, he also preferred 
that finders be town dwellers, living a “settled” life, as opposed to nomads.969 Other 
jurists tend to prefer the finder be a free person, but explicitly allow a slave, or a slave in 
the process of manumission, to take custody of a foundling with permission from their 
master.970 For his part, Nawawī mentions four characteristics it is preferable the finder 
have. First, he gives preference to someone who is wealthy over someone who is poor, 
even though he recognizes that other jurists hold them equal. However, he withholds 
this preference in cases where doubts exist regarding the finder’s supposed wealth.971 
Second, Nawawī preferences city/town dwellers over both nomads and rural 
inhabitants.972 His reasoning seems to rest primarily on the fact that it is more likely that 
the abandoned child is from a densely populated town as opposed to its outskirts and he 
is apprehensive about moving the child away from familiar territory.973 Third, Nawawī 
favors a person whose fairness has been proven over time (man ẓaharat ʿadālatuhu bi l-
ikhtibār).974 Finally, like other jurists, he states a preference for someone who is free as 
                                               
968 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185. 
969 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185. 
970 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 9, 131. 
971 Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 486. 
972 Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 486. 
973 Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 488-89. 
974 Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 486. 
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opposed to a slave.975 Overall, when considering qualities for a finder most jurists seem 
to center their considerations on what they consider the child’s long-term interests. 
They are especially concerned with factors that will bring greater stability to the child’s 
upbringing.  
Most jurists also distinguish between finders on the basis of their religious 
affiliation. In general, they do not permit a non-Muslim to assume caretaking duties over 
a Muslim foundling, but exercise more flexibility when it comes to Muslims caring for 
non-Muslim children.976 Of course, the key issue is determining the religion of a child 
about whom nothing is known. This issue is instructive for a number of reasons. First, in 
the easy rescue scenario no inquiry was made into the religion of the individual 
drowning. This is indicative of the supremacy jurists give to the preservation of life, such 
that in the easy rescue scenario we see Islamic legal duties that are owed to all human 
beings: the moral community is expanded.  
Second, the duty to foundlings puts forward a more advanced question than that 
raised with drowning: in a less urgent situation, what duties does a Muslim owe to a 
vulnerable individual who is not Muslim? Are Muslims absolved of the duty to “rescue” 
                                               
975 Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 486. 
976 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185; Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 4, 363-64. 
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a child if it is determined that he is a non-Muslim? Third, if they are absolved from this 
duty, is the reason simply because Muslims do not owe any duties to non-Muslims or is 
the sanctity of religion being considered alongside the sanctity of life? It might be argued 
that Muslim jurists view religious identity as sacred such that, despite their own faith 
convictions, they consider it in the child’s long-term interests to return to a familiar 
religious context even if it is non-Muslim. This is no small ethical concession especially 
if we consider it within the framework of “enjoining right” and “forbidding wrong.” 
Here, despite the fact that jurists would agree that a non-Muslim context is 
epistemologically wrong, they obligate returning the child to that context.  
In order to determine the foundling’s religion, jurists begin by considering the 
demographic makeup of the area where he is discovered. According to Muzanī, Shāfiʿī 
said it was permissible for a child found in a city inhabited almost exclusively by non-
Muslims to be taken in by a non-Muslim. In that circumstance, the child is considered 
non-Muslim until he comes of age, at which point he can choose Islam.977 Similarly, 
Shīrazī argues that if a child is found in a Muslim country among Muslims or in a Muslim 
locality captured by non-Muslims then he should be considered a Muslim. However, if he 
                                               
977 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185. For instance, in the caretaking of a non-Muslim, they favor a Muslim over a 
dhimmī. See, Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn, vol. 4, 486. 
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is found in a locality where there are no Muslims then he should be considered a non-
Muslim.978 While other jurists focus exclusively on the demographics of an area’s 
inhabitants, Ibn Qudāma also includes an assessment of who holds political power 
locally. Hence, he considers the default religion of any foundling to be Islam as long as 
they are found in territory under Muslim political control. The only exception to this 
scenario would be a case in which, despite the presence of a Muslim ruler, the inhabitants 
of a particular locality were exclusively non-Muslim; in this case, the foundling should 
be treated as a non-Muslim.  
For territories under the control of non-Muslims, but where Muslims also reside, 
Ibn Qudāma notes that two opinions exist. One opinion holds that the foundling should 
be treated as non-Muslim because the territory is under the political control of non-
Muslims. The second opinion advocates for the child being considered a Muslim because, 
all things equal, a preference should be given to Islam.979 In some respects this second 
opinion betrays the widely-held Islamic theological position that, in their primordial 
state, human beings all begin as “muslims”; their innate religious disposition is Islam and 
only after birth do religious labels attach. Hence, preferring Islam for the foundling is 
                                               
978 Shīrāzī, Tanbīh, 90-91. 
979 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 3, 465. 
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simply restoring the child to his original state before it was disrupted by the 
circumstances of his birth. Furthermore, these two juristic opinions also offer insight 
into how jurists weigh political power in their decisions about the best interests of the 
foundling. In the situation that Ibn Qudāma describes, non-Muslims control political 
authority, but presumably Muslims have some level of social dominance. Hence, the 
question arises as to what is in the best interests of the child: being a part of a community 
that is politically dominant or one that is social dominant? Some jurists see the social 
dominance to be powerful enough to overcome the influence of non-Muslim political 
rule, while others, possibly taking a more pragmatic approach, defer to political power 
as a controlling factor. 
 
Obligation of Care 
With regard to why taking custody of a foundling is a kifāya-duty, jurists offer two 
levels of argumentation: one level involves the practicalities of policy and the other more 
abstract moral questions. These moral questions in the context of foundlings share 
similarities with the underlying concerns when discussing easy rescue. My classification 
of caring for foundlings as a duty to rescue arises out of the fact that in both cases—easy 
rescue and foundlings—the central preoccupation of jurists is preventing the death of a 
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vulnerable individual. Hence, when discussing the foundling-duty Ghazālī argues that it 
is kifāya for two reasons: to encourage cooperation in good works and save children from 
“demise.”980 Shīrazī has a more expansive idea based on Q 5/al-Māʾidahh:32, which states 
that “whoever saves a life it is as if they have saved all of humanity.” He notes that 
rescuing someone from harm is obligatory, just like feeding a starving person, because 
in both cases there is the potential for a person’s demise.”981 Likewise, Marghīnānī says 
that taking care of a foundling becomes obligatory if one thinks that the child will perish 
(wa-in ghalaba ʿalā ẓannihi ḍayāʿuhu fa-wājib).982  
Building on the idea of saving lives, other jurists offer a more direct connection 
between caring for a foundling and the easy rescue of someone drowning. Ibn Qudāma 
and Māwardī say the foundling-duty is kifāya because it saves a human being from 
perishing (li-annahu injāʿ ādamī min al-halāk) in the same fashion that rescuing a drowning 
person would (ka-takhlīṣ al-gharīq).983 Qarāfī offers the same analogy but speaks of it in 
more inflated terms arguing that this is “classified as a principle of preserving life” and 
                                               
980 Ghazālī, al-Wasīṭ, vol. 4, 303. Also see v. 4, 306. 
981 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab vol. 2, 312. The verse Q 5/al-Māʾidahh:32 reads “On account of [his deed], We 
decreed to the Children of Israel that if anyone kills a person– unless in retribution for murder or 
spreading corruption in the land– it is as if he kills all mankind, while if any saves a life it is as if he saves 
the lives of all mankind. Our messengers came to them with clear signs, but many of them continued to 
commit excesses in the land.” 
982 Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 4, 361. 
983 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 3, 465; Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 8, 34. 
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about which “every community and revealed book agree.”984 In other words, he is making 
a universalist argument that is only tangentially connected to Islamic scripture and even 
then not unique. Furthermore, as in the case of rescuing a drowning person, the 
foundling-duty is not removed until the threat of destruction subsides.985 Jurists go to 
significant lengths to analogize the foundling to a drowning person, as well as emphasize 
the fact that this duty is owed to humans in general. Thus, even though there might be 
discussion on whether it would be more appropriate for a Muslim or a non-Muslim to 
care for a foundling of unknown religion, there is no debate over the fact that the 
foundling must be cared for by someone. Similar to the case of drowning, jurists 
construct the foundling-duty as one that Muslims owe to all human beings, not just their 
co-religionists.  
As with other kifāya-duties, jurists also discuss the point when the foundling-duty 
is triggered and proximity plays an important role. For some jurists, such as Māwardī, 
simple “knowledge” of a child’s status as a foundling is enough to trigger for the creatin 
of a duty to rescue the child and take responsibility for their upbringing.986 Presumably, 
                                               
984 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 9, 131. 
985 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 9, 131. 
986 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 8, 34. This is also the opinion of other jurists. See, Shīrāzī, al-Tanbīh, 90-
91. 
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if one has sole knowledge of the foundling then, like other kifāya-duties with only one 
possible performer, the duty is ʿayn until more potential caretakers arrive. Ibn Ḥazm 
requires some physical proximity, making it “obligatory” (farḍ) on anyone who “comes 
across” a foundling to take them in; he also requires their custodianship come with a 
firm commitment to the child’s preservation.987  
Like others, Ibn Ḥazm bases this on the scriptural imperative to work together 
for righteous ends, but more importantly on the previously mentioned verse Q 5/al-
Māʾidahh: 32. Ibn Ḥazm notes that “there is no sin greater than the sin of one who wastes 
a young sinless Muslim by allowing him to die of hunger or cold or to be eaten by dogs” 
(la ithm aʿẓam min ithm man aḍāʿa nasama mawlūda ʿalā al-islām ṣaghīra la dhanb laha ḥatā 
tamūt jawʿan wa-bardan aw taʾkuluhu al-kilāb).988 No other jurist speaks of failing to perform 
the duty with such severity, elevating it to a major sin. In fact, Ibn Ḥazm goes even 
further, implying that a severe penalty should be instituted on anyone that willfully 
neglects a foundling. He argues that anyone who allows a life to waste away due to 
neglect will be “guilty of intentional murder” (huwa qātil nafs ʿamdan bi-la shakkin), 
                                               
987 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, 274. 
988 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, 273-274. One interesting thing to note regarding Ibn Ḥazm’s discussion on 
the obligation to care here: he does not specify what type of obligation exists. One can assume that the 
obligation is at least individualized to the person who “comes across” the abandoned child, but there is 
no indication whether it would function as a kifāya duty otherwise. 
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essentially advocating for nonperformance of the foundling-duty to be punished with 
death.989 By analogizing failure to perform the foundling-duty with intentional murder, 
Ibn Ḥazm is instituting the harshest penalty in Islamic criminal law for not performing a 
rescue that you were capable of performing. He supports his position by quoting a 
Prophetic ḥadīth that put things starkly: “whoever is not merciful with people, God will 
not be merciful with them” (man la yarḥam al-nās la yarhamu Allāh).990 Ibn Ḥazm’s position 
here is particularly important because jurists rarely, if ever, connect nonperformance of 
a kifāya-duty to criminal sanction.991 Furthermore, I have found no other instance in the 
duty to rescue context where any link is made between nonperformance and criminality, 
even if there is a penalty. This suggests that jurists are likely using these duties to rescue 
as a space for moral speculation without fully considering practical enforcement or 
deterring nonperformance. Even Ibn Ḥazm’s rare expression of criminal sanction for not 
performing the duty is less related to enforcement as it is to his registering the 
seriousness of the ethical failure. 
                                               
989 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, 274.  
990 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, 274. It should be noted that for certain Ḥanafī jurists, even the abandonment 
of a child “for whatever reason” is sinful and worthy of punishment such that they require the sulṭān 
apply a discretionary penalty (taczīr). Sujimon, “Foundling,” 359; See also, Sarakhsī, Mabsūt, vol. 10, 209. 
991 There is another instance where Nawawī mentions a situation where the community insists on 
rejecting a ruler’s command that they provide for a foundling. In that scenario, Nawawī states that they 
should receive capital punishment (wa-in imtanaʿū athimū kulluhum wa-ṭalabahum al-imām fa-in aṣarrū 
qātiluhum). Nawawī, Rawḍat, vol. 4, 492. 
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Jurists also discuss whether the foundling-duty can be abandoned after someone 
begins to undertake it. Generally, the kifāya doctrine operates under the rule that once 
performance of a kifāya-duty has been initiated it must be continued until completion. 
The kifāya-doctrine has standard exceptions for situations where an individual loses the 
capacity to perform and these exceptions apply to the foundling-duty as well. In general, 
many jurists, particularly the Ḥanafīs, require that once a foundling is discovered, 
rescued and taken into custody they not be returned to where they were found: doing so 
constitutes “nonperformance of the duty.”992 However, others allow someone to forgo 
the duty on the basis of a broad exception relating to their personal abilities. For 
instance, consistent with Ghazālī’s opinion, Nawawī notes that the child may be returned 
if the finder lacks the capacity to raise a child.993 Qarāfī offers another situation where 
performance might be suspended: a conflict with the finder’s initial intention. He 
envisions two scenarios: either the person intended to perform the duty by taking the 
child into his home or the person intended only to bring the child to the attention of 
political authorities. In the first case, Qarāfī considers it impermissible to reject a child 
after having taken custody with the intention of raising the child. Alternatively, he notes 
                                               
992 Sujimon, “Foundling,” 359. 
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that if the child is taken simply with the intention of notifying the state (imām) of its 
existence then it is permissible subsequently to return the child to the location where it 
was found.994 This view is shared by other jurists who believe the finder’s duty is simply 
to “bring the child to the political authorities” and it is then for the authorities to 
“identify an appropriate person to care for the foundling.”995  
Jurists again seem to be staking out an ethical position here. First, while not 
stated explicitly, one might speculate that jurists understood the potential psychological 
trauma that would be inflicted on a child who was returned after having been found. In 
some respects, one could conceive of it like throwing a person back into the river who 
you had just rescued from drowning. Not only would this be nonperformance of the duty, 
but the finder would now become a cause of the foundling’s condition. Second, jurists 
only contemplate two scenarios of either intending to take the child into custody or of 
bringing the child’s existence to the attention of the state. Neither scenario contemplates 
an option of the child being neglected or left uncared for. Hence, even where returning 
the child is considered a possibility it is only as long as some other caretaker assumes 
responsibility for the child. To return them to where they were found without an 
                                               
994 Qarāfī, Dhakhīra, vol. 9, 131. 
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alternative caretaker would mean again subjecting them to potential demise since there 
is no guarantee of rediscovery. 
 
Shared Responsibility: The State and Community as Caretakers 
Building on the last point, a peculiar aspect of the foundling duty is the 
availability of another entity for the duty’s performance: the state. Ordinarily, kifāya-
duties involve a shared responsibility between individuals and the community, where 
individuals perform in order to satisfy the collective duty imposed on their community 
of residence. However, for some duties, there is also a role for the state, primarily in 
providing oversight over the sufficiency of performance. For instance, specifically in the 
context of jihād, the state may provide guidelines as to how the duty is satisfied, such as, 
determining the number of performers necessary to complete the duty, whether 
performance must occur immediately or can be delayed, and how the duty should be 
performed. Yet, despite having a regulatory role, jurists do not contemplate the state’s 
responsibility including actual performance of duties.  
However, for the foundling-duty, the state’s responsibility to perform expands in 
significant ways, essentially functioning in parallel to the community’s role. Jurists 
contemplate circumstances in which the state must assume a direct role in caring for 
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abandoned children. In essence, the state functions as a guarantor for the finder’s 
performance of the duty and, by extension, their ethical shortcomings. Where the 
finder’s inability to perform is to the degree that the child’s interests are comparatively 
better met by the state, the state’s responsibility is triggered. Specifically, jurists argue 
that when a foundling has no guardian, the sulṭān must be regarded as its “legitimate 
guardian” in his role as the Muslim community’s representative and the one conferring 
the rights owed to them.996 
 Hence, in considering a child’s welfare and best interests, jurists will shift the 
foundling-duty from the community (specifically, individuals within it) to the state; the 
state must then assume primary responsibility for the child. However, the state’s duties 
are different than those of an individual guardian in the same situation. The state has a 
duty to provide for the child’s upbringing and wet nursing, but is not required to provide 
an inheritance or arrange for the child to be married.997 For instance, one scenario jurists 
discuss is where the moral character of a finder is called into question. Muzanī focuses 
specifically on trustworthiness as a character trait which, if absent in the finder, triggers 
a more active role for the state in performance of the duty. If the finder is trustworthy 
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then Muzanī requires no further inquiry: the finder possesses exclusive responsibility 
for the child.998 However, where the finder is deemed untrustworthy, the child 
automatically becomes a ward of the state and is the “ruler’s responsibility.”999  
Furthermore, jurists are interested in more than just the trustworthiness of the 
finder. They also examine trustworthiness as it pertains to the inhabitants and local 
political authority where the finder lives. Local dynamics are able to affect how jurists 
conceive of the nature of the duty and where the burden for it lies. If a territory is 
inhabited by “trustworthy” people and ruled by a “just” political authority, then the 
analysis is straightforward: the finder can take custody of the foundling. In these cases, 
the only matter that requires additional attention is whether public notification of this 
custodianship is necessary or not.1000 In other situations, where a ruler may be unjust or 
residents untrustworthy, jurists are concerned primarily with whatever option is most 
likely to insure the “found property’s safekeeping,” which, in this case, is the child 
                                               
998 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185. He notes that the finder must provide formal testimony that the child he 
found is abandoned and account for all the child’s property (bimā wajada lahu). He is required to 
personally spend on the child at a level that would be appropriate based on custom (yaʾmaruhu bi-l-infāq 
minhu ʿalayhi bi-l-maʿrūf). Any property belonging to the foundling that the finder utilizes on himself, 
without the ruler’s permission, will be considered a debt and the finder will bear responsibility for it. 
Ibid. 
999 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185. 
1000 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 368. 
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itself.1001 Another connected consideration is the issue of child enslavement. In short, 
jurists like Qarāfī require a foundling to be placed under state guardianship when the 
trustworthiness of the finder is questionable and a risk exists that the finder might make 
the child a slave.  
It is noteworthy that not only are jurists placing the child’s well-being at the 
center of their analysis, but part of this analysis also involves assessing the fitness of the 
finder through broad moral traits like trustworthiness. Their assessment recognizes that 
a “rescue” occurring in the context of foundlings is perpetual as compared to someone 
drowning. In the latter, the rescuer’s duty ceases after the person is pulled out of the 
water: their moral act is simply in performing the rescue. However, for foundlings the 
rescue persists beyond the initial discovery and jurists raise the moral fitness of the 
finder as part of the ethical obligation associated with caring, providing for and bringing 
up a child. Furthermore, they charge the state with serving as a guarantor of the child’s 
upbringing, intervening should the finder not meet the standard of ethical fitness. 
In addition to adjusting the foundling-duty on the basis of the finder’s character, 
or lack thereof, jurists are also cognizant of the practical considerations behind the 
obligation and reassign the duty based upon the financial support the individual, and by 
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extension the community, can provide the child. A variety of different financial 
arrangements are contemplated, including both grants and loans, in order to support the 
foundling. These arrangements generally involve three potential sources of wealth: the 
finder’s existing fortune, the assets that accompanied the foundling when he was 
discovered and the state’s public treasury. As a baseline, many jurists, like Ibn Rushd, 
adhere to the opinion that “wealth is not a required condition for custodianship.” 1002 
However, this position probably operates on the assumption that the state will serve as 
a guarantor to allow finances not to be a limitation. It is also an indication that the ethical 
concerns over character traits is a more pressing matter for jurists than financial 
capacity.  
For many Ḥanafī jurists this assumption is explicitly stated in their position: “if 
the foundling has no money or property, the public treasury (bayt al-māl) is responsible 
for its maintenance and upbringing.”1003 Kāsānī echoes this view, suggesting that as a 
final resort, when other options have been exhausted, the public treasury is required to 
care for the foundling.1004 Similarly, Marghīnānī requires the foundling be “provided for 
                                               
1002 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat, vol. 2, 374. 
1003 Sujimon, “Foundling,” 363. Interestingly, Māwardī notes that in cases where the treasury lacks funds 
to support public interest and amenities then there is an obligation that exists on the Muslim community 
to provide it as a kifāya-duty. Māwardī, Aḥkām, 279.  
1004 Kāsāni, Badā’iʿ al-ṣanā’iʿ, vol. 6, 199. 
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from the public treasury” (nafaqatuhu fī bayt al-māl) in situations of “need,” an opinion he 
bases on rulings by both ʿUmar and ʿAlī.1005 He assigns responsibility to the public 
treasury because the foundling is a Muslim “unable to earn,” lacking both wealth and the 
support structure of close relatives. In fact, from a legal standpoint, Marghīnānī 
analogizes the foundling to a physically disabled person who automatically becomes a 
ward of the state by virtue of being handicapped.1006 In other words, he considers 
abandonment as a type of disability. Furthermore, Marghīnānī makes the treasury liable 
for any compensation arising out of the foundling’s civil or criminal offences.1007  
This position is not exclusive to the Hanafīs though. For instance, Muzanī notes 
that in situations where the finder possesses all other pre-requisites for custodianship 
except adequate finances, the ruler is obligated to utilize the state’s wealth to provide 
for the foundling (fa-in lam yūjad lahu māl wajaba ʿalā al-ḥākim an yunfiq ʿalayhi min māl 
Allāh).1008 He contemplates a kifāya-duty that is shared by the state and the community. In 
other words, if an adequate custodian is not present within the community, the state 
                                               
1005 Marghīnānī, Hidāya, vol. 4, 361. 
1006 Marghīnānī, Hidāya, vol. 4, 362. 
1007 Marghīnānī, Hidāya, vol. 4, 362. While it is not especially significant to the discussion here, it would be 
worth exploring how Marghīnānī would consider a foundling who is non-Muslim. Does the state assume 
the same responsibilities for this child as for a Muslim child? Would a non-Muslim child also be entitled 
to support from the public treasury? 
1008 Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī, 185. 
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must partner with the community to meet the burden of the obligation.  
Bearing the above in mind, Kāsānī relates an important point that other jurists 
raise as well: there is no recourse to the public treasury if a foundling’s upkeep can be 
funded from the child’s own property.1009 In fact, a considerable portion of the legal 
discussion around foundlings centers on who has rights to the property in the foundlings 
possession when they are discovered. According to both Muzanī and Māwardī, Shafīʿi’s 
position was that anything found on the child’s riding animal (dābbatihi) or bed (firāshihi) 
or on his person (ʿalā thawbihi) constitutes his property (fa huwa lahu).1010 Ibn Ḥazm says 
that whatever you find on his person is his because a young person is capable of owning 
property and everything he possesses should be used for his benefit.1011 Marghīnānī 
supports this position as well, noting that if wealth is discovered on the foundling’s 
person, or attached to an animal he is riding, it belongs to him.1012 A finder who spends 
the foundling’s wealth for his upkeep must do so in line with a judge’s guidelines. The 
authority to spend this money resides with the judge (li-l-qāḍī wilāyat ṣarf), but a 
foundling has the right to spend from his own wealth without the judge’s permission.1013 
                                               
1009 Kāsāni, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 6, 199.  
1010 See, Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar, 185; Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 8, 34. 
1011 See, Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, 276. 
1012 See, Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 4, 365. 
1013 See, Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 4, 365. 
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Marghīnānī also gives the finder, in his position as guardian, the authority to utilize a 
foundling’s wealth to purchase items necessary for the foundling’s well-being (lā budda 
lahu minhu), such as food and clothing.1014  
While the above discussion relates to financial arrangements obligating the state 
to provide grants for the maintenance of a foundling, jurists also discuss how the duty 
might be satisfied in other scenarios. Specifically, they recognize that the state may not 
always have discretionary funds in the public treasury to satisfy its role in the foundling-
duty. Nawawī suggests that in these cases the community must reassume the burden of 
the foundling exclusively, as a kifāya-duty, without the state as a guarantor: under no 
circumstances can either party let the child perish. As part of its duty, the state must 
take a more active role managing the foundling’s affairs. For instance, the ruler is 
required to gather the town’s wealthy individuals and divide responsibility for the child’s 
maintenance between them (qassamta ʿalayhim nafaqatahu) and the state (jaʿala nafsahu 
minhum).1015   
In addition, similar to Ibn Ḥazm’s outlier position instituting punishment for 
failure to perform the foundling-duty, Nawawī penalizes a community that refuses to 
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provide state-mandated support for a foundling. To begin with, he reiterates the 
standard position that every person in that town will have committed a sin due to the 
nonperformance of a kifāya-duty. More importantly, Nawawī says that if the community 
insists (aṣarrū) on maintaining their position of nonperformance after an order from the 
ruler (ṭalabahum al-imām), then lethal force can be used to compel their compliance 
(qātalahum).1016 If the situation reaches an impasse (ʿinda al-taʿadhdhur), he requires taking 
a loan, with a fixed return, from the public treasury on behalf of the foundling. The 
difference between the grant, as opposed to the loan, is that no repayment to the public 
treasury is required in the case of the former.1017 
The loan arrangement is contemplated by many jurists as an acceptable 
alternative to the grant. In general, it comes under consideration in situations where the 
state lacks the financial flexibility to provide monetary gifts so must offer monetary debt 
instead. Nawawī states that when a foundling has no money, the ruler (imām) can seek a 
loan from the public treasury for the child’s upkeep.1018 However, it is not immediately 
clear who carries the debt: the finder or the foundling. The interesting aspect of this 
arrangement is that while it requires the state to assume responsibility for the 
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foundling’s financial welfare, it does not impose a requirement to provide this support 
without expectation of repayment. In other words, the obligation can exist as both a form 
of charity and a transaction loan.  
Similarly, jurists also contemplate the finder providing a loan from his own 
wealth for the foundling’s upkeep, as opposed to a charitable grant. Kāsānī states that a 
finder is permitted to take care of a foundling with the understanding that he will be 
reimbursed from the child’s property. However, he places a condition on this loan: it 
must be agreed upon prior to the start of the custodial relationship and by judicial decree 
(bi-idhn al-qāḍī), with the state acting as a proxy for the minor foundling.1019 The finder 
cannot retroactively alter the arrangement from a grant to a loan. If no such agreement 
existed at the start of the relationship then the finder has waived his right to claim 
repayment from the foundling.1020 In cases where a judge compels the finder to provide 
maintenance for the foundling as part of his “sovereign power of compulsion” (wilāyāt 
al-ilzām), the finder is entitled to recover these expenses from the foundling when he 
becomes an adult.1021 A judicial order to provide maintenance is required in order to 
                                               
1019 Kāsāni, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 6, 199. He cites a Prophetic tradition that says “the ruler is a guardian for 
one who does not have a guardian” (al-sulṭān walī man la walī lahu). Ibid. 
1020 Kāsāni, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 6, 199. 
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recover the funds in the future. If the finder provides maintenance without a judge’s 
prior consent then it is considered a “charity” (tabarruʿ) and the foundling cannot be 
forced to pay it back.1022 
A succinct summary of the state’s role is recounted by Ibn Qudāma in a story 
about ʿUmar narrated by Sunayn Abū Jamīla where the latter says (emphasis added): “I 
found a foundling, so I brought him to ʿUmar who said: “Go away, he is free and upon you 
is his guardianship and upon us is his financial expense.”1023 A more detailed summary of 
the state’s role in the foundling duty is found in M.S. Sujimon’s discussion of the 
predominant view of medieval Ḥanafī jurists on this matter: 
Ultimately, it was the state’s responsibility to provide the foster father with the 
means to provide for the child. The state generally seems to have retained the 
patronage of the child, although this may not always have been the case. Thus, 
the state is normally responsible for the bloodwit of the foundling; and the state, 
represented by a qāḍī, may act as the marriage guardian (walī) of a female 
foundling. The state also may inherit from the foundling.1024 
 
Ancillary Duties to Rescue 
 The juristic discourse on the subcategory of duties to rescue within the kifāya 
category is dominated by the two duties discussed above: easy rescues and the foundling-
                                               
1022 Sujimon, “Foundling,” 365. This was specifically the position of Abū Hanīfā. 
1023 Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī, vol. 3, 465. 
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duty. However, other acts that jurists classify as kifāya might also be worthy of 
consideration as duties to rescue. This is primarily because the ethical considerations 
that underlie the duties discussed above also play a role in these other duties, though 
often less explicitly. Specifically, the main consideration is the preservation of human 
life, often characterized as preventing its demise, and the extent of an individual’s 
obligation towards this end. Unlike the widespread coverage given to the foundling-duty 
and easy rescue, the juristic discourse on these “ancillary” duties to rescue is more 
sporadic: some mention them while others omit them altogether. There seems to be no 
broad agreement as to whether these particular duties should constitute obligations and, 
thus, they are not a consistent part of the legal discourse. However, these discussions 
nonetheless shed further light on the legal thought underlying the development of the 
subcategory of duties to rescue. A few examples of these additional duties help illustrate 
the changing nature of the kifāya-duty and how the jurists’ moral speculation on ethics 
touched other areas of law as well. 
 
Assistance 
Among the kifāya-duties that fit more readily into the subcategory of duties to 
rescue is a broad duty to “provide assistance” to the needy. Ordinarily, zakat, an ʿayn-
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obligation, might be considered the appropriate place for these acts of charity, but in the 
premodern period zakat functioned as a tax on its Muslim population that allowed the 
state to provide them various services, including ensuring their well-being to some 
degree. The kifāya-duty to assist the needy exists outside the welfare state and 
contemplates the type of responsibility members of the community owe to others in the 
community in need of immediate rescue. For example, Ibn Baṭṭāl obligates feeding the 
hungry in one’s community as a kifāya-duty, specifically feeding those individuals 
without the means to secure their own meals. In fact, not only does he elevate feeding 
the needy to the level of kifāya-duty, he implies that, in certain contexts, the duty may 
acquire shades of an ʿayn-obligation as well. His argument here has parallels to the easy 
rescue situation: capacity to intervene, immediacy of need and proximity to the 
vulnerable individual.  
Ibn Baṭtāl argues that it is mandatory for a rescuer to intervene if someone faces 
an imminent prospect of death by starvation where two conditions exist. First, the 
rescuer must possess the ability to respond to the situation (wa-ʿindak mā tujībuhu bi-hi) 
and, second, they must be the only person positioned to do so at that time.1025 In this 
                                               
1025 Ibn Baṭṭāl, Sharḥ saḥīh al-Bukhārī, vol. 5, ed. Abū Tamīm Yāsir b. Ibrāhīm (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 
n.a.) 210. 
 
 
 
 
 
378 
situation, Ibn Baṭtāl follows the principle that “preserving his life is obligatory for you” 
(al-farḍ ʿalayka fī iḥyāʾ nafsihi).1026 Furthermore, in further alignment with the duties to 
rescue, he notes that the obligation will be downgraded to an “exhortation” (nadb) if 
immediacy (ḍarūra) is lifted. In fact, in many respects one could easily consider this 
simply another example of an easy rescue as opposed to a separate duty to rescue.  
There is also mention in the Prophetic tradition of “visiting the sick” and Ibn 
Baṭṭāl notes that opinion was split on this being a duty: some scholars believe it is a 
kifāya-duty and others consider it simply encouraged.1027 The opinion that it was a kifāya-
duty was not uncommon, as Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr reports various other unnamed scholars 
also holding it.1028 He notes that Ẓāhirī jurists actually elevate visiting the sick to an ʿayn-
obligation: a classification opposed by the majority of scholars.1029 The Ẓāhirī position is 
based on a ḥadīth that commands every person to engage in seven activities emphasized 
by the Prophet; one of them is visiting the sick.1030 
 
                                               
1026 Ibn Baṭṭāl, Sharḥ saḥīh al-Bukhārī, vol. 5, 210. Ibn Taymiyya also elevates feeding the hungry to the 
level of kifāya-duty, but adds clothing the poor as an additional duty as well. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā al-
Kubrā, vol. 4, 617. 
1027 Ibn Baṭṭāl, Sharḥ saḥīh al-Bukhārī, 211. 
1028 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Jāmiʿat Bayān, vol. 1, 58. 
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Hospitality 
A less common duty, that is more tangential to the duty to rescue, is mentioned 
by Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī in a commentary on Q 11/Hūd:69.1031 He notes the opinion of 
Layth b. Saʿd, which departed from other scholars, that providing hospitality to guests is 
obligatory. Layth b. Saʿd based this view on a Prophetic ḥadīth that stated “whoever 
believes in God and the Last Day let him honor his guest, his welcome is for a day and a 
night and whatever is more than that is charity (sadaqa).”1032 In another narration, the 
following is added: “It is not licit (ḥalāl) for a guest to stay with someone for so long that 
they become a burden upon them." Ibn al-ʿArabī notes that “scholars of law” (ʿulamāʾ al-
fiqh) did not consider hospitality an obligation but simply a demonstration of  “honorable 
moral character and the best kind of conduct between creatures, or God’s creatures” 
(innamā hiya min makārim al-akhlāq wa-ḥusn al-muʿāmalah bayna al-khalq).1033 For these 
jurists, the statement in the ḥadīth is an “exhortation” (nadb) not an obligation since to 
“honor one’s guest” is inherently voluntary; there is no honor if you are required to do 
it.1034 Ibn al-ʿArabī also notes that some people say the obligation has been abrogated; it 
                                               
1031 The verse reads: “To Abraham Our messengers brought good news. They said, ‘Peace.’ He answered, 
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1032 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām, vol. 3, 20. 
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existed at the beginning of Islam but not anymore (fī ṣadr al-Islām thumma nusikhan). He 
does not give this opinion much weight, classifying it as “weak” (ḍaʿīf).1035  
Instead, Ibn al-ʿArabī proceeds to discuss another ḥadīth which he uses as the 
framework for how the obligation should be understood. The ḥadīth, narrated from Abū 
Saʿīd al-Khudrī, recounts an incident in which a group of travelers requested hospitality 
from a certain tribe. Instead of providing the support, the tribe told the travelers that 
any hospitality carried a condition: the travelers had to help the tribe’s ailing chief. The 
traveling group agreed to perform a healing incantation over the tribal chief in return 
for the community’s hospitality and proceeded to read the fātiḥa, which seemed to cure 
the chief’s ailment.1036 For Ibn al-ʿArabī, the narration’s importance is that when the 
travelers, upon their return, informed the Prophet what happened, he did not express 
any displeasure at the tribe for failing to be hospitable. If the travelers had a right to 
hospitality from the tribe then the Prophet would have “informed them of this.”1037 
                                               
1035 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām, vol. 3, 20. 
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29 (“Medicine,” kitāb al-ṭib), Section 19 (“How an incantation is to be used,” bāb kayf al-ruqā); Ṣaḥīḥ al-
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ruqyah). 
1037 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām, vol. 3, 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
381 
Rather, Ibn al-ʿArabī says the ḥadīth shows that “in actuality, hospitality is a collective 
duty” (al-ḍiyāfa ḥaqīqatan farḍun ʿalā al-kifāya).1038 That said, he does note that some 
scholars qualify this obligation further. They note that hospitality is obligatory (wājiba) 
in rural areas (qurā) because of the scarcity of food and water for visitors, as opposed to 
urban areas (ḥawāḍir), where resources are more plentiful (mashḥūn). Ibn al-ʿArabī 
concludes by noting that if a guest is destitute (ʿadīm) then the hospitality is 
obligatory.1039 
Here again we see strains of the same ethical rationale behind other duties to 
rescue with familiar patterns of immediacy, proximity and capacity structuring the 
obligation. For instance, the preference for making hospitality an obligation in rural 
settings is based on the immediacy of need. Resources are scarce in rural settings and 
any traveler passing through them will require support more urgently from whoever 
they meet. In the urban setting, support might be more readily available because 
resources are more plentiful. Likewise, Ibn al-ʿArabī recognizes the element of 
immediacy in a guest who is destitute versus one who just happens to be passing through. 
He requires that the destitute guest receive support right away. Furthermore, in all these 
                                               
1038 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām, vol. 3, 21. 
1039 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām, vol. 3, 21. 
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cases, proximity and capacity is assumed since hospitality is being provided for a guest 
from one’s own provisions. Even the automatic requirement that guests receive a few 
days of hospitality suggests a reluctance, possibly for ethical reasons, that jurists had in 
turning someone away who was seeking shelter and allowing them a few days to restore 
their well-being.  
  
Marriage 
Like hospitality, it is not immediately clear how marriage might fit into the duties 
to rescue. In fact, not all jurists are even convinced that marriage is an obligation: some 
consider it merely a permissible act. Those that consider marriage obligatory often 
debate whether it should be a kifāya or an ʿayn-obligation. Other jurists hold that 
marriage is a conditional obligation, arguing that there is consensus that “marriage is 
obligatory when someone is consumed by an uncontrollable sexual desire for women” 
and they are able to meet the financial burden associated with marriage.1040 In this 
situation, it would be sinful not to marry.  
In addition, jurists agree that at least one group consistently held the position 
                                               
1040 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. Ibn Qudāma states that in situations where one lacks self-control, 
marriage becomes obligatory according to most scholars. Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 341. 
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that marriage is required: the Ẓāhirīs.1041 In fact, Kāsānī claims that their opinion was not 
only  that marriage was obligatory, but that it was an ʿayn-obligation “similar to fasting 
and prayer.”1042 As a result, Ẓāhirīs considered unmarried persons sinners if they had the 
physical and financial capability to marry.1043 Its narrated that Dāwud b. ʿAlī, the founder 
of the Ẓāhirī school, required people to marry at least once in their lifetime (yajib fī al-
ʿumr marratan wāhidatan).1044 His opinion was based on the language in Q 4/al-Nisāʾ: 3: “If 
you fear that you will not deal fairly with orphan girls, marry whichever [other] women 
seem good to you, two, three, or four. If you fear that you cannot be equitable [to them], 
then marry only one, or your slave(s): that is more likely to make you avoid bias” 
(emphasis added).1045 He reads this verse as containing an imperative command to marry 
                                               
1041 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, vol. 2, 1; Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193. The basis of this opinion is what they 
consider to be the direct command in both the Qurʾān and ḥadīth. Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193. 
1042 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. 
1043 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. 
1044 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 341.  
1045 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 9, 31. Māwardī responds to Ibn Dāwud reading this verse as a command 
by arguing that the verse is limited to promoting marriage to women of good character and is not 
suggesting a broader obligation. If it was then the obligation would apply in all conditions. Ibid. In 
addition, he notes that the later part of the verse presents a choice between marriage and taking a 
concubine (milk al-yamīn). He suggests that it does not make sense then that marriage is obligatory, but 
taking a concubine is not. Furthermore, he notes another verse, Q 4/al-Nisāʾ: 25, that juxtaposes 
marrying a free believer and slave believer. Māwardī points to a segment of the verse which states: “This 
is for those of you who fear that you will sin; it is better for you to practice self-restraint.” He argues that 
marriage with a slave is recommended for the person who cannot afford to marry a believing woman, 
but fears they will commit illicit sexual intercourse (zinā). Furthermore, if even that is not possible then 
the best course is to exercise self-restraint. Māwardī says that if self-restraint is considered the best 
 
 
 
 
 
384 
as opposed to a suggestion: “you may marry.”1046 The imperative form for Ẓāhirīs always 
means you “must” engage in the act and have no option. In fact, Dāwud argues that there 
was consensus among Muḥammad’s Companions on this point because it was the 
position held by two of the Muslim community’s earliest luminaries: ʿUmar [b. al-
Khaṭṭāb] and Muʿādh [b. al-Jabal].1047 Furthermore, Dāwud makes use of a story from 
Muʿādh’s life where, on his deathbed, he reportedly asked to be married so that he 
“would not have to meet his Lord as a bachelor (ʿazab).”1048  
Ibn Ḥazm confirms the Ẓāhirī view in al-Muḥallā, noting that “it is an obligation 
for anyone with the ability to copulate to follow one of two paths: find someone to marry 
or take a concubine.”1049 His discussion of the obligation is primarily meant to be 
juxtaposed against celibacy, which he views negatively. Specifically, he mentions various 
ḥadīth which indicate that the Prophet forbade celibacy and Ibn Ḥazm contends that this 
                                               
course in certain circumstances then marriage cannot be obligatory because otherwise self-restraint 
would actually be the worst option (shar SP). Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 9, 31.  
1046 I have altered the verse’s translation in the previous sentence. Muhammad Abdul Haleem translates 
the imperative command in the verse as “you may marry,” which is not how the Ẓāhirīs understood it. 
See, The Qurʾān, trans. M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, 50. 
1047 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 9, 31.  
1048 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 9, 31. Specifically, Muʿādh’s rationale was apparently that marriage is 
indicative of refinement of one’s soul (taḥṣīn al-nafs). Māwardī counters the claim about both Companions 
by noting that their advice was either specific to their circumstances or meant to be viewed as something 
desirable not obligated. Ibid., 32.  
1049 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥalla, vol. 9, 440. As proof to support his opinion, he notes a Prophetic ḥadīth that says 
people with the means to marry should marry otherwise they should fast. Ibid.  
 
 
 
 
 
385 
opinion was held by most early Muslims (qawl jamāʿa min al-salaf).1050 Ẓāhirī support for 
marriage as an ʿayn-obligation is premised on explicit textual support from the Qurʾān 
and Sunna.1051 On this basis, they consider the command to marry to be absolute, unless 
there is evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, Kāsānī notes their use of a legal maxim 
to advocate for the marital obligation: “anything necessary for performing an obligation 
is itself obligatory” (wa-mā lā yutawaṣṣal ilā al-wājib illā bihi yakūn wājibān).1052 The Ẓāhirīs 
argue that since abstaining from illicit sexual relations (zinā) is obligatory (wājib), and 
the only way to abstain from illicit sexual relations is through licit sexual relations 
(nikāḥ), thus licit sexual relations also become obligatory.1053  
Among the main Sunni legal schools, the Ḥanafīs, unlike the Mālikīs or Shāfiʿī’s 
mentioned earlier, were more likely to view marriage as an obligation even though they 
disagreed as to the details of the obligation. According to Kāsānī, they divided into two 
                                               
1050 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥalla, vol. 9, 440. He also mentions a ḥadīth attributed to the Prophet’s wife ʿĀʾisha in 
which, responding to a question about celibacy, she cites and provides commentary for Q 13/al-Raʿad:38 
(“We sent messengers before you and gave them wives and offspring…”) as a prohibition on celibacy. 
Ibid. 
1051 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228; Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193. One ḥadīth the Ẓāhirīs use as proof 
narrates the Prophet asking ʿAkāf b. Khālid whether he had a wife, to which he responds in the negative. 
The Prophet then instructs him to get married because in his current state he was among the “brethren 
of the satanic forces” (ikhwān al-shayāṭīn). Ibid. 
1052 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. Sarkahsī uses essentially the same words, but with a slight 
difference where farḍ is substituted for wājib: wa-mā la yatawaṣil ilā al-farḍ illā bihi yakūn farḍan. This 
difference is negligible for other schools, but not for Ḥanafīs. Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193.  
1053 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228.  
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primary groups: those who think marriage is obligatory and those who do not. The latter 
group, which included scholars like Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/951), said that 
marriage should be viewed as either a recommended (mandūb) or a commendable 
(mustaḥabb) act.1054 Sarakhsī claims that the majority of jurists, excluding the Ẓāhirīs, 
considered marriage to be a “commendable supererogatory” act (masnūn mustahab).1055 
They base this opinion on a ḥadīth in which the Prophet reportedly said “whoever among 
you can afford to get married should and whoever cannot should fast because this will 
serve as a restraint [on your desires]” (man istaṭāʿ minkum al-bāʾah fa-l-yatazawwaj wa-man 
lam yastaṭiʿ fa-l-yaṣum fa-inna al-ṣawm lahu wijāʾun).1056 Hence, fasting occupies the same 
station as marriage. However, fasting, apart from Ramadan, is not obligatory so marriage 
cannot be obligatory either since “it is not possible for something that is not obligatory 
to be substituted for something that is an obligation” (ghayr al-wājib la yaqūm maqām al-
wājib).1057  
Furthermore, the Ḥanafīs argued that there were Companions of the Prophet who 
                                               
1054 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. 
1055 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193. He actually cites an interesting ḥadīth that says that “if you are a 
Christian monk then you have the right not to marry, but if you are Muslim then get married.” Sarakhsī, 
Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193.  
1056 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. 
1057 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228.  
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never got married and, despite knowing this, the Prophet never admonished them for it, 
which indicates that marriage must not have been obligatory.1058 They also note that 
when the Prophet or his Companions listed the obligations of faith they never included 
marriage in such lists.1059 The Ḥanafīs also respond directly to the Ẓāhirī contention that 
marriage becomes obligatory based on the legal maxim that “anything necessary for 
performing an obligation is itself obligatory.” Sarakhsī argues that marriage is not the 
only means of preventing illicit acts that one is obligated to avoid; fasting can just as 
easily help one achieve the goal of shielding oneself from illicit sex.1060 Hence, marriage 
is not a necessity. 
Another group of Ḥanafīs considered marriage an obligation but disagreed as to 
the nature of that obligation. The basic distinction they made was between two types of 
obligation unique to Ḥanafī jurisprudence: farḍ (textual obligation) and wājib (reasoned 
obligation).1061 These jurists were themselves divided over whether it was a “reasoned 
                                               
1058 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228.  
1059 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193. 
1060 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193.  
1061 As noted earlier, the distinction that Ḥanafīs make between farḍ and wājib is that they consider farḍ to 
be “all the injunctions that are proven on the basis of a certain source that has no form of doubt to it.” 
On the other hand, wājib applies to those acts that are determined to be obligatory through reasoned 
deduction. Deen, Islamic Law, 97. As some scholars have noted, Abū Ḥanīfa considered the difference 
between these two concepts to be quite significant, relating that it is “like the difference between heaven 
and earth.” See, Reinhart, “Farḍ and Wājib,” 205 fn1. 
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collective obligation” (wājib ʿalā sabīl al-kifāya) or a “reasoned individual obligation” 
(wājib ʿaynan).1062 For his part, Kāsānī does not agree that marriage can be individually 
assigned as an obligation because failing to get married does not constitute sinful 
behavior. Instead he thinks at most it resembles collective obligations like jihād and 
funeral prayers where social responsibility is shared.1063 His preference is to consider 
marriage as inherently permissible (mubāḥ) and lawful (ḥalāl), but not in the realm of 
obligation. However, Kāsānī acknowledges that marriage can also become an obligation, 
recommended or favored, depending on its need as a defense against illicit sexual 
relations (zinā).1064  
The Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Qudāma notes a difference of opinion with regard to 
whether marriage is an obligation. The most prevalent (mashūr) opinion is that marriage 
is not obligatory except for the person who requires it as a defense against their own 
proclivities.1065 On the other hand, he says that Abū Bakr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz considered 
marriage obligatory, regardless of its purpose, on the basis of an opinion by Ibn 
                                               
1062 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228.  
1063 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 229. He centers his discussion on reading the “unqualified morphological 
patterns denoting obligation on the basis of [their] context” (ṣighat al-amr al-muṭlaqa can al-qarīna) as 
containing both obligation (farḍiyya) and recommendation (nadab).   
1064 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 229.  
1065 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 340.  
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Ḥanbal.1066 According to Ibn Qudāma, Ibn Ḥanbal considered marriage of paramount 
importance to the religion itself, stating that “whoever calls you to not get married is 
calling you away from Islam” (man daʿāk ilā ghayr al-tazwīj fa-qad daʿāk ilā ghayr al-Islām).1067 
Ibn Ḥanbal made the marital obligation conditional on the ability to provide for the 
family, noting that financial incapacity is equivalent to physical incapacity (namely, 
impotence or ʿājiz) when it comes to marriage.1068 For his own part, Ibn Qudāma relates 
different ways in which to consider marriage. Like other jurists, he considers an 
individual’s particular circumstance as determinative of how marriage should be 
categorized. For instance, he makes marriage obligatory for people who genuinely fear 
that without it they will engage in illicit behavior (man yukhāf ʿalā nafsihi al-wuqūʿ fī 
maḥẓūr in taraka al-nikāḥ). For others, Ibn Qudāma considers marriage only recommended 
(mustaḥib) as a result of lustful feelings (shahwa) that might lead to illicit behavior.1069 
                                               
1066 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 340. Ibn Qudāma relates that ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and Ibn Ḥanbal consider 
marriage obligatory both for the purpose of pleasure as well as safeguarding against falling into illicit 
behavior. Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 341. 
1067 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 341. Apparently, Ibn Ḥanbal said that “if a human being marries then 
they complete a divine command.” Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 341. 
1068 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 344. Ibn Ḥanbal notes: “it is necessary for a man to get married as long 
as he has the ability to provide, but if he doesn’t have this ability he should be patient.” Ibn Qudāma, al-
Mughnī, vol. 9, 344. Ibn Qudāma says that the level of financial capacity does not need to be especially 
high. Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 344. 
1069 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 341. He says that marriage as a recommended act is the opinion of the 
aṣḥāb al-rāʾy and present in the sayings and acts of the Companions. Ibn Qudāma also accounts for 
situations where someone has no desire (presumably for women) either because they were born without 
it (specifically, “unsexed” or cinīn) or had desire but it passed with old age, sickness, etc. For this person, 
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Marriage is again preventative here, but not obligatory because the threat of 
transgressing remains confined to the point of having evil thoughts as opposed to 
engaging in an imminent act.  
From a kifāya standpoint, one of the few jurists to raise marriage as a collective 
duty is Ibn Taymiyya, who reports that Abū Yaʾlā al-Saghīr and Abū al-Fatḥi b. Munī 
speak of marriage as a kifāya-duty.1070 Ibn Mufliḥ, a student of Ibn Taymiyya, also reports 
that Ibn Munī’s opinion was not simply that marriage was a kifāya-duty, but that “striving 
for it takes precedence [over other obligations], similar to jihād” (fa kāna al-ishtighāl bihi 
awlā ka-l-jihād).1071 Ibn Taymiyya actually establishes a hierarchy between different 
kifāya-duties in relation to marriage. He notes that in certain cases of need, marriage may 
take precedence over an ʿ ayn-obligation like hajj due to one’s “fear of significant hardship 
in the absence of marriage” (khashiyyat al-ʿanat bi-tarkihi).1072 Where there is no such fear 
regarding the absence of marriage, then even other kifāya-duties, specifically those 
involving acts of worship (ʿibādāt) such as pursuit of knowledge or jihād, take precedence 
                                               
Ibn Qudāma suggests there are two routes: it is recommended they get married or that they abandon 
marriage completely since there are no benefits in it for them. Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 9, 343. 
1070 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, vol. 5, 450. 
1071 Ibn Mufliḥ, Kitāb al-furūʿ, vol. 8, 178. He also notes elsewhere the opinion of his “shaykh” (which is a 
reference to Ibn Taymiyya) that marrying “previously unmarried women” (al-ayāma) is a kifāya. Ibid., 
218; see also, Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, vol. 5, 450. 
1072 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, vol. 5, 449-50.  
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over marriage.1073  
ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī1074 reports that many of his peers consider marriage to 
be a kifāya-duty, but others consider it to be mandūb or mustaḥabb.1075 Kāsānī suggests that 
there are various opinions regarding marriage and among these is one that considers it 
a kifāya-duty, where the obligation can be satisfied by the performance of some in the 
“same way as duties relating to jihād or funeral prayers.”1076 Others like, Shīrazī and Majd 
al-Dīn b. Taymiyya (d. 653/1255) only consider the walīma (wedding reception) to be a 
kifāya-duty for the married couple, but not the marriage itself.1077 In other words, there 
is no duty to marry, but if they choose to do so, then a duty attaches requiring a 
celebration that functions as a public announcement of the nuptials.1078 For Ibn Rushd, 
the juristic debate is a linguistic one centering around the nature of the command in Q 
4/al-Nisāʾ: 3 that says to “marry of the women who seem good to you,” as well as use of 
                                               
1073 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, vol. 5, 450.  
1074 There is a discrepancy in how the pdf volumes are ordered for Tuḥfat al-Fuqaha. It looks like they have 
been numbered wrong. The chapter on “purification” appears in volume 2 which is highly irregular. 
Need to look at hard copy. 
1075 Samarqandi, Tuḥfat al-Fuqaha, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilmiyya,1984), 117. 
1076 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. 
1077 Shīrāzī, Tanbīh, 109; Majd al-Dīn b. Taymiyya, al-Muḥarrar fī al-fiqh ʿalā madhhab al-imām Aḥmad b. 
Ḥanbal, vol. 2, ed. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿarif, 1984), 39. Ibn Taymiyya (the grandfather of the arguably 
more famous Ṭaqī al-Dīn) notes that it is preferable to have the walīma within a day or so of the nikāh.  
1078 For a brief discussion of the issue of public marriages versus secret marriages, see Susan A. Spectorsky, 
“Some Ḥanbalī Views on Secret Marriage,” in Arabic Humanities, Islamic Thought: Essays in Honor of Everett K. 
Rowson, ed. Joseph Lowry and Shawkat Toorawa (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 35-42. 
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the imperative verb in the ḥadīth.1079 That said, according to some scholars, at least one 
type of marriage is universally accepted as being a kifāya-duty: marrying widows 
(ayāmā).1080 
As noted above, many jurists take a position against marriage being obligatory 
arguing instead that it is only a permissible act. Ibn Rushd and others argue that the 
majority (jumhūr) opinion of all jurists, regardless of school, is that marriage is only 
recommended, but not obligated.1081 This was a position held by Mālikīs, like Qarāfī, who 
consider marriage permissible (mandūb) depending on the circumstances of the people 
wishing to get married.1082 He quotes al-Lakhmī’s (d. 478/1085) opinion that there are 
four legal divisions to marriage. First, it is a time-bound duty (wājib ghayr muwassaʾ) for 
whoever fears that he will engage in fornication, is unable to take a concubine and cannot 
fast.1083 Second, marriage is a flexible duty (wājib muwassaʾ), with no time limitation, for 
                                               
1079 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, vol. 2, 1. 
1080 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, vol. 5, 452. States that “marrying widows is a consensus kifāya-duty” 
(tazwīj al-ayāmā farḍ kifāya ijmāʿan). This opinion arises from an explicit verse in the Qurʾān, 24/al-Nūr: 32, 
that commands people to “marry single women/widows from amongst yourselves (wa-ankiḥū al-ayāmā 
minkum).” English translations of the Qurʾān will often translate the term ayāmā as “single.” See, The 
Qurʾān, trans. M.A.S. Abdel Haleem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 222. However, many Arabic-
English dictionaries define it more specifically as “widow.” See, Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written 
Arabic, ed. J. Milton Cown (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1979), 37; J.G. Hava, Arabic-English 
Dictionary for the Use of Students (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1899), 17. 
1081 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, vol. 2, 1. See also, Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 4, 193. 
1082 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 4, 190. 
1083 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 4, 188-89. Al-Lakhmī is likely a reference to the famous Mālikī jurist Abū ʿl-
Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Rabiʿī (d. 478/1085) from Sfax (Tunisia), the author of a lengthy fiqh 
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someone with the same conditions, but able to fast or take a concubine.1084 Third, it is 
recommended (mandūb) as a shield from illicit sex for the person who desires women and 
already has offspring.1085 Finally, Lakhmī says marriage is the permissible (mubāḥ) option 
for anyone who inclines towards women, but has no offspring.1086 This is in line with Ibn 
Rushd’s view that some later Mālikīs altered the classification of marriage depending on 
the circumstances and parties involved:  for certain people it is obligatory, for others 
recommended and for everyone else it is simply permissible.1087 Disagreement centers on 
the interpretation of the linguistic form (sīgha), in this case the imperative verbs that 
occur in the Qurʾān and Prophetic tradition in relation to marriage.1088 
Similarly, Shāfiʿī reportedly said that it is “desirable for men and women to marry 
if they possess the capacity, because God commands it, is pleased by it, and encourages 
it (nadaba ilayhi).”1089 Based on this opinion, Māwardī says that “marriage is permitted 
                                               
commentary entitled Kitāb al-tabṣira. There is some dispute over the date of his death. Carl Brockelmann 
says it is either 478/1085 or 498/1104. Carl Brockelmann, History of the Arabic Written Tradition, vol. 1, 
trans. Joep Lameer (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 417. David Powers a date of 1075 CE. David S. Powers, Law, Society 
and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 40. 
1084 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 4, 188-89. 
1085 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 4, 188-89. 
1086 Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīra, vol. 4, 188-89. Lakhmī also notes that this categorization applies to women, except 
with regard to their taking on concubines.  
1087 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, vol. 2, 1. 
1088 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, vol. 2, 1. 
1089 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 9, 31. 
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(mubāḥ), but not obligatory (laysa bi-wājib).”1090 He addresses Q 4/al-Nisāʾ: 3, which speaks 
of marrying women that “please you” as proof that marriage is not required because had 
it been obligatory then one would have to marry whether or not they could find a 
“pleasing” woman.1091 Kāsānī relates the Shāfiʿī position centers on Q 4/al-Nisāʾ: 24, the 
relevant portion of which states: “other women are lawful to you, so long as you seek 
them in marriage, with gifts from your property…” (wa-uḥilla lakum mā warāʾa thālikum an 
tabtaghū bi-amwālikum). The key portion here is wa-uḥilla lakum, which the Shāfiʿīs use to 
argue for treating marriage as a permissible act. Specifically, they note that the 
prepositional phrase lakum (“to/for you”) is ordinarily used to signify allowable acts 
(mubāḥāt). Since marriage is a means of curtailing one’s libido (qaḍāʾ al-shahwa) it 
becomes a permissible act, similar to “purchasing a female slave” for this purpose.1092 
Whereas other jurists might classify controlling one’s libido as obligatory, the Shāfiʿī 
position is that marriage is delivering something of benefit to oneself (i.e. controlling 
one’s libido), but one is not obligated to pursue it. Instead, marriage is a permissible act 
                                               
1090 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 9, 31. Kāsānī also reports Shāfiʿī’s opinion as considering marriage to be 
“permitted” (mubāḥ) like sales of goods. Ibid. 
1091 Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr, vol. 9, 31. The relevant portion of the verse reads: “you may marry 
whichever [other] women seem good to you, two, three or four.” He also argues that the marriage is to 
prevent illicit sexual relations, but another option is to fast. If marriage was obligatory then fasting 
would not be considered a suitable substitute. Ibid. 
1092 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. 
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in the same way that eating and drinking are.1093 Furthermore, the Shāfiʿīs argue that 
another verse in the Qurʾān, Q 3/al-ʿImrān: 39, confirms this view regarding marriage. 
The verse praises John the Baptist as being a prophet who was noble and “chaste” (ḥaṣūr); 
if marriage were obligatory then abstaining from women would not be praiseworthy, but 
rather blameworthy.1094 
As the above discussion of marriage indicates, there is no clear argument as to 
why it should be included within the subset of kifāya-duties to rescue. In large part, this 
is due to the fact that jurists themselves were not sure whether marriage should be 
classified as an obligation or not. For those who do not classify it as an obligation, the 
connection to a duty to rescue is not present. Likewise, the Ẓāhirīs seem to consider 
marriage an ʿayn-obligation, which also falls outside the kifāya-duties to rescue. 
Furthermore, the Ẓāhirī discussion centers on linguistic justification for how an 
imperative command should be understood or how a legal maxim functions in relation 
to the marital obligation. Their discussion does not center on the moral and ethical 
speculation behind duties to rescue.  
                                               
1093 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. 
1094 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 2, 228. Kāsānī contends that this verse actually demonstrates an 10 of the 
sharīca applicable to John the Baptist; he argues the legal prescription regarding marriage is different. 
Ibid., 229. 
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With regard to the remaining juristic discussion on marriage, a connection can 
be made with duties to rescue based on a similar rationale requiring performance of the 
duty due to urgency. Of course, unlike other duties to rescue, marriage and whether it 
occurs or not has a pragmatic component for any society for a number of reasons. 
However, jurists who consider marriage a kifāya-duty center its necessity on it being a 
“defense against illicit sexual relations.” In other words, marriage is required for those 
people who need to be rescued from their own desires. Jurists like Ibn Taymiyya give 
precedence to marriage over even ʿayn-obligations where an individual experiences 
severe hardship from remaining celibate. Likewise, Qarāfī’s division of marriage shifts 
classification of the act as an obligation depending on the urgency of the circumstances. 
Marriage is an obligation for someone who cannot control their desires, but is only 
recommended for others who don’t have the same issue. In addition, it should be noted 
that the “rescue” component is more explicit where there is greater vulnerability, as in 
the case of marrying widows, and jurists are largely in agreement as to the presence of a 
kifāya-duty in these situations. However, the vital difference between other duties to 
rescue and marriage is the severity of the consequences. In those other duties death is 
imminent whereas for marriage only illicit sexual relations may be imminent. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter describes a unique subcategory of duties within the larger kifāya 
category: duties to rescue. Ideally, one would want to understand the extent to which 
these duties developed out of social and political factors arising in each jurist’s 
environment. Central questions to ask would be whether the introduction of new 
communities into the larger Muslim community led to the need for greater social 
cohesion or the encouragement of certain behaviors so that a more seamless communal 
ethic could be established. Unfortunately, such a study requires social history sources 
for each jurists’ context that are not currently available. 
Fortunately, there is still much to be learned from these duties, which produce a 
discourse of moral and ethical speculation among jurists that demonstrate their thinking 
on the law beyond the pragmatics of its implementation. Their inquiries turned on the 
question of moral responsibility, or more specifically, whether there is a moral duty to 
aid? Jurists delved into investigating the proposition, as stated by the moral philosopher 
Peter Singer, that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
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morally, to do it."1095 Additionally, if there is a moral duty to the helpless, what extent of 
self-sacrifice and self-endangerment is necessary to satisfy the duty? While these 
questions carry no pressing social need, they test the limits of the jurists’ moral 
imagination and in the process shape the contours of Islamic law. Jurists do this by 
assessing the impact of concepts like immediacy, proximity and capability on an 
individual’s moral responsibility.  
Furthermore, duties to rescue also represent a departure from the notion that 
jurists approached the law solely as legal realists, not positivists; on the contrary, 
principles, as opposed to social circumstances, created legal rules for rescue. In fact, the 
jurists exploring these particular kifāya-duties seem unimpeded by constraints from 
even foundational texts. The duties are intuitive, reflecting common sense notions of 
moral responsibility. Of course, this is not to suggest that jurists were either exclusively 
positivist or realist, but rather to note that they were comfortable occupying both spaces 
at the same time. The dichotomy between these approaches did not hinder the jurists 
                                               
1095 Peter Singer, “Morality,” 231. Interestingly enough, he limits this to the requirement “only to prevent 
what is bad, and not to promote what is good.” Singer, 231. This distinction cuts against Islamic law’s 
moral prescription, based on various Qur’ānic verses, to command right and forbid wrong. See generally, 
Cook, Commanding Right. In some respects, Islamic law’s requirement to promote good can be seen as an 
extension of the duty to rescue since part of the motivation behind the “commanding right” is to rescue 
people from evil.  
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from employing them interchangeably depending on the type of duty they were 
exploring. They want the law to be dynamic, even as they insist it must maintain some 
static formalism for the sake of structure. They appear unencumbered by inconsistency 
as long as the loftier objectives underpinning the law are achieved. At its core, they are 
asking where to “draw the line between conduct that is required and conduct that is good 
although not required, so as to get the best possible result?"1096  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1096 Peter Singer, “Morality,” 240. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Years ago, as an undergraduate student, I was invited to observe an intimate 
scholarly gathering of Islamic studies professors at a leading American university. The 
format was simple: a scholar would present their paper and another would respond. 
During the course of this day-long workshop, one particular exchange left a lasting 
impression. After an especially erudite paper had been presented on an aspect of 
premodern Islamic thought, the respondent recounted the key points in a lengthy 
comment before concluding with a poignant question: “so what?” The present treatise 
began with a question about its origin story—why farḍ kifāya—and now takes up a version 
of the “so what” question by asking: what are we to make of the preceding discussion? 
Phrased another way, what precisely is its value? 
 Of course, on its face, one might conclude that there is value simply in the fact 
that an extensive examination of this key legal concept now exists for the first time in a 
Western language and this adds another piece in our quest to better understand the 
Islamic legal tradition. In some respects, that might be enough to satisfy the “so what” 
question. However, I suspect the respondent at that workshop would remain unsatisfied 
by this. Instead, they would likely want to know how precisely our understanding of 
Islamic law is enhanced: what lessons have been learned and why might they matter? 
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 Before exploring these lessons, it seems appropriate to further acknowledge the 
basic value of the present work. This study has endeavored to shed light on the jurists’ 
creation of a scheme of obligations that cover significant aspects of Muslim life. The 
suggestion that there may be such a thing as a kifāya doctrine is a novel one, but plainly 
evident from the primary sources. While topics like jihād and funeral rites are routinely 
discussed they are seldom approached from the perspective of obligation as opposed to 
simply black letter law. The shift in perspective advocated here moves from exploring 
these topics as independent rules to viewing them as duties within a larger framework 
of obligation. This shift offers many new dimensions to further our understanding of 
what jurists were seeking and the constraints they felt. To some degree, we now have a 
better sense of the normative universe within which jurists were creating legal rules in 
the premodern period. 
 Beyond this, there are also four important themes that emerge in the kifāya 
discussion which provide potential insights into the enterprise of Islamic law as a whole. 
In some respects, these themes can be said to emerge in an overarching context that 
underlies juristic thought: Islamic law is at once the law of empire, community and 
personal devotion. The content of treatises of substantive law bear witness to this, 
moving between topics that at times fall strictly within the purview of one of these three 
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areas and at other points traverse all three at once. This overlapping is especially 
noticeable within the category of kifāya-duties and is a subtext to the themes that emerge 
in juristic thinking on these obligations. 
The first theme is a persistent oscillation between functional and pietistic 
rationales that jurists rely on to create rules surrounding these duties. Jurists indicate a 
commitment to neither a purely realist or positivist approach to the law. Instead, they 
recognize the law as multi-dimensional, serving multiple purposes at once. For example, 
in the context of funerary duties, jurists describe the method for performing the ritual 
washing as serving the practical goal of “cleansing” the corpse before burial. Likewise, 
the practical limitations of the battlefield impact the rules jurists create for how to bury 
fallen soldiers. In their functional analysis, jurists rely on and develop roles for concepts 
like proximity and immediacy as important determinants of legal rules governing kifāya-
duties. Thus, in the context of jihād, the scenarios in which the duty is triggered include 
instances when the physical proximity between a potential performer and the battlefield 
is decreased or when the enemy comes within proximity to the Muslim population.  
At the same time, there is also a pietistic analysis that occurs, which at times 
supplements functional considerations. The best example of this might be the situation 
of martyrs. They receive fewer funerary duties given the difficulties associated with 
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conferring these rites in the midst of battle or shortly thereafter. However, jurists 
recognize the need for these martyrs to be elevated as acknowledgement of their 
sacrifice. As a result, the rationale that emerges to justify the absence of funerary duties 
for martyrs revolves around a narrative of their blood’s sacredness.  
Similarly, at times jurists forgo practical considerations and simply engage in 
moral and ethical speculation as they define a duty. The best example of this is the duty 
to rescue, especially the easy rescue, which has little practical utility given how rarely 
the average person finds themselves in the position to rescue anyone. Hence, unlike 
funerary duties or jihād, where the frequency of their occurrence shapes the rules jurists 
develop, duties to rescue depend on the jurist’s moral imagination. The inquiries jurists 
make about duties to rescue have broader ethical implications, fundamentally asking 
what level of sacrifice must one person endure on behalf of another. 
Functionalism or pragmatism is also an important part of the story of Islamic law 
for another reason. The jurists’ pragmatic interventions are routinely given sacred 
status, based on dubitable links to the sacred sources, and this enlarges religious law 
while complicating the law’s theoretical consistency. Jurists wrestle with, on the one 
hand, serving the needs of the people by crafting law that addresses their lived 
experience while, on the other hand, preserving the internal coherence of the law. These 
 
 
 
 
 
404 
interests conflict just as frequently as they coincide. To serve the people, jurists pursue 
rules based on practical necessity and approach the law with a functionalist lens in order 
for its continued applicability and relevance in people’s lives. It is no small consequence 
that this also allows jurists themselves to remain relevant and influential. At the same 
time, they are keen on serving the law and do so through attempting to maintain 
consistency within the framework.1097  
However, this last point proves hard to pursue in light of jurists’ pragmatic 
sensibilities. Hence, at least for kifāya-duties, they settle for a more modest goal: 
symmetry within the law. This is the second theme that arises in the preceding chapters. 
Symmetry is different than consistency because it is narrowly focused on particular legal 
rules as opposed to a more expansive view across the law. For kifāya-duties, consistency 
across the law is a harder proposition given the lack of an overarching rationale that ties 
the duties together. There is no mechanism to consistently determine which acts qualify 
as kifāya-duties and which do not because the same rationale that includes one act within 
                                               
1097 As Norman Calder notes, one of the ways in which the “generative, progressive aspect of the law 
worked” was by “logical generation of new rules which were consistent with the established core and the 
established patterns of justificatory argument.” Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, 61. Ahmed El-Shamsy states 
that the “pursuit of consistency through analogical extensions was…a characteristic of the raxy method 
of dialectic debate.” El Shamsy, Canonization, 193. This method searched for “common assumptions” to 
allow for a “shared basis for reasoning” that then let them focus on the “ramifications and applicability” 
of the shared assumptions. El Shamsy, Canonization, 26.  
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the category may not be enough to include another. The inability to predict new kifāya-
duties presents a challenge for the broad pursuit of consistency. Symmetry in discrete 
areas of the law at least allows for some internal coherence that fortifies the law’s 
structure.  
An example of this symmetry is what jurists seek between life and death, 
particularly in funerary duties. As Kāsānī notes, “the situation at death should be 
considered in light of the same context in life” (ḥālat al-mawt muʿtabaratun bi-ḥālat al-
ḥayāt).1098 For instance, in developing rules for funeral prayer and ritual washing at death 
jurists analogize to prayer and its preconditions in life. In theory, there is no practical 
need to do so; they could just as easily develop rules for funerary duties that are 
disassociated from requirements for the living. But, jurists go to great lengths to create 
symmetry between life and death. This symmetry projects a level of theoretical 
consistency, but is piecemeal not holistic. This may suggest insights into the way in 
which Islamic law has developed, but may also be a broad commentary on the inevitable 
inconsistency that will emerge in any legal system faced with the limits of law and the 
demands of the people governed by it.1099 
                                               
1098 Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 1, 302. 
1099 Arguably one of the few to pursue consistency across the law, in theory and method, was Ibn Ḥazm 
and it eventually proved untenable. 
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A third theme that emerges in the discussion on kifāya-duties is the role of the 
state or more specifically that of state authority within the law. As noted early in this 
treatise, the state is a contentious topic within the field of Islamic studies and scholars 
have generally coalesced around the idea of its diminished role within Islamic law. While 
it is certainly true that Islamic law does not necessarily imagine a robust, centralized 
modern administrative state as an instrumental part of its legal system, that is not the 
only conception of a state that can exist. A looser, decentralized state consisting of a 
center with many autonomous parts is also a model of political governance that exerts 
some authority over the law. Furthermore, and especially pertinent for our purposes, 
while it can be argued that in practice the central state or caliphate after the reign of 
Ḥarūn al-Rashid continued to diminish, in the jurist’s imagination and writing it 
maintained a prominent role. The imām remains a key figure and continues to be present 
in later juristic discourse even after the introduction of the parallel authority of the amīr. 
Kifāya-duties are a prime example of this continued role, somewhat regulatory, 
that jurists imagined for state authority in the law. Most prominently in the context of 
jihād, the idea of a “competent authority” is central for the administration of the duty. 
Jurists do not conceive of the jihād-duty functioning without the permission of the state 
except in exigent circumstances that might require it. Political authority defines the 
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parameters of warfare, who engages in battle and when the duty to fight is suspended. 
This is not to say that jurists were unaware of the challenge that comes with allowing 
the state to exert authority over a duty that also manifests the ultimate sign of personal 
devotion. Their rules around the duty reflect this concern and carve out space for the 
jihād-duty to function independently of the state as well if required. Political authority 
even arises in the context of funerary duties where jurists require the state to spend from 
the public treasury for the burial of indigent members of society. Likewise, in the context 
of foundlings, the state not only has to provide for the caretaking of the child, but in 
certain circumstances is required to actually perform the duty by having the child 
become a ward of the state.  
The final theme that emerges in this juristic discourse is that of the moral 
community, one defined by obligations that its members owe to each other. A significant 
portion of the discussion on kifāya-duties takes up the question as to who is owed these 
duties and who is required to satisfy them. Both the performance of the duty and having 
it performed on you is conceived of as a privilege of membership as opposed to a burden. 
In part, there is clearly an intention by jurists to define the moral community such that 
religious identity supersedes virtually all other identities a person might have. Arguably, 
the most powerful of these other identities arises out of kinship and with funerary duties 
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this factors into the discussion on who has the privilege of performing the rites that are 
owed to the deceased. Similarly, in the context of jihād, the label of martyr, and its 
associated privileges, is generally conditioned on death coming at the hands of hostile 
forces outside the moral community.  
Yet, even this idea of a moral community defined by religious identity is 
disrupted at different points, especially in the context of duties to rescue. In this context, 
the moral community expands and the obligations that are owed to members of the 
community are extended to humanity as a whole. The most pertinent example of this is 
the situation of easy rescue, where someone is drowning and requires saving. Jurists 
never pose the question of the drowning individual’s faith as a condition to their rescue. 
Their humanity is enough to trigger a duty. Likewise, in the context of foundlings, the 
default assumption jurists have is that the abandoned child is free and not a slave. This 
is premised on their stated belief that all human beings are born free and the child’s 
default status is not altered even when their presumed religion is not Islam. 
What do these obligations and the accompanying themes mean for the study of 
Islamic law? They suggest that jurists who craft Islamic law are pragmatic, but not 
constrained by functional considerations alone. They endeavor to find symmetry in the 
law when possible in order to lend it some internal coherence. They recognize the role 
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of state in the administration of Islamic law, but it does not permeate every aspect of the 
law. The law services the needs of empire, community and individual sometimes 
concurrently and at other times separately. Finally, in every duty that jurists define as 
kifāya they etch out the contours of the moral community, one that carves out a space 
for religious identity without abandoning the obligations that are owed to humanity at 
large. Above all else, the discourse in the preceding pages suggests the centrality of 
obligation in the normative universe of Islamic law and how it defines itself. In my 
estimation, all this is indispensable to the study of the Islamic legal tradition. 
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